| SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
AT&T CORPORATION, NETWORK SYSTEMS DIVISION v. LOREN CHUMLEY, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE, STATE OF TENNESSEE
Larry D. Crabtree, Steven C. Douse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, AT&T Corporation Ų Network Systems Division.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor General; Stephen Nunn, Sr. Counsel, for the appellee, Loren Chumley, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee.
AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.
IN RE ESTATE OF JOSEPH OWEN BOOTE, JR.
Andree Sophia Blumstein and William L. Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Helen Boote Shivers and Linda Boote Gerritsen.
Walter W. Bussart and Lee Bussart Bowles, Lewisburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, Martha M. Boote.
This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator‚s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband‚s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator‚s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator‚s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form. Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator‚s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil.
MARTHA M. BOOTE v. HELEN BOOTE SHIVERS ET AL.
Andree Sophia Blumstein and William L. Harbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Helen Boote Shivers and Linda Boote Gerritsen.
Walter W. Bussart and Lee Bussart Bowles, Lewisburg, Tennessee, for the appellee, Martha M. Boote.
This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent‚s wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband‚s will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year‚s support. The decedent‚s daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent‚s wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent‚s daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable.
GEORGE R. CALDWELL, JR., ET UX. v. PBM PROPERTIES
Glenna W. Overton, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellants, George R. Caldwell, Jr. et ux Angie R. Caldwell.
Robert R. Davies, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, PBM Properties.
George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell („Plaintiffsš or „Mr. Caldwellš as appropriate) sued PBM Properties („Defendantš) for nuisance claiming that during Defendant‚s development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision („Blue Grassš), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs‚ property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant‚s property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm.
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD ALLEN
Richard A. Spivey, Kingsport, Tennessee (on appeal), and Ivan Lilly, Assistant Public Defender(at trial), for the appellant, Ronald Allen.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Renee W. Turner, Assistant Attorney General;Joe Crumley, District Attorney General; and Janet Hardin, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
The defendant, Ronald Allen, was convicted of rape of a child. On appeal, this court affirmedthe conviction but modified the sentences, holding that enhancement factor (7), that the personal injuries inflicted upon the victim were particularly great, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(7)(2003), was applied in violation of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The state filed an application for permissionto appeal to our supreme court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Our supreme court granted the application and remanded the case to this court forreconsideration by virtue of its opinion in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 659 (Tenn. 2005). Based upon the holding in Gomez, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.