ÿWPCWK …# VUNa %¯ 0Nµb 0Ù Hä , w@4 4t ˆ — m™ 0D° 0Jô †> 0TÄ 0@ D3X B‹ 0^¨ 0h 0rn 0|à 0†\ 0â 1ur 0dçUS>KB)‰DC² AMõU*B1l6PÓ-#8PsˆçûdâeF }«!O($w&((x.)-¦*4Ó+G-N..\0"Š2¸¬3¸d58q,:=4-@v~aBvÓßC AO²IÆJ 0DÇJ D/ K B:K˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼(&öy$¡¡Ó  ÓÙñÓ Ù- ù-(‰(2L$¤¤Ý ƒöy!ÝÓ  ÓÙñÓ ÙÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XõX¼¼ÔÓ  Óà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóc:\Corel\Office7\Template\WP7US.WPT ™ Eš e› aœ D Dž DŸ D  D¡ Ó€« DÒ ¾Ù3|x«  ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ôalexander and davis v. inman - dissent (Todd) Ì 5 ' IB011C20IB011C2 .   2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò$$$$'ÿÿdxd d2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô345678 ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 dBBBB7Border 1dd€CCþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial 'Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€EÔÔ€EÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€EXÔÌÌDecember€11,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó ,Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€lawyers€presented€evidence€that€their€$501,514.50€fee€wasÏreasonable.€€The€client€presented€evidence€that€a€reasonable€fee€for€theÏlawyersðð€services€was€$60,000.€€The€majority€used€the€followingÏcalculation€to€determine€the€value€of€the€lawyersðð€services:Ï$501,514.50€+€$60,000€=€$561,514.50€ðð2€=€$280,757.25.Ì FÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òò¢Inman£€v.€¢Inman£,óó€App.€No.€89„82„II,€1989€WL€122984€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€Oct.€18,€1989).Ì #Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òò¢Inman£€v.€¢Inman£,óó€811€¢S.W.2d£€870€(Tenn.€1991).Ì .Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòAlexander€v.€¢Inman£,óó€903€¢S.W.2d£€686€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ì iÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(A)€prohibits€lawyers€from€enteringÏinto€contracts€for€an€illegal€fee.€€Other€types€of€fee€arrangements€mayÏalso€be€unenforceable€even€if€they€are€not€illegal.€€For€example,€aÏlawyer€cannot€enter€into€a€contingent€fee€contract€to€seek€additionalÏalimony€or€child€support€if€the€fee€is€based€on€the€amount€of€additionalÏalimony€or€child€support€received.Ì ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòSee,€e.g.,óó€òòCooper€&€Keys€v.€Bell,óó€127€Tenn.€142,€153,€153€¢S.W.£Ï844,€847€(1913)€(declining€to€enforce€the€contract€because€of€the€lackÏof€evidence€that€the€lawyers€and€their€client€€had€a€mutualÏunderstanding€concerning€the€fee).Ì ZÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(A)€prohibits€lawyers€from€enteringÏinto€an€agreement€for€a€clearly€excessive€fee.Ì [Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòWhite€v.€McBride,€óóApp.€No.€¢02S01£„9510„PB„00104,€1996€WLÏ495006,€slip€op.€at€16„17€(Tenn.€Sept.€3,€1996).Ì sÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Alice€Bradley€&€Bryan€¢Essary£,€Note,€òòThe€Treatment€of€AttorneysððÏFee€Enhancements€in€Alabama€and€the€Eleventh€¢Ciruit£:€Justice!€The€Law!ÏMy€Ducats€and€My€Daughter!,óó€20€¢Cumb£.€L.€Rev.€769€(1989„1990)€(generalÏdiscussion€of€enhancement€factors);€George€D.€¢Hornstein£,€òòLegalÏTherapeutics:€The€ð ðSalvageðð€Factor€in€Counsel€Fee€Awards,óó€69€¢Harv£.€L.ÏRev.€658,€660€(1956).€€Ì EÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝLawyers€tailor€their€rates€to€attract€and€keep€institutionalÏclients€such€as€banks,€hospitals,€or€insurance€companies€who€have€anÏongoing€need€for€legal€services€and€who,€by€the€volume€of€their€work,Ïcan€provide€a€lawyer€with€cash€flow€to€support€the€overhead€of€aÏpractice.€€They€may€also€adjust€their€rates€as€an€accommodation€forÏother€reasons.Ì …Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝAn€experienced€lawyer€can€usually€avoid€spending€unnecessaryÏtime€on€matters€that€are€not€likely€to€be€productive€in€advancing€theÏclientððs€interests.€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòWhite€v.€McBride,óó€òòsupra,óó€slip€op.€at€16.Ì nÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòIn€re€Brown,óó€511€¢N.E.2d£€1032,€1033„34€(Ind.€1987);€òò¢Salsbury£€v.Ï¢Salsbury£,óó€658€So.€2d€734,€739€(La.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ì #Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòIn€re€Tobin,óó€628€¢N.E.2d£€1268,€1270€(Mass.€1994).Ì *Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòIn€re€Conduct€of€Barber,óó€904€P.2d€620,€629„30€(Or.€1995).Ì =Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòAttorney€Grievance€¢Commððn£€v.€¢Kovotki£,óó€569€A.2d€1224,€1236Ï(Md.€1990).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòPeople€v.€Walker,óó€832€P.2d€935,€936€(Colo.€1992);€òòIowa€Prof.ððlÏEthics€Conduct€Bd.€v.€Evans,€óó537€¢N.W.2d£€783,€785€(Iowa€1995)€(lawyerÏinflated€value€of€the€estate€in€order€to€circumvent€the€statutory€feeÏcap);€òòIn€re€¢Lempesis£,óó€362€¢S.E.2d£€10,€11€(S.C.€1987).Ì $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòFlorida€Bar€v.€¢Mirabole£,óó€498€So.€2d€428,€429€(Fla.€1986)€(feeÏeight€times€the€amount€in€controversy);€òòDisciplinary€ProceedingsÏAgainst€¢Bult£,€óó469€¢N.W.2d£€653,€654€(Wis.€1991)€(fee€amounting€to€sixtyÏpercent€of€the€amount€in€controversy€where€the€lawyer€could€notÏexplain€how€the€fee€was€computed).Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝòòWhite€v.€McBride,óó€supra,€slip€op.€at€12.Ì ®Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòSee,€e.g.,óó€òòWilson€Mgt.€Co.€v.€Star€¢Distribs£.€Co.,óó€745€¢S.W.2d£€870,Ï873€(Tenn.€1988);€òòUnited€Medical€Corp.€v.€¢Hohenwald£€Bank€&€Trust€Co.,óóÏ703€¢S.W.2d£€133,€134€(Tenn.€1986).Ì ®Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›òòSee,€e.g.,óó€òòConners€v.€Conners,óó€594€¢S.W.2d£€672,€676€(Tenn.€1980)Ï(rejecting€the€common€belief€that€lawyers€representing€the€wife€in€aÏdivorce€case€were€entitled€to€a€fee€equal€to€ten€percent€of€the€totalÏalimony€awarded€to€the€wife);€òò¢Ligon£€v.€¢Ligon£,óó€556€¢S.W.2d£€763,€768„69Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1977)€(vacating€an€attorneyððs€fee€award€for€one€of€Ms.Ï¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€equal€to€ten€percent€of€the€total€alimonyÏaward).€€Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝMr.€Alexanderððs€normal€hourly€rate€was€$250/hour.€€Mr.ÏWilliamsððs€normal€hourly€rate€was€$150/hour.€€Mr.€Davisððs€normalÏhourly€rate€during€this€time€varied€between€$200€and€$255/hour.€€In€theÏabsence€of€more€specific€proof,€I€have€calculated€Mr.€Davisððs€rate€atÏ$225/hour.Ì gÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€presented€time€records€showingÏ1,275€hours€of€work€on€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€behalf.€€Of€this€total,€803.6€hoursÏwere€performed€by€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€three€principal€lawyers,€and€471.4€hoursÏwere€performed€by€other€persons€working€under€Mr.€Davisððs€supervision.€ÏMr.€Davis€spent€379.50€hours€on€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€case;€while€Messrs.ÏAlexander€and€Williams€spent€172.65€and€251.65€hours€respectively.€ÏBased€on€their€normal€hourly€rate€and€their€claimed€time,€Mr.ÏAlexanderððs€fee€would€have€been€$43,162.50;€Mr.€Williamsððs€fee€wouldÏhave€been€$37,747.50;€and€Mr.€Davisððs€fee€would€have€been€$85,342.50.Ì †Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›There€is€no€evidence€that€Messrs.€Alexander€and€Davis€sufferedÏany€permanent€loss€of€employment€as€a€result€of€representing€Ms.Ï¢Inman£.€€Mr.€Williams€testified€that€he€lost€some€potential€employmentÏbecause€of€Mr.€¢Inman£ððs€prominence€in€Williamson€County€businessÏcircles;€however,€Mr.€Williams€is€not€a€party€to€this€case.€€Only€Messrs.ÏAlexander€and€Davis€are€seeking€to€recover€a€fee€in€this€proceeding.Ì *Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€AXÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›Adding€a€request€for€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€Mr.€¢Inman£ððsÏadultery€required€little€additional€work€or€skill€since€Mr.€Alexander€hadÏalready€obtained€this€information€by€virtue€of€his€firmððs€representationÏof€another€divorce€client.€€òòSeeóó€òòAlexander€v.€¢Inman£,óó€825€¢S.W.2d£€102Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1991).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  inion Geneva ÒÒ  inion Geneva Ò€‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€AÔÔ€A¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ Ò›Ñ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€Ÿ¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÔ€A„ÔÑ  Ñœ›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEó óÌÌÔ€A¼ÔÌDAVID€A.€ALEXANDER€andà à)Ì¢MACLIN£€P.€DAVIS,€JR.,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiffs/Appellees,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€91„4018„II(III)Ì¢VS£.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à¢01A01£„9605„CH„00215̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßR€DFCA1-j| 9` ç `€€@ÿRß›JULIA€ANN€WHITE€¢INMAN£,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à àà à)ÌÌœ›ÌÓ€ÓÔ€A„Ôà@ àò òòòDISSENTING€OPINIONóóó óÌÔ€A¼ÔÌà àThis€appeal€involves€the€efforts€of€two€lawyers€toÏcollect€a€$501,514.50€fee€from€a€client€in€a€divorce€case.€€FeeÏdisputes€require€careful€and€principled€consideration€becauseÏof€the€publicððs€concern€that€judges€might€sympathize€withÏtheir€colleagues€at€the€bar€when€it€comes€to€fees€and€becauseÏof€the€legal€communityððs€concern€that€judges€are€unfamiliarÏwith€the€economic€realities€of€modern€law€practice.€€While€IÍconcur€with€the€courtððs€decision€that€the€fee€contract€in€thisÏcase€is€not€enforceable,€I€cannot€concur€that€the€actual€valueÏof€the€lawyersðð€services€should€be€calculated€by€simplyÏadding€together€the€highest€and€lowest€reasonable€feeÏsupported€by€the€proof€and€then€dividing€the€result€by€two.× ƒG ××  ×€ÏWhile€averaging€is€simple€and€expeditious,€it€ignores€theÏissues€that€courts€must€confront€in€cases€of€this€sort.€ÌÌœ›à@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àJulia€Ann€White€¢Inman£€and€Gordon€¢Inman£,€two€prominentÏresidents€of€Williamson€County,€had€been€married€for€twenty„seven€years€when€their€marriage€foundered€in€1987.€€TheirÏdivorce€litigation€between€1987€and€1991€focused€primarilyÏon€the€division€of€their€multi„million€dollar€marital€estate.€ÏMr.€¢Inman£€had€the€same€representation€throughout€theÏlitigation.€€Ms.€¢Inman£€changed€her€representation€prior€to€trialÍand€was€represented€by€the€same€lawyers€during€the€lastÏthree€years€of€the€divorce€proceeding.€€ÌÌà àIn€December€1988,€the€Chancery€Court€for€WilliamsonÏCounty€valued€the€¢Inmans£ðð€marital€estate€at€$8,000,000€andÏawarded€Ms.€¢Inman£€$2,300,200€in€marital€property€„€onlyÏ$25,000€more€than€Mr.€¢Inman£ððs€proposed€division.€This€courtÏmodified€the€trial€courtððs€decision.€€In€addition€to€awardingÏthe€divorce€to€Ms.€¢Inman£€rather€than€to€Mr.€¢Inman£,€weÏincreased€the€value€of€the€marital€estate€to€$8,850,000€andÏawarded€Ms.€¢Inman£€additional€marital€property€worthÏ$1,043,230.€€We€also€held€that€Ms.€¢Inman£€was€entitled€toÏrehabilitative€¢spousal£€support€in€the€amount€of€$5,000€perÏmonth€for€three€years€and€that€Mr.€¢Inman£€should€pay€fiftyÏpercent€of€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€legal€expenses€at€trial€and€seventy„five€percent€of€her€legal€expenses€on€appeal.¢× ƒH ××  ×£€€The€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€modified€our€decision€in€three€material€ways.€ÏFirst,€it€gave€Mr.€¢Inman£€the€option€of€either€conveying€theÏcontested€real€property€to€Ms.€¢Inman£€or€paying€her€its€cashÏequivalent.€€Second,€it€vacated€the€¢spousal£€support€award.€ÍThird,€it€determined€that€Mr.€¢Inman£€would€not€be€required€toÏreimburse€Ms.€¢Inman£€for€her€legal€expenses.¢× ƒI ××  ×£€€ÌÌà àMs.€¢Inman£€was€not€pleased€with€the€outcome.€€She€hadÏanticipated€receiving€a€larger€portion€of€the€marital€estate,Ïas€well€as€¢spousal£€support€and€additional€funds€to€defray€partÏor€all€of€her€legal€expenses.€€Less€than€two€weeks€after€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€final€action€in€the€case,€Ms.Ï¢Inman£ððs€lawyers€sent€her€a€letter€requesting€payment€ofÏ$501,514.50€„€fifteen€percent€of€her€total€recovery.€€NotingÏthat€she€had€already€paid€$159,000,€the€letter€requested€thatÏthe€remaining€$342,514.50€be€divided€equally€between€herÏtwo€lawyers€of€record.€€Ms.€¢Inman£€declined€to€pay€anyÏadditional€fee.€€ÌÌà àThe€lawyers€withdrew€from€representing€Ms.€¢Inman£€inÏSeptember€1991.€€Three€months€later€they€filed€suit€in€theÏChancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€seeking€to€recover€theÏ$342,514.50€balance€remaining€on€their€fee.€€Ms.€¢Inman£Ïcounterclaimed€to€recover€the€fee€she€had€already€paid.€ÏFollowing€a€three„day€trial,€a€jury€returned€a€$263,985Íverdict€in€favor€of€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers.€€Ms.€¢Inman£Ïappealed,€and€in€July€1995,€this€court€vacated€that€judgmentÏand€remanded€the€case€for€a€new€trial€because€of€erroneousÏevidentiary€rulings€and€incomplete€jury€instructions.¢× ƒJ ××  ×£€€We€hadÏno€occasion€to€address€the€¢enforceability£€of€the€feeÏagreement€or€the€reasonableness€of€the€fee€at€that€stage€ofÏthe€proceeding.ÌÌà àThe€parties€elected€not€to€retry€the€case€before€a€jury.€ÏThey€decided€instead€to€submit€it€to€the€trial€court€forÏdecision€based€on€the€record€of€the€first€trial,€including€theÏpreviously€excluded€evidence,€the€lawyersðð€original€timeÏrecords,€and€a€stipulation€concerning€Mr.€¢Inman£ððs€legalÏexpenses€during€the€entire€divorce€litigation.€€In€JanuaryÏ1996,€the€trial€court€filed€a€memorandum€opinion€concludingÏthat€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€had€failed€to€prove€that€theirÏ$501,514.50€fee€was€reasonable.€€After€considering€theÏevidence€in€light€of€the€criteria€in€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B),€the€trial€court€concluded€that€the€reasonable€fee€wasÏ$300,000.€€Because€Ms.€¢Inman£€had€already€paid€$159,000,€theÏtrial€court€entered€a€judgment€against€her€for€$141,000.ÌÌà àMs.€¢Inman£€asserts€on€this€appeal€that€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment€lacks€evidentiary€support€and€that€she€shouldÏrecover€$99,000€of€the€fee€already€paid.€€Her€former€lawyersÏinsist€that€they€are€entitled€to€the€full€balance€remaining€onÏtheir€$501,514.50€fee.€€The€court€has€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏdetermination€that€the€fee€agreement€is€not€enforceable.€€ItÏhas€also€found€that€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€did€not€forfeitÏtheir€right€to€a€fee€by€entering€into€a€contract€for€or€byÏattempting€to€collect€a€clearly€excessive€fee€contrary€toÏTenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106.€€Accordingly,€the€court€hasÏdetermined€that€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€are€entitled€to€aÏquantum€¢meruit£€recovery€of€ð ðthe€reasonable€cost€ofÏemploying€competent€counsel€to€perform€the€services€whichÏwere€necessary€and€were€performed€by€plaintiffs.ðð€€RatherÏthan€determining€and€awarding€these€ð ðreasonable€costs,ðð€theÏcourt,€in€somewhat€non€sequitur€fashion,€has€decided€that€theÏð ðvalueðð€of€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyersðð€services€isÏ$280,757.25€and,€therefore,€that€they€should€receive€anÏadditional€$121,757.25.€€ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌÌà àLawsuits€of€this€nature€require€careful€attention€to€theÏdecision„making€process€because€it€is€the€process€itself€thatÏprovides€the€assurance€of€fair€and€consistent€results.€€TheyÏpotentially€involve€three€questions.€€The€first€is€whether€theÏlawyer€has€an€enforceable€fee€agreement€with€his€or€herÏclient.€€The€resolution€of€this€question€entails€considerationÏof€the€substance€of€the€contract,¢× ƒK ××  ×£€the€contracting€processÏitself,¢× ƒL ××  ×£€and€the€size€of€the€fee€permitted€by€the€contract.¢× ƒM ××  ×£€€IfÏthe€court€determines€that€the€lawyer€and€the€client€haveÏentered€into€an€enforceable€fee€contract,€it€should€award€theÏlawyer€the€fee€required€by€the€contract.ÌÌà àA€finding€that€a€fee€contract€is€not€enforceable€does€notÏnecessarily€end€the€inquiry€because€lawyers€may€still€be€ableÏto€recover€in€quantum€¢meruit£€for€the€€actual€value€of€theirÏservices€even€if€the€fee€agreement€with€their€client€is€notÏenforceable.€€A€quantum€¢meruit£€recovery€is€not,€however,Ïavailable€to€lawyers€who€are€attempting€to€collect€a€ð ðclearlyÏexcessiveðð€fee.€€òòWhite€v.€McBride,óó€___€¢S.W.2d£€___,€___€(Tenn.Ï1996).¢× ƒN ××  ×£€€Thus,€upon€concluding€that€a€lawyerððs€fee€contract€isÏnot€enforceable€on€any€ground€other€than€that€it€requires€theÏpayment€of€a€clearly€excessive€fee,€the€court€must€confrontÏthe€second€question€„€whether€the€fee€the€lawyer€is€seekingÏto€collect€is€clearly€excessive€under€the€standards€containedÏin€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B).ÌÌà àA€finding€at€any€stage€of€the€proceeding€that€the€feeÏbeing€sought€is€clearly€excessive€defeats€the€lawyerððs€claim.€ÏOn€the€other€hand,€a€finding€that€the€fee€is€not€clearlyÏexcessive€shifts€the€focus€of€the€inquiry€to€the€quantumÏ¢meruit£€theory€and€prompts€the€third€question€„€what€is€theÏactual€value€of€the€services€the€lawyer€rendered€to€theÍclient?€€The€answer€to€this€question€depends€on€the€facts€andÏequities€of€each€case€because€no€formula€can€be€devised€thatÏwill€fit€all€cases.ÌÌà àLawyers€bear€the€burden€of€proving€that€they€areÏentitled€to€a€quantum€¢meruit£€recovery.€€òòSeeóó€òòArrow,€¢Edelstein£Ï&€Gross,€P.C.€v.€¢Rosco£€Prods.,€Inc.,óó€581€F.€Supp.€520,€524Ï(¢S.D.N.Y.£€1984);€òòIn€re€Marriage€of€¢Malec£,óó€562€¢N.E.2d£€1010,€1022Ï(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1990);€òòJohnson€v.€Insurance€Co.€of€N.€Am.,óó€666ÏSo.2d€1286,€1289€(La.€Ct.€App.€1996);€òò¢Calderon£€v.€¢Navarette£,óóÏ800€P.2d€1058,€1060€(N.M.€1990).€€In€order€to€prevail,€theyÏmust€prove€(1)€that€they€provided€valuable€services€to€theÏclient,€(2)€that€the€client€reasonably€knew€or€should€haveÏknown€that€the€lawyer€expected€to€be€paid€for€the€services,Ïand€(3)€that€it€would€be€unfair€or€unjust€to€permit€the€client€toÏbenefit€from€the€lawyerððs€services€without€paying€for€them.€ÏòòSeeóó€òò¢Castelli£€v.€Lien,óó€910€¢S.W.2d£€420,€427€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).ÌÌà àQuantum€¢meruit£€recoveries€are€limited€to€the€actualÏvalue€of€the€services€provided,€not€the€price€originallyÏagreed€upon€for€the€services.€€òòWarren€Bros.€Co.€v.ÏMetropolitan€¢Govððt£,óó€540€¢S.W.2d£€243,€247€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1976);Íòò¢Cooksey£€v.€Shanks,€óó23€Tenn.€App.€595,€598,€136€¢S.W.2d£€57,€58„59€(1939).€€Thus,€the€courts€will€not€award€damages€for€aÏquantum€¢meruit£€claim€without€some€proof€of€the€€value€of€theÏservices€actually€provided.€€òò¢Bokor£€v.€Holder,óó€722€¢S.W.2d£€676,Ï680„81€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986);€òò¢Lawler£€v.€¢Zapletal£,óó€679€¢S.W.2d£Ï950,€955€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€ÌÌœ›à àCourts€have€used€a€variety€of€approaches€to€calculateÏthe€actual€value€of€a€lawyerððs€services€in€quantum€¢meruit£Ïcases.€€òòSee€¢Mulholland£€v.€Kerns,óó€822€F.€Supp.€1161,€1169€(E.D.ÏPa.€1993).€€Some€courts€use€the€same€factors€found€in€Tenn.€S.ÏCt.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106€used€to€set€a€reasonable€fee€in€otherÏcontexts.€€òòSee,€e.g.,óó€òòLaw€Offices€of€J.€E.€¢Losavio£,€Jr.€v.€Law€FirmÏof€Michael€W.€¢McDivitt£,€P.C.,óó€865€P.2d€934,€936€(Colo.€Ct.€App.Ï1993);€òòAnderson€v.€Anchor€Org.€for€Health€Maintenance,óó€654Ï¢N.E.2d£€675,€681„82€(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1995).€€Others€focus€primarilyÏon€the€documented€number€of€hours€the€lawyer€worked€on€theÏclientððs€case€and€the€lawyerððs€customary€hourly€charge.€€òòSee,Ïe.g.,óó€€òò¢OððRourke£€v.€Cairns,óó€666€So.€2d€345,€349€(La.€Ct.€App.Ï1995).€€In€the€absence€of€an€enforceable€fee€agreement,ÏTennessee€courts€have€traditionally€determined€theÏreasonable€value€of€a€lawyerððs€services€by€considering€theÍnumber€of€hours€billed€and€the€lawyerððs€customary€hourlyÏrate.€€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Davis,óó€719€¢S.W.2d£€526,€529€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1986);€òòCummings€v.€Patterson,óó€59€Tenn.€App.€536,€542,€442Ï¢S.W.2d£€640,€643€(1968).€ÌÌà àThe€ð ðby„the„meterðð€approach€is€not€perfect€because€itÏdoes€not€necessarily€take€into€consideration€the€numerousÏfactors€that€could€possibly€enhance€a€lawyerððs€fee.€€òòSeeóóÏòòBrowning€v.€¢Peyton£,óó€123€¢F.R.D.£€75,€78€(¢S.D.N.Y.£€1988).¢× ƒO ××  ×£€€It€does,Ïhowever,€incorporate€several€of€the€more€commonÏenhancement€factors.€€€A€lawyerððs€hourly€rate€reflects,€atÏleast€to€some€extent,€the€lawyerððs€skills,€experience,€andÏreputation.€€òòBlum€v.€¢Stenson£,óó€465€U.S.€886,€895„96€n.€11,€104€S.ÏCt.€1541,€1547€n.11€(1984);€òòNorman€v.€Housing€Auth.€ofÏMontgomery,óó€836€F.2d€1292,€1302€(11th€Cir.€1988);€¢Sharlene£Ï¢Lassiter£,€òòWhat€Is€a€Lawyer€Really€Worth?,óó€25€¢Cumb£.€L.€Rev.€23,Ï38€(1994„1995);€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B)(7).€€It€alsoÏreflects€the€rates€customarily€charged€in€a€particular€localityÍfor€similar€services,€€òò¢Glasscock£€v.€¢Glasscock£,óó€403€¢S.E.2d£€313,Ï315€(S.C.€1991);€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B)(3),€and€canÏconceivably€reflect€the€nature€and€length€of€a€lawyerððsÏprofessional€relationship€with€a€client.€€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B)(6).× ƒP ××  ×ÌÌÑ 8 Ñà àThe€other€variable€in€this€formula€„€the€number€of€hoursÏspent€on€the€case€„€is€likewise€essential€because€a€quantumÏ¢meruit£€recovery€must€be€based€on€the€services€provided.€€ItÏalso€reflects,€at€least€indirectly,€enhancement€factors€such€asÏthe€time€and€labor€involved€in€the€case€because€of€its€noveltyÏor€particular€difficulty,€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B)(1),€theÏtime€limitations,€if€any,€imposed€on€the€lawyer€by€the€clientÏor€the€particular€circumstances€of€the€case,€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,Ï¢DR£€2„106(B)(5),€and€the€lawyerððs€experience.€€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,Ï¢DR£€2„106(B)(7).× ƒQ ××  ×ÌÌà@ àò òIII.ó óÌÌà àI€will€now€apply€the€foregoing€procedure€and€principlesÏto€this€case.€€ÌÌà@ àòòò ò¢Enforceability£€of€the€Fee€Agreementó óóóÌÌà àThe€first€question€involves€the€¢enforceability£€of€the€feeÏagreement.€€I€concur€with€the€courtððs€conclusion€that€the€feeÏagreement€between€Ms.€¢Inman£€and€her€former€lawyers€is€notÏenforceable.€€My€decision€rests€on€two€grounds.€€First,€Ms.Ï¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€failed€to€prove€that€they€reached€aÏmutual€understanding€with€Ms.€¢Inman£€with€regard€to€their€fee.€ÏòòSeeóó€òòCooper€&€Keys€v.€Bell,óó€127€Tenn.€at€153,€153€¢S.W.£€at€847.€ÏSecond,€the€former€lawyers€failed€to€prove€how€entering€intoÏa€fee€agreement€containing€a€cap€equal€to€fifteen€percent€ofÏher€total€recovery€was€in€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€best€interests€or€thatÏMs.€¢Inman£€would€have€been€unable€to€compensate€them€hadÏthey€billed€by€the€hour.ÌÌœ›à@ àòòò òPotential€Excessiveness€of€the€Feeó óóóÌÌà àThe€second€question€concerns€whether€the€fee€sought€isÏð ðclearly€excessive.ðð€€I€likewise€concur€with€the€courtððsÏconclusion€that€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€did€not€enter€intoÏa€fee€agreement€that€was€clearly€excessive€on€its€face€andÏwere€not€Ñ ° Ñattempting€to€collect€a€fee€that€was€clearlyÏexcessive€in€violation€of€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(A).€€ThisÏconclusion€warrants€further€explanation.€ÌÌà àThe€concept€of€a€ð ðclearly€excessiveðð€fee€derives€fromÏthe€American€Bar€Associationððs€Code€of€ProfessionalÏResponsibility.€€Thus,€a€lawyerððs€attempt€to€collect€a€clearlyÏexcessive€fee€is€ð ðan€ethical€transgression€of€a€most€flagrantÏsort.ðð€€òòWhite€v.€McBride,óó€___€¢S.W.2d£€at€___.× ƒR ××  ×€€The€concept€isÏmost€frequently€construed€in€a€disciplinary€context,€andÏcourts€in€other€jurisdictions€have€labeled€fees€as€clearlyÏexcessive€in€the€following€illustrative€circumstances:€(1)Ïwhere€the€fee€was€grossly€out€of€proportion€with€the€feesÏcharged€for€similar€services€by€other€lawyers€in€the€sameÍlocale;¢× ƒS ××  ×£€(2)€where€a€lawyer€induced€a€client€to€pay€forÏunnecessary€services;¢× ƒT ××  ×£€(3)€where€a€lawyer€submittedÏreconstructed€time€records€in€an€attempt€to€collect€a€feeÏequal€to€a€disallowed€contingent€fee;× ƒU ××  ×€(4)€where€a€lawyerÏsolicited€a€fee€for€work€already€paid€for;¢× ƒV ××  ×£€€(5)€where€aÏlawyer€attempted€to€collect€a€fee€exceeding€an€authorizedÏamount;¢× ƒW ××  ×£€or€(6)€where€the€lawyer€attempted€to€collect€a€feeÏthat€is€unexplainedly€disproportionate€to€the€amount€inÏcontroversy.¢× ƒX ××  ×£ÌÌà àEach€of€these€cases€leaves€the€unmistakable€impressionÏthat€the€lawyerððs€proffered€justification€for€the€fee€isÏunworthy€of€belief€and€that€the€lawyer€put€his€or€her€desire€toÏhave€money€ahead€of€any€realistic€evaluation€of€theÏappropriate€compensation€earned€for€services€rendered.€ÏThey€illustrate€one€commentatorððs€Ñ À Ñobservation€that€theÏconcept€of€a€clearly€excessive€fee€grew€out€of€cases€in€whichÏthe€fee€being€sought€was€so€far€out€of€relation€to€the€servicesÏrendered€or€to€the€benefit€conferred€as€to€constitute€aÏmisappropriation€of€the€clientððs€funds.€€Charles€Wolfram,ÏòòModern€Legal€Ethicsóó€ðð€9.3,€at€517€n.39€(Practitionerððs€ed.Ï1986).€ÌÌà àThe€òòWhite€v.€McBrideóó€decision€comports€with€theseÏillustrative€cases.€€I€do€not€construe€it€as€an€attempt€by€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€to€regulate€or€even€discourageÏarguably€high€fees.€€In€fact,€the€court€acknowledged€theÏexistence€of€a€range€of€permissible€fees€and€theÏpermissibility€of€fees€at€the€ð ðupper€endðð€of€that€range.€€òòWhiteÍv.€McBride,óó___€¢S.W.2d£€at€___.× ƒY ××  ×€€Thus,€a€fee€can€be€high€yet€notÏbe€clearly€excessive.€€ÌÌà àMs.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€are€attempting€to€recover€aÏhigh€fee€in€this€case.€€To€support€their€claim,€they€presentedÏthree€prominent€Nashville€lawyers€with€extensive€domesticÏrelations€practices€who€stated€their€opinions€that€the€feeÏbeing€requested€was€reasonable.€€These€lawyers€did€notÏtestify€about€the€going€rates€for€divorce€work€in€WilliamsonÏCounty.€€Accordingly,€their€testimony€was€not€responsive€toÏTenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B)(3)€which€permits€the€courts€toÏconsider€ð ðthe€fee€customarily€charged€in€the€locality€forÏsimilar€services.ðð€€Even€though€we€could€disregard€theseÏopinions€altogether€with€regard€to€the€actual€value€of€theÏservices€Ms.€¢Inman£€received,€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Davis,óó€719€¢S.W.2d£Ï526,€529€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1986),€they€establish€that€the€feeÏbeing€sought€by€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€is€at€the€upperÏend€of€the€range€of€permissible€fees€for€cases€of€this€sort.€€ÌÌà àThe€parties€in€this€case€have€a€good€faith€disagreementÏconcerning€the€value€of€the€legal€services€rendered€by€Ms.Í¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers.€€Messrs.€Alexander€and€Davis€believeÏthat€they€are€entitled€to€a€premium€fee€in€a€high€stakesÏdivorce€fought€all€the€way€to€the€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏwhere€only€a€minuscule€number€of€divorce€cases€ever€getÏconsidered.€€They,€like€the€attorneys€who€testified€on€theirÏbehalf,€may€have€overvalued€the€results€of€their€work.€€ButÏthey€have€demonstrated€to€my€satisfaction€that€this€fee,Ïwhile€exceedingly€high,€is€not€clearly€excessive€under€theÏfactors€in€Tenn.€S.€Ct.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B).ÌÌà@ àòòò òActual€Value€of€the€Servicesó óóóÌÌà àThe€third€question€relates€to€the€actual€value€of€theÏservices€provided€by€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers.€€The€trialÏcourt€erroneously€treated€this€case€as€if€it€were€one€in€whichÏthe€lawyers€were€requesting€the€court€to€set€a€ð ðreasonableÏfeeðð€for€their€services.€€In€reality,€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyersÏhad€already€decided€that€their€$501,514.50€fee€wasÏreasonable€and€were€seeking€a€judgment€against€Ms.€¢Inman£€forÏthe€balance€of€the€fee€they€believed€she€was€contractuallyÏobligated€to€pay.€€A€lawyerððs€suit€against€a€client€for€anÏunpaid€fee€differs€significantly€from€a€proceeding€requiring€aÍtrial€court€to€set€a€reasonable€fee€in€accordance€with€someÏcontractual€provision€allowing€for€the€recovery€of€aÏreasonable€fee¢× ƒZ ××  ×£€or€as€part€of€a€divorce€proceeding.¢× ƒ[ ××  ×£€€òòSeeóóÏòòAlexander€v.€¢Inman£,óó€903€¢S.W.2d£€at€705€n.30.ÌÌà àUnder€the€facts€of€this€case,€the€actual€value€of€theÏservices€Ms.€¢Inman£€received€should€be€based€on€the€hoursÏworked€and€the€lawyersðð€customary€hourly€fee,€even€thoughÏMessrs.€Alexander€and€Davis€are€not€relying€on€the€hourlyÏbilling€provision€in€their€fee€agreement.€€The€percentageÏrelied€on€by€Messrs.€Alexander€and€Davis€bears€no€relation€toÏthe€value€of€the€services€to€Ms.€¢Inman£.ÌÌà àHad€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€three€principal€lawyers€billed€her€atÏtheir€regular€hourly€rate× ƒ\ ××  ×€for€the€work€they€actuallyÏperformed,€their€fee€would€have€been€$166,252.50.¢× ƒ] ××  ×£€€In€theÏcontext€of€a€quantum€¢meruit£€claim,€the€former€lawyers€haveÏthe€burden€of€proving€that€the€actual€value€of€their€work€wasÏthree€times€higher€than€their€normal€hourly€rate.€€Even€thoughÏthey€received€a€second€chance€to€produce€this€evidence,€theyÏdid€not€do€so.€€Accordingly,€they€have€not€proved€that€theyÏare€entitled€to€a€fee€greater€than€what€they€would€normallyÏreceive€had€they€been€billing€by€the€hour€at€their€customaryÏhourly€rate.€€ÌÌà àThis€conclusion€is€in€harmony€with€the€factors€in€Tenn.€S.ÏCt.€R.€8,€¢DR£€2„106(B).€€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€haveÏreputations€and€skills€that€enable€them€to€command€high€fees.€ÏThey€accepted€employment€shortly€before€a€scheduled€trial,Ïand€these€time€limitations€required€them€to€temporarilyÏforego€other€employment€in€order€to€prepare€for€trial.€€TheÏrecord€contains€no€direct€proof€concerning€these€matters,Ïand€in€any€event,€the€time€constraints€did€not€exist€after€theÏconclusion€of€the€trial€in€mid„November€1988.¢× ƒ^ ××  ×£€€OtherÏcircumstances€weigh€against€these€potentially€enhancingÏfactors.€€The€issues€in€this€case€were€neither€novel€norÏdifficult,€and€the€case€did€not€require€extraordinary€skill€toÏtry€effectively.¢× ƒ_ ××  ×£€€The€results,€as€the€trial€court€noted,€wereÏadequate€but€not€particularly€exceptional€for€Ms.€¢Inman£.€€ÌÌà àIn€addition,€the€record€lacks€substantiation€for€some€ofÏthe€services€performed€and€indicates€that€some€of€theÏservices€may€have€been€unnecessarily€¢duplicative£.€€TheÏexamples€of€the€lack€of€substantiation€and€duplication€areÏdiscussed€in€more€detail€in€our€earlier€opinion.€€òòAlexander€v.Ï¢Inman£,óó€903€¢S.W.2d£€at€702„03.€€Lawyers€are€not€entitled€toÏrecover€in€quantum€¢meruit£€for€unsubstantiated€or€¢duplicative£Ïservices.€€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€could€have€providedÏfurther€substantiation€for€their€services€after€we€remandedÏthis€case€but€did€not€do€so.€€Accordingly,€the€evidenceÏjustifies€limiting€the€quantum€¢meruit£€recovery€to€the€timeÏMs.€¢Inman£ððs€three€former€principal€lawyers€spent€on€her€case.€€Ìà àThis€court€has€lived€with€this€case,€not€as€long€as€counselÏfor€the€parties,€but€long€enough.€€Having€had€this€case€andÏother€related€matters€for€adjudication€for€some€years€nowÏand€having€reviewed€this€record€a€number€of€times€fromÏdifferent€perspectives,€a€judgment€based€on€theÏsubstantiated€time€spent€by€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€three€principalÏlawyers€multiplied€by€their€customary€hourly€rate€bestÏreflects€the€actual€value€of€the€legal€services€Ms.€¢Inman£Ïreceived.€€In€light€of€the€undisputed€proof€that€she€hadÏalready€paid€her€former€lawyers€$159,000,€I€would€modify€theÍjudgment€to€require€Ms.€¢Inman£€to€pay€her€former€lawyersÏ$7,252.50.ÌÌà@ àò òIV.ó óÌÌà àMs.€¢Inman£€is€also€seeking€to€recover€part€of€the€$159,000Ïfee€she€has€already€paid€her€former€lawyers.€€Relying€on€herÏproof€that€a€reasonable€fee€in€this€case€would€have€been,Ï$60,000,€she€asserts€that€she€is€entitled€to€recover€$99,000Ïplus€prejudgment€interest.€€I€find€that€she€has€not€carried€herÏburden€of€proof€for€two€reasons.€€First,€a€$60,000€fee€wouldÏcompensate€her€lawyers€at€approximately€one„third€of€theÏnormal€hourly€rate€for€their€substantiated€time.€€Second,Ïsetting€the€fee€at€that€level€fails€to€make€an€adequateÏallowance€for€the€time€constraints€facing€the€lawyers€whenÏthey€were€hired€and€the€lawyersðð€reputation€and€skill.€€Ìà àÌà àThe€òòWhite€v.€McBrideóó€decision€provides€no€additionalÏsupport€for€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€claims.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€CourtÏintended€òòWhite€v.€McBrideóó€to€provide€clients€with€a€shieldÏagainst€their€lawyersðð€efforts€to€recover€clearly€excessiveÍfees.€It€did€not€intend€to€provide€clients€with€a€sword€toÏobtain€refunds€of€fees€already€paid.ÌÌà àThe€record€contains€indirect€evidence€that€the€$159,000ÏMs.€¢Inman£€has€already€paid€her€lawyers€is€appropriate.€€First,ÏMs.€¢Inman£ððs€legal€expenses€would€have€been€$166,252.50€hadÏher€lawyers€billed€her€at€their€normal€hourly€rate€for€theirÏactual€documented€time.€Second,€Mr.€¢Inman£€paid€his€lawyersÏ$160,000€for€comparable€services€during€the€sameÏproceeding.€€Accordingly,€no€reasonable€lawyer€familiar€withÏthe€facts€of€this€case€would€conclude€that€the€$159,000€Ms.Ï¢Inman£€has€already€paid€her€former€lawyers€is€clearlyÏexcessive.€€ÌÌà@ àò òV.ó óÌÌà àIn€summary,€I€have€concluded€that€the€fee€agreementÏbetween€Ms.€¢Inman£€and€her€lawyers€is€not€enforceable€andÏthat€Ms.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€are€not€attempting€to€collectÏa€clearly€excessive€fee.€€Based€on€the€facts€of€the€case,€I€haveÏalso€concluded€that€the€actual€value€of€the€legal€services€Ms.Ï¢Inman£€received€in€this€case€is€$166,252.50€and,€therefore,€thatÍMs.€¢Inman£ððs€former€lawyers€are€entitled€to€a€judgment€equalÏto€the€difference€between€the€actual€value€of€their€servicesÏand€the€fees€Ms.€¢Inman£€has€already€paid.€€Therefore,€I€wouldÏreduce€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€from€$141,000€to€$7,252.50.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE