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D3Æ' Bù' 0@( AOV(Æ¥( 0Dk) D/¯) BÞ)˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀäÌÀÀÌÀä0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ GUH I J K LM£NOÓ€[z!ÁÂÃÄÅÆÇÈÉÊËÌ3|x[((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial âÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òNovember€5,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ’Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Wife€takes€issue€with€the€fact€that€the€Husbandððs€business€expenses€exceeded€seventyÏpercent€of€his€gross€business€receipts.€€Absent€a€specific€finding€by€the€trial€court,€however,€weÏare€unwilling€to€conclude€that€this€percentage€alone€rendered€the€Husbandððs€business€expensesÏunreasonable.€€We€note,€for€example,€that€in€ò òòòBurchfield€v.€Naveó óóó,€1994€WL€13374,€at€*1Ï(Tenn.€App.€1994),€ò òòòperm.€app.€deniedó óóó,€the€expenses€from€the€partiesðð€apartment€rentalÏbusiness€exceeded€sixty„two€percent€of€their€gross€receipts.Ì ÂÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝApparently,€the€Wife€did€not€begin€working€for€Federal€Express€until€1993€or€1994.€Ì çÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝInasmuch€as€the€Wife€sufficiently€demonstrated€a€need€for€alimony€in€the€amountsÏawarded,€we€conclude€that€reversal€of€the€alimony€award€is€not€warranted€by€the€trial€courtððsÏarguably€erroneous€admission€of€testimony€concerning€statements€made€by€the€Husband€duringÏsettlement€negotiations.€€On€appeal,€the€Husband€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€theÏWife€to€testify€that€the€Husband€refused€to€agree€to€pay€for€the€childrenððs€college€educations.€€TheÏHusband€argues€that€introduction€of€this€evidence€violated€Rule€408€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€ofÏEvidence,€which€precludes€the€introduction€of€ð ð[e]vidence›€of€conduct€or€statements€made€inÏcompromise€negotiations.ðð€€T.R.E.€408.€€Contrary€to€the€Husbandððs€argument,€a€careful€review€ofÏthe€transcript€indicates€that€the€trial€court€sustained€the€Husbandððs€objections€to€the€WifeððsÏtestimony€regarding€the€Husbandððs€refusal€to€agree€to€pay€for€the€childrenððs€college€educations.€€InÏany€event,€after€reading€the€relevant€portion€of€the€transcript,€we€remain€convinced€that€thisÏtestimony€did€not€affect€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€alimony€in€this€case.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝRule€14C€requires€the€parties€in€ð ðall€contested€divorces€or€suits€for€separate€maintenanceððÏto€submit€sworn€statements€of€their€monthly€income€and€expenses.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Shelby€County€Cir.€Ct.ÏR.€14C(1).€€Rule€14C€specifically€permits€the€parties€to€change€their€statements€ð ðas€soon€asÏpossible,€and€not€later€than€ten€(10)€days€before€the€trial,€unless€circumstances€beyond€a€partyððsÏcontrol€are€shown.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€Even€if€Rule€14C€did€not€permit€the€parties€to€change€their€financialÏstatements,€we€question€whether€principles€of€judicial€estoppel€would€prevent€such€changes,Ïinasmuch€as€a€partyððs€financial€position€may€change€between€the€time€the€statement€is€filed€and€theÏtrial.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,ó óóó€ò òòòLoveridge€v.€Loveridgeó óóó,€1986€WL€5896,€at€*3€(Tenn.€App.€1986)Ï(refusing€to€extend€doctrine€of€judicial€estoppel€to€preclude€husband€from€presenting€proof€ofÏproperty€valuations€which€were€different€than€those€previously€given€in€husbandððs€financialÏstatement€and€answers€to€wifeððs€interrogatories).Ì =Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSection€36„5„103(c)€provides€that:ÌÌà8 àà àThe€plaintiff€spouse€may€recover€from€the€defendant€spouse,€and€the€spouseÏor€other€person€to€whom€the€custody€of€the€child,€or€children,€is€awarded€mayÏrecover€from€the€other€spouse€reasonable€attorney€fees€incurred€in€enforcing€anyÏdecree€for€alimony€and/or€child€support,€or€in€regard€to€any€suit€or€actionÏconcerning€the€adjudication€of€the€custody€or€the€change€of€custody€of€any€child,€orÏchildren,€of€the€parties,€both€upon€the€original€divorce€hearing€and€at€anyÏsubsequent€hearing,€which€fees€may€be€fixed€and€allowed€by€the€court,€beforeÏwhom€such€action€or€proceeding€is€pending,€in€the€discretion€of€such€court.ÌÌT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„103(c)€(Supp.€1995).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò++++'ÿÿdxd d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÓ` Ü` p”XÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€WESTERN€SECTIONÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà@ à_______________________________________________________ÌÌó óà à)ò òÌBARBARA€BEEM,ó óà à)à àShelby€County€Circuit€CourtÌà à)à àNo.€144550€R.D.Ì€€€€€Plaintiff/Appellee.à à)Ìà à)ÌVS.à à)à àC.€A.€NO.€02A01„9511„CV„00252ÌÙ€€ÙßL€ ";+'h|á:` Å `€€Lßà à)Ìò òROBERT€ALAN€BEEM,ó óà à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Defendant/Appellant.à à)Ìà à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis.Ìò òHonorable€George€H.€Brown,€Jr.,€Judge€€ó óÌÌÌÌò òDavid€E.€Caywoodó ó,Ìò òMarc€E.€Reismanó ó,ÌCAUSEY,€CAYWOOD,€TAYLOR,€McMANUS€&€BAILEY,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Defendant/Appellant.ÌÌÌÌò òKay€Farese€Turneró ó,Ìò òCharles€W.€McGheeó ó,ÌTURNER€&€McGHEE,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AS€MODIFIED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌò òÌÌÌà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌLILLARD,€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)Ìò òSUMMERS,€Sp.€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ` Ü` ˜XÓÓÓà àDefendant„Appellant,€Robert€Alan€Beem€(ð ðHusbandðð),€appeals€the€judgment€of€theÏtrial€court€ordering€him€to€pay€child€support,€alimony,€and€attorneyððs€fees€to€Plaintiff„Appellee,ÏBarbara€Beem€(ð ðWifeðð).ÌÌà àThe€parties€were€divorced€in€October€1994€by€a€final€decree€which€incorporated€theÏterms€of€the€partiesðð€marital€dissolution€agreement€(ð ðMDAðð).€€Pursuant€to€the€MDA,€the€Wife€wasÏgranted€sole€custody€of€the€partiesðð€two€minor€children,€who€were€16€and€14€years€of€age€at€theÏtime€of€the€divorce.€€As€pertinent€to€this€appeal,€the€MDA€also€contained€the€following€provisions:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà à2.€€The€parties€mutually€agree€one€with€the€other€that€theÏHusband€shall€pay€to€the€Wife€as€child€support€the€sum€of€$272.00Ïper€month€commencing€on€September€1,€1994€for€a€period€ofÏeight(8)€months.€€The€amount€of€child€support€being€agreed€upon€isÏbased€upon€representation€of€the€Husband€that€he€is€unemployedÏand€making€$850.00€per€month.€€However,€the€parties€further€agreeÏthat€in€the€event€the€Husband€becomes€employed€during€the€eight(8)Ïmonth€period€in€which€he€pays€this€amount€of€child€support,€thenÏand€in€that€event,€the€child€support€guidelines€will€apply€to€his€thenÏand€there€existing€income.€€At€the€end€of€the€eight(8)€month€period,Ïwhether€or€not€the€Husband€is€employed,€the€child€support€will€beÏautomatically€raised€to€the€guidelines€based€upon€a€minimum€grossÏincome€of€$40,000.00€or€the€Husbandððs€actual€income,€whicheverÏis€greater.ÌÌà8 àà à3.€€The€parties€have€further€agreed€that€the€Wife€is€entitled€toÏalimony,€however,€the€decision€regarding€the€amount€and€length€ofÏtime€she€will€receive€such€alimony€shall€be€deferred€for€a€period€ofÏeight(8)€months€from€August€15,€1994,€at€which€time€there€will€beÏa€hearing€before€the€Court€on€the€alimony€issue€for€determination€ofÏthe€amount€and€length€of€time€to€which€she€may€be€entitled€to€suchÏalimony.ÌÌà8 àà à4.€€The€parties€mutually€agree€that€each€party€shall€be€solelyÏresponsible€for€their€own€attorneyððs€fees.ÌÌà8 àà à....ÌÌà8 àà à7.€€Husband€shall€keep€the€Court€advised€and€Wife€advisedÍduring€this€eight(8)€month€period€of€time€of€all€developmentsÏrelative€to€his€employment€and€will€relay€through€his€counsel€thisÏinformation€to€be€relayed€to€Wifeððs€counsel€regarding€hisÏemployment€status,€the€amount€of€money€he€is€making,€togetherÏwith€documentation€either€in€the€form€of€a€pay€stub€or€otherÏcertification€of€his€employment€and€current€wages....€€ÌÌÓÓÌà àIn€accordance€with€these€provisions,€the€trial€court€conducted€an€evidentiary€hearingÏin€July€1995€to€determine€the€amount€of€child€support€and€alimony€to€be€awarded€the€Wife.€€InÏAugust€1995,€the€trial€court€entered€its€judgment€ordering:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà à1.€€...[T]hat€[the€Husband]€shall€pay€to€[the€Wife],€asÏrehabilitative€alimony,€the€sum€of€$750€per€month€for€three€years€toÏbe€increased€to€the€sum€of€$900€per€month€for€four€years€for€a€totalÏof€seven€years€rehabilitative€alimony.ÌÌà8 àà à2.€€That€[the€Husband]€shall€pay€to€[the€Wife]€the€sum€ofÏ$1,059€per€month€as€child€support€for€the€partiesðð€two€minorÏchildren,€such€sum€being€based€upon€an€income€of€$55,000€per€yearÏand€such€sum€being€consistent€with€the€child€support€guidelines.ÌÌà8 àà à3.€€[That€the€Husband]€shall€pay€to€[the€Wife]€the€sum€ofÏ$1,900€as€additional€alimony€òòò òin€solidoó óóó€to€be€used€by€her€to€pay€theÏfees€of€her€counsel€for€representation€in€this€matter€now€before€theÏcourt.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àOn€appeal,€the€Husband€presents€the€following€issues€for€review:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà à1.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€awarding€seven€years€of€alimonyÏto€be€paid€at€the€rate€of€$750.00€per€month€for€the€first€three€yearsÏand€$900.00€per€month€for€the€following€four€years€where€[theÏWife]€is€a€certified€public€accountant€gainfully€employed€by€FederalÏExpress€whose€income€is€sufficient€to€meet€her€reasonable€needs,Ïwhere€her€earned€income€is€approximately€equal€to€that€of€[theÏHusband]€and€where€ten€and€a€half€months€before€the€hearing,€[theÏWife]€represented€to€the€court€that€she€only€needed€$500.00€perÏmonth€for€three€years?ÌÌà8 àà à2.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€allowing€[the€Wife]€to€testifyÏabout€communications€which€took€place€between€the€parties€duringÏsettlement€negotiations?ÌÌà8 àà à3.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€basing€[the€Husbandððs]€childÏsupport€obligation€on€an€annual€income€of€$55,000.00€where€theÍpartiesðð€marital€dissolution€agreement€which€was€approved€by€theÏtrial€court€provided€that€child€support€would€be€based€upon€[theÏHusbandððs]€actual€income€or€$40,000.00€annual€income€whicheverÏwas€greater€and€where€the€evidence€showed€that€[the€Husbandððs]Ïactual€income€was€no€more€than€$42,000.00€per€year?ÌÌà8 àà à4.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€awarding€an€attorney€fee€to€[theÏWife]€where€the€parties€had€agreed€that€they€would€pay€their€ownÏattorney€fee€and€where€[the€Wife]€has€sufficient€funds€to€pay€herÏown€fee?€€ÌÌÓÓÌÌà@ àòòò òI.€€Child€Supportó óóóÌÌà àAs€an€initial€matter,€we€conclude€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€the€Husband€toÏpay€child€support€in€the€amount€of€$1,059€per€month€based€on€the€courtððs€finding€that€the€HusbandÏhad€the€ability€to€earn€a€gross€annual€income€of€$55,000€($4,583€per€month).€€The€evidence€at€theÏhearing€below€established€that€the€Husband€earned€in€excess€of€$55,000€from€his€formerÏemployment€with€Kimberly„Clark;€however,€the€Husband€left€Kimberly„Clark€in€1994€when€hisÏjob€was€eliminated.€€At€that€time,€the€Husband,€an€engineer€in€the€pulp€and€paper€industry,€decidedÏto€start€his€own€consulting€business.€€The€Husband€testified€that€he€also€sought€employment€atÏvarious€companies€from€which€he€solicited€business,€and€he€provided€his€resume€to€a€number€ofÏemployment€search€firms,€but€the€Husbandððs€efforts€to€obtain€a€full„time€position€wereÏunsuccessful.ÌÌà àAt€the€time€the€parties€entered€into€the€MDA,€the€Husband€was€unemployed€andÏwas€earning€no€income€from€the€business.€€By€the€date€of€the€hearing,€however,€the€HusbandÏreportedly€was€earning€a€gross€monthly€income€of€$2,970.€€During€the€period€from€March€16,Ï1995,€to€June€30,€1995,€gross€receipts€from€the€Husbandððs€business€totaled€$35,086.95.€€DuringÏthat€same€period€of€time,€the€Husband€reported€business€expenses€of€$24,691.71.€€Accordingly,Ïthe€Husbandððs€gross€income€from€self„employment€for€this€three„and„one„half€month€period€wasÏ$10,395.24,€or€$2,970€per€month.€€The€Husband€testified€that€business€was€improving€and€that€heÍanticipated€being€able€to€earn€a€gross€income€of€$3,500€per€month€for€the€remainder€of€the€year.ÌÌà àIn€imputing€$55,000€in€gross€annual€income€to€the€Husband,€the€trial€courtÏappeared€to€be€influenced€primarily€by€two€findings:€€(1)€that€the€Husband€earned€in€excess€ofÏ$55,000€while€still€employed€by€Kimberly„Clark,€and€(2)€that,€as€a€sole€proprietor,€the€HusbandÏhad€ð ða€motivation€to€not€be€productiveðð€and€ð ðto€minimizeðð€his€reported€income.ÌÌà àWe€recognize€that€the€Child€Support€Guidelines€authorize€the€imputation€of€incomeÏto€an€obligor€spouse€who€is€willfully€and€voluntarily€unemployed€or€underemployed.€€In€suchÏcases,€the€trial€court€may€determine€the€obligor€spouseððs€potential€income€based€on€evidence€of€theÏobligorððs€educational€level€or€previous€work€experience.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€tit.€1240,Ïch.2„4„.03(3)(d)€(amended€1994).€€Here,€however,€the€record€contains€no€evidence€that€theÏHusband€was€willfully€and€voluntarily€unemployed€or€underemployed.€€It€was€undisputed€that€theÏHusband€left€Kimberly„Clark€because€his€position€was€eliminated.€€No€evidence€was€introduced€atÏthe€hearing€to€contradict€the€Husbandððs€testimony€concerning€his€attempts€to€solicit€business€or€toÏobtain€full„time€employment.€€Further,€in€entering€into€the€MDA,€the€parties€agreed€that€theÏHusband€was€then€unemployed;€that,€if€the€Husband€became€employed€in€the€subsequent€eight„month€period,€the€child€support€guidelines€would€apply€to€his€ð ðexistingðð€income;€and€that,€at€theÏconclusion€of€the€eight„month€period,€the€child€support€guidelines€would€be€applied€either€toÏ$40,000€or€to€the€Husbandððs€ð ðactualðð€income,€whichever€was€greater.€€We€believe€that,€underÏthese€circumstances,€the€trial€court€should€not€have€relied€upon€the€Husbandððs€former€salary€atÏKimberly„Clark€in€determining€the€Husbandððs€current€potential€income.€€ò òòòCf.óóó ó€ò òòòRiley€v.€Rileyó óóó,Ï1995€WL€311331€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(husband€voluntarily€left€employment€with€school€boardÏwhere€he€was€earning€over€$28,000€annually€and€unsuccessfully€attempted€to€earn€living€asÏfarmer);€ò òòòMyers€v.€Myersó óóó,€1995€WL€140754€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(husband€voluntarily€terminatedÏoperation€of€profitable€trucking€business€which€was€netting€in€excess€of€$40,000€per€year).ÌÌà àThe€more€difficult€issue€presented€in€this€case€is€whether€the€trial€courtððs€expressedÏskepticism€regarding€the€Husbandððs€reported€gross€income€from€self„employment€justified€theÏimputation€of€income€to€the€Husband.€€After€a€careful€review€of€the€record,€we€conclude€that€theÏevidence€does€not€support€the€imputation€of€income€on€this€basis.ÌÌà àIn€calculating€gross€income€from€self„employment,€the€Husband€was€entitled€toÏdeduct€ð ðreasonable€expenses€necessary€to€produce€such€income.ðð€€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€tit.Ï1240,€ch.€2„4„.03(3)(a)€(amended€1994).€€Excluded€from€ð ðreasonable€expensesðð€areÏð ð[d]epreciation,€home€offices,€excessive€promotional,€excessive€travel,€excessive€car€expenses,€orÏexcessive€personal€expenses.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€At€the€hearing,€the€Wife€questioned€the€high€amount€ofÏexpenses€claimed€by€the€Husband€for€a€home€business,€as€well€as€the€extensive€traveling€done€byÏthe€Husband€in€connection€with€the€business.€€The€Wife€also€testified€that€the€Husband€formerlyÏhad€a€contract€with€Federal€Express€that,€had€it€ð ðbeen€on€an€annual€basis,ðð€would€have€grossed€theÏHusband€about€$80,000€per€year.€€On€cross„examination,€the€Husband€acknowledged€that€such€aÏcontract€existed,€but€he€testified€that€Federal€Express€canceled€the€contract€in€July€1994.€€At€theÏhearingððs€conclusion,€the€trial€court€specifically€declined€to€find€that€the€Husband€had€engaged€inÏany€dishonesty€in€reporting€his€gross€income€from€self„employment,€but€the€court€indicated€that€itÏwould€view€the€Husbandððs€financial€statement€and€documents€ð ðwith€some€degree€of€skepticism.ððÌÌà àWe€understand€the€trial€courtððs€concern€that,€where€the€obligor€spouse€is€self„employed,€the€potential€exists€for€the€obligor€to€manipulate€his€reported€income€either€by€failing€toÏaggressively€solicit€business€or€by€inflating€his€business€expenses,€thereby€minimizing€his€income.€Ïò òòòSee,€e.g.,ó óóó€ò òòòKoch€v.€Kochó óóó,€874€S.W.2d€571,€578€(Tenn.€App.€1993)€(recognizing€difficulty€ofÏestablishing€husbandððs€self„employment€income€from€commercial€painting€business).€€In€this€case,Ïhowever,€neither€the€trial€courtððs€findings€nor€the€evidence€at€the€hearing€below€demonstrated€thatÏthe€Husband€was,€in€fact,€manipulating€his€income.€€To€the€contrary,€all€of€the€evidence€indicatedÏthat€the€Husband€had€successfully€sought€clients€for€his€consulting€business€and€that€he€wasÍactively€engaged€in€pursuing€new€clients.€€Further,€in€light€of€the€trial€courtððs€refusal€to€find€thatÏthe€Husbandððs€financial€documents€contained€any€ð ðuntruths,ðð€we€are€reluctant€to€infer€that€the€trialÏcourt€found€the€Husbandððs€business€expenses€to€be€unreasonable.€€Even€if€such€a€finding€by€theÏtrial€court€could€be€inferred€from€the€record,€we€believe€that€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏsuch€a€finding.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€Husband€admitted€that€his€expenses€were€not€audited€or€reviewed€by€aÏthird€party,€our€review€reveals€nothing€unreasonable€about€the€Husbandððs€claimed€businessÏexpenses.€€It€was€undisputed€that€the€nature€of€the€Husbandððs€business€involved€extensive€travel.€ÏContrary€to€the€Wifeððs€position,€the€evidence€indicated€that€the€Husband€may€have€saved€money€byÏdriving€his€personal€car€and€staying€with€friends€on€out„of„town€trips,€as€well€as€by€purchasingÏused,€rather€than€new,€equipment€for€his€business,€such€as€a€camcorder€and€a€lap„top€computer.€ÏSome€of€the€Husbandððs€travel€expenses€were€later€reimbursed€by€clients,€but€in€those€situations,Ïthe€Husband€testified,€he€properly€included€the€reimbursement€as€part€of€his€gross€businessÏreceipts.€€In€accordance€with€the€Child€Support€Guidelines,€the€Husband€did€not€deduct€businessÏexpenses€relative€to€maintaining€his€office€at€home.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€tit.€1240,€ch.Ï2„4„.03(3)(a)€(amended€1994).× ƒ# ××  ×ÌÌà àBased€on€the€foregoing€evidence,€we€conclude€that€the€record€does€not€support€theÏimputation€of€income€to€the€Husband€in€excess€of€$3,500€per€month,€the€amount€suggested€by€theÏHusband€below€and€on€appeal.€€Accordingly,€as€the€Husband€requests,€we€modify€the€HusbandððsÏchild€support€obligation€to€$833€per€month.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.€tit.€1240,€ch.€2„4Ï(amended€1994).€€Nevertheless,€in€an€effort€to€ensure€the€Wife€access€to€information€which€mightÍjustify€any€future€modification€of€child€support,€we€direct€the€Husband€to€provide€the€Wife€with€allÏpertinent€financial€documents,€including€W„2's,€1099€tax€forms,€tax€returns,€and€any€otherÏevidence€of€income€earned€by€the€Husband,€each€year€as€soon€as€such€documents€becomeÏavailable.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€ò òòòJones€v.€Jonesó óóó,€1993€WL€523567,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.€1993);€ò òòòsee€alsoó óóó€ò òòòMerrittÏv.€Merrittó óóó,€1992€WL€220160€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€This€obligation€shall€apply€to€the€1995€taxÏyear€and€shall€continue€until€Husbandððs€obligation€to€pay€child€support€ceases.€ÌÌòòò òà@ àII.€€Alimonyó óóóÌÌà àWe€decline€to€disturb€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€to€the€Wife€inÏthis€case.€€As€previously€indicated,€the€trial€court€awarded€the€Wife€alimony€in€ð ðthe€sum€of€$750Ïper€month€for€three€years€to€be€increased€to€the€sum€of€$900€per€month€for€four€years€for€a€total€ofÏseven€years€rehabilitative€alimony.ðð€€The€Husband€concedes€that€the€Wife€was€entitled€to€an€awardÏof€rehabilitative€alimony.€€The€Husband€contends,€however,€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determiningÏthe€amount€and€duration€of€alimony€to€be€awarded€because€the€Wife€failed€to€demonstrate€a€needÏfor€such€a€large€award.€€Alternatively,€the€Husband€argues€that€the€alimony€award€should€beÏreversed€because,€in€a€prior€pleading,€the€Wife€sought€only€$500€in€alimony€for€a€period€of€threeÏyears€and,€thus,€the€Wife€was€estopped€from€seeking€more€than€this€amount€in€a€later€pleading€orÏat€the€hearing.€€Ìà àPursuant€to€Local€Rule€14C€of€the€Shelby€County€Circuit€Court,€the€Wife€filed€aÏfinancial€affidavit€reflecting€her€monthly€income€and€expenses.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Shelby€County€Cir.€Ct.€R.Ï14C.€€After€deducting€expenses€from€net€income,€the€Wifeððs€financial€affidavit€reflected€a€monthlyÏdeficit€of€$1,805.€€After€deducting€from€this€amount€the€$833€in€child€support€awarded€in€thisÏcase,€as€modified,€the€Wifeððs€financial€affidavit€still€would€reflect€a€monthly€deficit€of€$972.€ÏAccordingly,€if€accepted€at€face€value,€the€Wifeððs€financial€affidavit€demonstrates€a€need€forÏalimony€in€excess€of€the€monthly€amounts€awarded€of€$750€and€$900.€€The€Husband€contends,Ïhowever,€that€the€deficit€reported€was€inaccurate€because€the€Wifeððs€affidavit€overstated€herÍmonthly€expenses€while€under€reporting€her€income.ÌÌà àWe€first€reject€the€Husbandððs€argument€regarding€the€reasonableness€of€the€WifeððsÏmonthly€expenses€as€reflected€in€her€affidavit.€€Based€upon€its€award€of€alimony€to€the€Wife,€theÏtrial€court€evidently€found€the€Wifeððs€claimed€monthly€expenses€of€approximately€$4,377€to€beÏreasonable,€and€we€conclude€that€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€such€a€finding.€€ò òòòSeeó óóóÏò òòòMcPherson€v.€McPhersonó óóó,€1992€WL€247639,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€ò òòòsee€alsoó óóó€ò òòòQuarryÏv.€Quarryó óóó,€1992€WL€141796,€at€*5€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€At€the€hearing,€the€Husband€challengedÏonly€four€listed€expenses€of€the€Wife.€€First,€the€Husband€contended€that€any€expenses€listed€onÏbehalf€of€the€partiesðð€sixteen„year„old€daughter€were€inflated€because€the€daughter€worked€twentyÏhours€per€week€and€earned€enough€money€to€contribute€to€her€own€expenses.€€The€Wife€testified,Ïhowever,€that€the€daughter€paid€only€a€limited€amount€of€her€own€expenses,€such€as€entertainmentÏand€gas,€and€that€the€daughter€did€not€pay€for€rent,€food,€or€insurance.€€The€Wifeððs€affidavit€listedÏmonthly€entertainment€expenses€for€both€children€as€$100,€and€the€affidavit€did€not€list€anyÏexpenses€for€gas€for€the€daughterððs€car.€€Even€if€the€daughter€paid€for€all€of€her€own€entertainmentÏexpenses,€therefore,€at€most€the€daughterððs€income€would€reduce€the€Wifeððs€monthly€expenses€byÏonly€$50€(half€of€the€childrenððs€entertainment€expenses).ÌÌà àNext,€the€Husband€challenged€the€Wifeððs€listed€monthly€expense€of€$50€forÏcharitable€contributions,€but€the€Husband€has€not€challenged€this€expense€on€appeal.ÌÌà àOn€appeal,€the€Husband€does€challenge€several€items€listed€under€the€WifeððsÏclaimed€home€maintenance€expense€of€$490.66,€arguing€that€many€of€the€items€represent€one„time,Ïand€not€annual,€expenses.€€We€note,€however,€that€the€Husband€did€not€challenge€these€specificÏitems€at€the€hearing€below.€€Instead,€the€Husband€made€the€general€argument€that€$490.66€forÏhome€maintenance€was€excessive€because€it€was€ð ðjust€a€little€bit€lessðð€than€the€rent€the€HusbandÏwas€paying€for€a€two„bedroom€apartment.€€We€also€note€that€the€Husband€could€have€cross„examined€the€Wife€regarding€these€specific€home€maintenance€expenses,€but€apparently€chose€notÏto€pursue€this€line€of€questioning.ÌÌà àFinally,€the€Husband€challenged€the€Wifeððs€listed€monthly€expense€of€$125€for€aÏfamily€vacation€fund,€stating€through€his€counsel€that€ð ð[t]hat€may€or€may€not€be€able€to€be€doneÏright€now.ðð€€The€trial€court,€however,€addressed€this€argument€from€the€bench,€stating:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àI€mean€the€Beem€children€and€[the€Wife€are]€entitled€to€aÏvacation€just€like€[the€Husband].€€He€went€fishing€and€did€someÏother€things€while€he€was€out€west€seeking€employment.€€And€heÏwent€to€Destin,....€€So€sheððs€entitled€to€a€vacation,....€€ÌÌÓÓÌà àAs€for€the€Husbandððs€arguments€regarding€the€Wifeððs€income,€the€Wifeððs€testimonyÏand€her€financial€affidavit,€which€was€filed€as€an€exhibit€at€the€hearing€below,€indicated€that€theÏWifeððs€monthly€net€income€was€$2,572.€€This€amount€included€net€monthly€wages€of€$2,335€fromÏthe€Wifeððs€employment€as€an€accountant€with€Federal€Express,€as€well€as€net€monthly€income€ofÏ$237€from€the€Wifeððs€employment€as€conservator€of€her€fatherððs€estate.€€Additionally,€on€cross„examination,€the€Wife€admitted€that€in€1994,€the€year€prior€to€the€hearing,€the€Wife€receivedÏapproximately€$2,000€in€bonuses€from€Federal€Express.€€Although€the€Wife€testified€that€ð ðthereÏ[had]€been€a€number€of€years€when€Federal€Express€[did]€not€give€the€bonuses,ðð€the€Wife€alsoÏadmitted€that€she€already€had€received€one€bonus€in€1995€for€$1,400.× ƒ$ ××  ×ÌÌà àThe€Husband€contends€that€the€trial€court€should€have€included€the€Wifeððs€bonusesÏin€her€income€when€the€court€determined€the€Wifeððs€need€for€alimony.€€In€determining€the€amountÏand€duration€of€the€alimony€to€be€awarded€in€this€case,€the€trial€court€was€required€to€consider,Ïamong€other€factors,€the€relative€earning€capacity€and€financial€resources€of€each€party,€includingÏincome€from€all€sources.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)(A)€(Supp.€1995).€€Nevertheless,€even€ifÍthe€trial€court€failed€to€include€the€Wifeððs€bonuses€in€her€income,€this€failure€does€not€requireÏreversal€of€the€alimony€award.€€Accordingly,€based€on€Wifeððs€demonstrated€need€for€alimony,€theÏtrial€court€did€not€err€in€awarding€alimony€in€the€amounts€of€$750€and€$900€per€month,Ïrespectively.× ƒ% ××  ×€€If€the€Wifeððs€bonuses€are€added€to€her€income,€the€Wifeððs€financial€affidavit€stillÏreflects€a€monthly€deficit€in€excess€of€$800.ÌÌà àGiven€the€duration€of€the€partiesðð€marriage€and€the€Wifeððs€contributions€to€theÏmarriage,€both€tangible€and€intangible,€we€likewise€conclude€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€itsÏdiscretion€in€establishing€a€seven„year€term€for€the€alimony€award.€€ò òòòSee,€e.g.,ó óóó€ò òòòQuarry€v.ÏQuarryó óóó,€1992€WL€141796,€at€*4€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€ò òòòsee€alsoó óóó€T.C.A.€ðððð€36„5„101(d)(1)(C),€(J)Ï(Supp.€1995).€€The€evidence€at€the€hearing€showed€that€the€parties€were€married€for€twenty„threeÏyears.€€In€the€early€years€following€the€partiesðð€marriage,€the€Wife€worked€full„time€and€put€theÏHusband€through€college.€€The€Wife€quit€working€outside€the€home€after€the€birth€of€the€partiesððÏfirst€child.€€During€the€marriage,€the€parties€relocated€to€a€different€city€at€least€five€times€while€theÏHusband€worked€to€advance€his€career.€€In€1986,€when€the€parties€had€been€married€approximatelyÏfifteen€years,€the€Wife€returned€to€college€to€obtain€an€accounting€degree.€€After€obtaining€herÏdegree,€the€Wife€became€a€certified€public€accountant.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€Wife€hadÏbeen€working€as€an€accountant€for€Federal€Express€for€less€than€two€years.€€During€the€eight„€orÏnine„month€period€between€entry€of€the€final€divorce€decree€and€the€hearing€below,€the€WifeÏsupported€herself€and€the€children€with€only€minimal€child€support€and€no€alimony€payments€fromÍthe€Husband.€€ÌÌà àFinally,€we€reject€the€Husbandððs€argument€that€the€Wife€was€estopped€from€seekingÏmore€alimony€at€the€hearing€than€she€requested€in€a€previous€pleading.€€The€Wifeððs€initial€claim€forÏalimony€in€the€amount€of€$500€per€month€for€three€years€was€made€in€a€memorandum€filed€withÏthe€court€approximately€eleven€months€prior€to€the€hearing€pursuant€to€Local€Rule€14D€of€theÏShelby€County€Circuit€Court.€€Rule€14D€requires€counsel€in€contested€divorce€cases€to€provide€toÏthe€court,€prior€to€trial,€a€memorandum€setting€forth€the€partyððs€position€with€regard€to€the€variousÏlegal€issues€before€the€court,€such€as€grounds€for€divorce,€visitation,€child€support,€disposition€andÏvalue€of€the€marital€home,€disposition€of€any€other€property,€alimony,€and€attorneyððs€fees.€€ò òòòSeeó óóóÏShelby€County€Cir.€Ct.€R.€14D.€€Approximately€one€month€prior€to€the€hearing€in€this€case,€theÏWife€amended€her€proposed€alimony€award€to€request€$1,000€per€month€for€a€period€of€eightÏyears.ÌÌà àUnder€the€doctrine€of€ð ðjudicial€estoppel,ðð€where€a€person€states€under€oath€in€priorÏlitigation,€ð ðeither€in€pleadings€or€testimony,€that€a€fact€is€true,€she€will€not€be€permitted€to€deny€thatÏfact€in€subsequent€litigation.ðð€€ò òòòCardin€v.€Campbelló óóó,€920€S.W.2d€222,€223„24€(Tenn.€App.Ï1995).€€Principles€of€judicial€estoppel€may€also€prevent€a€party€from€changing€a€legal€positionÏasserted€in€prior€litigation,€provided€the€position€was€asserted€in€a€sworn€pleading.€€ò òòòLayhew€v.ÏDixonó óóó,€527€S.W.2d€739,€741€(Tenn.€1975).€€Where€the€previous€pleading€was€not€sworn,Ïhowever,€and€represented€ð ðno€more€than€the€statements€of€position€of€the€parties€to€that€action,ððÏestoppel€principles€do€not€apply€because€ð ðjudicial€estoppels€are€not€favored€and€ordinarily€do€notÏarise€out€of€mere€unsworn€pleadings.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóóÌÌà àThe€memorandum€required€by€Rule€14D€does€not€appear€to€be€a€sworn€statement€orÏpleading,€such€as€the€financial€affidavit€required€by€Local€Rule€14C.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Shelby€County€Cir.€Ct.ÍR.14C.× ƒ& ××  ×€€Rather,€the€memorandum€appears€to€represent€no€more€than€the€partyððs€statement€ofÏposition€with€regard€to€the€issues€before€the€court.€€Accordingly,€principles€of€judicial€estoppel€doÏnot€apply€to€the€Wifeððs€memorandum€filed€pursuant€to€Rule€14D,€and€the€Wife€was€not€estoppedÏfrom€changing€her€position€with€regard€to€the€alimony€issue.ÌÌÔ&  Ôà àòòò òà@ àIII.€€Attorneyððs€Feesó óóóÌÌà àWe€also€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€$1,900€to€the€Wife€as€additional€alimonyÏòòò òin€solidoó óóó€to€be€used€by€the€Wife€to€pay€her€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€relative€to€the€hearing€below.Ô'  Ô€ÏThe€Husband€insists€that€the€Wife€should€be€required€to€pay€her€own€attorneyððs€fees€pursuant€toÏthe€terms€of€the€partiesðð€MDA,€under€which€the€parties€mutually€agreed€to€ð ðbe€solely€responsibleÏfor€their€own€attorneyððs€fees.ðð€€Because€the€MDA€specifically€contemplated€that€a€hearing€would€beÏheld€after€eight€months€to€determine€the€alimony€issue,€the€Husband€argues,€the€attorneyððs€feeÏprovision€also€applied€to€the€hearing€below.€€In€awarding€attorneyððs€fees€to€the€Wife,€the€trial€courtÏruled€that,€although€the€fee€provision€governed€the€proceedings€up€to€the€date€of€the€MDA,€theÏprovision€did€not€preclude€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€in€future€proceedings.ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€the€MDAððs€attorneyððs€fee€provision€did€notÏpreclude€an€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€to€the€Wife€for€the€hearing€below.€€Although€the€attorneyððs€feeÏprovision€may€have€applied€to€the€alimony€hearing€contemplated€by€the€MDA,€the€provision€didÏnot€apply€to€any€future€proceedings€brought€to€enforce€the€child€support€provisions€of€the€MDA€asÍincorporated€into€the€final€divorce€decree.€€Instead€of€providing€for€a€later€hearing€to€determineÏchild€support,€the€MDA€placed€an€affirmative,€continuing€obligation€on€the€Husband€to€keep€theÏtrial€court€and€the€Wife€advised€of€all€developments€relative€to€the€Husbandððs€employment€status,Ïincluding€the€amount€of€income€the€Husband€was€making.€€This€obligation€required€the€HusbandÏto€provide€the€Wife€with€documentation€of€his€income,€such€as€a€pay€stub€or€other€certification.€ÏFurther,€if€the€Husband€became€employed€during€the€eight„month€period,€the€MDA€required€theÏHusband€to€adjust€his€child€support€payments€in€accordance€with€the€Child€Support€Guidelines.€ÏAt€the€conclusion€of€the€eight„month€period,€the€Husbandððs€child€support€obligation€wouldÏautomatically€increase€in€accordance€with€the€guidelines€based€on€a€minimum€gross€income€ofÏ$40,000€or€the€Husbandððs€actual€income,€whichever€was€greater.ÌÌà àTennessee€has€long€recognized€ð ðthe€right€of€the€custodial€parent€to€bring€suit€toÏenforce€the€childrenððs€right€of€support€and€to€recover€reasonable€attorneyððs€fees€from€the€obligorÏspouse.ðð€€ò òòòSilverstein€v.€Silversteinó óóó,€1987€WL€18376,€at€*5€(Tenn.€App.€1987)€(citingÏò òòòGraham€v.€Grahamó óóó,€140€Tenn.€328,€334„35,€204€S.W.€987,€989€(1918)).€€In€this€regard,ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€Section€36„5„103(c)€permits€a€custodial€spouse€to€recover€reasonableÏlegal€expenses€incurred€in€any€proceeding€to€enforce€a€decree€for€child€support.€€ò òòòLumpkins€v.ÏLumpkinsó óóó,€1995€WL€581417,€at€*5€(Tenn.€App.€1995);€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„103(c)€(Supp.€1995).× ƒ' ××  ×€ÏIn€awarding€attorneyððs€fees€pursuant€to€section€36„5„103(c),€the€trial€court€may€consider€proof€ofÏinability€to€pay,€but€ð ðability€to€pay€should€not€be€the€controlling€consideration.ðð€€ò òòòSherrod€v.ÍWixó óóó,€849€S.W.2d€780,€785€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€ÌÌà àAt€the€hearing€below,€the€Husband€admitted€that€he€did€not€adjust€his€child€supportÏpayments€during€the€eight„month€period€as€required€by€the€MDA.€€Although€the€HusbandÏincreased€his€child€support€payments€at€the€conclusion€of€the€eight„month€period,€the€Wife€testifiedÏthat€she€incurred€additional€attorneyððs€fees€because€the€Husband€insisted€on€going€to€trial€on€theÏissue€of€child€support€when€the€parties€were€unable€to€resolve€their€dispute.€€Accordingly,€we€holdÏthat,€despite€the€attorneyððs€fee€provision€contained€in€the€partiesðð€MDA,€section€36„5„103(c)Ïauthorized€the€trial€court€to€award€the€Wife€$1,900€to€cover€her€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€relative€toÏthe€hearing€below.€€In€so€holding,€we€note€that,€although€the€MDA€contemplated€that€the€partiesÏwould€be€responsible€for€their€own€attorneyððs€fees,€the€MDA€also€contemplated€that€the€HusbandÏwould€comply€with€the€child€support€provisions€of€the€MDA€without€resort€to€court€action.€€TheÏHusband€should€not€be€permitted€to€enforce€the€MDAððs€attorneyððs€fee€provision€against€the€WifeÏrelative€to€a€hearing€which€was€necessitated€in€part€by€the€Husbandððs€failure€to€abide€by€the€childÏsupport€provisions€of€the€MDA.ÌÌÔ&  Ôà0 àòòò òà@ àIV.€€Conclusionó óóóÌÌà àWe€modify€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€to€order€the€Husband€to€pay€child€support€inÏthe€amount€of€$833€per€month.€€Additionally,€we€order€the€Husband€to€provide€the€Wife€with€allÏpertinent€financial€documents€and€other€evidence€of€income€earned€by€the€Husband€in€accordanceÏwith€the€dictates€of€this€opinion.€€In€all€other€respects,€the€trial€Ô'  Ôcourtððs€judgment€is€affirmed.€€ThisÏcause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€court€for€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€ofÏthis€appeal€are€taxed€one„half€to€the€Husband€and€one„half€to€the€Wife,€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓ` Ü` È“XÓÓÓà à_______________________________Ìà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌLILLARD,€J.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌSUMMERS,€Sp.€J.€(Concurs)