| J. ELAINE BURKE v. MARY KATHERINE LANGDON
Marshall H. Peterson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, J. Elaine Burke.
Gail F. Wortley, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Mary Katherine Langdon.
J. Elaine Burke („Plaintiffš) sued Mary Katherine Langdon („Defendantš) claiming that Defendant: (1) acting as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles Henry Langdon, III („the Estateš) was aware that Decedent owed money to Plaintiff; (2) had a duty under Tenn. Code Ann. § 30-2306(e) to notify Plaintiff of the time and procedure for filing claims against the estate; (3) breached that duty with the result that the Probate Court held that Plaintiff‚s claim was time barred; and (4) could be held personally responsible for the debt owed by Decedent to Plaintiff. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted Defendant‚s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff‚s complaint finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff had cited no case „where the personal representative was held personally responsible for time barred claims of creditors that resulted from the personal representative‚s failure to give actual notice to the creditor ... [and that] the Court has found no support for such a claim by way of precedence or from a review of well-accepted treatises.š Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand.
CRAIG ALAN DUNN v. MATRIX EXHIBITS, INC.
C. Bennett Harrison, Jr. and Brian W. Holmes, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Craig Alan Dunn.
Paul W. Ambrosius and W. Justin Adams, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Matrix Exhibits, Inc.
In this suit by an employee, Craig Dunn, against his former corporate employer, Matrix Exhibits, Inc., for breach of written employment contract, the trial court entered judgment for Dunn based upon a finding Matrix anticipatorily breached the employment agreement. The trial court awarded Dunn three of six categories of damages he sought but denied the other claimed damages based upon a finding Dunn‚s proof of the amount of such damages was speculative. Both parties appealed. Finding Matrix in actual breach of the employment contract, we affirm the award of damages for moving expenses, car allowance, and salary, but reverse the finding that Dunn‚s proof of damages for 5% of Matrix‚ value was too speculative, and award Dunn an additional $282,500. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. REGGIE ESTES
William L. Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Reggie Estes.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General; Garry Brown, District Attorney General; and Jerald Campbell, Assistant District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.
The Appellant, Reggie Estes, was convicted by a Haywood County jury of vehicular homicide by intoxication and was sentenced to fourteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, Estes raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) whether he was sentenced in violation of Blakely v. Washington. After review of the record, we affirm.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANGIE DELENE JACKSON
Mitzi L. Sweet, Morristown, Tennessee (on appeal); and Leroy Tipton, Jr., Greeneville,Tennessee (at trial), for the appellant, Angie Delene Jackson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kathy D. Aslinger, Assistant AttorneyGeneral; C. Berkeley Bell, Jr., District Attorney General; and Cecil Clayton Mills, Jr., Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Angie Delene Jackson, was convicted of driving a commercialvehicle under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater, a Class A misdemeanor, and for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, a ClassB misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each conviction. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erredin denying her motion to suppress the results of her blood alcohol test; (2) that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle;and (3) that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve five percent of her effective sentence in confinement. We find that the trial court erred in denying Defendant‚s motion tosuppress the evidence discovered during a search of her vehicle. We find the trial court‚s error harmless as to Defendant‚s DUI conviction, and affirm that conviction. Because we find theevidence insufficient, however, to support Defendant‚s conviction for violation of the motor carrier safety rules and regulations, we reverse it and dismiss that charge. We further reverseDefendant‚s sentence for her DUI conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
Civilian Handgun Permits
TN Attorney General Opinions
Opinion Number: 05-154