JUDITH CHRISTENBERRY v. STANLEY F. TIPTON, ET AL.
Court:TSC
Attorneys:
David L. Buuck, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Judith
Christenberry.
J. Gregory O'Connor, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State
Automobile Mutual Insurance Company.
William Arthur Simms, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Stanley
F. Tipton.
Judge: BARKER
First Paragraph:
This case involves a claim for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. The accident occurred when the vehicle in which
the plaintiff was a guest passenger was forced off the road by an
unidentified motorist. The plaintiff asserted a claim for uninsured
motorist benefits under the provisions of an insurance policy issued
to her former husband and his company. The issue on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant
insurance company after concluding the undisputed facts revealed that,
under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff was not insured
under the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary
judgment. Upon appeal to this Court, we conclude that the undisputed
facts in the record do not support the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the insurance company. After thoroughly reviewing the
record, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the plaintiff was insured under the automobile insurance
policy at the time of the accident and therefore entitled to uninsured
motorist coverage. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC/christenberryj.wpd
LARRY BRENT DARNELL v. CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY COMPANY
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
Aundreas Wattley-Smith, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
defendant/appellant, Connecticut Indemnity Company.
Paul A. Bates and Charles M. Bates, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the
plaintiff/appellee, Larry Brent Darnell.
Judge: STOTTS
First Paragraph:
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing
and reporting to the Supreme Court of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The issue in this case is whether the trial
court's award of permanent total disability is supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. We find no error and affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/darnelllarryb.wpd
JOYCE R. KROLL, and CIGNA HEALTHCARE, Intervenor v.CARADON CUSTOM
CONTROLS, INC., HEATCRAFT, INC., GENERAL ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA, AND PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY.
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Attorneys:
Ann Buntin Steiner, Law Offices of Steiner and Steiner, Nashville, TN,
for the appellant, Joyce Kroll.
A. Scott Derrick, Gullet, Sanford, Robinson, and Martin, PLLC,
Nashville, TN, for the intervenor/appellant, CIGNA Healthcare
John R. Lewis, Nashville, TN, for the appellees, Heatcraft, Inc. and
Pacific Employers Insurance Co.
Diana Benson Burns, Mitchell & Mitchell, Murfreesboro, TN, for the
appellee, Caradon Custom Controls, Inc.
Judge: STAFFORD
First Paragraph:
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance
with Tenn. Code Ann. S 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee contends the
trial court erred (1) when it held that the employee's phlebitis did
not arise out of and in the scope of her employment, (2) in finding
that the employee's torn rotator cuff was not timely reported, and (3)
in finding that the employee's torn rotator cuff did not arise out of
and in the scope of her employment. We affirm the trial court's
finding that the employee's phlebitis did not arise out of her
employment. However, we reverse the trial court's findings that the
employee's rotator cuff was not timely reported and did not arise out
of and in the course of her employment.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/krolljoycer.wpd
AUSTA LA VISTA, LLC and TAKE IT EASY, LLC, and BOARDWALK PROPERTY
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, v. MARINER'S POINTE INTERVAL OWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., and HENRY PHILLIPS, individually
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
Gary R. Patrick, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for appellant.
M. Taylor Harris, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee, Mariner's Pointe
Interval Owners Association, Inc.
Judge: FRANKS
First Paragraph:
In this dispute, plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment as to use of
their lake by defendant, payment of fees and injunctive relief.
Defendant counter-claimed for a declaratory judgment as to its use of
the lake, disputed any obligation to pay fees to the plaintiff, and
sought monetary damages and attorney's fees. The Trial Court held
that plaintiffs' owned the lake and the master deed provided for
maintenance fee and membership fees, that defendant's members were
required to pay. But if the defendants' members did not use the lake
they would not be required to pay the fees. On appeal, we hold the
Court correctly found that the lake was an amenity and that a lake use
fee was required to be paid to plaintiffs pursuant to the master deed
and exhibits. But the Court erred in holding that defendant owners
could choose not to use the lake and not pay the fees. We otherwise
affirm the Court's rulings on the issues raised on appeal.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/austalavista.wpd
BEATRICE HARMON MONTGOMERY v. TERRY LANE MONTGOMERY, ET AL.
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
Thomas C. Jessee, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the Appellant Terry
Lane Montgomery.
David S. Haynes, Bristol, Tennessee, for the Appellee Beatrice Harmon
Montgomery.
Mark D. Edmonds, Jonesborough, Tennessee, for the Appellee Brian
Montgomery.
Judge: SWINEY
First Paragraph:
While Beatrice Harmon Montgomery ("Plaintiff") and Terry Lane
Montgomery ("Defendant") never married, they lived together for many
years beginning in 1969. Plaintiff and Defendant had one child, Brian
Montgomery. During their relationship, Plaintiff and Defendant
accumulated substantial assets and operated several businesses.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit seeking dissolution of her implied
business partnership with Defendant. Brian Montgomery intervened
claiming he also was a partner in two of the business ventures. The
Trial Court concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant were equal partners
in all of their business pursuits, and that Brian also was a partner
in two of them. It is this ruling that forms the basis for most of
the numerous issues raised on appeal. We reverse in part, vacate in
part, affirm in part as modified, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this Opinion.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/montgomerybeh.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES v. RDV
Court:TCA
Attorneys:
David A. Stuart, Clinton, Tennessee, for appellant.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Douglas Earl
Dimond, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee.
Judge: FRANKS
First Paragraph:
In this action to terminate father's parental rights, the Trial Court
refused to appoint counsel for father, despite his claim of indigence.
On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further hearing on
the issue of indigency.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCA/rdv.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD ALLEN
Court:TCCA
Attorneys:
Richard A. Spivey, Kingsport, Tennessee (on appeal), and Ivan Lilly,
Assistant Public Defender (at trial), for the appellant, Ronald Allen.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Renee W. Turner,
Assistant Attorney General; Joe Crumley, District Attorney General;
and Janet Hardin, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: WADE
First Paragraph:
The defendant, Ronald Allen, was convicted of rape of a child. The
trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal,
he asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial
court erred by permitting the state to ask leading questions of the
minor victim; (3) that the sentence is excessive under the terms of
the 1989 Sentencing Act; and (4) that the sentence must be modified
under the terms of Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct.
2351 (2004). The sentence is modified to twenty-three years.
Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCCA/allenronald.wpd
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANTHONY LEE HILL
Court:TCCA
Attorneys:
John E. Appman, Jamestown, Tennessee, Attorney for the Appellant,
Anthony Lee Hill.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Renee W. Turner,
Assistant Attorney General; Wm. Paul Phillips, District Attorney
General; John W. Galloway, Jr., Deputy District Attorney General; and
Sarah H. West Davis, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
Appellee, State of Tennessee.
Judge: HAYES
First Paragraph:
The Appellant, Anthony Lee Hill, was convicted by a Scott County jury
of nine counts of sexual battery and received an effective two-year
split confinement sentence with service of six months in the county
jail. On appeal, Hill raises two issues for our review: (1) whether
the evidence is sufficient to support the nine convictions and (2)
whether the statutory language of the phrase "can reasonably be
construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification"
improperly lessens the State's burden of proof and is, thus,
unconstitutional. After review, the judgments of conviction are
affirmed.
http://www.tba.org/tba_files/TCCA/hillanthonylee.wpd
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