EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY v. RUTH E. JOHNSON, COMMISSIONER OF
REVENUE, STATE OF TENNESSEE
Brett R. Carter, Charles A. Trost and Michael G. Stewart, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Eastman Chemical Company.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Joseph F. Whalen,
Associate Solicitor General; and Charles L. Lewis, Deputy Attorney
General, for the appellee, Ruth E. Johnson, Commissioner of Revenue,
State of Tennessee.
Jay Stapp, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Amicus Curiae,
Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, LLC.
The sole issue in this case is whether certain chemical catalysts used
by Eastman Chemical Company fall within the industrial machinery
exemption to the Tennessee sales and use tax statute, Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 67-6-101 et seq. (2003). The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer. The Court of Appeals
reversed, dismissing the taxpayer's complaint seeking refunds for
1995, 1996 and 1997 based on the Court of Appeals' determination that
the chemical catalysts used by the taxpayer did not come within the
definition of "industrial machinery" in Tennessee Code Annotated
section 67-6-102(13)(A) (1998). We reverse the Court of Appeals and
reinstate the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in
favor of the taxpayer.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RICKY THOMPSON
Charles Corn, Athens, Tennessee, and Brock Mehler, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Ricky Thompson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; Angele M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General;
Jerry N. Estes, District Attorney General; and William W. Reedy and
Amy Reedy, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.
The defendant was convicted by a jury for the 1989 first-degree
premeditated murder of his wife, the aggravated assault of his wife's
niece, and the arson of his home. Following a bifurcated sentencing
hearing, the jury sentenced the defendant to death. After a hearing
on the defendant's Motion for New Trial, the trial court found that
the State had failed to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt and modified the jury's verdict to "not guilty by
reason of insanity." On appeal by the State, the Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed, finding that under the standard of review of
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, the evidence was sufficient
to support the jury's verdicts of guilt. The court reinstated the
jury's verdicts and remanded the case to the trial court for
consideration of the remaining issues in the defendant's Motion for
New Trial and for sentencing on the aggravated assault and arson
convictions. The defendant filed an application for permission to
appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11, seeking
review in this Court. We granted the application to determine (1)
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury's
verdict, including its determination that the defendant was sane at
the time of these offenses, and (2) whether the provision of Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-11-501(c)(effective as of July 1, 1995),
which prohibits experts from testifying on the ultimate issue of
whether a defendant is legally insane, applied in this trial for
offenses committed in 1989. After due consideration of the relevant
authority, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's verdict of guilt and that the prohibition of expert testimony
on the ultimate issue of sanity was a substantive change to the law
that should not apply in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court for further consideration of the Motion for New Trial and
for sentencing in the aggravated assault and arson convictions.
BECKY BRIDGES v. MICKEY BRIDGES
Charles David Buckholts, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for Appellant, Becky
April Carroll Meldrum and Sal W. Varsalona, Clinton, Tennessee, for
the Appellee, Mickey Bridges.
This case presents the issue of whether a qualified domestic relations
order which awarded the husband's navy retirement benefits one-half to
the husband and one-half to the wife can be altered more than one year
later to specify the equal division of the cost of living allowance.
We hold that the trial court's order allowing the cost of living
allowance to be divided equally between the husband and wife was a
proper clarification of its previous order, and not a modification of
the original order.
IN RE: ESTATE OF AGIE BUNDREN
David H. Stanifer, Tazewell, Tennessee, for Appellant Jerry Bundren.
David L. Bacon, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellees William Albert
Bundren, Helen Johnson, Leonard Bundren, Thelma Bundren, Larry
Bundren, and David Bundren.
The two primary issues in this case are: whether deeds that are
executed by a father to his various children, but retained by his wife
in a lockbox in his home and not delivered to his children until after
his death, are invalid due to lack of delivery; and whether deeds
executed by a father to his son are invalid due to the son's alleged
undue influence over the father where the father and son had a close
personal and business relationship, but where the father retained his
independence despite his deteriorating physical health. Agie Bundren
executed twelve deeds conveying tracts of his real property to his
children- ten of the deeds were retained in a lockbox in Agie
Bundren's home and two were delivered to a son with whom Agie Bundren
had a close business and personal relationship. We hold that the
deeds retained in the lockbox and not delivered to Agie Bundren's
children until after his death are ineffective gifts due to failure of
delivery and that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's
finding that the two deeds delivered prior to Agie Bundren's death
were procured by the son due to undue influence. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court's judgment as to deeds retained in the lockbox
and reverse as to the deeds delivered to the son prior to Agie
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROGER DALE CATES
John Pellegrin, Gallatin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Roger Dale
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger,
Assistant Attorney General; and Lytle Anthony James, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Roger Dale Cates, was convicted of driving under the
influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of
eleven months and twenty-nine days with one hundred twenty days to be
served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. The
defendant's driver's license was revoked for a period of three years.
Because the trial court properly instructed the jury as to whether the
defendant was in control of the vehicle, the judgment is affirmed.
CHARLES GODSBY, JR. v. RICKEY BELL, and the STATE OF TENNESSEE
Charles Godsby, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Seth P. Kestner,
Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District
Attorney General; and Pamela S. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus, in which he contends that: (1) the State cannot
maintain convictions on both murder and robbery when the murder was
committed in the act of robbery; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to
sentence him because he did not plead to the charge of attempted
second degree murder; and (3) the court erred in dismissing his
petition without first appointing him counsel. After careful review,
we affirm the dismissal of the petition.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MONTY EARL PICKLESIMER
Fikisha Swader (at trial) and Jeffrey A. DeVasher (on appeal),
Assistant Public Defenders, for the appellant, Monty Earl Picklesimer
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Seth P. Kestner,
Assistant Attorney General; and Pamela Anderson, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Monty Earl Pickelsimer, entered negotiated pleas of
guilt to theft of property having a value of more than $10,000.00 or
more but less than $60,000.00 and theft of property having a value of
more than $1000.00 more but less than $10,000.00. The plea agreement
included concurrent Range I sentences of three years on each offense
and certified a question of law for appeal as to whether the defendant
was denied a speedy trial under the state and federal constitutions.
Because the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial, the
judgment is reversed, the conviction is set aside, and the cause is
Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act / LILAC Registration
Date: November 23, 2004
Opinion Number: 04-168