LISA R. ALTMAN v. ALAN ALTMAN
Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Alan
Michael K. Williamson, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Lisa
This appeal involves the division of marital property. Following
almost fifteen years of marriage, both the husband and the wife sought
a divorce in the Chancery Court for Montgomery County. The trial
court, disregarding the marital dissolution agreement and quitclaim
deed that the husband induced the wife to sign following their
separation, awarded 58.5% of the marital estate to the husband and the
remainder to the wife. The husband asserts on this appeal that the
trial court erred by declining to follow the marital dissolution
agreement and by overvaluing the marital property. We find that the
trial court properly ignored the marital dissolution agreement and the
quitclaim deed and that its valuation of the marital property is
supported by the evidence. We have also determined that the manner in
which the trial court divided the marital property was equitable.
JUDY DODSON. v. ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL, ET AL.
James L. Harris of Nashville For Appellant, Judy Dodson
Matthew C. Lonergan and Karyn C. Bryant of Nashville For Appellees,
St. Thomas Hospital, Kathy Tyler, and Diane Fitzpatrick
Appellant, an at-will employee, was terminated from her position with
St. Thomas Hospital because an investigation led Hospital employees to
the conclusion that Appellant was involved in the harassing and
stalking of another employee. Appellant sued Hospital and two
employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent infliction of emotional distress stemming from her
termination. Appellees moved for summary judgment, which was granted.
ANDREW J. MATTHEWS v. E. E. (EDDIE) MATTHEWS, ET AL.
Stephen C. Knight, Nader Baydoun and Winfield S. Rose, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, E. E. (Eddie) Matthews and Crossroads
Daryl Miller South, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Andrew
This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment action. Crossroads
Market, LLC, a grocery, was owned by two brothers whose differences
escalated to a point that necessitated an action to dissolve the LLC.
The trial court granted the petition to dissolve the LLC and ordered
the LLC be sold at auction to the highest bidder. Appellant, one of
the brothers, was the successful bidder; however, a dispute arose
immediately following the auction concerning the liabilities of the
LLC. The Appellant insisted that a certain $300,000 promissory note
was not a liability of the LLC while his brother, the Appellee, the
holder of the note, insisted it was. The court, finding that the LLC
had identified the promissory note as a liability on its financial
reports and tax returns from the inception of the LLC, ruled that the
note was a liability of the LLC when it was purchased at auction by
the Appellant. Appellant appealed. We affirm.
PROGENY MARKETING v. FARMERS & MERCHANTS BANK
Alexandra Coulter Cross, Anne-Marie Moyes, Nashville, Tennessee,
attorneys for the appellant, Progeny Marketing Innovations, Inc.
P. Edward Schell, Franklin, Tennessee, attorney for the appellee,
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Eatonton, Georgia.
This case involves a dispute regarding whether Tennessee courts have
personal jurisdiction over a Georgia bank regarding a contract for
business services provided by a Tennessee business. The trial court
found no personal jurisdiction over the Georgia bank and dismissed
Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. We find that
the Tennessee Long Arm Statute does give Tennessee courts personal
jurisdiction over the Georgia bank; therefore, we reverse this case
and remand it for further proceedings.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JULIA MOSLEY
William A. Kennedy, Blountville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Julia
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley,
Assistant Attorney General; H. Greeley Wells, Jr., District Attorney
General; and Barry Staubus, Assistant District Attorney General, for
the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The appellant, Julia Mosely, pled guilty in the Sullivan County
Criminal Court to facilitation of attempted rape of a child and felony
failure to appear. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she was sentenced
to six years for the facilitation conviction and one year for the
felony failure to appear. The trial court ordered that the two
sentences be served consecutively, with both sentences suspended and
to be served on probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the
appellant's probation and ordered her to serve the balance of her
sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant challenges the
revocation of her probation. Upon our review of the record and the
parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.