STATE OF TENNESSEE v. EDWIN GOMEZ and JONATHAN S. LONDONO
CORRECRED OPINION (ORIGINALLY ISSUED 4-15-2005)
Glenn R. Funk and Cynthia M. Fort, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for
Appellant, Edwin Gomez.
David A. Collins, Nashville, Tennessee, and James Stafford, Houston,
Texas, Attorneys for Appellant, Jonathan S. Londono.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael Moore,
Solicitor General; Gordon W. Smith, Associate Solicitor General;
Victor S. (Torry) Johnson III, District Attorney General; and Bret
Gunn and Roger Moore, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the
Appellee, State of Tennessee.
David L. Raybin, Nashville, Tennessee and Wade V. Davies, Knoxville,
Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae, The Tennessee Association of Criminal
We granted this appeal to determine whether the defendants are
entitled to relief on their claim that admission of testimony about a
co-defendant's oral statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation and whether the defendants' sentences were imposed in
violation of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We conclude
that admission of testimony about a co-defendant's oral statement
violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
because the defendants had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the
codefendant. See Crawford v. Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 1354
(2004). Nevertheless, we conclude that Gomez is not entitled to relief
on this claim because he has failed to preserve it for review and has
failed to establish the prerequisites for obtaining relief via plain
error review. Although Londono preserved the issue for plenary
appellate review, we conclude that he is not entitled to relief
because the constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Finally, we conclude that the defendants' sentences were not
imposed in violation of their Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See
United States v. Booker, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Thus, the defendants
are not entitled to relief on this claim. Accordingly, the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
MURFREESBORO MEDICAL CLINIC, P.A. v. DAVID UDOM
CORRECTED OPINION (ORIGINALLY ISSUED 6-29-2005)
Douglas B. Janney, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, David
Josh A. McCreary, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellee,
Murfreesboro Medical Clinic, P.A.
The issue presented in this case is whether a covenant not to compete
is enforceable between a physician and his former employer, a private
medical clinic. The trial court concluded that the non-compete
agreement was enforceable and enjoined the physician from establishing
a medical practice at a location within the restricted area. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the non-compete
agreement was enforceable, but reversed the grant of the temporary
injunction and remanded the case to the trial court for further
determinations with respect to the agreement's "buy-out" provision.
After a thorough review of the issues presented, including
considerations of public policy, we reverse the Court of Appeals'
judgment. We hold that except for those specifically prescribed by
statute, physicians' covenants not to compete are unenforceable and
ED THOMAS BRUMMITTE, JR. v. ANTHONY LAWSON, ET AL.
Douglas T. Jenkins, Rogersville, Tennessee, for Appellants, Anthony
Lawson and Kathy Lawson.
Joseph E. May, Mount Carmel, Tennessee, for Appellee, Ed Thomas
This appeal arises out of a dispute over the proper location of the
boundary line between property of the plaintiff and property of the
defendants. The trial court held that the boundary line was as
established by the plaintiff's surveyor. On appeal, the defendants
argue that the trial court's judgment should be vacated for failure to
join necessary parties or reversed because the evidence preponderates
against the trial court's findings as to the proper location of the
disputed boundary line. It is our determination that only the
plaintiff's and the defendants' propertyrights were affected by the
trial court's ruling and, therefore, we hold that there was no failure
to join any necessary parties in the case. We further hold that the
evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion as
to the proper location of the boundary line. The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed and the cause is remanded.
KEITH EDWARD GARRETT, v. PRISCILLA LOUISE GARRETT, et al., ESTATE OF
LUTHER GASTON GARRETT
CORRECTED OPINION (ORIGINALLY ISSUED 5-27-2005)
Thomas Harding Potter, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant.
James P. Romer, Jamestown, Tennessee, for Appellee.
In this second appeal of this case, the Trial Court had ruled that
appellee was entitled to a dwelling house and all improvements on land
owned by the Deceased. Appellant appeals this and numerous issues. We
CHRISTINE PAMELA SCHOOF GOFORTH v. TERRY JAMES GOFORTH
Jeffery L. Stimpson of Munford, Tennessee for Appellant, Christine
Pamela Schoof Goforth
No appearance by Appellee
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce as it concerns
custody of the parties' children. The trial court awarded primary
residential custody to Father and provided for visitation with Mother.
Mother appeals asserting that, pursuant to the factors set out in
T.C.A. B36-6-106, she should have been named primary residential
parent. We affirm
SPENCER D. LAND, ET AL. v. JOHN L. DIXON, ET AL.
James R. McKoon and John R. Hegeman, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the
Appellants, Spencer D. Land and Action Building and Development, LLC.
Roger W. Dickson and James T. Williams, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for
the Appellees, John L. Dixon, Henry Glascock, John L. Dixon &
Associates, Inc., and The Glascock Company d/b/a The Henry B. Glascock
This action arises from a sale of real estate by auction. Plaintiffs,
the high bidders on the property, sued the auctioneer and the real
estate broker, alleging professional negligence in conducting the
auction, misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion for
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), and the
Plaintiffs appeal. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' cause of action based on misrepresentation
and alleged violation of the Consumer Protection Act, but vacate the
dismissal of the claim for professional negligence, and remand for
RHONDA (QUALLS) NEWMAN v. GARY RONALD NEWMAN
G. Kline Preston, IV, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Gary
Ed Neal McDaniel, Savannah, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rhonda
This appeal involves a charge of civil contempt. The plaintiff wife
and defendant husband were divorced by final decree entered in May
2001. In the final decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife
alimony in futuro as well as marital debts. He did not do so. In
December 2003, the wife filed a petition in the trial court, seeking
to hold the husband in contempt as well as an award of the
alimonyarrearage. Thewife gave the husband notice of the contempt
proceedings bymailing a copy of the petition and notice of hearing to
the husband's counsel of record. At the hearing, the husband's counsel
moved to dismiss the petition for contempt, arguing that the husband
had not received proper notice of the hearing. This motion was denied,
and the husband was held in contempt of court and ordered jailed until
the contempt was purged. The husband nowappeals. We affirm, concluding
that the husband received sufficient notice of the petition for
ARLEN WHISENANT v. BILL HEARD CHEVORLET, INC.
Charles A. Sevier and James E. King, Jr., of Memphis, for Appellant,
Bill Heard Chevorlet, Inc.
Kevin A. Snider of Germantown for Appellee, Arlen Whisenant
Appellee brought suit against Appellant, a car dealership, after
experiencing problems with purchased vehicle. Among other things,
Appellee alleged fraud in the inducement. Appellant sought to enforce
arbitration agreement in the contract for sale. The trial court ruled
that, under Tennessee law, claims of fraud in the inducement are not
arbitrable. Appellant appeals the trial court's judgment. Finding no
error, we affirm.
CORNELIUS RICHMOND v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Cornelius Richmond, Henning, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G.Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Rachel
E.Willis,Assistant Attorney General; and William L. Gibbons, District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal
Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his
convictions for seven counts of aggravated robbery. He claims that
Tennessee's Post-Conviction Procedure Act as applied to his case
violates the due process clause and that the trial court erred in
sentencing. We affirm the trial court.