STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANDREW THOMAS, ET AL.
CORRECTED OPINION
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
Michael E. Scholl and Robert C. Brooks, Memphis, Tennessee, for the
Appellant, Andrew Thomas.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; Alice B. Lustre, Assistant Attorney General;
William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Amy Weirich and
Jennifer Nichols, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
Appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: ANDERSON
First Paragraph:
The defendant, Andrew Thomas, was convicted of felony murder. In
imposing a death sentence, the jury found that evidence of one
aggravating circumstance, i.e., the defendant was previously convicted
of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involved the use of
violence to the person, outweighed the evidence of mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the conviction and the death sentence, and the case
was automatically docketed in this Court. We entered an order
identifying three issues for oral argument and now hold as follows:
(1) the trial court did not err in excusing a prospective juror for
cause; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
lesser included offenses of felony murder but the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the death sentence was not
arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. We also agree with the
Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusions with respect to the remaining
issues, the relevant portions of which are included in the appendix to
this opinion. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment is
affirmed.
CORRECTED OPINION
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/thomasandrew_opn.wpd
RONNIE DOTSON v. RICE-CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH- DODGE, INC., ET AL.
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
Robert R. Davies, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants,
Rice-Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc. and the Hartford.
Louis Andrew McElroy, II, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee,
Ronnie Dotson.
Judge: DROWOTA
First Paragraph:
In this workers' compensation action, the plaintiff sought
compensation for a work-related injury which caused reflex sympathetic
dystrophy in his left arm, a scheduled member for workers'
compensation purposes. The plaintiff contended that reflex
sympathetic dystrophy which affects only a scheduled member
nevertheless entitles a claimant to body-as-a-whole compensation
because the American Medical Association's Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment convert reflex sympathetic dystrophy to a rating
for the body as a whole. Alternatively, the plaintiff contended that
his condition extended beyond his arm because he was denied potential
future treatment options for other, non-work-related injuries and
because his arm's hypersensitivity and pain caused insomnia, chronic
fatigue, and a diminished ability to concentrate. Holding that reflex
sympathetic dystrophy must always be apportioned to the body as a
whole, the trial court awarded the plaintiff permanent total
disability benefits. Reversing the trial court, we hold that an award
for reflex sympathetic dystrophy may be limited to the compensation
for scheduled members as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-207(3)(A) to (D) (1999). Further, we hold that for reflex
sympathetic dystrophy to be properly apportioned to the body as a
whole under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(F) (1999),
the claimant's injury must affect a portion of the body not
statutorily scheduled, affect a particular combination of members not
statutorily provided for, or cause a permanent injury to an
unscheduled portion of the body. Having so held, we determine that
the preponderance of the evidence fails to show that the plaintiff's
condition has extended beyond his arm as a scheduled member.
Therefore, we vacate the trial court's award of permanent total
disability benefits to the plaintiff and hold that the plaintiff's
permanent disability award is limited exclusively to 200 weeks of
benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-207(3)(A)(ii)(m) (1999). We remand this case to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as may be
necessary.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/dotsonronnie.wpd
GREGORY FODNESS v. NEWPORT AND COCKE COUNTY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
COMMISSION, INC.
WITH DISSENTING OPINION
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
David B. Hamilton, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant Gregory
Fodness.
Clyde A. Dunn, Newport, Tennessee, for Appellee Newport and Cocke
County Economic Development Corporation., Inc.
Judge: LEE
First Paragraph:
This case involves the interpretation of a portion of the Tennessee
Public Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. S 10-7-503. The issue presented
is whether the statutory exemption set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. S
10-7-503(d)(1) is available to the Appellee which is a nonprofit joint
municipal-county economic development commission. The trial court
granted the commission's motion for summary judgment, finding that the
exemption was applicable and the commission did not have to provide
its records to the Appellant. We hold that the commission is entitled
to the statutory exemption, but that there is a genuine question of
material fact as to whether the commission is the functional
equivalent of a public agency. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/fodnessgreg_opn.wpd
DISSENTING OPINION
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/fodnessgreg_dis.wpd
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