STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EDWIN GOMEZ and JONATHAN S. LONDONO
Glenn R. Funk and Cynthia M. Fort, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for
Appellant, Edwin Gomez.
David A. Collins, Nashville, Tennessee, and James Stafford, Houston,
Texas, Attorneys for Appellant, Jonathan S. Londono.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore,
Solicitor General; Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General;
Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Bret
Gunn and Roger Moore, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
Appellee, State of Tennessee.
David L. Raybin, Nashville, Tennessee and Wade V. Davies, Knoxville,
Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, The Tennessee Association of Criminal
We granted this appeal to determine whether the defendants are
entitled to relief on their claim that admission of testimony about a
co-defendant's oral statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation and whether the defendants' sentences were imposed in
violation of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We conclude
that admission of testimony about a co-defendant's oral statement
violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
because the defendants had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
codefendant. See Crawford v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004). Nevertheless, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief
on this claim because he has failed to preserve it for review and has
failed to establish the prerequisites for obtaining relief via plain
error review. Although Londono preserved the issue for plenary
appellate review, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief
because the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Finally, we conclude that the defendants' sentences were not
imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See
United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thus, the defendants
are not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
DIANE LANE v. RICH PRODUCTS and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY
Court:TSC - Workers Comp Panel
William Joseph Butler and E. Guy Holliman, Farrar, Holliman & Butler,
Lafayette, TN, for the appellant, Diane Lane.
Michael L. Haynie, Manier & Herod, Nashville, TN, for the appellees,
Rich Products and Continental Casualty Company.
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated B 50-6- 225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of
fact and conclusions of law. In determining whether pursuant to Tenn.
Code Ann. BB 50-6-241(a)(2) and 50-6-207(3)(F), the appellant was
entitled to reconsideration benefits stemming from a 1997 injury when
she was terminated following a subsequent injury to the body as a
whole, the trial court found the claim to be prohibited by statute.
The appellant contends the trial court erred in its statutory
interpretation. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CLINTON CURTIS BOYD
V. Michael Fox, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Clinton
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore,
Solicitor General; and Lizabeth A. Hale, Assistant Attorney General,
for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Clinton Curtis Boyd was charged with violation of Tenn. Code Ann. B
55-10-406(3) - the socalled "implied consent law" - for refusing to
take a test to determine his blood alcohol content when he was
arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicant. A jury
found him not guilty of DUI while the trial judge, sitting without a
jury, found that the defendant violated the implied consent law when
he refused to take a "breath test" and revoked his license. Boyd
appeals claiming the procedure required by Tenn. Code Ann. B
55-10-406(3) violates the separation of powers clauses of the
Tennessee and United States constitutions because, he contends, it
requires the trial judge to serve as an administrative officer of the
Tennessee Department of Safety. Finding the issue was resolved in
Goats v. State, 364 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1963), which held
that such a procedure did not violate the separation of powers
clauses, we affirm.
CITADEL INVESTMENTS, INC., v. WHITE FOX INCORPORATED, F/K/A THE JONES
GROUP, ET AL
Darrell West and William Caldwell Hancock, Nashville, Tennessee, for
the appellants, White Fox Inc., f/k/a The Jones Group, Inc., K. Dwight
Fox and Fred White.
Jay Longmire and C. Ronald Blanton, Hendersonville, Tennessee, Bruce
N. Oldham, Gallatin, Tennessee, and Julie Bhattacharya Peak,
Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Citadel Investments, Inc.,
Carl McKellor, Richard W. Weachter and Robert A. Sindle.
This is an action on a promissory note against two stockholders of a
now insolvent closely-held corporation, who it is alleged, guaranteed
payment of a note owed by the corporation. The alleged guarantee
arises out of a stock purchase agreement. Liability hinges on the
construction of the stock purchase agreement and whether parol
evidence is admissible. The trial court found the agreement
unambiguous and barred parol evidence. The defendants insist the
agreement is ambiguous and that evidence of negotiations leading up to
the execution of the agreement and the intent of the parties should
have been admitted. We find the agreement is ambiguous and therefore
parol evidence should have been considered. We also find that the
defendants are entitled to a new trial on the merits because they have
been deprived of the substantial right to introduce evidence of
contract negotiations and the intent of the parties at the time the
Agreement was executed. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand
this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BUD CASH, JR.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michelle Chapman
McIntire, Assistant Attorney General; Jerry N. Estes, District
Attorney General; and Robert W. Richardson, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee.
Douglas A. Trant, Knoxville, Tennessee (at trial) and Jeanne L.
Wiggins, Athens, Tennessee (on appeal) for the appellee, Bud Cash, Jr.
The Defendant, Bud Cash, Jr., was indicted on sixteen counts of
possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, and three counts of
possession of an altered serial number weapon. After the statute of
limitations had expired, the State filed two subsequent superceding
indictments. The trial court dismissed all three indictments, holding
that the original indictment was insufficient to provide the Defendant
notice of the charges and insufficient to protect the Defendant from
double jeopardy, and that the subsequent indictments were untimely
filed. The State appeals, contending that the trial court erred when
it dismissed the indictments. We agree with the State, and,
accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court
Constitutionality of House Bill 53/Senate Bill 277
Date: May 16, 2005
Opinion Number: 05-084