JAMES EDWARD DUNN v. KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT MERIT SYSTEM
COUNCIL, ET AL.
MaryAnn Stackhouse, Deputy Knox County Law Director, Knoxville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Knox County Sheriff's Department Merit
Herbert S. Moncier and David S. Wigler, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the
appellee, James Edward Dunn.
Following a hearing, the Knox County Sheriff's Department Merit System
Council ("the Council") voted to uphold Sheriff Tim Hutchison's
termination of the plaintiff, James Edward Dunn. Dunn filed a petition
for writ of certiorari in the trial court. He also filed a separate
complaint in the same court alleging that the Council had violated the
Open Meetings Act. Each side filed a motion for summaryjudgment on
this latter issue. The trial court denied both motions. The trial
court then held that the Council's decision to uphold Dunn's
termination was supported by material evidence; but the court remanded
the case to the Council, because the court held that the Council had
failed to follow one of its procedural rules. Both parties have raised
issues on appeal. We affirm.
KEVIN EASLEY v. LARRY C. BAKER AND GARY H. BAKER d/b/a LEGEND'S BAR
Tusca R.S. Alexis and Luvell L. Glanton, Nashville, Tennessee,
attorneys for the appellant, Kevin Easley.
Randolph A. Veazey, Nashville, Tennessee, attorney for the appellees,
Larry C. Baker and Gary H. Baker d/b/a Legend's Bar and Grill.
The unsuccessful Plaintiff, Kevin Easley, appeals the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Larry G. and Gary H. Baker,
d/b/a Legend's Bar and Grill. On appeal, Easley argues that the record
presents a genuine issue of fact on the question of whether Defendants
provided adequate notice of a dangerous condition. We affirm the trial
MARTHA HALLOWELL v. VESTCO, INC., d/b/a WENDY'S, ET AL.
Beth Stricklin Bates of Jackson For Appellant, Martha Hallowell
Paul G.Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Warren A.Jasper,
Assistant Attorney General For Appellee, Commissioner James Neeley
Appellant was asked to leave her job after she failed to comply with
an order from her supervisor to comply with the dress code. Appellant
was denied unemployment benefits because of work-related misconduct
which was affirmed by the Board of Review. Appellant filed a Petition
for Judicial Review in the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed
the Board of Review and Appellant appeals. We affirm.
WILLIAM EDWARD HARGROVE v. MERRIELLEN HARGROVE
Clifford K. McGown, Jr., Waverly, TN, for the appellant Merriellen
Michael U. King, Huntingdon, TN, for the appellee William Edward
This case is about post-divorce modification of child support. At the
time of the parties' divorce, they adopted a permanent parenting plan
which designated the father as the primary residential parent of the
parties' son and the mother as the primary residential parent of the
parties' daughter. Each had a child support obligation to the other,
which was offset with the father paying the difference to the mother.
The daughter graduated from high school. As a result, the father's
child support obligation to the mother was terminated, and the mother
was ordered to pay increased child support to the father for their
son. The trial court also ordered the mother to reimburse the father
for the son's health insurance premiums and to pay the father's
attorney's fees. The mother appeals, arguing that her child support
obligation could not be modified because the evidence did not indicate
a significant variance in the mother's income as required by Tennessee
law. We affirm the ruling of the trial court as modified.
IN RE ADOPTION OF JOHN ALLEN KLESHINSKI AND KEVIN RAY KLESHINSKI
WITH CONCURRING OPINION
Susan E. McCown, Fayetteville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Julia
N. Andy Myrick, Jr., Fayetteville, Tennessee, for the appellees,
Chirlena Jean Kleshinski and John Edward Kleshinski.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The mother and father
were married, and two sons were born during the marriage. The father
physically abused the mother during the marriage. In 1996, the parties
divorced. Later in 1996, a consent order was entered giving the father
custody of the children. The order did not require the mother to pay
child support. Both parties remarried, and the mother moved to
Alabama. The mother exercised visitation with the children until the
early part of 1999. Around that time, the mother stopped visiting the
children entirely. The father claimed that he did not know why the
mother stopped visiting, and the mother said that the father and his
new wife threatened her with physical harm if she attempted to see her
sons. About four and a half years after the mother's last attempt to
visit with the children, the father and his new wife filed this
petition to terminate the mother's parental rights and to permit the
father's new wife to adopt the children. The father and his new wife
asserted that the mother had abandoned the children by willfully
failing to support or visit them. The trial court terminated the
mother's parental rights but declined to permit the adoption at that
time. The mother now appeals. We reverse the finding of the willful
failure to support and affirm the finding of willful failure to visit.
However, we vacate the termination of parental rights on the basis
that the trial court failed to make specific written findings
regarding the best interest of the children, and remand for further
proceedings on this issue.
JOYCE NIPPER v. AXTROM INDUSTRIES, INC. ET AL.
Richard E. Spicer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Avanti USA
Betty Lou Taylor and Christi L. Dalton, Hartsville, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Joyce Nipper.
This products liability action involves the explosion of a pepper
spray product. The purchaser filed suit in the Circuit Court for
Trousdale County against the product's manufacturer and the store that
sold her the product. After the manufacturer filed an amended answer
asserting comparative fault of the manufacturer of one of the
product's component parts, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint
naming the component's manufacturer as an additional defendant.
However, the plaintiff failed to cause a summons to be issued until
more than ninety days after the filing of the amended answer. The
component's manufacturer moved to dismiss the amended complaint
because the summons had not been timely issued in accordance with
Tenn. Code Ann. B 20-1-119 (Supp. 2004). After the trial court denied
its motion, the component's manufacturer filed an application for a
Tenn. R. App. P. 10 appeal. We have determined that the trial court
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.
Accordingly, we grant the component part's manufacturer's application
for an extraordinary appeal and vacate the trial court's order denying
its motion to dismiss.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AARON EDWIN AYTES
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Brent C. Cherry,
Assistant Attorney General; WilliamE. Gibson, District Attorney
General; and John Moore, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
Appellant, State of Tennessee.
David N. Brady, District Public Defender; and Cynthia S. Lyons and
John B. Nisbet, III, Assistant District Public Defenders, for the
Appellee, Aaron Edwin Aytes.
This is a state appeal from the Cumberland County Criminal Court's
suppression of a handgun seized pursuant to a warrantless search of
the defendant's vehicle. Because a "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule has not been adopted as a facet of the state
constitution, we affirm.
EDWARD BEARD v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Edward Beard, pro se
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David E. Coenen,
Assistant Attorney General; Garry G. Brown, District Attorney General;
and Gary Brown, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee,
State of Tennessee
This appeal arises from the post-conviction court's dismissal of the
Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief. The Petitioner,
Edward Beard, pled guilty to one count of rape, and the trial court
sentenced him to eight years in prison, to be served at 100%. The
Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The
trial court summarily dismissed the Petitioner's petition because the
Petitioner failed to submit any facts in support of his claims for
relief. Finding no error in the judgment of the post-conviction court,
we affirm the dismissal of the Petitioner's petition for
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KATHY CHANCE CUTSHAW
Joseph Costner, Maryville, Tennessee (at trial) and Julie A.Rice,
Knoxville, Tennessee (on appeal) for the appellant, Kathy Chance
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe,
Assistant Attorney General; Mike Flynn, District Attorney General; and
Ellen Berez, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.
The Defendant, Kathy Chance Cutshaw, was convicted by a jury of
aggravated assault by use or display of a deadly weapon, a Class C
felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. S 39-13-102(a)(1)(B), (d)(1). Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range
I standard offender to four years and six months, to be served in
split confinement. The Defendant now appeals her sentence, contending
that the trial court erred in ordering her to serve any time in
confinement. We modify the Defendant's sentence to four years but
otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. PHILANDER T. FLEMING
James M.Gulley (at trial and on appeal) and Kevin Balkwill (at trial),
Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Philander T. Fleming.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley,
Assistant Attorney General; WilliamL. Gibbons, District Attorney
General; and Glen Baity, Assistant District Attorney General, for the
appellee, State of Tennessee.
The appellant, Philander T. Fleming, was convicted by a jury in the
Shelby County Criminal Court of voluntary manslaughter. The trial
court sentenced the appellant to nine years incarceration in the
Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant
challenges the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress and the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Upon our review
of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. FRAZIER FASHUN PERRY
Clifford K.McGown, Jr., Waverly, Tennessee (on appeal), Jim W.Horner,
District Public Defender and H. Tod Taylor, Assistant Public Defender,
Dyersburg, Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Frazier Fashun
Paul G.Summers, Attorney General &Reporter; Seth P.Kestner, Assistant
Attorney General; Phillip Bivens, District Attorney General; and Karen
Burns, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
The appellant, Frazier Fashun Perry, was indicted for: (1) possession
of cocaine over .5 grams with the intent to sell or deliver; (2)
possession of marijuana over one-half ounce with the intent to sell or
deliver; and (3) being a drug felon in possession of a handgun. The
appellant filed a motion to suppress the items seized as a result of
the execution of a "no knock" search warrant. The trial court denied
the motion to suppress and the appellant entered a guilty plea to
possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to resell,
a Class B felony. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant
reserved a certified question of law to determine whether exigent
circumstances existed to justify execution of the "no knock" search
warrant in violation of Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e).
The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We determine that the
trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as the State
proved that exigent circumstances existed which justified the issuance
of a "no knock" search warrant. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
Banning Lobbyists and Their Employers from Boards and Commissions
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-067
Constitutionality of House Bill No. 8 / Promotional Contests
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-068
Duty of Health Care Providers to Report Potential DUI or Drug Use /
Right Against Self- Incrimination
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-069
Voluntary Pre-K for Tennessee Act of 2005 (HB 2333, SB 2317)
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-070
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-071
Sessions of the Chancery and Circuit Courts of the 1st Judicial
Date: May 3, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-072