ÿWPC„ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µ {gÝ4D X g } w@“ {gÓ 0J: 0T„ 0^Ø 0h6 0rž 0| 0†Œ 0 1u¢ U, 0dCU,§U>ÓB) B:DCW AMšU*ç  D3v~NvÓÌ 0@Ÿ AO߯. 0Dô D/8 Bg˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡(?Hl$¡¡ÑµµÑÔ€V‘öVXXÔÓÆÓyJÚ 3|x2ÿDepÿÿDepÿ  E!"E#$E%&Ó€2(?Hl$¡¡ÑµµÑÔ€V‘öVXXÔÓÆÓ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òAugust€9,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó%%%%'ÿÿdxdPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€""X„d&ÓÑ#€""Xd#ÑÔ€#ÔÝ  ÝÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\Ñò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€6XXdìdÈ7Ñ›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óÌà@ àò òWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóÌÌALI€AGHA€BATEBI,€€€€€€à àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àó óPlaintiff/Appelleeò òà àà àà à)à àó óShelby€œLaw€No.€41863€T.D.›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)Ìvs.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à à€ÌœÙ€€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€')&;+'h|5` Å `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌPATRICK€WAYNE€CLARK€€and€€€à à)à àó óAppeal€No.€Ìò òTHE€KRYSTAL€COMPANY,€€€ó ó€ò òà àà à)à àœó ó02A01„9410„CV„00228ò ò›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àDefendants/Appellants.à àò òà à)à àÌòòó óÌò òóóÌ€€€ÌÌÌà@ àó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JAMES€M.€THARPE,€JUDGE€€€ÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appelleeóó:òòà àà àà àFor€the€Defendants/Appellantsóó:òòÌóóÌJoseph€Michael€Cookà àà àà àà àœB.€J.€Wade€›ÌMemphis,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àœLori€KeenÌà àà àà àà àà àà àMemphis,›€TennesseeÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌò òÌÌÌà@ à€€€€€€€€AFFIRMED€ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÇØØÙ  ÙÓÓÑ7€6XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  Ñà@ àò òOPINIONó óÌà àIn€this€case,€the€defendant,€The€Krystal€Company€(Krystal),€appeals€a€jury€verdict€holdingÏit€liable€for€personal€injuries€received€by€the€plaintiff,€Ali€Agha€Batebi€(Batebi),€from€a€criminalÏassault€by€a€third€party€while€on€Krystal's€property.€€We€affirm.Ìà àKrystal€operates€a€restaurant€in€Memphis,€Tennessee.€€At€approximately€midnight€onÏAugust€3,€1991,€Batebi€went€to€the€restaurant€to€purchase€food.€€The€Krystal€restaurant€wasÏshorthanded€that€night€with€only€two€employees,€one€cooking€the€food€and€the€other€taking€ordersÏfrom€customers.€€When€Batebi€came€in,€there€were€several€customers€in€line€ahead€of€him.Ìà àDefendant€Patrick€Wayne€Clark€(Clark)€was€present€in€the€restaurant€when€Batebi€entered.€ÏClark€had€been€drinking€beer€and€was,€by€his€own€admission,€intoxicated€and€loud.€€Clark€hadÏordered€no€food€and€was€pacing€around€the€restaurant€with€his€shirt€open,€harassing€an€African„American€female€customer€ahead€of€Batebi€in€line.€€After€the€female€customer€left,€Clark€turned€hisÏattention€to€Batebi,€laughed€at€him,€and€repeatedly€asked€him€to€say€the€word€"brewer."€€BatebiÏfirst€ignored€Clark.€€When€Clark€persisted,€Batebi€asked€him€if€he€was€"trying€to€start€a€fight€orÏsomething."€€Batebi€tried€to€get€the€attention€of€the€Krystal€employees€but€was€unsuccessful.€€€€ÏClark€testified€that€he€asked€Batebi€to€step€outside€the€restaurant€and€that€Batebi€refused.€€ClarkÏthen€left€the€restaurant.€€When€Clark€left,€Batebi€believed€that€the€confrontation€had€ended.€ÏHowever,€Clark€returned€to€the€restaurant€moments€later€with€a€baseball€bat.€€Batebi€was€unawareÏthat€Clark€had€come€back€inside.€€€While€Batebi€was€still€facing€the€front€counter€of€the€restaurant,ÏClark€struck€him€in€the€head€with€the€baseball€bat.€€The€entire€exchange€between€Clark€and€BatebiÏlasted€approximately€fifteen€to€twenty€minutes.Ìà àBatebi€sustained€serious€injuries€from€the€blow€from€the€baseball€bat.€€He€incurredÏ$14,641.25€in€medical€expenses€and€$1,051.20€in€lost€wages.€€Batebi€filed€suit€against€KrystalÏand€Clark,€alleging€negligence,€gross€negligence,€and€willful€conduct€on€the€part€of€bothÏdefendants.€€The€suit€sought€both€compensatory€and€punitive€damages.€€At€trial,€the€plaintiffÏintroduced€proof€that€Krystal€regularly€permitted€intoxicated€persons€to€frequent€the€restaurant,Ïparticularly€during€the€ð ðthird€shiftðð€from€11:00€p.m.€to€7:00€a.m.€€The€plaintiff€submitted€testimonyÍthat€employees€working€at€Krystal€during€that€shift€were€fearful€and€had€requested€KrystalððsÏmanagement€to€provide€additional€security.€€A€Memphis€police€officer€testified€regarding€prior€callsÏto€the€police€from€the€restaurant.€€Ìà àThe€jury€found€that€Krystal€had€been€negligent€and€that€Krystal's€negligence€was€a€Ïproximate€cause€of€Batebi's€injuries.€€It€assessed€50%€of€the€total€fault€against€Clark€and€50%€€Ïagainst€Krystal.€€It€found€Batebiððs€total€damages€to€be€$166,000€and€also€awarded€punitiveÏdamages€against€Clark€in€the€amount€of€$15,700.€€After€post„trial€motions,€Krystal€filed€thisÏappeal.€€Ìà àOn€appeal,€Krystal€contends€that€Batebi€failed€to€establish€that€Krystal€owed€a€duty€toÏprotect€him€under€these€circumstances.€€Krystal€also€argues€that€Clarkððs€assault€against€Batebi€wasÏan€independent,€superseding,€and€intentional€act€for€which€Krystal€should€not€be€held€liable.€ÏFurther€Krystal€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€permitting€a€police€officer€to€testify€regardingÏprior€calls€made€to€the€Memphis€Police€Department€from€the€Krystal€restaurant€in€question.€ÏFinally,€Krystal€maintains€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€exercise€its€duty€as€thirteenth€juror.€€Ìà àUnder€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d),€"[f]indings€of€fact€by€a€jury€in€civil€actions€shall€be€setÏaside€only€if€there€is€no€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict."€€The€standard€of€review€for€aÏquestion€of€law,€however,€is€ò òòòde€novo€óóó ówith€no€presumption€of€correctness.€€òòò òCarvell€v.ÏBottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995).Ìà àThe€leading€case€in€Tennessee€regarding€the€liability€of€a€business€establishment€for€the€€€Ïcriminal€acts€of€third€persons€is€òòò òCornpropst€v.€Sloanó óóó,€528€S.W.2d€188€(Tenn.€1975).€€€InÏò òòòCornpropstó óóó,€the€Court€held:€€ÌÓÓÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ  ÒThere€is€no€duty€upon€the€owners€or€operators€of€a€shopping€center,€individually€orÏcollectively,€or€upon€merchants€and€shopkeepers€generally,€whose€mode€ofÏoperation€of€their€premises€does€not€attract€or€provide€a€climate€for€crime,€to€guardÏagainst€the€criminal€acts€of€a€third€party,€unless€they€know€or€have€reason€to€knowÏthat€acts€are€occurring€or€about€to€occur€on€the€premises€that€pose€imminentÏprobability€of€harm€to€an€invitee;€whereupon€a€duty€of€reasonable€care€to€protectÏagainst€such€act€arises.€€ÌÌÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ ° Òòòò òIdó óóó.€at€198.€€œÓÓIn›€ò òòòCornpropstó óóó,€it€was€undisputed€that€the€business€establishment€in€question€had€noÍknowledge€that€an€identifiable€person€would€attack€the€plaintiff€customer€in€the€defendantððs€parkingÏlot.€€The€plaintiff€sought€to€establish€the€liability€of€the€defendant€business€establishment€by€proofÏof€prior€criminal€activity€on€the€premises€or€in€the€immediate€area.€€The€Court€found€that€this€wasÏnot€sufficient€to€impose€liability.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€197.Ìà àSubsequent€cases€applying€ò òòòCornpropstó óóó€have€usually€involved€situations€in€which€theÏbusiness€establishment€did€not€know€or€have€reason€to€know€that€a€particular€individual€wasÏattacking€or€about€to€attack€a€customer.€€See,€for€example,€òòò òMcClung€ex€rel.€McClung€v.ÏDelta€Square€Ltd.€Partnershipó óóó,€1995€WL€30595€(Tenn.€App.€Jan.€26,€1995)€(permission€toÏappeal€granted€Dec.€11,€1995);ò òòòLewter€v.€OððConnor€Management€Inc.ó óóó,€886€S.W.2d€253Ï(Tenn.€App.€1994);€ò òòòGray€v.€McDonaldððs€Corp.ó óóó,€874€S.W.2d€44€(Tenn.€App.€1993).€€TheseÏcases€dealt€with€a€sudden€criminal€attack€in€which€the€attacker€could€not€have€been€identified€inÏadvance€of€the€criminal€act.€€In€each€case,€allegations€of€past€criminal€activity€in€the€area€and€on€theÏpremises€were€not€sufficient€to€give€rise€to€a€duty€for€the€defendant€to€protect€the€invitee€from€theÏcriminal€acts€of€a€third€party.€€In€each,€the€court€found€that€the€defendant€merchant€did€not€know€orÏhave€reason€to€know€that€criminal€acts€were€occurring€or€about€to€occur€which€involved€imminentÏharm€to€an€invitee.€€€Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€proof€at€trial€showed€that€Clark€was€very€intoxicated€and€loud,€and€wasÏpacing€around€the€restaurant€without€ordering€any€food.€€He€had€verbally€harassed€an€African„American€female€customer€before€turning€his€attention€to€Batebi.€€Clark€repeatedly€and€loudly€triedÏto€bait€Batebi€into€a€confrontation.€€Batebi€tried€to€get€the€attention€of€one€of€the€two€employees€onÏduty,€but€they€were€too€busy€to€respond.€€The€exchange€between€Batebi€and€Clark€whichÏculminated€in€Clark€striking€Batebi€in€the€head€with€a€baseball€bat€lasted€approximately€fifteen€toÏtwenty€minutes.Ìà àUnder€ò òòòCornpropstó óóó,€the€owners€or€operators€of€a€business€establishment€may€be€heldÏliable€for€the€criminal€acts€of€a€third€party€if€ð ðthey€know€or€have€reason€to€know€that€acts€areÏoccurring€or€about€to€occur€on€the€premises€that€pose€imminent€probability€of€harm€to€an€invitee€.€.Í.€.ðð€€ò òòòCornpropstóóó ó,€528€S.W.2d€at€198.€€In€this€case,€we€find€that€there€was€sufficient€evidenceÏfrom€which€a€jury€could€reasonably€infer€that€Krystal€should€have€known€that€Clark€was€about€toÏengage€in€acts€that€posed€ð ðimminent€probability€of€harmðð€to€Batebi€and€that€Krystal€took€no€actionÏto€remove€Clark€from€the€premises€or€protect€Batebi.€€Therefore,€under€ò òòòCornpropstó óóó,€we€hold€thatÏthere€was€sufficient€evidence€to€impose€a€duty€upon€Krystal€to€take€action€to€protect€Batebi€and€thatÏthere€was€a€breach€of€that€duty.€€Ìà àKrystal€next€argues€that€the€criminal€act€of€Clark€was€a€superseding€intervening€act€whichÏbroke€the€chain€of€proximate€causation.€€Krystal€notes€that,€when€Clark€left€the€restaurant€to€get€theÏbaseball€bat,€Batebi€believed€he€had€left€the€premises€and€would€not€come€back.€€Batebi€admits€thatÏhe€did€not€know€Clark€was€going€to€hit€him€until€it€happened.€€In€ò òòòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyó óóó,€806ÏS.W.2d€767€(Tenn.€1991),€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€sets€forth€the€test€for€proximateÏcausation:€€ÌœÓÓ›à8 à(1)€the€tortfeasor's€conduct€must€have€been€a€"substantial€factor"€in€bringing€aboutÏthe€harm€being€complained€of;€and€(2)€there€is€no€rule€or€policy€that€should€relieveÏthe€wrongdoer€from€liability€because€of€the€manner€in€which€the€negligence€hasÏresulted€in€the€harm;€and€(3)€the€harm€giving€rise€to€the€action€could€haveÏreasonably€been€foreseen€or€anticipated€by€a€person€of€ordinary€intelligence€andÏprudence.€€The€foreseeability€requirement€is€not€so€strict€as€to€require€the€tortfeasorÏto€foresee€the€exact€manner€in€which€the€injury€takes€place,€provided€it€isÏdetermined€that€the€tortfeasor€could€foresee,€or€through€the€exercise€of€reasonableÏdiligence€should€have€foreseen,€the€general€manner€in€which€the€injury€or€lossÏoccurred.ò òÌó óÌœÓÓòòò òId.›€ó óóóat€775€(citations€omitted).€€Under€ò òòòMcClenahanó óóó,€in€order€to€be€the€proximate€cause€of€anÏinjury,€an€act€need€not€be€ð ðthe€sole€cause,€the€last€act,€or€the€one€nearest€to€the€injury,ðð€so€long€as€itÏis€ð ða€substantial€factor€in€producing€the€end€result.ðð€€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€€The€Court€noted€that€ð ð€ðð[a]n€interveningÏact€will€not€exculpate€the€original€wrongdoer€unless€it€appears€that€the€negligent€intervening€actÏcould€not€have€been€reasonably€anticipated.ðð€ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€(quoting€òòò òEvridge€v.€American€HondaÏMotor€Co.ó óóó,€685€S.W.2d€632,€635€(Tenn.€1985)).€€As€with€the€issue€of€proximate€causation,€theÏquestion€of€superseding€intervening€cause€is€normally€an€issue€for€the€jury€because€the€trier€of€factÏmust€determine€if€the€act€in€question€was€foreseeable.€€ò òòòMcClenahanó óóó,€806€S.W.2d€at€775„76.Ìà àIn€this€case,€as€stated€above,€there€is€sufficient€evidence€from€which€a€jury€couldÏreasonably€infer€that€Krystal€should€have€known€that€Clark€was€about€to€engage€in€acts€that€posedÏimminent€probability€of€harm€to€Batebi.€€In€other€words,€under€circumstances€in€which€Clark€hadÏengaged€in€drunken€and€abrasive€behavior€toward€Batebi€for€approximately€fifteen€to€twentyÏminutes,€it€was€foreseeable€that€Clark€would€take€action€to€harm€Batebi.€€From€this€a€jury€couldÏreasonably€infer€that€Krystalððs€failure€to€take€action€to€remove€Clark€from€the€premises€or€protectÏBatebi€was€a€substantial€factor€in€bringing€about€the€harm€to€Batebi.€€Because€there€is€materialÏevidence€to€support€the€juryððs€determination€that€Krystalððs€negligence€was€the€proximate€cause€ofÏBatebiððs€injuries,€we€affirm€on€this€issue€as€well.€€€€Ìà àKrystal€next€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€Batebi€to€introduce€theÏcommunication€records€of€the€Memphis€Police€Department€through€Lieutenant€Pendleton€of€theÏMemphis€Police€Department,€to€show€telephone€calls€to€the€police€department€from€the€restaurantÏin€question.€€Krystal€argues€that€Lieutenant€Pendleton€was€not€the€records€custodian€of€the€policeÏdepartment€at€the€time€of€trial€and€that€she€had€been€transferred€out€of€the€communicationsÏdepartment€for€almost€a€year€at€the€time€of€trial.€Ìà àRule€803(6)€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€€Evidence€provides€that€business€records€may€beÏintroduced€into€evidence€by€the€testimony€of€the€custodian€or€ð ðother€qualified€witness.ðð€€€€UnderÏTennessee€case€law,€the€term€"qualified€witness"€is€given€a€broad€interpretation.€€òòò òAlexander€v.ÏInmanó óóó,€903€S.W.2d€686,€700€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€€To€be€qualified,€a€witness€must€be€personallyÏfamiliar€with€the€record„keeping€procedures€and€must€be€able€to€explain€them.€€It€is€not€necessaryÏfor€the€witness€to€have€personal€knowledge€of€the€facts€in€the€record,€to€have€been€involved€in€theÏpreparation€of€the€record,€or€even€to€know€who€actually€created€the€record.€€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€Ìà àQuestions€on€admissibility€of€evidence€lie€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€court.€€ÏWe€will€reverse€the€trial€court's€decision€to€admit€or€exclude€evidence€only€on€a€showing€of€€abuseÏof€discretion.€€òòò òArcata€Graphics€Co.€v.€Heidelberg€Harris,€Inc.ó óóó,€874€S.W.2d€15,€24„25Ï(Tenn.€App.€1993);€òòò òRoyal€v.€Days€Inns€of€Am.€Inc.ó óóó,€708€S.W.2d€411,€414€(Tenn.€App.Í1985).€€From€our€review€of€the€record,€there€has€been€no€showing€of€abuse€of€discretion€inÏadmitting€this€evidence€through€Lieutenant€Pendleton.€Ìà àFinally,€Krystal€argues€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€properly€perform€its€function€asÏthirteenth€juror€in€approving€the€jury€verdict.€€Krystal€unsuccessfully€sought€a€new€trial€on€theÏgrounds€that€the€jury€verdict€was€contrary€to€the€weight€of€the€evidence.€€Krystal€argues€thatÏstatements€made€by€the€trial€judge€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€a€new€trial€demonstrate€that€heÏfailed€to€weigh€the€evidence€in€accordance€with€his€role€as€thirteenth€juror.€€Ìà àThe€law€governing€the€trial€courtððs€role€as€thirteenth€juror€and€appellate€review€thereof€isÏwell€summarized€in€ò òòòMiller€v.€Doeó óóó,€873€S.W.2d€346,€347€(Tenn.€App.€1993).€€If€the€trial€judgeÏis€dissatisfied€with€the€jury€verdict,€it€is€his€duty€to€set€the€verdict€aside€and€grant€a€new€trial.€€If€theÏtrial€judge€is€asked€to€act€as€thirteenth€juror€and€he€approves€the€verdict€without€comment,€theÏappellate€court€will€presume€that€he€adequately€performed€his€function.€€If€the€trial€court€statesÏreasons€for€denying€the€motion€for€a€new€trial,€the€appellate€court€will€examine€the€stated€reasonsÏonly€to€determine€if€the€trial€court€properly€reviewed€the€evidence€and€was€satisfied€œor€dissatisfied›Ïwith€the€verdict.€€If€the€trial€judge€makes€statements€while€considering€the€motion€for€a€new€trialÏthat€indicate€that€he€was€not€satisfied€with€the€juryððs€verdict€but€then€does€not€grant€a€new€trial,€theÏappellate€court€should€grant€one€based€on€the€trial€courtððs€dissatisfaction€with€the€verdict.€€€If€theÏtrial€judge€makes€comments€indicating€that€he€has€misconceived€his€duty€as€thirteenth€juror€or€thatÏhe€clearly€has€not€followed€it,€we€must€reverse€and€remand€the€case€for€a€new€trial.€Ìà àIn€òòò òMilleró óóó,€at€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€new€trial,€the€trial€judge€made€lengthyÏcomments€that€included€remarks€such€œas,›€œð ð[W]hat›€makes€the€judge€any€smarter€than€the€jury€in€œÌthis›€œcase,ð𛀀and€ð ðIððm€not€inclined€to€interfere€with€the€verdict€of€the€œjury.ð𛀀ò òòòMilleró óóó,€873€S.W.2d€atÏ347„48.€€Although€the€trial€judge€also€stated€that€he€approved€the€verdict€of€the€jury,€this€CourtÏfound€that€œoverall€his›€remarks€œindicated›€that€he€was€ð ðbeing€deferential€to€the€œjury,ðð›€with€nothingÏindicating€that€he€had€independently€weighed€the€evidence.€€œò òòòIdó óóó.›€at€349.€Ìà àIn€ò òòòMichelsen€v.€Stanleyó óóó,€893€S.W.2d€941€(Tenn.€App.€1993),€a€medical€malpracticeÍcase,€the€plaintiff€made€a€motion€for€a€new€trial€and€asked€the€trial€court€to€œconsider›€the€credibilityÏof€the€expert€œwitnesses.€€ò òòòId€ó óóóat€941,€943.›€€The€trial€court€stated€that€the€credibility€of€œwitnesses›€ð ðisÏpeculiarly€within€the€province€of€the€œjuryðð€and€that€ð ð[t]he›€Court€is€not€the€judge€of€the€credibility€ofÏthe€witnesses.ðð€€œò òòòIdó óóó.›€œat›€944„45.€€Consequently,€this€Court€determined€that€the€trial€judgeððs€remarksÏdemonstrated€that€he€misconstrued€his€duty€as€thirteenth€œjuror›€and€remanded€the€case€for€a€newÏtrial.€€œò òòòIdó óóó.€at›€945.€€Ìà àThe€trial€courtððs€duty€œas›€thirteenth€juror€was€also€discussed€in€ò òòòRidings€v.€NorfolkÏSouthern€œRailway›€Co.ó óóó,€894€S.W.2d€281€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€In€ò òòòRidingsó óóó,€the€motion€for€aÏnew€trial€was€based€on€numerous€grounds,€including€whether€the€verdict€was€œexcessive.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€atÏ289.€€›€€The€defendant€argued€that€the€following€comments€by€the€trial€judge€indicated€that€he€didÏnot€perform€his€function€as€thirteenth€juror:ÌœÓÓ›à8 àBut€without€indulging€in€the€interesting€intellectual€exercise€of€trying€to€figure€outÏjust€exactly€how€the€jury€arrived€at€this€verdict,€the€Court€is€constrained€to€concludeÏthat€in€view€of€the€evidence€that€was€before€the€Court,€and€in€view€of€the€juryððsÏimportant€function€in€resolving€credibility€issues€that€the€verdict€is€within€that€rangeÏof€reasonableness€based€upon€the€evidence€that€the€jury€heard€which€compels€theÏCourt€to€approve€the€verdict€and€deprives€the€Court€of€any€opportunity€to€substituteÏits€judgment€in€any€way€for€the€amount€of€that€verdict€so;€again,€I€feel€like€I€have€toÏdischarge€this€important€but€very€difficult,€extremely€difficult€task€of€passing€uponÏthe€amount€of€the€verdict€by€concluding€that€under€the€evidence€this€jury€heard€itÏwas€a€matter€for€the€jury€to€say,€not€for€the€Court.ÌÌœÓÓò òòòIdó óóó.›€at€290€&€n.4.€€These€remarks€were€followed€by€this€statement:ÌœÓÓ›à8 àCertainly€the€verdict€and€the€result€is€not€such€that€this€Court€in€the€œ›Ìà àexercise€of€its€function€as€a€thirteenth€juror€could€in€good€conscience€set€Ìà àaside.€€Iððm€constrained€to€overrule€the€motion.ÌÌœÓÓò òòòIdó óóó.›€at€œ290€(emphasis€deleted).›€€Considering€the€trial€courtððs€œoverall€remarks,›€this€Court€noted€thatÏit€was€clear€that€the€remarks€relied€upon€by€the€appellant€were€addressed€to€issues€separate€from€theÏCourtððs€role€as€thirteenth€juror,€issues€such€as€the€excessiveness€of€the€œverdict.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€289.€€›€ÏConsequently,€this€Court€stated:ÌœÓÓ›à8 àComments€of€the€trial€court€with€respect€to€these€other€issues€should€not€beÏinterpreted€by€us€as€a€failure€to€properly€perform€the€role€as€thirteenth€œjuror,›€sinceÏthey€were€not€offered€by€the€trial€court€in€the€context€of€his€role€as€thirteenth€juror.ÌÌœÓÓò òòòIdó óóó.›€€The€Court€found€that€the€trial€judge€then€ð ðchanged€gearsðð€and€that€the€separate€thought€whichÏfollowed€the€remarks€œat›€issue€demonstrated€sufficiently€that€the€trial€court€understood€its€role€asÏthirteenth€œjuror.€€ò òòòIdó ó.€óóat€290.€›Ìà àIn€this€cause,€the€defendant€Krystal€moved€for€directed€verdict€at€the€conclusion€œof›€œBatebiððs›Ïproof,€and€the€trial€court€determined€that€there€was€sufficient€evidence€to€present€the€case€to€theÏjury.€€After€the€jury€verdict,€Krystal€filed€a€motion€for€new€trial€on€numerous€grounds,€includingÏthe€failure€to€direct€a€œverdict,€the›€alleged€excessiveness€of€the€œverdict,›€and€the€assessment€of€50%Ïfault€to€Krystal.€€During€the€hearing€on€the€motion€for€new€trial,€counsel€for€Krystal€acknowledgedÏthat€the€motion€for€new€trial€was€based€on€a€number€of€grounds€that€were€presented€œduring›€the€trialÏand€to€which€the€trial€court€had€rendered€a€ruling€adverse€to€Krystal;€consequently,€counsel€forÏKrystal€said€that€he€would€not€argue€every€ground€at€the€hearing.€€Krystal€then€œargued€at€length›Ïthat€the€jury€had€awarded€an€excessive€amount€of€damages€œand›€had€assessed€50%€of€the€faultÏagainst€Krystal€primarily€because€the€jurors€knew€that€defendant€Clark€was€a€pauper€and€thatÏœBatebi›€would€not€be€able€to€collect€any€significant€monies€from€him.€€After€œBatebiððs›€counselÏreviewed€the€evidence€against€Krystal,€the€trial€court€ruled€as€follows:€€ÌœÓÓ›à8 àThis€case€during€the€trial€was€a€rather€long€case,€but€the€Court€considered€Ìà àthis€matter€at€that€time€about€the€liability€of€the€„„€of€the€Krystal,€the€ownerÌà àof€the€premises.€€The€Court€concluded€at€that€time€that€it€was€a€jury€question.Ìà àThe€Court€has€been€sent€that€same€question€again€in€this€motion.€Ìœà àà àCertainly€the€amount€of€the€verdict,€I€don't€see€how€fault€can€be€taken,€Ìà àthe€argument€has€been€made€there's€really€not€a€legal€question€but€an€Ìà àeconomical€question.€€The€fact€that€one€of€the€defendants,€the€actor,€is€a€Ìà àpauper,€maybe,€that's€the€indication€I€got,€there€is€no€proof€to€the€contrary,€Ìà àand€he€can't€pay€the€judgment,€that's€not€the€matter€to€be€considered€by€theÌà à€jury€to€consider€the€fault€in€the€case.€€›Ìà àœà àI›€believe€that€this€motion€under€those€circumstances€will€have€to€œbeÌà à›€denied.€€Draw€an€order.ÌÌœÓÓ›à àAs€in€ò òòòRidingsó óóó,€the€trial€court€in€this€case€initially€addresses€issues€other€than€the€requestÏthat€he€œreweigh›€the€evidence€as€thirteenth€juror.€€The€first€remarks€allude€to€the€motion€for€directedÏverdict,€noting€that€the€trial€court€found€sufficient€evidence€to€present€the€case€to€the€jury€andÏindicating€that€the€motion€for€a€new€trial€was€based€on€the€same€grounds.€€The€trial€judge€thenÍresponds€to€Krystalððs€argument€that€the€juryððs€verdict€resulted€from€their€realization€that€Clark€hadÏno€money€from€which€to€collect€a€judgment.€€The€trial€court€indicates€agreement€with€the€amount€ofÏthe€verdict,€says€that€Krystalððs€argument€is€ð ðnot€a€legal€œquestion,ðð›€and€states€that€Clarkððs€status€as€aÏpauper€is€ð ðnot€the€matter€to€be€considered€by€the€jury€to€consider€the€fault€in€œthe›€case.ððÌà àFinally,€as€in€ò òòòRidingsó óóó,€the€trial€judge€ð ðchanges€gearsðð€and€summarily€rules€on€the€entireÏœmotion.€€The›€trial€court€does€not€œaffirmatively›€state€that€he€is€œreweighing›€the€evidence,€but€simplyÏrules€without€further€comment.Ìà àUnlikeò òòò€Miller€v.€Doeó óóó€and€ò òòòMichelsen€v.€Stanleyó óóó,€the€trial€courtððs€remarks€do€notÏdemonstrate€that€he€misconstrued€his€duty€as€thirteenth€juror€or€ð ðclearlyðð€did€not€follow€it,€or€thatÏhe€was€deferring€to€the€jury.€€Indeed,€in€ò òòòRidingsó óóó,€the€trial€judgeððs€remarks€on€the€allegedÏexcessiveness€of€the€verdict€indicated€considerably€more€deference€to€the€jury€than€œdo›€the€trialÏcourtððs€remarks€in€this€œcase,€yet€this€Court€affirmed€the€denial€of€the€motion€for€new€trial.€›Ìà àAppellantððs€argument€that€the€trial€court€failed€to€perform€his€function€as€thirteenth€juror€isÏwithout€merit.€€The€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€motion€for€a€new€trial€is€affirmed.€Ìà àAffirmed.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€Appellant,€for€which€execution€may€issue€ifÏnecessary.€€€ÌœÓÓ›à àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:Ìœòò›Ì€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌòòÌ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€œJ.ó ó›