|

January 19, 2001
Volume 7 -- Number 013

What follows is the case style or name, first paragraph, author's name, and the names of attorneys for the parties of each opinion released eletronically today to TBALink.
- This Issue (IN THIS ORDER):
-
| 07 |
New Opinion(s) from the Tennessee Supreme Court |
| 03 |
New Opinion(s) from the Tennessee Supreme Court Workers' Compensation Panel |
| 00 |
New Document(s) or Proposed Rule(s) from the Tennessee Supreme Court |
| 02 |
New Opinion(s) from the Tennessee Court of Appeals |
| 02 |
New Opinion(s) from the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
| 00 |
New Opinion(s) from the Tennessee Attorney General (PDF format) |
| 00 |
New Judicial Ethics Opinion(s) |
| 00 |
New Formal Ethics Opinion(s) from the Board of Professional Responsibility |
-
There are three ways for TBALink members to get the full-text versions of these opinions from the Web:
Do a key word search in the Search Link area of TBALink. This option will allow you to view and save a plain-text version of the opinion.
Browse the Opinion List area of TBALink. This option will allow you to download the original version of the opinion.
Click the URL at end of each Opinion paragraph below. This option will allow you to download the original document.
Lucian T. Pera
Editor-in-Chief, TBALink

GARRY L. ALLEN v. CITY OF GATLINBURG, et al.
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
John T. Batson, Jr., and Nathan D. Rowell, Knoxville, Tennessee, for
the appellants, City of Gatlinburg and Tennessee Municipal League Risk
Management Pool.
Richard T. Wallace, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Garry L.
Allen.
Kathleen W. Stratton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Second
Injury Fund.
Judge: BIRCH
First Paragraph:
This case requires us to interpret subsections (a) and (b) of the
Second Injury Fund statute, Tenn. Code Ann. S 50-6-208 (1999). Garry
L. Allen, sustained two injuries while working for the City of
Gatlinburg; the first occurred in 1992, and the second in 1995. As a
result of the 1992 injury, Allen was awarded benefits for a 20 percent
permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Following the
trial for the 1995 injury, the trial court found Allen to be
permanently and totally disabled and awarded him benefits to age 65,
apportioning 80 percent of the liability to the City of Gatlinburg and
20 percent to the Second Injury Fund. The Special Workers'
Compensation Appeals Panel agreed. We granted the City of
Gatlinburg's motion for review by the entire Supreme Court pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. S 50-6-225(e)(5)(B) (1999) to determine whether the
trial court properly apportioned benefits under the laws governing
Second Injury Fund awards. Because the trial court did not make a
specific finding of fact regarding the extent of disability caused by
the second injury without considering the first injury, we conclude
that the trial court erred. Accordingly, we remand the case so that
such a determination may be made.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/alleng.wpd
REGINA L. CABLE v. CHARLES E. CLEMMONS, JR.
CORRECTED OPINION
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Oliver S. Thomas, John A. Bell, Catherine P. Kligerman, and Theodore
R. Kern, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Regina L. Cable.
Jonathan A. Moffatt, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Charles
E. Clemmons, Jr.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
We granted this appeal to determine the following two issues: 1)
whether double jeopardy bars multiple convictions for criminal
contempt based on violations of an order of protection and 2) whether
domestic violence counseling may be imposed as part of the sentence
for criminal contempt. After finding the defendant guilty of six
counts of criminal contempt, the trial court's sentence consisted of
1) ten days in jail for each act of contempt to be served
consecutively and 2) forty-five weeks of domestic violence counseling.
A new order of protection was issued. The Court of Appeals held that
the evidence supported only one conviction for criminal contempt and
that the trial court lacked the authority to impose counseling as part
of a sentence for criminal contempt. After reviewing the record and
authority, we hold that double jeopardy does not bar multiple
convictions for criminal contempt and that the evidence supports three
convictions in this case. We further hold that although the
legislature has not specifically authorized domestic violence
counseling as a sentence for criminal contempt, the trial court
properly imposed the requirement as part of a new order of protection.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/cableri.wpd
D&E; CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. ROBERT J. DENLEY CO., INC.
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Julie C. Bartholomew, Somerville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert
J. Denley Co., Inc.
Ted M. Hayden, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, D&E; Construction
Company, Inc.
Judge: BARKER
First Paragraph:
The contractor submitted to arbitration a contractual payment dispute
with the project owner arising from a contract to build a subdivision
in Collierville. The arbitrators found in favor of the contractor and
included an award of attorney's fees. The trial court determined that
the arbitration panel exceeded its authority in awarding attorney's
fees and vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals
reversed, reinstating the entire award. We hold that when the
arbitrators awarded attorney's fees, they exceeded their authority by
awarding upon a matter not within the scope of the contract's
arbitration provision. Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and vacate the award of attorney's fees.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/deconst.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KENYETTA FIELDS
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Greg W. Eichelman, Morristown, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kenyetta
Fields.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; Mark E. Davidson, Assistant Attorney General,
Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: BARKER
First Paragraph:
The issue raised on this appeal is whether the defendant's conviction
of the Class C felony of facilitation of an illegal drug transaction
within 200 yards of a school overcomes the presumption in favor of
alternative sentencing so as to justify a sentence of confinement.
The trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals found confinement
necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. We
conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of alternative sentencing. Therefore, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand this case to the
trial court to determine an appropriate alternative sentence.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/fieldsk.wpd
ERSKINE LEROY JOHNSON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; Amy L. Tarkington, Senior Counsel Criminal
Division, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Joseph S. Ozment, Memphis, Tennessee; Jonathan I. Blackman, New York,
New York; David E. Brodsky, New York, New York, for the appellee,
Erskine Leroy Johnson.
Judge: BARKER
First Paragraph:
The sole issue in this capital post-conviction appeal is whether the
State improperly withheld material, exculpatory evidence at the
appellee's capital sentencing hearing. The appellee was convicted of
felony murder and sentenced to death in 1985, and in 1991, he filed a
post-conviction petition alleging, among other things, that the State
improperly withheld a police report that was discoverable under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The post-conviction court denied
relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and vacated the
capital sentence. Finding that the police report was exculpatory and
material, the intermediate court held that a new sentencing hearing
was constitutionally required. The State then appealed to this Court.
For the reasons given herein, we hold that the State improperly
withheld the police report, which was both "evidence favorable to the
accused" and material as to the issue of sentencing. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals vacating the
appellee's sentence, and we remand this case to the Shelby County
Criminal Court for a new capital sentencing hearing.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/johnsonel.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEBIASI SIRNARD KING AND DEWAYNE KING
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General;
Michael J. Fahey, II, Assistant Attorney General; William H. Cox, III,
District Attorney General; and C. Leland Davis and Yolanda Mitchell,
Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellant, State of
Tennessee. John Allen Brooks, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Debiasi Sirnard King.
Lisa M. Mack, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dewayne D.
King.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
We granted review to determine whether the trial court committed
reversible error by conducting trial proceedings in violation of a
common law rule that prohibits judicial functions on Sunday. The Court
of Criminal Appeals reversed the defendants' convictions for
second-degree murder and remanded for a new trial, holding that the
trial court violated a common law rule prohibiting judicial functions
on Sunday and that such proceedings were "absolutely void." We
conclude that conducting judicial proceedings on Sunday does not
violate the Tennessee Constitution or any state statute and that the
justifications for the common law rule are no longer sufficiently
persuasive to invalidate Sunday proceedings as a matter of law. We
further hold that the issue of whether to conduct judicial functions
on Sunday rests within the discretion of the trial court. In
exercising this discretion, the trial court should be deferential to
the preferences of the litigants, witnesses, jurors, and attorneys;
must be mindful of the need for every participant in a trial
proceeding to be prepared and rested; must respect and accommodate the
genuinely-held religious view of any litigant, witness, juror or
attorney; and must weigh all of these concerns against whatever
pressing need or compelling interest may necessitate a Sunday
proceeding. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
under the facts of this case and, therefore, affirm the result reached
by the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on the separate
grounds stated herein.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/kingds.wpd
BILLY WAYNE LESLIE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE.
CORRECTED OPINION
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Billy Wayne
Leslie.
Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant
Attorney General; Victor S. Johnson III, District Attorney General;
and John C. Zimmermann, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
We granted review in this post-conviction case to determine whether
the trial court erred by allowing the appellant's appointed attorneys
to withdraw and refusing to appoint new counsel. A majority of the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court did not err either
by allowing the appointed attorneys to withdraw or by refusing to
appoint new counsel because the appellant had abused the
post-conviction process. We conclude, and the State concedes, that
the trial court erred by allowing counsel to withdraw without a
hearing and failing to appoint new counsel. We therefore reverse the
Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment and remand the case to the trial
court for the appointment of counsel and proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/lesliebw.wpd
ELSIE ANNE BULLOCK v. MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL, INC., AND CIGNA.
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
Ralph M. Maylott, Knoxville, Tennessee for the appellant, Elsie Ann
Bullock
Robert M. Shelor, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Medical
Professional, Inc., and CIGNA.
Judge: PEOPLES
First Paragraph:
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance
with Tennessee Code Annotated S 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and
reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The appellant, Elsie Bullock, appeals the dismissal of her claim
for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court found that she
had "failed to meet her burden of proof that the conditions of which
she complains are related to work-related accident of February 14,
1996." Ms. Bullock contends the trial court (1) erred in finding that
she did not have a compensable injury to her back, and (2) erred in
finding she did not have a compensable mental injury as a result of
the injury she sustained at work. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/bullockvmedprof.wpd
VERONICA GOODLOE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
Tracy W. Moore, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellee, Veronica
Goodloe.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; and Heather C. Ross, Assistant Attorney General,
for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
In this workers' compensation case, the employee, Veronica Goodloe,
has appealed from a judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission
denying her claim for benefits filed against the employer, Columbia
State Community College. The employee, who suffered from pre-existing
depression, had a mental breakdown after being informed by her
supervisor that she might be terminated. The Tennessee Claims
Commission granted summary judgment to the employer on the basis that
the employee's mental breakdown did not result from an event producing
sudden fright, shock, or excessive unexpected anxiety. The Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, upon reference for findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. S
50-6-225(e)(3) (1999 & Supp. 2000), held that summary judgment was
improperly granted and remanded the case for trial. Thereafter, the
employer filed a motion for full Court review of the Panel's decision.
We granted the motion to decide whether the employee's psychiatric
injury arose out of her employment because it resulted from the type
of identifiable stressful, work-related event producing sudden fright,
shock, or excessive unexpected anxiety to justify a recovery. After
carefully examining the record and considering the relevant
authorities, we hold that the employee's mental injury is not
compensable. Therefore, we reject the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Panel and affirm the judgment of the Claims
Commission.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/goodloev.wpd
PHIL HOUSER, Deceased, et al. v. BI-LO, INC.
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
K. O. Herston, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Phil Houser,
deceased, by and through his surviving spouse, Sharon Houser.
B. Chadwick Rickman, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Bi-Lo,
Inc.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
In this workers' compensation case, the widow of the employee, Phil
Houser, has appealed from a circuit court judgment denying the
employee's claim for benefits filed against the employer, Bi-Lo, Inc.
The employee, who managed the employer's grocery store, suffered a
stroke after becoming upset over unexpectedly receiving an unusually
large order of stock. The trial court denied benefits because
receiving a large shipment of stock did not constitute an unusual or
abnormal circumstance for the manager of a grocery store. The
plaintiff appealed, arguing that the employee was performing the
obligations of his employment in an abnormally stressful set of
circumstances when he suffered the stroke. The appeal was argued
before the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. S 50-6-225(e)(3) (1999 & Supp. 2000), but transferred
to the full Supreme Court prior to the Panel issuing its decision.
The question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates
against the trial court's finding that the employee's stroke did not
arise out of his employment because it was not caused by a mental or
emotional stimulus of an unusual or abnormal nature, beyond what is
typically encountered by the manager of a grocery store. After
carefully examining the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm
the trial court's decision.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/houserp.wpd
JUDD'S INCORPORATED v. DORIS L. MUIR, et al.
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
W. Richard Baker, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, Doris
L. Muir and Allan T. Muir
James H. Ripley, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the Appellee Judd's
Incorporated
Edward H. Hamilton, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the Appellee
Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc.
Judge: GODDARD
First Paragraph:
In this appeal Doris and Allan Muir insist that the Chancellor was in
error in not allowing their homestead exemption as to certain funds
realized from the sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment previously
entered against them. Their attorney, W. Richard Baker, Jr., insists
that the Chancellor was in error in not enforcing a lien for his
attorney fees that he claimed was properly perfected as to the same
funds. We affirm.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/juddinc.wpd
RICHARD EUGENE STONER v. MARY ELIZABETH STONER
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
Teresa McCaig Marshall, Paris, Tennessee, for the appellant, Richard
Eugene Stoner.
Vicki H. Hoover, Paris, Tennessee, for the appellee, Mary Elizabeth
Stoner.
Judge: FARMER
First Paragraph:
This appeal arises from a divorce between a couple with a long
standing pre-marital relationship. Citing this relationship, the
trial court classified two stock accounts as marital property and
awarded Wife a portion of their funds. These accounts were
pre-marital accounts of Husband. No marital funds were deposited in
the accounts by either party and Wife had no interaction with the
accounts. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's
classification of this property as marital property amounts to
recognition of a common-law marriage, and Tennessee does not recognize
common-law marriages. As such, the trial court was incorrect in
awarding funds from the accounts to Wife. The trial court correctly
assigned pre-marital debt, divided the remainder of marital property,
and awarded alimony in futuro and attorney's fees. We affirm in part
and reverse in part.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/stonerrichardeugene.wpd
MICHAEL EUGENE SAMPLE and LARRY MCKAY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Court:TCCA
Attorneys:
David M. Eldridge and Richard L. Gaines, Knoxville, Tennessee; and
Harry R. Reinhart, Columbus, Ohio, for the appellant, Michael Eugene
Sample.
David C. Stebbins, Columbus, Ohio, for the appellant, Larry McKay.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Erik W. Daab,
Assistant Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney
General; and Reginald Henderson and John W. Campbell, Assistant
District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: WELLES
First Paragraph:
The Defendants were each convicted in 1982 of two counts of felony
murder. Each Defendant received two death penalties for the murders.
On post-conviction, the Defendants contend that the State withheld
exculpatory information and that their death penalties were predicated
in part on an invalid aggravating circumstance. The trial court
dismissed the petitions without a hearing, finding that the Brady
claims were time-barred and finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have imposed the death sentences absent consideration of
the invalid aggravating circumstance. The Defendants now appeal the
trial court's findings on both claims for relief. We affirm the trial
court's judgment.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCCA/sampleme.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GILFORD E. WILLIAMS
WITH CONCURRING OPINION
Court:TCCA
Attorneys:
Patrick F. Martin, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gilford E.
Williams.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Mark E. Davidson,
Assistant Attorney General; Don Allen, Christopher J. Schultz, and
Shaun A. Brown, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: WADE
First Paragraph:
The defendant, Gilford E. Williams, was convicted of one count of
vehicular homicide. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of
five years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims an
entitlement to a new trial because the state violated the rules of
discovery and the trial court erroneously admitted a photograph of the
victim into evidence. Because there was no reversible error, the
judgment is affirmed.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCCA/williamsgil_opn.wpd
CONCURRING OPINION
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCCA/williamsgil_con.wpd

PLEASE FORWARD THIS E-MAIL!
Feel free to forward this Opinion Flash on to anyone you know of with an e-mail address.
GET A FULL-TEXT COPY OF AN OPINION!
See the intrsuctions at the beginning of this edition of Opinion Flash.
JOIN TBALink!
While Opinion Flash is a free service of the Tennessee Bar Association, you must be a subscriber to TBALink, the premier Web site for Tennessee attorneys, in order to access the full-text of the opinions or enjoy many other features of TBALink. TBA members may join TBALink for just $50 per year. To join, go to: http://www.tba.org/join.html/
SUBSCRIBE TO OPINION FLASH!
Would you like to receive the TBALink Opinion Flash free each day by e-mail? Anyone, whether a TBA member or not, is welcome to subscribe ... it's free!
For the Plain Text Version:
1) Send an e-mail message to: Opinion-Flash@tba.org
2) In the SUBJECT of the message type: SUBSCRIBE
3) Leave the body of the message blank
For the HTML Text Version:
1) Send an e-mail message to: Opinion-Flash@tba.org
2) In the SUBJECT of the message type: SUBSCRIBE HTML
3) Leave the body of the message blank
UNSUBSCRIBE TO OPINION FLASH? ... SURELY NOT!
To STOP receiving TBALink Opinion-Flash:
1) Send an e-mail message to: Opinion-Flash@tba.org
2) In the SUBJECT of the message type: UNSUBSCRIBE
3) Leave the body of the message blank

     
© Copyright 2001 Tennessee Bar Association
|