| LARRY HOPPER V. OSHKOSH B‚GOSH AND STATE OF TENNESSEEDEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DIVISION OF WORKERS‚ COMPENSATION, SECOND INJURY FUND
Dianne Stamey Dycus, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for the appellant, SecondInjury Fund.
William J. Butler, Farrar, Holliman, & Butler, Lafayette, TN, for the appellee, Larry Hopper.
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to theSpecial Workers‚ Compensation Appeals Panel, in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mr.Hopper injured his back February 19, 1996 while working in the warehouse of his employer. On November 17, 1997 Mr. Hopper settled this claim for 20% vocational disability. All told, Mr.Hopper initiated four workers‚ compensation claims during his employment with OshKosh resulting in 100% vocational disability. Several years later, after he lost his job with OshKosh,Mr. Hopper filed a motion to reconsider his earlier settlement of the February 19, 1996 claim against the Second Injury Fund only. The trial court granted this relief, increased Mr. Hopper‚svocational disability by 30%, and assigned liability to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals on the grounds that the employee‚s motion was untimely, that the trial courtdid not have subject matter jurisdiction because the employee had suffered subsequent injuries, and that the evidence preponderated against increasing the employee‚s vocational disability.After carefully reviewing the record, we reverse the trial court‚s judgment.
C. R. BATTS CONSTRUCTION, LLC v. 101 CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ET AL.
Henry Haile, Nashville, TN, for Appellant
John W. Rodgers, Murfreesboro, TN, for Appellee
This appeal arises out of a breach of contract action filed by the plaintiff against the defendants. After a hearing, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, awarding the plaintiff $24,260.11. Additionally, the trial court awarded the plaintiff pre-judgment interest in the amount of $5,579.82. The defendants have appealed to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY v. RUTH E. JOHNSON, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, STATE OF TENNESSEE
Michael D. Sontag and Christopher L. Haley, Nashville, Tennessee, attorneys for appellant, FordMotor Credit Company.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; MaryEllen Knack, Assistant Attorney, General for appellee, State of Tennessee.
Ford vehicles leased by its dealers are simultaneously purchased by Ford Credit, a wholly ownedsubsidiary of the Ford Motor Company. Ford Credit is subject to a franchise tax which is determined by the book value of its tangible personal property owned or used in Tennessee. Ifthe leased vehicles are finished goods inventory, their value is excluded from the calculation of franchise taxes. The trial court ruled that the leased vehicles were not held by Ford Credit forsale, and thus did not qualify as finished goods inventory. Ford Credit appeals. The judgment is affirmed.
MUREL LAUGHLIN v. CHERYL M. FILLERS
J. Russell Pryor, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Murel Laughlin.
Thomas L. Kilday, Greeneville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Cheryl M. Fillers.
In 1997, a car driven by Cheryl M. Fillers („Defendantš) crossed into the on-coming lane of traffic and collided with a wrecker driven by Murel Laughlin („Plaintiffš). Plaintiff sued and the case was tried before a jury. At the close of proof, the Trial Court directed a verdict on the issue of liability in favor of Plaintiff. The jury returned its verdict, and a judgment was entered in accordance with the verdict in September 2004, awarding Plaintiff damages for, among other things, damage to his wrecker. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. The Trial Court denied the motion for new trial or to alter or amend, and specifically approved the verdict of the jury. Plaintiff appeals claiming that the award for damages to his wrecker was inadequate and insufficient as a matter of law, and that the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant a new trial based upon alleged improper and inflammatory statements made by defense counsel in the presence of the jury. We affirm.
TERESA ANN (WOODBY) WILSON v. JOHN GREGORY WILSON
OPINION ON MOTION TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES
Appellant, Teresa Ann (Woodby) Wilson, filed a motion on September 19, 2005 asking the court to address her request for attorney fees incurred on appeal. Appellant properly raised the issue in her brief and the court failed to address the issue in the opinion filed on September 12, 2005.
OPINION ON MOTION TO AWARD ATTORNEY FEES