WPCI  0~V 0x 0kL 0k 0" 0~ 0: 0 0 0 0  0 01 0C 0V( 0~ 0M 0 0 0X 0 0 0 0KUB %0 0z6 0 1 0 r 0= 0F 0P 1V 0 0O$#Es# 0}u# 0x# 0j$ 0j$ 0ea% 0W% 0W& 0t& 0j& 0b' 0( 0( 0w) 0X* 0L+ 0S, 0-m- 0@. 0/ 00 0#1 01 0^2 03 03 0l4 04 15?6nO6 046 B074M7 0a7^7 0J\88 0@9 D39w@ : 0JK: 0T: 0^: 0hG; 0r; 0|!< 0< 0#= 1u= 0d(>U6>B)>DC> AM.?U*{??v~@v<6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiXXx6X@JQX@( T$   dڃ"$(G.2٘$ FT!   XX     0  MARVINBERKELESLIEMcWILLIAMS($   0   VANNLASLEYPINCHAKWERNERStantonspousal 401K/401KAleshireBrandtTownerPenlandMcKee("$    GGGG'dxd *+,-.D/U0D1U23Ӏ2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23  VWXYZ[\] ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X<  9p`(Courier New% Line 7 dgggg7Border 1ddNhC << G<  9p`(Arial  F!  #d#f  jj   YYY FILEDjX August28,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.jAppellateCourtClerk PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'hStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva NC<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd F! . f    7z XXdd7\RA'\ `    , 5  g u` RikhA1-j|`  `@Rߛ @ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEE@ EASTERNSECTIONJUDITHGAILGRIZZLEBOWERS@ @ ) SULLIVANCOUNTY @ ) 03A019606CH00193 PlaintiffAppellee   @ )@ )@ ) v.    @ ) HON. RICHARDE.LADD,̀@ ) CHANCELLOR@ ) @ JOSEPHSTANTONBOWERS,JR.@ )̀@ ) DefendantAppellant @ ) AFFIRMEDANDREMANDEDMELVINJ.WERNEROFKINGSPORTFORAPPELLANTDAVIDS.HAYNESOFBRISTOLFORAPPELLEE    OPINION         Goddard,P.J.  JosephStantonBowers,Jr.,appealstheSullivanCountyChanceryCourt'sdenialofhismotiontomodifysupportpaymentstohisexwife,JudithGailBowers,pursuanttotheparties'maritaldissolutionagreement.Mr.BowersinsiststhattheTrialCourterredinitscharacterizationofthesupportpaymentsasalimonyinsolido,whichrenderedthemincapableofbeingmodified.  Thepartiesweremarriedfor28yearswhen,onApril26,1991,Mr.Bowerswasgrantedadivorceonthegroundsofirreconcilabledifferences.ThedivorcedecreeincorporatedtheagreedtoMaritalDissolutionAgreement.  TheMaritalDissolutionAgreementprovidedthatthespousalsupporttobepaidtoMs.Bowersfor15yearswouldbedeterminedbyasomewhatcomplicatedformula,authoredbyMr.Bowers,whichwastiedtohisincomeandthemaritaldebts.TheAgreementprovidedinpertinentpartasfollows:         DISTRIBUTIONOFMARITALDEBTSANDSPOUSALSUPPORT. Totalincome,usingthetermtomeanthesameasmutualincome,willbedefinedastheHusband'sincomeasofAugust1,1990lessfederalwithholding,socialsecurity,healthinsurance(aslongasWifeiscoveredbysuchhealthinsurance),andlifeinsurance(aslongasWifeisbeneficiary).AnyincomewhichtheWifereceivesafterSeptember1,1990,andanyincomeovertheamountofAugust31,1990thattheHusbandreceivesafterSeptember1,1990shallnotbeincludedinthedefinitionoftotalincomeormutualincome. Atotalof$4,000.00(FourThousandDollars)shallbedeductedfromthetotalincomeasheretoforedefinedeachyear($2,000.00each)foranIRAor401KforHusbandandWife. HusbandandWifeshallshareequallythetotalincomelessIRA/401Kdeductionsasdescribedinparagraphabove,lessmutualdebtsashereinafterdescribedforaperiodoffifteenyearsbeginningSeptember1,1990. Aslongasincomeisbeingdivided,incometaxrefundsordebtsincurredfromthedividedincomeshallbedivided50/50. Whenamutualdebtispaidoff,orreduced,orifanewmutualdebtisincurred,thedifferencebetweentheoldmutualdebttotalandthenewmutualdebttotal,orthereducedpaymentsshallbesplit50/50andaddedto,orsubtractedfrom,Husband'sorWife'sshareofthetotalincomeasheretoforedescribed.       TheMaritalDissolutionAgreementdoesnotcharacterizethesupportasalimonyinsolidooralimonyinfuturo.  Mr.BowersmadetimelysupportpaymentsinconjunctionwiththeAgreementforapproximatelythreeyearsuntilonJuly15,1994,whenhefiledamotionwiththeSullivanCountyChanceryCourttomodifythesupportpaymentsduetoallegedchangedcircumstances.Ms.BowersfiledacounterclaimallegingthatMr.BowerswasdeficientinhispaymentsundertheAgreement.  AfterahearingbeforetheSullivanCountyChanceryCourtonthemotionandcounterclaimonJune28,1994,theTrialCourtissuedanorderonJuly7,1994.TheTrialCourtheldthatthesupportpaymentscalledforintheMaritalDissolutionAgreementwerealimonyinsolido,andthusnotsubjecttomodification.TheTrialCourtreferredthecasetoaSpecialMasterforrecommendationsastothebalanceoftheaccountsbetweenthepartiesasofthedateofthehearing.OnAugust19,1994,Mr.Bowersfiledamotionforreconsiderationofthejudgment,whichtheTrialCourtdeniedafterahearing.  Aftertwoadditionalhearings,concerningexceptionstotheSpecialMaster'sReport,theTrialCourtenteredafinalorderonApril2,1996.TheCourtheldthatthesupportpaymentswerealimonyinsolidoandnotsubjecttomodification.TheTrialCourtorderedMr.BowerstopayMs.Bowers$31,806.27peryearfor15yearsin26paymentsperyear.TheCourtalsoorderedMr.BowerstopayarrearageasdeterminedbytheSpecialMaster.  Mr.Bowersappealsthefinalorderandraisestwoissuesonappeal,whichareinterrelated.HeinsiststhattheTrialCourterredinitsfindingthatthealimonywasalimonyinsolidoandnotsubjecttomodification.HefurtherinsiststhatuponitsfindingthatthealimonywasalimonyinsolidothattheTrialCourtabuseditsdiscretionintheamountofalimonyandarrearageawardedtoMs.Bowers.  Mr.Bowersfirstarguesthattheevidenceofthecasepreponderatesagainstafindingthatthealimonywasinsolido,andthusthefindingshouldbereversedonappeal.Areviewoftherecord,however,showsthattheTrialCourtdidnoterrinitsfindingthatthealimonyintheMaritalDissolutionAgreementwasalimonyinsolido.  TheTennesseedivorcestatutesallowforacourttoawardthreedifferentkindsofalimonytoanexspouse,rehabilitativealimony,alimonyinsolido,andalimonyinfuturo.Mr.BowersinsiststhatthealimonytobepaidtoMs.Bowersisalimonyinfuturo,notalimonyinsolidoastheTrialCourtdetermined.  TheTennesseecourtshavedefined"alimonyinsolido"as:       anawardofadefiniteamountoralumpsumofmoney.Thislumpsumcanbepayablebyinstallmentsforadefinitelengthoftimeandstillbeclassifiedasalimonyinsolido.9TennesseeJurisprudence, DivorceandAlimony ,33(1983). Alimony insolido cannotbemodifiedafterthecourt'sdecreebecomesfinal.Theentireawardmustbepaidinfullregardlessofsubsequenteventssuchasremarriageoftherecipientordeathofthepayor. Aleshirev.Aleshire ,642S.W.2d729(Tenn.Ct.App.1981),citing Spaldingv.Spalding ,597S.W.2d739,741(Tenn.Ct.App.1980).       Brandtv.Brandt,anunpublishedopinionofthisCourt,filedinJacksononJanuary4,1991.Thekeydeterminationastowhetheranalimonyawardisinsolidoiswhetherthelanguageoftheawardisdefiniteorindefinite."Iftheawardcallsforadefinitesumofmoneynotcontingentuponthehappeningofanevent,thenitisalumpsumor insolido awardregardlessofwhetheritwasorderedtobepaidininstallmentsoronefixedamount."Brandt,citingMcKeev.McKee,655S.W.2d164(Tenn.App.1983).  WemustlooktothelanguageoftheMaritalDissolutionAgreementtodeterminewhetherthepaymentsweredefiniteorwhethertheywerecontingentuponthehappeningofafutureevent.Itisclearfromthelanguageoftheagreementthatthepaymentswouldbethesamecertainsumfora15yearperiodasapercentageofMr.Bowers'1990income.Thefactthatthepaymentswerenottitled"alimonyinsolido"doesnotrenderthemmodifiable.Additionally,merelybecausesomeofthepaymentsmightbeusedinthefuturetopayoffdebtsdoesnotrenderthepaymentsmodifiablesincetheamountpaidwillbethesame,regardlessofhowthepaymentsareused.Finally,itisclearfromthelanguageoftheagreementthatthepartiesintendedthepaymentstobedefinite.TheAgreementstates:       Amodificationorwaiverofanyoftheprovisionsofthisagreementshallbeeffectiveonlyifmadeinwritingandexecutedwiththesameformalityasthisagreement,andapprovedbythecourtifsuchapprovalisrequired.Failureofeitherpartytoinsistuponstrictperformanceofanyoftheprovisionsofthisagreementshallnotbeconstruedasawaiverofanysubsequentdefaultofthesameorsimilarnature.       Therefore,weconcludethattheTrialCourtwascorrectinitsfindingthatthealimonywasinsolidoalimony,notsubjecttomodification.  Mr.Bowersadditionallyarguesthateveniftheawardwereinsolidoalimony,theamountofinsolidoalimonyawardedcouldnothaveexceededtheamountoftheestateatthetimeofthedivorce.Hearguesthathewouldhavetopayapproximately$477,000over15years,anamountnearly15timesgreaterthanthevalueoftheestateatthetimeofthedivorcedecree.  AssumingthatMr.Bowersiscorrectinhiscontentionthatthealimonyinsolidocannotbegreaterthantheamountoftheestate,theCourtstillnolongerhastheabilitytomodifytheaward.Generally,thecontractualobligationsoftheMaritalDissolutionAgreementwouldmergeintothefinaldecree.Townerv.Towner,858S.W.2d888(Tenn.1993).However,onlythepartsoftheagreementthatthecourthastheauthoritytoenforcemergeintothedecree.TheTennesseeSupremeCourtstated:       [I]tisclearthatthereasonforstrippingtheagreementofthepartiesofitscontractualnatureisthecontinuingstatutorypoweroftheCourttomodifyitstermswhenchangedcircumstancesjustify. Itfollows,andwesohold,thatonlythatportionofapropertysettlementagreementbetweenhusbandandwifedealingwiththelegaldutyofchildsupport,oralimonyoverwhichthecourthascontinuingstatutorypowertomodify,losesitscontractualnaturewhenmergedintoadecreefordivorce. (Emphasisadded).       Townerv.Towner,858S.W.2d888,890(Tenn.1993),quotingfromPenlandv.Penland,521S.W.2d222(Tenn.1975).Therefore,inordertohavemodifiedthesupportpayments,Mr.Bowerswouldhavehadtoappealthefinaljudgmentwithin30daysinaccordancewiththeTennesseeRulesofAppellateProcedure.WeconcludethatevenifMr.Bowersiscorrectinhiscontentionthattheawardcannotbelargerthantheestate,neithertheTrialϜCourtnorthisCourthasthepowertomodifythealimonyaward.  FortheforegoingreasonsthejudgmentoftheTrialCourtisaffirmedandthecauseremandedforsuchfurtherproceedingsasmaybenecessaryandcollectionofthejudgmentandcostsbelow.CostsofappealareadjudgedagainstMr.Bowersandhissurety.      _______________________________      HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.CONCUR:________________________________HerschelP.Franks,J.________________________________DonT.McMurray,J.̛