ÿWPCh …# VU:a %› 0û¡w@œ 4Ü ð ÿ   0L 0J_ 0T© 0^ý 0h[ 0rà 0|5 0†± 07 1uÇU,< 0dhU,ÌU*øB)"DCK BŽ AM«»øv~³vÓ1 D3 0@7 0Lw AOÃÆ 0DØ D/ BK˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 , øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX(Óý,$¡¡Ñ  ÑÒH°ÒÒ°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal[  AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XûXXXÔÑ7€>‚XXdðXXdð7Ñ ýþDÿDDÊÓ€‹â 3|xHTÈR> ÿÿ$Large Circleððà0 à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d####7Border 1dd d€-$Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€"ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€d#ÑÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌò òAugustÏ16,Ï1996ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€"ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò>ßb$Large Circleððà0 à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú2Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€!!X„d&ÓÑ#€!!Xd#ÑÔ€"ÔÑ  ÑÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÑ#€Xd#ÑÝ  ÝÓÓò òÙ€€ÙÙ€€ÙÓ  ÓßL€&'$;+'h|Á` à. `€€Lß›IN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÓ  Óà@ à„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„„Ìó óÌÓÓœZOLTAN›€œBOKOR›,à àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€CircuitÏNo.€œ94C›„2327Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellantà àà àà à)à àAppeal€No.€Ïœ01A01„9603„CV„00119›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌWILLIAM€BRUCE€and€BRUCE,€à àà à)ÌWEATHERS,€ET.€AL.,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appelleesà àà à)à àÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSONÏCOUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌTHE€HONORABLE€WALTER€C.€œKURTZ›,€JUDGEÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌò òDAVID€H.€KINGÌKING,€œTURNBOW›€&€œBRISBY›Ìó ó203€Third€Avenue€SouthÌFranklin,€TN€37064ÌAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌò òWINSTON€S.€EVANSÌEVANS,€JONES€&€œREYNOLDS›Ìó ó1810€First€Union€TowerÌ150€Fourth€Avenue,€NorthÌNashville,€TN€37219„2424ÌAttorney€for€Defendants/AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMED€and€REMANDED.ÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€H.€INMAN,€SENIOR€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€œCRAWFORD›,€JUDGEÌÌALAN€E.€œHIGHERS›,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌò òòòÓ  ÓO€P€I€N€I€O€N€€ÌÓ  ÓÌÓÓóóó óà àThis€action€for€damages€alleging€malpractice€by€the€defendant€law€firm€wasÏdismissed€on€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€We€agree€that€the€one„year€statute€ofÏlimitations,€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.€ððóó€28„3„104,€bars€the€action.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€alleged€that€he€employed€the€defendant€Bruce€to€represent€himÏin€a€dispute€with€an€œarchitect,€Rains,€with›€whom€he€had€worked€on€certain€housingÏprojects.€€One€of€these€œprojects€was€located€in€Huntsville,€Alabama.€€The€fee€for€theÏproject€was€$250,000.00,›€to€be€divided€equally€between€the€plaintiff€and€Rains.Ìà àDisagreements€arose,€resulting€in€the€plaintiff€employing€the€defendantÏBruce€to€file€suit€against€Rains€to€protect,€or€collect,€his€share€of€the€Huntsville€fee.€ÏThis€suit€was€filed€February€8,€1991€and€dismissed€on€March€24,€1992€for€failure€toÏprosecute.€€Two€days€later,€the€Huntsville€project€was€closed€and€the€entireÏ$250,000.00€was€disbursed€to€œRains,€who€failed€to€remit€one„half€to€the€plaintiff.›Ìà àThe€plaintiff€thereupon€employed€another€attorney€who€filed€a€motion€to€setÏaside€the€order€of€dismissal.€€This€motion€œwas›€granted€August€25,€1992.€€The€caseÏwas€heard€and€judgment€œentered›€against€Rains€for€$114,174.50€on€July€28,€1993.Ìà àRains€then€filed€a€petition€in€bankruptcy.€€Owing€to€a€change€in€œaddress,›€theÏplaintiff€had€no€notice€of€the€bankruptcy€until€February€1,€1994.€€The€plaintiffððsÏjudgment€was€discharged.Ìà àThe€plaintiff€then€turned€his€attention€to€Mr.€Bruce€by€filing€this€action€on€JulyÏ24,€1994,€in€which€he€alleged€that€the€negligence€of€Mr.€Bruce€in€failing€toÏprosecute€the€action€against€Rains€was€the€direct€and€proximate€cause€of€his€loss.Ìà àThe€defendants€moved€for€summary€judgment€alleging€the€action€accrued€inÏœMarch›€1992€when€it€was€dismissed€for€failure€to€prosecute.€€The€plaintiff€respondedÏthat€his€damages€accrued€as€of€August€30,€1993€when€he€learned€of€RainsððÏœbankruptcy€which€rendered€his€judgment€worthless.›Ìà àThe€trial€judge€ruled€that€the€statute€ð ðbegan€to€run€in€March€of€1992€andÏcertainlyœ€by€May€of€1993"€and€granted€the€defendantsðð€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€This€appeal€ensued.Ìà àOur€Supreme€Court€has€ruled€that€it€is€no€longer€necessary€for€the€plaintiff€toÏsuffer€an€ð ðirremediableðð€injury€before€a€cause€of€action€for€legal€malpractice€willÏaccrue.ÌÒ  ÒÒ H ÒÒ  ÒÒ r ÒÓÓÓ  ÓAlthough€the€ð ðtollingðð€argument€pressed€by€the€plaintiffs€has€beenÏaccepted€in€some€jurisdictions,€it€is€not€supported€by€our€cases.€€InÏòòSecurity€Bank,óó€we€held€that€the€plaintiffs€had€suffered€anÏð ðirremediable€injuryðð€when€the€bonds€defaulted;€and€we€specificallyÏrejected€the€plaintiffððs€contention€that€the€injury€was€not€irremediableÏuntil€the€suit€against€the€guarantors€of€the€bonds€was€concluded.€ÏSimilarly,€in€òòChambers,€óówe€held€that€the€plaintiff€had€suffered€anÏirremediable€injury,€in€the€form€of€court€costs,€delays,€and€additionalÏattorneyððs€fees,€when€his€lawsuit€against€Washington€County€wasÏdismissed.€€We€made€this€determination€without€regard€to€ð ðwhetherÏor€not€the€Washington€County€lawsuit€had€reached€the€irremediableÏstage.ðð€€òòChambers,€óó713€S.W.2d€at€899.€€Since€our€cases€establishÏthat€the€injury€need€not€be€ð ðirremediableðð€in€the€sense€urged€by€theÏplaintiffs,€we€reject€their€argument.€€Furthermore,€we€can€no€longerÏeven€approve€of€the€usage€of€the€adjective€ð ðirremediableðð€in€thisÍcontext:€€this€term,€which€was€first€used€in€pure€dicta€by€theÏòòAmeraccountóó€court,€has€caused€confusion€from€its€inception€andÏserves€no€useful€purpose.€€Therefore,€to€avoid€further€confusion,€weÏconclude€that€henceforth€the€term€ð ðlegally€cognizable€injuryðð€orÏð ðactual€injuryðð€should€be€used€in€this€context.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ r ÒÒ  ÒÒ Ï ÒÓ K ÓÓÓòòCarvell€v.€Bottoms,€óó900€S.W.2d€23,€29„30€(Tenn.€1995)ÌÓ  Óà àTherefore,€a€cause€of€action€for€legal€malpractice€accrues€when€theÏfollowing€events€occur:Ìà à(a)€The€plaintiff€becomes€aware€of€the€alleged€negligence€of€the€attorney;Ìà à(b)€The€plaintiff€suffers€a€legally€cognizable€injury€or€an€actual€injury.Ìà àThere€is€no€dispute€that€the€plaintiff€became€aware€of€the€allegedÏnegligence€of€Mr.€Bruce€in€March€of€1992€when€he€learned€that€the€lawsuit€hadÏbeen€dismissed€and€that€the€funds€had€been€disbursed€to€Rains.€€Therefore,€theÏquestion€before€the€Court€is€whether€the€plaintiff€suffered€a€ð ðlegally€cognizableÏinjury€or€an€actual€injuryðð€more€than€one€year€before€the€date€on€which€Bokor€filedÏsuit.Ìà àThe€closing€occurred€and€the€entire€fee€was€disbursed€to€Rains€in€March€ofÏ1992.€€Therefore,€the€plaintiff€suffered€a€legally€cognizable€or€actual€injury€inÏMarch€of€1992,€more€than€two€years€before€suit€was€filed.€€Accordingly,€theÏplaintiffððs€claim€for€legal€malpractice€is€barred€by€the€statute€of€limitations,€òòTenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ððóó€28„3„104.Ìà àÌà àBut€the€plaintiff€contends€that€he€could€not€have€suffered€any€injury€ð ðprior€toÏdetermining€his€interest,€if€any,€in€the€funds€which€were€disbursed€as€a€result€of€Mr.ÏBruceððs€negligence.ðð€€This€argument€is€without€merit€because€the€plaintiff€had€òòatÏleastóó€a€contingent€interest€when€the€funds€were€disbursed€in€March€of€1992.Ìà àMoreover,€the€trial€courtððs€Memorandum€Opinion€and€Order€of€June€3,€1993Ïin€the€underlying€lawsuit€held€that€the€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€a€judgment€in€theÏamount€of€$114,174.50€against€Rains,€thus€settling€the€issue€that€the€plaintiff€hadÏan€interest€in€the€funds€which€had€been€disbursed€to€Rains.€€This€was€more€thanÏone€year€before€Bokor€filed€suit€for€legal€malpractice.Ìà àDirectly€on€point€is€òòChalmers€v.€Dillow,€óó713€S.W.2d€896€(Tenn.€1986)€whereÏanother€lawyer€allowed€a€lawsuit€to€be€dismissed€for€failure€to€prosecute.€€TheÏclient€then€hired€a€second€lawyer€who€was€able€to€reinstate€the€lawsuit.€€However,Ïthe€reinstated€lawsuit€was€then€dismissed€because€it€had€not€been€initially€filed€byÏthe€first€lawyer€within€the€statute€of€limitations.€€The€client€then€filed€a€legalÏmalpractice€action€against€the€first€lawyer.€€The€legal€malpractice€action€wasÏdismissed€as€time„barred€even€though€it€was€filed€within€one€year€from€the€timeÏthat€the€underlying€lawsuit€was€ultimately€dismissed€on€the€merits.€€TheÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€explained€in€holding€that€the€client€had€suffered€injuryÏas€soon€as€he€learned€of€the€dismissal€for€failure€to€prosecute:ÌÒ  ÒÒ Ï ÒÒ  ÒÒ ½ ÒÓÓÓ  Ó[A]ssuming€that€the€full€extent€of€his€damages€were€notÏascertainable€at€the€time,€we€have€held€that€a€plaintiff€cannot€beÏpermitted€to€wait€until€he€knows€all€of€the€injurious€effects€asÏconsequences€of€an€actionable€wrong.€€òòSecurity€Bank€and€Trust€Co.Ïv.€Fabricating€Inc.,€óó673€S.W.2d€860€(Tenn.€1983);€òòTaylor€v.€ClaytonÏMovile€Homes,€Inc.,€óó516€S.W.2d€72€(Tenn.€1974).€€Plaintiff€wasÏliable€for€the€court€costs€of€his€dismissed€lawsuit,€he€had€suffered€aÏlengthy€delay€in€the€progress€of€his€case,€even€if€it€be€assumed€itÏwas€subject€to€revival,€and€at€a€minimum€had€lost€the€interest€on€theÏuse€of€an€anticipated€money€recovery.€€Also€he€was€immediatelyÏfaced€with€the€necessity€to€incur€additional€attorneyððs€fees,€all€as€aÏdirect€result€of€Frostððs€negligence.€€Those€damages,€which€hadÏmatured€in€March€1982,€together€with€his€full€knowledge€of€FrostððsÏnegligence,€were€sufficient€òòinjuryóó€to€trigger€the€accrual€of€plaintiffððsÏcause€of€action€without€regard€to€whether€or€not€the€WashingtonÏCounty€lawsuit€had€reached€the€irremediable€stage.ÌÌÒ  ÒÒ ½ ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÓÓÓ  Ó713€S.W.2d€at€898„899.Ìà àÌà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€plaintiff€€ð ðwas€liable€for€the€court€costs€of€his€dismissedÏlawsuit,ðð€ð ðhad€suffered€a€lengthy€delay€in€the€progress€of€his€case,ðð€and€ð ðhad€lostÏthe€interest€on€the€use€of€an€anticipated€recovery.ððÌà àThe€plaintiff€contends€that€he€ð ðwas€not€injured€until€such€time€as€he€learnedÏthat€he€was€unable€to€collect€the€funds€from€Mr.€Rains.ðð€€This€argument€runsÏcounter€to€the€rational€of€òòChambersóó€because€the€plaintiff€suffered€injury€as€soon€asÏhis€lawsuit€against€Rains€was€dismissed€for€failure€to€prosecute€and€the€funds€wereÏdisbursed€to€Rains.€€Significantly,€the€plaintiff€received€a€financial€statement€fromÏRains€during€settlement€discussions€in€early€May€of€1993€which€revealed€thatÏRains€was€insolvent.€€It€is€perfectly€clear€that€the€plaintiff€knew€he€had€beenÏdamaged€òòto€some€extent,óó€even€if€the€full€extent€of€his€damages€were€notÏascertainable€at€that€time.€€As€stated€in€òòChambers,óó€ð ða€plaintiff€cannot€be€permittedÏto€wait€until€he€knows€all€of€the€injurious€effects€as€consequences€of€an€actionableÏwrong.ððÌà àFrom€all€of€which€we€are€satisfied€that€the€motion€was€correctly€granted.€€WeÏdo€not€presume€the€correctness€of€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€and€have€made€aÏfresh€determination€as€to€whether€the€requirements€of€òò€Rule€56,€Tenn.€R.civ.€P.Ï,óóhave€been€satisfied.€€òòGonzales€v.€Alman€Const.€Co.,€óó857€S.W.2d€42€(Tenn.€Ct.ÏApp.€1993).€à à›à àÌà àThe€judgment€is€affirmed€at€the€costs€of€the€appellant.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à_______________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àWilliam€H.€Inman,€Senior€JudgeÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌW.€Frank€œCrawford›,€JudgeÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌAlan€E.€œHighers›,€œJudge›ÌÔ% € ÔÌœ›Ô% € ÔÌÌà àà àà àà àà à