EMMA LYNN NUCHOLS v. METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER OF OAK RIDGE
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
Broderick L. Young, Knoxville, Tennessee, for appellant, Methodist
Medical Center of Oak Ridge.
Roger L. Ridenour and J. Timothy Bobo, Clinton Tennessee, for
appellee, Emma Lynn Nuchols.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance
with Tenn. Code Ann. S 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the
Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial
court awarded the employee 50 percent disability to the body as a
whole based upon a 20 percent impairment. The employer contends the
award was excessive because the trial court failed to allocate
impairment to a preexisting spondylolisthesis. Judgment is modified to
find impairment to be 11 percent from last injury and recovery is
limited to two and one-half times impairment rating.
State of Tennessee Justice Information Tracking System State List for
Permission to Appeal
Court:TSC - Rules
LENDEL L. CONLEY v. JO ANN CONLEY
Mitchell A. Byrd, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Jo Ann
Stephen T. Greer, Dunlap, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Lendel L.
In this divorce case, the wife raises the issues of whether the trial
court erred in ruling it had jurisdiction based on the husband's
domicile in Bledsoe County, Tennessee; whether the trial judge erred
in refusing to recuse himself from the trial of the case; and whether
the court erred by failing to equitably divide the marital estate. The
husband argues on appeal that the trial court should have classified
certain assets that it held to be marital property as his separate
property. We modify the division of marital property to increase the
amount awarded to the wife, and affirm the court's judgment in all
JEANETTE JENKINS, ET AL. v. BILLY GENE ROBERTSON
Cynthia Richardson Wyrick, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the Appellant,
Billy Gene Robertson.
Scott D. Hall, Sevierville, Tennessee, for the Appellees, Jeanette
Jenkins and Eilene McInturff.
BillyGene Robertson ("Defendant") listed property for lease with
Jeanette Jenkins, the listing agent, and Eilene McInturff, the broker,
("Plaintiffs") of Realty World-Barnes Real Estate. Defendant signed a
contract agreeing to pay a 10% commission to the broker. Plaintiffs
located a party who leased Defendant's property. Defendant made some
commission payments to Plaintiffs, but then stopped making payments
claiming, in part, that the time period for making commission payments
under the contract was unclear. Ms. McInturff, as the broker,
attempted to assign her rights under the contract to Ms. Jenkins and
Ms. Jenkins sued Defendant for the commissions. Defendant objected
that Ms. Jenkins did not have standing because she was not the broker.
The Trial Court allowed joinder of Ms. McInturff, and the case
proceeded to trial. After trial, the Trial Court entered an order
holding, inter alia, that Defendant owed Plaintiffs commissions over
the life of the lease and also that Plaintiffs were entitled to a
judgment against Defendant in the amount of $37,688.35, which included
the award made on Plaintiffs' claim for commissions owed to the date
of the judgment, an award of attorney's fees, and an award of
discretionary costs. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
CHARLES W. RANDOLPH, II v. EASTMAN CHEMICAL COMPANY
Timothy A. Housholder, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant Charles
W. Randolph, II.
Richard M. Currie, Jr., Kingsport, Tennessee, for the Appellee Eastman
Charles W.Randolph, II, ("Plaintiff") is an engineer employed
byTesTex, Inc. ("TesTex"). Eastman Chemical Company ("Eastman" or
"Defendant") entered into a contract with TesTex for TesTex to conduct
non-destructive electromagnetic testing on heat exchangers located at
Eastman's Kingsport facility. The testing was to occur during a plant
shutdown which lasts for twenty days and which occurs every two years.
Plaintiff was on Eastman's premises to conduct the electromagnetic
testing when he was injured while boarding an elevator. Plaintiff
filed a negligence lawsuit against Eastman. Eastman asserted that it
was Plaintiff's statutory employer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. S
50-6-113 and, therefore, Plaintiff was prohibited from filing a
negligence claim because of the exclusive remedy rule contained in the
workers' compensation law. After a trial, the Trial Court agreed with
Eastman and held that Plaintiff's negligence claim was barred. We
FRANKIE ANN ROLEN, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of
JEWELL V. INGRAM AND PATSY LOU YOUNG, Individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of JEWELL V. INGRAM, v. WOOD PRESBYTERIAN
Loren E. Plemmons, Lenoir City, Tennessee, and Donald Capparella,
Nashville, Tennessee, for appellants.
Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tennessee, for appellee.
This action involves claims brought regarding the decedent
JewellIngram against WoodPresbyterian Home, Inc., alleging that Ingram
was injured while in defendant's care, and also that her treatment by
defendant ultimately contributed to her death. Plaintiff proposed a
jury form which asks that the jury determine whether defendant was
guilty of negligence which caused Ingram's death, but also asked the
jury to find whether defendant was guilty of negligence which caused
injury to Ingram. The jury form submitted by the Trial Judge, however,
asked whether defendant was at fault for the death of Ingram, and
directed that if the answer to that question was no, the jury should
return a verdict for defendant. The jury answered the question in the
negative, and announced a defendant's verdict. Plaintiff has appealed.
We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment for defendant as to the wrongful
death claim, but remand for a new trial on the issue of damages for
injuries sustained prior to decedent's death.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DONALD BLEVINS
Michelle M. Benjamin, Winchester, Tennessee, for the appellant, Donald
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael Markham,
Assistant Attorney General; and Larry Bryant, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Donald Blevins, was convicted for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11
months and 29 days. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial
court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defenses of
necessity and duress. The conviction and sentence are affirmed; the
case is remanded for entry of an amended judgment to correct a
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. STEVEN JOHN CHROMIK, III
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Angele M.Gregory,
Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. (Torry) Johnson, III, District
Attorney General; and Kimberly Fields Cooper, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
John R.Hellinger and Erik R.Herbert, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Steven John Chromik, III.
In this interlocutory appeal arising from the Davidson County Criminal
Court's order suppressing certain statements and writings made by the
defendant, Steven John Chromik, III, the state claims that the trial
court erred in finding the defendant's statements and writings
constituted inadmissible hearsay. The defendant contends that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements and
writings because of violation of his rights under the United States
and Tennessee constitutions. Weaffirm the trial court's judgment
concerning the defendant's constitutional claims but reverse its
suppression of the defendant's statements on evidentiary grounds, and
we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
JIMMY JENNETT, JR., A/K/A MICHAEL BREWER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Gerald L. Melton, District Public Defender, for the appellant, Jimmy
Paul G.Summers, Attorney General &Reporter; David E. Coenen, Assistant
Attorney General; and William C. Whitesell, Jr., District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The petitioner, JimmyJennett, Jr., appeals the trial court's dismissal
of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal, he asserts
that the trial court erred by dismissing the petition because he is
"restrained of his liberty" by virtue of a 1977 Tennessee conviction
that was used to increase his sentence for a 1985 Mississippi
conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JAMES C. WARD v. HOWARD CARLTON, WARDEN, and the STATE OF TENNESSEE
James Ward, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michelle Chapman
McIntire, Assistant Attorney General; Joe C. Crumley, Jr., District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The petitioner, James C. Ward, appeals from the trial court's order
denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a
motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of
relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish his claim of a void
judgment. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.