ÿWPC8 …# VU:a %› 0(¡4ÉÝìw"ì 0J 0TX 0^¬ 0h 0rr 0|ä 0†` 0æ 1uv U,ë 0d U,{ U*§ B)Ñ DCú AM= BŠê§U>‘v~ÏvÓM D3  0@S AO“Æâ 0D¨ D/ì B˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡A‚k 3|x9*+,Ó€892 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d àÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òMarch€12,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó< Œ 9p`(&Times New RomanPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€  X„d&ÓÑ#€  Xd#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€wºXXdædÈ7Ñà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà@ àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÌBETTYE€SUE€MORRISON€ADAMS,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àó óPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àà àò ò)ó ó€€ò òShelby€Chancery€No.€D€21140„3ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)€€ó óÌò òvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9310„CH„00219ÌCHARLES€MCAULEY€ADAMS,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àó óDefendant/Appellant.à àà àò ò)ó óÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€D.€J.€ALISSANDRATOS,€CHANCELLORÌÙ€€ÙßL€$&#;+'h|&` Å `€€LßÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òCHARLES€R.€CURBOÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òLINCOLN€A.€R.€HODGESÌó óGermantown,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌó óà àÌÌÌÌÌÌÑ7€wºXXdæXXdæ7ÑÌÓÓà àThis€divorce€appeal€presents€the€issue€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€itsÏdivision€of€marital€property€and€award€of€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€to€the€wife.ÌÌà@ àò òI.€FACTSÌÌà àó óBettye€Sue€Morrison€Adams€("Wife")€filed€suit€in€the€Chancery€Court€of€ShelbyÏCounty€against€Charles€McAuley€Adams€("Husband")€for€divorce€on€the€grounds€ofÏcruel€and€inhuman€treatment€and€irreconcilable€differences.€€€Husband€counter„claimed,€alleging€inappropriate€marital€conduct.€€Following€a€two„day€bench€trial,€theÏchancellor€awarded€a€divorce€to€Wife€on€grounds€of€cruel€and€inhuman€treatment.€ÏAdditionally,€the€chancellor€awarded€to€Wife€$150,000€alimony€òòin€solidoóó,€$10,000€inÏattorney€fees,€custody€of€the€parties'€three€minor€children,€and€child€support€inÏaccordance€with€the€child€support€guidelines.€€€With€respect€to€marital€property,€heÏawarded€each€party€whatever€was€in€their€possession€at€the€time€of€trial.€€€The€CourtÏalso€issued€a€permanent€injunction,€enjoining€Husband€from€all€visitation€and€contactÍwith€the€three€minor€children.€€On€appeal,€Husband€raises€the€following€issues:€€(1)€DidÏthe€trial€court€err€in€failing€to€make€findings€of€fact€regarding€what€property€wasÏseparate€property€and€what€property€was€marital€property,€the€value€of€same,€who€hasÏpossession€of€which€specific€items€of€separate€property€and€marital€property,€and€as€toÏwhat€property€had€been€disposed€of;€and€(2)€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€the€division€ofÏmarital€property,€specifically€in€awarding€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€and€attorney's€fees?€€€€ForÏthe€reasons€stated€herein,€we€affirm€the€decision€of€the€lower€court€in€its€entirety.òò€€óóò òÌó óÌà àThe€parties€were€married€in€February€1971€and€divorced€in€September€1993.€ÏFour€daughters€were€born€of€the€marriage,€three€of€which€were€minors€at€the€time€ofÏtrial.ÌÌà àDuring€their€marriage,€the€parties€lived€on€farm€property€owned€by€Husband'sÏmother.€€€Husband€derived€his€livelihood€primarily€from€farming€this€property€untilÏ1990,€when€Husband€and€Wife€opened€a€restaurant.€€Wife€was€not€formally€employedÏfor€the€majority€of€the€time€that€the€parties€were€married,€but€she€later€became€theÏmanager€and€cook€at€their€restaurant.€ÌÌà àNumerous€witnesses€testified€at€trial,€recounting€an€appalling€and€wretchedÏdescription€of€events€that€transpired€during€the€course€of€this€21„year€marriage.ÌÌà àWife€testified€that€Husband€repeatedly€abused€both€her€and€their€four€daughtersÏthroughout€the€marriage.€€The€parties'€oldest€daughter,€age€18€at€the€time€of€trial,Ítearfully€recalled€frequent€and€unprovoked€beatings€of€her€mother€that€she€and€herÏsisters€had€witnessed.€€Husband's€brother€testified€to€having€noticed€evidence€ofÏphysical€abuse€on€Wife,€such€as€bruises€and€limping.€€He€stated€that€when€he€askedÏHusband€about€them,€Husband€replied,€"Sometimes€you€have€to€discipline€theÏb____."€ÌÌà àVarious€other€witnesses€described€a€myriad€of€Husband's€malevolent€actsÏperpetrated€upon€his€family,€which€included:€€(1)€€shooting€and€killing€the€family€dog€inÏfront€of€the€children;€(2)€€while€travelling€on€the€highway,€ramming€his€pickup€truck€intoÏthe€family€station€wagon€containing€Wife€and€their€four€daughters;€beating€Wife's€headÏagainst€the€bathroom€wall€in€front€of€the€children;€holding€the€youngest€daughter,€ageÏseven,€off€€of€the€floor€by€her€arms,€beating€and€kicking€her,€and€then€throwing€herÏdown€the€steps€of€the€restaurant;€throwing€their€daughter's€birthday€cake€into€a€wall€inÏa€fit€of€rage€in€front€of€the€entire€family;€attempting€to€stab€Wife;€and€committing€adulteryÏand€showing€certain€pictures€of€his€mistress€to€Wife.€ÌÌà àWife€eventually€left€Husband€in€1991,€after€Husband€attempted€to€drown€her€inÏa€sink€full€of€water€and€then€beat€her€head€against€the€dishwasher€when€she€tried€toÏescape.€€Ìà àThe€chancellor€made€an€oral€ruling€at€the€conclusion€of€the€trial,€much€of€whichÏwas€incorporated€into€the€Final€Decree€of€Divorce.€€In€a€thorough€22„page€ruling,€theÏchancellor€explained€with€particularity€the€rationale€behind€his€decision€to€awardÏalimony€and€custody€to€Wife.€€Specifically,€he€described€Husband€as€a€"manipulative"Íperson€and€as€a€"tormentor€and€destroyer."€€The€chancellor€noted€that€Husband€smiledÏin€the€courtroom€as€his€Wife€and€daughter€testified€with€tears€about€the€horror€andÏabuse€to€which€they€had€been€subjected.€€The€chancellor€further€found€that€Husband'sÏtestimony€was€without€credibility€and€that€his€allegations€that€Wife€had€neglected€theÏchildren€were€false.€€He€found€that€Husband€had€knowingly€and€willfully€dissipated€theÏmarital€estate€in€violation€of€a€court€injunction.€€The€chancellor€described€this€case€asÏone€of€the€"top€two€or€three...absolute€worst€divorce€case[s]€it€has€had€the€duty€toÏpreside€over."€€€He€stated€that€Husband€made€"a€home€that€can€best€be€described€as€aÏnightmare,€a€home€of€abuse,€and€a€home€of€hate."€€ÌÌÓ  Óò òII.€€DIVISION€OF€MARITAL€PROPERTYó óÌÓ  ÓÌà à€In€the€present€case,€the€lower€court€awarded€to€each€party€whatever€propertyÏwas€in€their€possession€at€the€time€of€trial.€€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏfailing€to€make€findings€of€fact€regarding€the€classification€of€the€parties'€property€asÏmarital€or€separate€and€the€values€thereof.€We€find€Husband's€contention€to€be€withoutÏmerit€and€thus,€we€affirm€the€trial€court's€manner€of€property€division.ÌÌà àTrial€courts€have€wide€latitude€in€dividing€the€marital€estate€in€divorce€cases.€ÏòòHarrington€v.€Harringtonóó,€798€S.W.2d€244,€245€(Tenn.€App.1990).€€Their€decisions€areÏentitled€to€great€weight€on€appeal,€òòBatson€v.€Batsonóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€859€(Tenn.ÏApp.1988),€and€will€be€presumed€to€be€correct€unless€the€evidence€preponderatesÏotherwise.€€òòHardin€v.€Hardinóó,€689€S.W.2d€152,€154€(Tenn.€App.1983).ÌÌà àAppellate€courts€are€generally€disinclined€to€disturb€the€trial€court's€findings€Ïunless€the€distribution€lacks€proper€evidentiary€support€or€results€from€an€error€of€lawÏor€a€misapplication€of€statutory€requirements.€€òòThompson€v.€Thompsonóó,€797€S.W.2dÏ599,€604€(Tenn.€App.1990).€ÌÌà à€Contrary€to€Husband's€assertion,€the€chancellor€made€several€findings€of€factÏregarding€the€parties'€marital€and€separate€property.€€For€instance,€the€chancellorÏfound€that€at€the€time€of€trial,€Wife€had€no€separate€estate€due€to€€Husband's€willfulÏdissipation€of€said€estate.€€Husband's€primary€separate€property€consists€of€aÏremainder€interest€in€a€trust€created€by€his€father's€will€that€entitles€him€to€a€one„halfÏinterest€in€the€farm€property€upon€his€mother's€death.€€€A€Trust€Department€Vice„President€and€Farm€Manager€testified€that€the€property€was€worth€$370,000,€with€anÏannual€income€of€$13,430.€€€After€Wife€filed€for€divorce,€an€injunction€was€issued€thatÏprohibited€Husband€from€disposing€of€any€marital€or€separate€property.€€InÏcontravention€of€this€order,€however,€Husband€sold€virtually€all€of€the€furnishings€in€hisÏpossession.ÌÌà àThe€chancellor€also€found€that€Husband€ran€the€restaurant,€which€was€maritalÏproperty,€into€the€ground.€€€€If,€as€Husband€alleges,€the€chancellor's€findings€of€factÏwere€deficient€in€any€respect,€such€deficiency€would€be€solely€attributable€to€theÏactions€and€behavior€of€Husband€in€presenting€inconsistent€testimony€to€the€court€andÏin€selling€the€property€in€violation€of€a€court€order.€€ÌÌà àThe€chancellor€stated€that€in€attempting€to€equitably€divide€the€marital€property,Ïhe€was€taking€into€consideration€the€fact€that€Husband€dissipated€the€estate,€€theÏsubstantial€disparity€in€the€earning€capacities€of€the€parties,€the€fact€that€the€partiesÏenjoyed€a€good€standard€of€living,€the€fact€that€Wife€has€no€separate€estate€remainingÏdue€to€Husband's€dissipation€of€it,€and€the€fact€that€Wife€made€substantial€contributionsÏto€the€marriage€through€her€labor€and€nurturing€of€the€children.€€These€factors€areÏentirely€appropriate€for€consideration€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€€36„4„121.€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌà àIn€any€event,€the€failure€of€a€trial€court€to€make€complete€findings€of€fact€andÏconclusions€of€law€does€not€require€reversal€of€a€judgment€if€there€are€sufficientÏfindings€relative€to€the€issues€in€a€cause.€€òòBruce€v.€Bruceóó,€801€S.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€App.Ï1990).€€ÌThere€is€ample€evidence€from€the€record€to€support€the€trial€court's€manner€of€divisionÏof€property€in€awarding€to€each€the€property€in€their€possession€at€the€time€of€trial.€ÌÌà àThe€most€pertinent€evidence€on€this€issue€stems€from€testimony€at€trial€that€afterÏthe€last€beating€by€Husband,€Wife€left€hastily€and€took€very€few€personal€belongingsÏwith€her.€€While€she€was€gone,€Husband€either€sold€or€otherwise€disposed€of€theÏmajority€of€the€furniture€and€jewelry€that€remained€in€the€home.€€Wife€eventuallyÏreturned€to€the€residence€and€recovered€the€few€remaining€items€of€property€HusbandÏleft€after€he€moved€in€with€his€girlfriend.€€€€Witnesses€testified€that€Wife's€currentÏresidence€is€pitifully€furnished.€€€€In€light€of€these€facts,€it€is€surprising€that€HusbandÍwould€complain€to€this€Court€of€the€trial€court's€decision€to€allow€both€parties€to€retainÏthe€property€each€had€in€their€possession.€€Ìà àÓ  Óò òIII.€€ALIMONYÌÌÓ  Óó óÔ€'Ôà àÔ€!ÔIn€the€Final€Decree€of€Divorce,€the€chancellor€awarded€to€Wife€$150,000€asÏalimony€òòin€solidoóó.€€Husband€contests€this€award,€arguing€that€the€award€was,€inÏessence,€periodic€alimony.€€Because€he€feels€that€the€alimony€should€be€redesignatedÏas€periodic€or€òòin€futuroóó,€Husband€seeks€to€have€this€Court€consider€as€a€post„judgmentÏfact€that€Wife€remarried€after€the€divorce€and€modify€the€award€accordingly.€€€He€furtherÏasserts€that€the€lower€court€awarded€the€alimony€to€punish€him€for€marital€misconduct.€€ÌÌà àAfter€consideration€of€all€facts€contained€in€the€record,€we€are€persuaded€thatÏthe€trial€court's€award€was€proper€in€light€of€the€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d).ÌÌà àAlthough€payable€over€a€certain€period€of€time,€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€consists€of€aÏlump€sum€that€is€definite€in€amount.€€òòMcKee€v.€McKeeóó,€655€S.W.2d€164€(Tenn.€App.Ï1983).€€It€is€designed€to€provide€financial€assistance€to€a€needy€spouse.€€òòAleshire€v.ÏAleshireóó,€642€S.W.2d€729€(Tenn.€App.€1981).€€Alimony€òòin€solidoóó€is€not€subject€to€laterÏmodification€or€termination€despite€subsequent€events€such€as€remarriage€of€theÏrecipient€or€death€of€the€payor.€€òòId.óó€at€732„33;€€òòIsbell€v.€Isbellóó,€816€S.W.2d€735€(Tenn.Ï1991).ÌÌà àTrial€courts€have€broad€discretion€concerning€the€amount€and€duration€ofÍspousal€support.€€òòJones€v.€Jonesóó,€784€S.W.2d€349,€352€(Tenn.€App.1989).€€TheseÏdeterminations€are€factually€driven€and€require€a€balancing€of€the€factors€contained€inÏT.C.A.€ðð€€36„5„101(d)€(Supp.1992).€€As€a€general€matter,€we€are€disinclined€to€alter€aÏtrial€court's€spousal€support€decision€unless€the€court€manifestly€abused€its€discretion.€ÏòòIngram€v.€Ingramóó,€721€S.W.2d€262,€264€(Tenn.€App.1986).€€With€regard€to€alimony,Ïcourts€are€required€to€apply€the€factors€set€out€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101€to€determineÏwhether€alimony€is€necessary€or€appropriate.€€€ÌÌà àThis€section€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(d)(1)€It€is€the€intent€of€the€general€assembly€that€a€spouseÏwho€is€economically€disadvantaged,€relative€to€the€otherÏspouse,€be€rehabilitated€whenever€possible€by€the€grantingÏof€an€order€for€payment€of€rehabilitative,€temporary€supportÏand€maintenance.€€Where€there€is€such€relative€economicÏdisadvantage€and€rehabilitation€is€not€feasible€inÏconsideration€of€all€relevant€factors,€including€those€set€outÏin€this€subsection,€then€the€court€may€grant€an€order€forÏpayment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long„term€basisÏor€until€the€death€or€remarriage€of€the€recipient€except€asÏotherwise€provided€in€subdivision€(a)(3).€€RehabilitativeÏsupport€and€maintenance€is€a€separate€class€of€spousalÏsupport€as€distinguished€from€alimony€in€solido€andÏperiodic€alimony.€€In€determining€whether€the€granting€of€anÏorder€for€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€to€a€party€isÏappropriate,€and€in€determining€the€nature,€amount,€lengthÏof€term,€and€manner€of€payment,€the€court€shall€consider€allÏrelevant€factors,€including:ÌÌà8 àà8 à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€andÏfinancial€resources€of€each€party,€including€income€fromÏpension,€profit€sharing€or€retirement€plans€and€all€otherÏsources;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€theÏability€and€opportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€suchÍeducation€and€training,€and€the€necessity€of€a€party€toÏsecure€further€education€and€training€to€improve€suchÏparty's€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€notÏlimited€to,€physical€disability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronicÏdebilitating€disease;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€toÏseek€employment€outside€the€home€because€such€party€willÏbe€a€custodian€of€a€minor€child€of€the€marriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€andÏpersonal,€tangible€and€intangible;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€propertyÏas€defined€in€Sec.€36„4„121;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€duringÏthe€marriage;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangibleÏand€intangible€contributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetaryÏand€homemaker€contributions,€and€tangible€and€intangibleÏcontributions€by€a€party€to€the€education,€training€orÏincreased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;ÌÌà8 àà8 à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,Ïin€its€discretion,€deems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€€andÌÌà8 àà8 à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€toÏeach€party,€as€are€necessary€to€consider€the€equitiesÏbetween€the€parties.€€ÌÌT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101€(Supp.€1995).ÌÓÓÌà àIn€Tennessee,€therefore,€fault€of€a€spouse€is€a€factor€to€be€considered€in€makingÏan€award€of€alimony.€€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(10).€€€In€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court€below,€itÍwas€stated€that€the€considerable€fault€of€Husband€was€taken€into€account€inÏcalculating€the€alimony€award.€€In€addition,€the€chancellor€supported€his€decision€withÏthe€following€factual€findings:€€(1)€€There€is€a€substantial€disparity€in€the€earningÏcapacities€of€the€parties;€(2)€€Wife€has€no€skills€as€compared€to€Husband's€numerousÏskills;€(3)€€Husband€possesses€the€asset€of€his€remainder€interest€in€the€trust;€(4)€€WifeÏhas€no€separate€property;€(5)€€The€marriage€was€of€long€duration;€(6)€€Wife€suffers€fromÏemotional€trauma€due€to€Husband's€abuse;€(7)€€Wife€should€not€be€employed€full„timeÏoutside€the€home€due€to€the€needs€of€the€parties'€three€minor€children;€€(8)€€The€partiesÏestablished€a€good€standard€of€living€during€the€marriage;€€(9)€€Wife€made€substantialÏtangible€and€intangible€contributions€to€the€marriage€through€her€labors€andÏcontributions€in€nurturing€the€children;€(10)€€Husband€willfully€and€substantiallyÏdissipated€the€parties'€estate;€and€(11)€€Husband€was€clearly€at€fault€through€hisÏabuse,€cruel€and€inhuman€conduct,€and€adultery.€ÌÌà àWe€could€hardly€contemplate€a€more€thorough€or€factually€well„supportedÏanalysis€than€that€which€was€rendered€by€the€chancellor.€He€unquestionablyÏconsidered€and€applied€the€appropriate€factors€in€arriving€at€his€award€of€alimony€òòinÏsolidoóó€and€there€is€no€evidence€€indicating€that€such€award€was€punitive€in€nature.€ÌÌà àWe€can€summarily€dispose€of€Husband's€assertion€that€the€award€was€periodicÏalimony€rather€than€alimony€òòin€solidoóó€by€simply€iterating€the€principle€that€alimony€isÏalimony€òòin€solido€óówhen€the€amount€to€be€paid€is€definite.€€€€òòIsbellóó,€816€S.W.2d€735.€€InÏthe€present€case,€the€trial€court€specifically€stated€in€the€final€decree€that€€$150,000,Íwhich€is€a€definite€amount,€was€alimony€òòin€solidoóó.€€Therefore,€Husband's€contention€isÏwithout€merit.ÌÌÓ  Óò òIV.€€ATTORNEY'S€FEESÌÓ  Óó óÌà àHusband's€final€contention€on€appeal€is€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€awarding€toÏWife€$10,000€in€attorney€fees.ÌÌà à€€Attorney€fee€awards€are€treated€as€alimony€òòin€solido.€€óóòòGilliam€v.€Gilliamóó,€776ÏS.W.2d€81,€86€(Tenn.€App.1988).€€In€determining€whether€to€award€attorney€fees,€theÏtrial€court€should€again€consider€the€relevant€factors€delineated€above€in€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„5„101(d)(1).€€òòHoughland€v.€Houghlandóó,€844€S.W.2d€619,€623€(Tenn.€App.1992).€ÏThese€awards€are€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court€and€will€not€be€disturbedÏon€appeal€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€award.€€òòLyon€v.€Lyonóó,€765ÏS.W.2d€759,€76263€(Tenn.€App.1988).€€Where,€as€here,€the€Husband€has€the€ability€toÏpay€and€the€Wife€demonstrates€that€she€is€financially€unable€to€afford€counsel,€a€trialÏcourt€may€properly€require€the€Husband€to€pay€the€Wife's€attorney€fees.€€òòId.óó;€òòHarwell€v.ÏHarwellóó,€612€S.W.2d€182,€185€(Tenn.€App.1980).€ÌÌà àBecause€an€award€of€attorney€fees€is€an€alimony€òòin€solido€óóaward,€we€believeÏthat€it€is€justified€in€this€case,€considering€the€factors€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„5„101(d)(1).€We€find€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€that€Wife€is€entitled€to€attorney€fees,€and€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuseÍits€discretion.Ì€à àÌà àÌà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€in€its€entirety.€€Costs€in€thisÏcause€are€taxed€to€Husband,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌ€