ÿWPC9 …# VUNa %¯ 0(µUPÝw@- 4m  0l 0Dü 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0h< ¤ 0r¬ 0| 0†š 0 1u° 0d%U>‰U 6Ç D3ý B0B)M 0@vDC¶ AMùU*Fp³€®3báv~CvÓÁ AO”Æã 0D© D/í B˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡&@FÐZ ‹8CaslonOpnface BT Regular YEZ[D\]^D_`Ó€lm·‚^!3|xm((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Courier New++++'ÿÿdxd d% Line 7 d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò,,,,7Border 1dd€-.Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÔ€0ÔÔ€0ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€0XÔÌÌò òDecember€13,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€0ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ©Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔThe€trial€court€found€that€the€Kanopolis›€Stone€note€was€worth€$150,000;Ïhowever,€because€the€court€found€ð ðuncertainty€regarding€[its]€value,ðð€heÏsimply€directed€that€all€payments€on€the€note€be€divided€equally€between€theÏparties.Ì ¤Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔNote,€however,€that€a€trial€court€has€the€power,€in€an€appropriateÏcase,€to€order€ð ðsuitable€support€and€maintenance€of€either€spouse€.€.€.€out€ofÏ[a]€òòspouseððs€propertyóó.ðð€€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101(a)(1).€€(Emphasis€added).Ì XÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ôÔHowever,€if€the€property€is€fraudulently€conveyed€before€the€divorce,Ïthe€court€can€consider€it€under€the€express€language€of€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(A).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€(ÔÝ  ÝÑ P ÑÔ€)ÔÑ7€õXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  Ñ›à@ àÞ ÞÌà àà àà àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE̜ـ€ÙßR€/1.A1-j|ÏX` Å `€€@ÿRß›ÌÌÌÌLYNNE€W.€BROCK,à àà àà à)€C/A€NO.€œ03A01›„9605„CH„00165Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€Ìà àà àPlaintiff„Appellee,à à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àœ)€APPEAL€AS€OF€RIGHT€FROM€THE›Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà àœ)€HAMILTON€COUNTY€CHANCERY€COURT›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌJ.€DONALD€BROCK,à àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)€HONORABLE€œHOWELL›€N.€PEOPLES,Ìà àà àDefendant„Appellant.)€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌÌFor€Appellantà àà àà àà àà àà àFor€AppelleeÌÌRICHARD€W.€œBETHEA›,€JR.à àà àà àà àTHOMAS€O.€œHELTON›ÌNICOLE€R.€BARNETTà àà àà àà àà àBaker,€œDonelson›,€œBearman›ÌœStophel›€&€œStophel›,€P.C.à àà àà àà à€&€CaldwellÌChattanooga,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àChattanooga,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€ÔÔ€ Ôà@ àœO€P€I€N€I€O€NÔ€)ÔÔ€)XÔ›ÌÌÌÌÌÌREVERSED€IN€PARTÌAFFIRMED€IN€PARTÌREMANDED€WITH€INSTRUCTIONSà àà àà àà àà àà àœSusano›,€J.ÌÓÓà àà àIn€this€divorce€case,€the€trial€court€dissolved€aÏmarriage€of€31€years.€€The€court€granted€the€counter„plaintiff,€J.ÏDonald€Brock€(Husband),€a€divorce€from€the€original€plaintiff,ÏLynne€W.€Brock€(Wife),€on€the€ground€of€adultery;€awarded€HusbandÏcustody€of€the€partiesðð€four€minor€children,€subject€to€WifeððsÏliberal€visitation€rights;€divided€the€partiesðð€property;€andÏdenied€Wifeððs€request€for€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€and€counsel€fees.€ÏHusband€appealed,€raising€issues€that€present€the€followingÏquestions€for€our€consideration:ÌÌÓÓà àà8 à1.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€failing€toÏð ðexclude€from€the€marital€estateðð€theÏð ðreasonable€market€valueðð€of€assets€broughtÏinto€the€marriage€by€Husband?̛̜à àà8 à2.€€Did€the€trial€court€properly€value€theÏmarital€assets?̛̜à àà8 à3.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€when€itÏestablished€the€terms€of€Husbandððs€option€toÏpurchase€from€Wife€the€common€stock€of€AstecÏIndustries,€œInc.›€awarded€to€her€in€the€finalÏjudgment?̛̜à àà8 à4.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€failing€toÏaward€Husband€sufficient€liquid€assets€toÏenable€him€to€meet€his€mandatory€and€optionalÏœpayment›€œobligations€under›€the€œfinal›€judgment?ÌÓÓÓӜ̛à àà8 à5.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€treatingÏHusbandððs€voluntary€payments€to€Wife€duringÏthe€pendency€of€the€divorce€as€temporaryÏspousal€support?̛̜à àà8 à6.€€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€determiningÏthat€it€was€equitable€to€divide€the€maritalÏassets€equally?ÌÓÓÌœWife›€has€not€raised€any€additional€issues.ÌÌà àà àOur€review€is€òòde€novoóó;€however,€the€record€developedÏbelow€comes€to€us€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctnessÏof€the€trial€courtððs€œfindings,›€œwhich€presumption›€we€must€honorÏð ðunless€the€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€otherwise.ðð€€RuleÏ13(d),€T.R.A.P.€€The€trial€courtððs€conclusions€of€law€are€notÏafforded€the€same€deference.€€òòò òAdams€v.€Dean€Roofing€Co.,€Inc.ó óóó,Ï715€S.W.2d€341,€343€(Tenn.€App.€1986).€€(ð ðWe€are€not€bound€by€[theÏtrial€courtððs]€conclusions€of€law.ðð)ÌÌà@ àI.ÌÓÓà@ àòòFactsóóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€parties€were€married€on€June€16,€1963.€€Husband€wasÏthen€25€and€Wife€was€19.€€They€lived€in€Atlanta€until€œ1966,›€whenÏHusband€received€a€Ph.D.€in€mechanical€engineering€from€GeorgiaÏTech.€€The€parties€then€moved€back€to€Chattanooga.€€Wife€completedÏtwo€years€of€college€prior€to€her€marriage;€after€œthe€partiesðð›Ïreturn€to€Chattanooga,€she€received€a€bachelorððs€degree€in€homeÏeconomics€from€what€was€then€the€University€of€Chattanooga.€€MostÏof€Wifeððs€tuition€and€œother€college€expenses›€œwas›€paid€by€herÏmother.ÌÌà àà àWife€intended€to€teach€school€and€actually€applied€for€aÏteaching€position€in€the€Chattanooga€area.€€œHowever,€Husband›€wasÏopposed€to€œher€working›€outside€the€home.€€He€preferred€that€she€beÏa€homemaker€and€be€responsible€for€the€children€the€partiesÏintended€to€have.€€She€agreed€to€this€arrangement.ÌÌà àà àDuring€their€marriage,€the€parties€adopted€sevenÏchildren.€€They€could€not€have€children€naturally€because€ofÏHusbandððs€physical€problems.€€Beth€was€adopted€in€1968;€BenÏfollowed€in€1971.€€In€1983,€the€parties€adopted€five€more€childrenÏfrom€a€disadvantaged€home.€€At€the€time€of€their€adoption,€theÏchildren€were€ages€seven,€six,€five,€and€twin€girls,€age€four.€€AtÍthe€time€of€the€divorce,€the€twins€were€the€only€minors€remainingÏat€home.ÌÌà àà àHusband€was€initially€employed€œat€his›€œfatherððs›€company,ÏIndustrial€Boiler€Company.€€In€1966,€Husband€purchased€ChattanoogaÏWelding€&€Machine€Corporation.€€That€company€œmerged›€withÏIndustrial€Boiler€Company€in€œ1968,›€and€together€they€becameÏChattanooga€Systems,€Inc.€€Husband€and€his€father€were€theÏprincipal€stockholders€and€managers€of€the€new€company.ÌÌà àà àIn€1969,€Chattanooga€Systems,€Inc.,€merged€with€CMIÏCorporation,€a€publicly„traded€company€which€manufactured€asphaltÏmanufacturing€equipment€and€other€industrial€equipment.€€HusbandÏwas€installed€as€president€of€the€Chattanooga€division€of€CMI.ÌÌà àà àIn€1972,€Husband€left€CMI€and€formed€a€new€company,ÏAstec€Industries,€Inc.€€To€finance€the€new€company,€he€borrowedÏ$400,000€from€a€Chattanooga€bank.€€With€these€funds,€he€purchasedÏa€building€and€secured€equipment€from€a€bankrupt€company.€€AsÏcollateral€for€the€loan,€Husband€pledged€his€CMI€stock€andÏpersonally€guaranteed€the€loan.€€The€CMI€stock€was€laterÏliquidated€to€pay€off€the€loan.ÌÌà àà àHusband€executed€a€stock€subscription€agreement€withÏAstec,€pursuant€to€which€he€received€252,000€shares€of€theÏcompanyððs€common€stock.€€As€a€result€of€stock€splits€over€theÏyears,€Husband€now€owns€2,180,000€shares€of€Astec€stock.€€InÏaddition,€he€has€an€option€to€purchase€an€additional€40,000€sharesÏfor€$1.35€per€share.ÌÌà àà àAt€the€time€of€the€divorce€hearing,€despite€down€periodsÏin€the€1970's€and€1980's,€Astec€was€a€successful€multi„national,Ïmulti„divisional€company€involved€in€the€manufacturing€and€sale€ofÏasphalt€manufacturing€plants,€paving€equipment,€and€other€relatedÏproducts.€€The€company€went€public€in€1986,€and€is€currentlyÏtraded€on€the€NASDAQ€stock€exchange.ÌÌà àà àBased€on€the€companyððs€share€price€on€November€1,€1994,Ïthe€date€of€the€partiesðð€divorce€judgment,€Astec€was€valued€atÏapproximately€$150,000,000.€€Husbandððs€interest€in€the€company€onÏthe€same€date,€again€based€on€the€NASDAQ€share€price,€was€worthÏ$33,246,000,€assuming€the€exercise€of€the€option€to€purchase€theÏadditional€40,000€shares.ÌœÌà àà àHusband€is€an€admitted€workaholic.€€Generally€speaking,Ïhe€has€worked€in€excess€of€80€hours€a€week€since€1963.›Ìà àà àHusband€has€been€the€President€and€Chairman€of€the€BoardÏof€Astec€since€1975.ÌÌà@ àII.ÌÓÓà@ àœòòTrial€Courtððs€Division›€of€PropertyóóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àThe€trial€court,€in€œa›€œcomprehensive,€52„page€memorandum€›Ïopinion,€decided€that€it€was€equitable€to€divide€the€partiesððÏmarital€estate€œequally.›€€He€found€that€all€of€the€property€atÏissue€was€marital€property.€€The€courtððs€œfindings€of€value€andÏdivision€of€property€are›€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓœ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ò ò€€€€Total€€€€€€€€€€€€€€DistributedÏtoó óÌ€€€€€€€ò òAssetó ó€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ò ò€€€€Valueó óà àà à€ò òWifeà à€€ÏHusband€€€ó óÌCash€in€Pioneer€Bank€€€€$€€€€16,800€€€€$€€€€€8,400€€€€$€€€€€8,400ÌResidence,€240€S.Ì€€Crest€Rd›.à àà àà à€1,350,000à àà àà à€€€€€€1,350,000ÌVehicles€and€boatà àà à€€€€47,000à à€€€€œ11,750›à à€€€€35,250ÌStock,€Astec€Ì€€Industries,€Inc.à àà à33,246,000à àœ16,650,000›à àœ16,596,000›ÌStock€and€bondÌœ€€holdingsà àà àà à€1,601,727›à àà àà àà à€œ1,601,727ÌRetirement›€accountsà àà à€€€175,473à àà àà àà à€€€175,473ÌAgreement€not€to€compete€€€€200,000à àà àà àà à€€€200,000ÌFamily€silverware€andÌ€œ€other›€itemsà àà àà à€€€€10,000à à€€€€œ10,000›ÌNote€œreceivable„„›Ì€œ€Kanopolis›€Stoneœ× ƒ2 ××  ×›à àà à€€€150,000à à€€€€œ75,000›€€€€€€€€œ€75,000›ÌCash€payment€from€HusbandÌ€œ€to›€Wife€to€equalizeÌÒ ° ÒÒ „ Ò€œ€division›à àà àœ€€€€___________›€€œ€€òò€€1,670,350óó€€€€òò€<1,670,350>óó›ÌÌÒ ° ÒÒ ° Òà àà àà àà à€€€€œ$36,797,000€€€€$18,425,500›€€€œ€$18,371,500›ÌÓÓà àà àà àà à€€€€œ===========€€€€===========›€€€œ€===========›ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€decreed€that€Husband€would€have€anÏoption€to€purchase€the€œ1,110,000€shares€of€Astec›€common€stockÏawarded€to€œWife:›ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àFor€a€period€of€twenty„nine€(29)€daysÏfollowing€the€date€of€the€entry€of€thisÏCourtððs€final€order€in€this€case,€not€countingÏthe€date€upon€which€such€order€is€entered,Ï[Husband]€shall€have€the€option€to€purchaseÏthe€shares€awarded€to€[Wife]€by€this€order€atÏa€maximum€price€of€$11,148,840€($10.044€perÏshare).€€The€Court€has€determined€this€priceÏin€the€following€manner:€1,110,000€shares€xÏ$15.00€per€œshare›€=€$16,650,000€„€7%€salesÏcommission€=€net€sales€price€of€$15,484,500€„Ï28%€tax€rate€=€$11,148,840.€€In€view€of€theÏdramatic€way€in€which€the€circumstances€ofÏAstec€and€these€parties€might€be€changed€by€aÏsignificant€lapse€of€time,€this€option€willÏremain€open€to€[Husband]€only€for€the€periodÏspecified€by€this€paragraph,€regardless€ofÏprocedural€developments€in€the€case,€such€asÏmotions€to€reconsider€or€appeals.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àœà àFollowing€the€partiesðð€separation,›€Husband€œprovided›€WifeÏwith€$176,000€to€defray€her€living€expenses€and€fund€her€graduateÏart€studies€in€New€York€City.€€The€court€held€that€these€paymentsÏwere€spousal€support€òòpendente€liteóó€and€ð ðnot€to€be€treated€as€aÏpart€of€the€marital€estate€to€be€divided€by€the€court.ððÌÌœÌÌÌÌÌ›à@ àIII.ÌÓÓœà@ àòòGeneral€PrinciplesóóÌ›à@ àòòRegarding€Division€of€PropertyóóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àBecause€the€issues€before€us€involve€the€division€of€theÏpartiesðð€property,€we€deem€it€appropriate€to€discuss€some€of€theÏgeneral€principles€bearing€on€this€subject.ÌÌà àà àIn€divorce€cases,€Tennessee€recognizes€two€distinctÏtypes€or€classes€of€property,€i.e.,€ð ðmarital€propertyðð€as€definedÏat€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)€and€ð ðseparate€propertyðð€as€addressed€atÍT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2).€€The€distinction€is€important€because€theÏrelevant€statutory€provision,€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(a),€ð ðprovides€onlyÏfor€the€division€of€marital€property.ðð€€ò òòòœBatson›€v.€œBatson›ó óóó,€769ÏS.W.2d€849,€856€(Tenn.€App.€1988).€€Implicit€in€the€statuteððsÏmandate€is€the€concept€that€œassets€properly›€classified€asÏð ðseparate€propertyðð€œare›€not€divided€between€the€parties,€butÏrather€œare›€set€aside€to€the€spouse€to€whom€the€property€isÏð ðseparateðð€in€nature.€€òòIdóó.€€(ð ð.€.€.€it€is€incumbent€on€the€trialÏcourt€.€.€.€to€give€each€party€their€separate€property,€.€.€.ðð).× ƒ3 ××  ×ÌÌà àà àAlso€implicit€in€the€statutory€scheme€for€the€divisionÏand/or€distribution€of€marital€and€separate€property€is€theÏconcept€that€the€property€upon€which€the€trial€court€acts€is,Ïgenerally€speaking,€œthe›€property€owned€by€the€parties,Ïindividually€or€jointly,€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,ÏT.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(A)€which€defines€ð ðmarital€propertyðð€inÏterms€of€œproperty›ÌÌÓÓà àà8 à.€.€.€acquired€by€either€or€both€spousesÏduring€the€course€of€the€marriage€up€to€theÏdate€of€the€final€divorce€hearing€and€owned€byÍeither€or€both€spouses€as€of€the€date€ofÏfiling€of€a€complaint€for€divorce,€.€.€.ÌÌÌÌÓÓAs€a€corollary€to€this€principle,€and€again€speaking€in€generalÏterms,€property€once€owned€by€a€spouse,€either€as€separateÏproperty€or€marital€property,€but€not€owned€by€either€spouse€atÏthe€time€œof›€œdivorce,›€œis›€not€subject€to€classification€and€divisionÏor€distribution€œwhen›€the€œdivorce€is€pronounced.›× ƒ4 ××  ×€€This€is€because,Ïgenerally€speaking,€a€court€cannot€divide€and/or€distribute€whatÏis€ð ðnot€thereðð„„property€no€longer€owned€by€the€parties,Ïindividually€or€jointly,€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.ÌÌà àà àIn€the€instant€case,€Husband€urges€us€to€considerÏproperty€interests€owned€by€him€at€the€time€of€the€partiesððÏmarriage.€€Those€property€interests,€in€the€form€in€which€theyÏexisted€at€the€time€of€the€partiesðð€marriage,€were€not€owned€byÏthe€parties,€individually€or€jointly,€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€ÏWhile€they€are€no€longer€available€to€be€divided€and/orÏdistributed€by€the€trial€court,€they€may€still€be€relevant€œas€to€›Ïœthe›€division€and/or€distribution€of€property€that€òòwasóó€in€existenceÍat€the€time€of€the€partiesðð€divorce.€€For€example,€œin€generalÏterms,€if›€property€in€existence€at€the€time€of€the€divorce€wasÏð ðacquired€in€exchange€for€property€acquired€before€the€marriage,ððÏœthe€former€property›€is€considered€separate€œproperty.›€œ€òòSeeóó›€T.C.A.€ððÏœ36„4„121(b)(2)(B).›ÌÌà àà àProperty€owned€by€a€spouse€at€the€time€of€marriage,€butÏnot€owned€ð ðin€the€marriageðð€at€the€time€of€the€divorce,€can€alsoÏbe€significant€in€dividing€marital€property€if€that€œpre„marriageÏproperty›€is€properly€viewed€as€a€contribution€of€a€party€ð ðto€theÏacquisition,€preservation,€[or]€appreciation€.€.€.€of€the€marital€Ì.€.€.€property.ðð€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(c)(5).€€This€does€not€meanÏthat€the€property€to€be€divided€is€ð ðseparate€œpropertyðð,›€but€ratherÏthat€a€spouseððs€contribution€of€his€or€her€pre„marriage€propertyÏis€a€factor€to€be€considered€in€reaching€an€equitable€division€ofÏœthe€marital€property.›€€In€other€words,€the€property€owned€at€theÏtime€of€the€marriage€does€not€come€into€play€as€a€ð ðclassificationððÏœmatter,›€but€rather€as€a€factor€to€be€considered€in€dividingÏmarital€property.ÌÌà@ àIV.ÌÓÓà@ àòòProperty€Owned€by€HusbandÌà@ àat€Time€of€MarriageÌÓÓÌóóà àà àHusband€argues€that€the€trial€courtððs€division€of€theÏmarital€property€ð ðis€inequitable€because€it€[does]€not€provide€himÏwith€a€creditðð€for€the€assets€that€he€owned€at€the€time€of€theÏpartiesðð€marriage.€€This€argument€is€based€on€a€false€premise.€€ItÏincorrectly€assumes€that€some€part€of€the€property€to€be€dividedÏin€this€case€is€separate€property€because€Husband€owned€propertyÏat€the€time€of€the€marriage.ÌÌà àà àThe€proof€is€clear€that€prior€to€the€partiesðð€marriageÏin€1963,€Husband€sold€a€carpet„dryer€design€to€Singer„Cobble,ÏInc.,€for€œ$125,000,›€payable€in€ten€equal€annual€installments.€ÏThis€receivable€had€a€balance€due€of€$112,500€when€the€partiesÏmarried.€€That€balance€was€apparently€paid€during€the€first€nineÏyears€of€the€partiesðð€œmarriage.€€It›€is€also€clear€from€the€recordÏthat€Husband€owned€a€10%€interest€in€his€fatherððs€business,ÏIndustrial€Boiler€Company,€at€the€time€of€the€marriage.€€The€valueÏof€that€interest€at€the€time€of€the€partiesðð€marriage€is€notÏclearly€reflected€in€the€œrecord,›€but€it€is€obvious€that€it€hadÏsome€value.ÌÌà àà àHusband€claims€that€these€assets€were€his€separateÏproperty€because€they€fit€within€the€definition€of€ð ðseparateÏpropertyðð€found€at€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)(A):ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àAll€real€and€personal€property€owned€by€aÏspouse€before€marriage.ÌÌÌÌÓÓHe€argues€from€this€that€ð ðthe€property€division€is€inequitableÏbecause€it€did€not€provide€him€with€a€credit€for€[the€Singer„Cobble€receivable]€or€for€his€interest€in€Industrial€Boiler.ððÌÌà àà àWe€agree€that€the€property€in€question€falls€within€theÏdefinition€of€ð ðseparate€property.ðð€€We€disagree€with€HusbandððsÏinterpretation€of€the€significance€of€this€fact€in€this€case.ÌÌà àà àThe€definitions€of€ð ðseparate€propertyðð€and€ð ðmaritalÏpropertyðð€found€at€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121€are€for€the€purpose€of€aidingÏa€court€in€properly€classifying€property€owned€by€one€of€both€ofÏthe€parties€òòat€the€time€of€their€divorce.óó€€In€the€instant€case,Ïneither€of€the€assets€in€question€was€owned€by€either€of€theÏparties€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€Those€interests€œhad›€beenÏdisposed€of€or€otherwise€œliquidated€at€an€earlier€time.›€€œThe›Íproperty€interests€represented€by€these€assets€were€merged€intoÏthe€ð ðwealthðð€of€the€marriage.ÌÌà àà àWe€are€not€aware€of€any€authority,€and€counsel€has€notÏdirected€us€to€any,€for€the€proposition€that€assets€of€a€spouse€atÏthe€time€of€marriage,€but€not€owned€by€œhim€or€her›€at€the€time€ofÏthe€divorce,€are€to€be€carved€out€of€the€marital€estate€œasÏseparate€property€for›€the€benefit€of€that€spouse€at€the€time€ofÏthe€divorce.ÌÌà àà àThe€appellant€is€not€entitled€to€an€automatic€dollar„for„dollar€credit€against€the€marital€estate€for€œthe€value€of€Ïproperty›€owned€by€him€at€the€time€of€the€marriage,€but€no€longerÏowned€by€him€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€œHowever,€to›€the€extentÏthese€interests€were€contributed€by€Husband€to€the€wealth€of€theÏmarriage,€they€are€a€proper€œmatter€to€be€considered›€in€determiningÏhow€the€marital€estate€should€be€equitably€divided.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„4„121(c)(5).€€òòœCf›.€ò òœJahn›€v.€œJahn›ó óóó,€C/A€No.€œ03A01›„9511„CH„00388Ï(Tenn.€App.€at€Knoxville,€May€24,€1996,€perm.€œapp›.€denied€OctoberÏ21,€1996).ÌÌà àà àHusband€is€not€correct€in€claiming€an€automatic€dollar„for„dollar€credit€against€the€marital€estate€for€œthe€ð ðreasonable›Ïmarket€valueðð€of€property€owned€by€him€at€the€time€of€theÏœmarriage,›€but€not€owned,€in€whole€or€in€part,€by€him€at€the€timeÏof€the€œdivorce.€€This€issue€is€found€to€be€without€merit.›ÌÌà@ àV.ÌÓÓà@ àòòValue€of€Marital€PropertyóóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àHusband€contends€that€the€trial€court€did€not€properlyÏvalue€certain€assets€in€the€marital€estate.€€He€argues,€in€effect,Ïthat€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€courtððs€findingsÏas€to€œthese›œ›œ›€œassets.›€€A€comparison€of€the€trial€courtððs€findingsÏand€the€values€proposed€by€Husband€is€demonstrated€by€theÏfollowing€table:ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà à€€€€ò òTrial€Courtððsó ó€€€ò òHusbandððsó óÌà à€€€€€€€€€ò òAssetòòó óà àà àà àóóà àò ò€€€Finding€€à à€€€Value€€œÌó ó›Ìà àStock€and€Bond€Holdingsà àà à$1,601,727à à$1,235,229Ìà àCash€at€Pioneer€Bankà àà à€€€€16,800à à€€€€13,000Ìà àRetirement€Accountsà àà àà à€€€175,473à à€€€€94,755Ìà àMarital€Residenceà àà àà à€1,350,000à à€€€986,700Ìà àMisc.€Vehicles€and€Boatà àà à€€€€47,000à à€€€€15,000Ìà àNon„compete€Agreementà àà à€€€200,000à à€€€100,000Ìà àœKanopolis›€Noteà àà àà àà à€€€150,000à à€€€€€€„0„Ìà àMisc.€Personal€Propertyà àà à€€€€10,000à à€€€€20,000ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àà àEach€of€the€parties€submitted€their€own€œindividualÏtestimony›€as€well€as€other€evidence€to€support€their€respectiveÏpositions€regarding€the€value€of€these€assets.€€The€trial€court,Ïin€its€memorandum€opinion,€indicated€that€it€had€considered€all€ofÏthe€relevant€evidence€and€œhad€based›€its€values€on€the€totality€ofÏthis€evidence.€€We€have€considered€all€of€this€evidence€in€lightÏof€the€following€test€set€forth€in€ò òòòWallace€v.€Wallaceóóó ó,€733ÏS.W.2d€102€(Tenn.€App.€1987):ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àThe€value€of€marital€property€is€a€factÏquestion.€€Thus,€a€trial€courtððs€decision€withÏregard€to€the€value€of€a€marital€asset€will€beÏgiven€great€weight€on€appeal.€€(citationÏomitted).ÌÌà@ à*€€€€*€€€€*ÌÌà àà8 àThe€value€of€a€marital€asset€is€determined€byÏconsidering€all€relevant€evidence€regardingÏvalue.€€(citation€omitted).ÌÌà@ à*€€€€*€€€€*ÌÌà àà8 à.€.€.€the€trial€court,€in€its€discretion,€isÏfree€to€place€a€value€on€a€marital€asset€thatÏis€within€the€range€of€the€evidence€submitted.€Ï(citation€omitted).ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòIdóó.€at€107.€€We€do€not€find€that€the€evidence€preponderatesÏagainst€the€trial€courtððs€findings€with€respect€to€the€variousÍvalues€of€the€œlisted€assets.€€Husbandððs›€issue€on€this€subject€isÏwithout€merit.ÌÌà@ àVI.ÌÓÓà@ àòòOption€to€Purchase€StockÌà@ àand€Liquidity€IssuesÌÌÌÓÓóóà àà àA€trial€courtððs€decree€with€respect€to€a€division€ofÏmarital€property€is€ð ðgiven€great€weight€on€appeal.ðð€€òòò òœBarnhill›€v.ÏœBarnhill›óóó ó,€826€S.W.2d€443,€449€(Tenn.€App.€1991).€€In€the€instantÏcase,€the€court€below€granted€Husband€an€option€to€buy€the€AstecÏcommon€stock€awarded€to€Wife.€€Husband€contends€that€the€trialÏcourt€œerred€in€the€manner€in€which€it›€crafted€a€formula€for€theÏœbuy„out.€€He€also€contends€that€it€erred›€in€limiting€the€optionÏœperiod,›€œin›€failing€to€award€him€liquid€assets€to€exercise€theÏœoption,›€œand›€in€failing€to€provide€him€with€sufficient€liquidity€toÏmake€the€equalizing€payment€of€$1,670,350€required€by€the€finalÏjudgment.ÌÌà àà àIt€is€clear€that€Husband€œwanted€very›€œmuch›€to€continueÏownership€of€all€of€the€Astec€stock.€€He€contended€that€hisÏeffective€control€of€the€corporation€was€essential€to€theÏmarketability€of€the€Astec€stock,€and€œwas€also€of›€extremeÍimportance€to€the€institutional€œinvestors,›€who€owned€approximatelyÏ45%€of€the€stock€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€courtððs€mandate€was€to€divide€the€partyððsÏmarital€estate€in€an€equitable€manner.€€œObviously,€that€courtÏdetermined›€that€it€was€impossible€to€do€so€and€still€provideÏHusband€with€control€of€all€of€the€stock€that€he€owned€prior€toÏthe€divorce.€€We€agree.€€While€it€was€certainly€beneficial€toÏHusband€and€maybe€even€to€Astec€if€Husband€continued€to€controlÏall€of€the€shares€of€Astec€stock€at€issue€in€this€case,€thisÏœconsideration€cannot€take€precedence€over€the›€courtððs€œvery€clear,Ïoverriding€obligation›€to€divide€the€marital€estate€equitably.ÌÌà àà àWe€also€do€not€find€error€in€the€fact€that€the€courtÏvalued€the€Astec€stock€at€$15.00€per€share,€the€price€at€which€theÏstock€was€trading€on€the€œdate›€of€the€divorce.€€This€valuation€œis›Ïin€keeping€with€the€language€of€the€œpertinent€statute,›€œT.C.A.›€ððÏœ36„4„121(b)(1)(A),€which€provides€that€the€marital€estate€beÏð ðvalued›€as€of€a€date€as€near€as€reasonably€possible€to€the€finalÏdivorce€hearing€œdate.ðð›ÌÌà àà àHowever,€there€is€a€more€fundamental€reason€why€theÏtrial€courtððs€valuation€of€the€Astec€stock€is€not€error.€€SinceÏthis€was€an€asset€that€could€œbe€and›€was€divided€in€kind,€theÏvaluation€was€immaterial€except€as€to€the€formula€for€the€buy„out.€ÏRegardless€of€the€value€assigned€to€the€stock,€an€award€of€fiftyÏpercent€to€each€party€achieved€the€trial€courtððs€objective€ofÏequality.ÌÌà àà àAs€to€the€fact€that€the€option€formula€starts€out€with€aÏraw€price€of€$15.00,€we€find€no€error€in€this€or€œany›€other€aspectÏof€the€option.€€The€option€was€granted€as€an€accommodation€toÏHusband.€€Equity€did€not€require€the€trial€court€to€grant€HusbandÏan€option€of€any€kind.€€There€was€no€reason€to€deprive€Wife€ofÏthis€very€valuable€asset€except€on€the€fairest€of€terms€to€her.€ÏGiven€the€volatility€of€the€market€for€the€stock,€the€formula€andÏthe€œ29„day›€ð ðwindowðð€were€fair€to€both€parties.€€In€our€œopinion,›Ïthe€trial€courtððs€judgment€would€have€been€fair€and€equitable€evenÏin€the€absence€œof€an›€option.ÌÌà àà àAs€to€Husbandððs€complaint€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏaward€him€liquid€assets€to€satisfy€his€mandatory€and€optionalÏpayment€obligations,€there€are€a€number€of€responses.€€First,Íœsubstantially€all€of€the€liquid€assets€in€the€marital€estate›€œwereÏawarded€to€Husband.€€He€received€all€of€the€stock€and€bondÏholdings€of€$1,601,727.€€Second,€he€was€awarded€substantial€assets›Ïthat€could€be€liquidated€to€œprovide›€funds€to€meet€at€least€theÏmandatory€payment€of€$1,670,350.€€More€importantly,€the€trialÏcourt€was€not€required€to€provide€liquidity€to€either€or€both€ofÏthe€œparties;›€œthe›€courtððs€œonly€responsibility›€œwas€to›€divide€theÏestate€œin€an€equitable€fashion.›ÌÌà àà àHusbandððs€third€and€fourth€issues€are€found€to€beÏwithout€merit.ÌÌà@ àVII.ÌÓÓà@ àòòPayments€to€Wife€Pending€DivorceóóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àHusband€contends€that€the€voluntary€payments€made€toÏWife€pending€the€divorce„„totaling€$176,000„„should€have€beenÏcharged€against€her€as€a€part€of€her€equal€share€of€the€maritalÏestate.ÌÌà àà àThe€Chancellor€determined€that€Husbandððs€voluntaryÏpayments€should€be€considered€spousal€support€òòpendente€liteóó.€€AÏtrial€court€has€broad€discretion€regarding€spousal€support€andÍdivision€of€property.€€ò òòòœMarmino›€v.€œMarmino›ó óóó,€238€S.W.2d€105,€107Ï(Tenn.€App.€1950);€ò òòòœBatson›€v.€œBatson›ó óóó,€769€S.W.2d€849,€859€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1988);€òòò òœHarrington›€v.€œHarrington›óóó ó,€798€S.W.2d€244,€245Ï(Tenn.€App.€1990);€ò òòòWallace€v.€Wallaceó óóó,€733€S.W.2d€102,€106Ï(Tenn.€App.€1987).ÌÌà àà àThe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€theÏChancellorððs€findings€with€respect€to€these€voluntary€payments.€ÏCertainly,€we€cannot€say€that€he€abused€his€discretion€in€notÏconsidering€these€payments€as€a€part€of€the€division€of€property.ÌÌà@ àœVIII.›ÌÓÓà@ àòòWas€Division€of€Marital€Estate€Equitable?óóÌÌÌÓÓà àà àHusband€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€when€itÏdivided€the€marital€estate€equally.€€Generally€speaking,€he€basesÏœthis›€œassertion›€on€two€premises:€first,€that€the€trial€court€failedÏto€factor€into€the€division€ð ðequationðð€œthe€fact€that›€he€hadÏsignificant€assets€at€the€time€of€the€marriage;€and,€second,€thatÏbeginning€in€1989,€Wifeððs€contributions€to€the€marriageÏsignificantly€lessened.€€We€will€consider€these€matters€in€reverseÏorder.ÌÌà àà àHusband€candidly€admits€that€Wifeððs€contributions€in€theÏfirst€26€years€of€their€marriage€were€significant€and€substantial.€ÏHe€concedes€in€his€brief€what€is€abundantly€clear€from€the€recordÏbefore€us:ÌÌÓÓà àà8 àIt€is€undisputed€that€for€the€first€[26]€yearsÏof€the€marriage,€[Wife]€fulfilled€her€role€asÏwife,€mother€and€homemaker.ÌÌÌÌÓÓHe€contends,€however,€that€this€changed€in€1989€when€she€œunderwent›Ïheart€œsurgery,›€and€individuals€close€to€her€passed€away,€one€in€aÏtragic€manner.€€He€says€that€from€that€point€œon,›€her€relationshipÏwith€her€children€and€Husband€deteriorated.€€He€points€out€thatÏshe€went€back€to€school,€pursued€a€graduate€degree€in€art€in€NewÏYork€City,€left€the€marital€residence€for€good€on€September€21,Ï1993,€and€started€an€adulterous€relationship,€the€latter€being€theÏbasis€upon€which€the€trial€court€granted€Husband€an€absoluteÏdivorce.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€found€that€her€contributions€wereÏð ðextraordinaryðð€prior€to€1989,€and€ordinary,€but€substantial,Ïafter€œthat.›€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trialÍcourtððs€finding€that€Wifeððs€non„monetary€contributions€were€equalÏto€Husbandððs€contributions€during€the€period€of€their€marriage.ÌÌà àà àIf€the€only€issue€before€us€was€whether€theÏcontributions€made€by€the€parties€òòafter€their€marriageóó€dictate€anÏequal€division€of€the€marital€estate,€we€would€not€hesitate€toÏaffirm€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€without€modification.€€However,Ïwe€believe€the€trial€œcourt,€in€considering€the€factors€set€forthÏat€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(c)(1)„(10),›€failed€to€give€sufficient€weightÏto€the€fact€that€Husband€brought€œsubstantial›€property€into€theÏœmarriage.›€€We€believe€œthis›€œcontribution›€œby€Husband€requires,›€onÏthis€òòde€novoóó€review,€that€we€divide€the€marital€property€in€aÏdifferent€manner.ÌÌà àà àIt€is€clear€from€the€record€œthat,€at€the€time€of€theÏpartiesðð€marriage,›€Husband€owned€an€account€receivable€fromÏSinger„Cobble,€Inc.,€in€the€amount€of€œ$112,500.›€€It€is€also€clearÏthat€he€owned€a€10%€interest€in€Industrial€Boiler€Company€at€theÏsame€time.€€In€October,€1964,€a€little€more€than€a€year€after€theÏpartiesðð€marriage,€the€parties€had€a€net€worth€of€œ$234,178.41,›Ïaccording€to€a€financial€statement€prepared€by€Husband.ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€court€found€that€Husbandððs€rights€under€theÏagreement€with€Singer„Cobble€were€marital€property€because€90%€ofÏthe€payments€were€received€after€the€marriage€and€because€HusbandÏhad€some€consulting€duties€under€the€agreement€for€two€yearsÏduring€the€marriage.€€He€refused€to€consider€Husbandððs€10%Ïinterest€in€Industrial€Boiler€Company€because€he€found€that€thereÏwas€insufficient€proof€to€demonstrate€that€the€10%€interest€(or,Ïfor€that€matter,€the€payments€under€the€agreement€with€Singer„Cobble)€œwas›€used€to€fund€Husbandððs€interest€in€Astec.€€We€believeÏall€of€this€misses€the€point.ÌÌà àà àAs€we€have€previously€indicated,€the€maritalÏproperty/separate€property€dichotomy€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121€is€designed€to€enable€a€court€to€classify€property€owned€byÏone€or€both€of€the€parties€òòat€the€time€of€the€divorceóó.€€SinceÏneither€of€the€assets€œnow€under›€discussion€was€still€in€existenceÏand€owned€by€Husband,€individually€or€jointly,€at€the€time€of€theÏdivorce,€the€trial€courtððs€œreasoning›€œfails€to€address€the€real€›Ïœquestion:€Did€Husband›€œha›œve›€a€net€worth€that€he€brought€into€theÏmarriage€which€should€be€considered€as€a€contribution€by€him„„andÏnot€a€contribution€by€the€joint€efforts€œof›€the€parties„„underÍT.C.A.€ðð€œ36„4„121(c)(5)?€€The€record€is€clear€that€he€had€such€anÏestate€and€that€he€contributed€it€to€the€wealth€of€the€marriage.›ÌÌà àà àWe€find€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€theÏtrial€courtððs€finding€that€the€account€receivable€was€a€jointÏcontribution€to€the€marital€estate.€€It€predated€the€partiesððÏmarriage.€€It€was€clearly€a€payment€for€the€design€of€a€piece€ofÏmachinery,€and€not€for€the€œancillary€consulting›€work€of€two€yearsÏduration.€€The€fact€that€90%€of€the€payments€were€made€after€theÏmarriage€is€œimmaterial›€œto›€the€ð ðcontributionðð€issue.ÌÌà àà àIt€seems€clear€to€us€that€the€bulk€of€the€partiesðð€netÏworth€that€had€grown€to€$234,178.41€in€a€little€less€than€a€yearÏafter€their€marriage€is€attributable€to€Husbandððs€ð ðcontributionððÏof€his€net€worth€that€preexisted€the€marriage.€€Wife€had€no€assetsÏat€the€time€of€the€marriage.€€There€was€nothing€that€the€partiesÏdid€during€their€first€year€of€marriage€that€can€account€for€suchÏa€large€net€worth.€€It€is€important€to€remember€that€œall€of€theseÏinterests€are›€in€œ1963„1964›€dollars.€€In€todayððs€œdollars,›€œtheseÏvalues€would›€be€substantially€œhigher.›ÌÌà àà àThe€wealth€that€Husband€accumulated€before€the€marriage,Ïwhich€he€and€he€alone€produced,€was€the€ð ðseedðð€wealth€for€theÏsubstantial€marital€estate€we€now€have€before€us.€€It€is€true€thatÏit€cannot€be€directly€traced€into€Husbandððs€stock€holdings€inÏAstec.€€As€we€have€previously€stated,€we€are€satisfied€that€theÏAstec€stock€is€clearly€marital€property;€however,€we€do€notÏunderstand€that€Husband€is€arguing€œon€this€issue€that›€Astec€is€hisÏseparate€property€œas€property›€ð ðacquired€in€exchange€for€propertyÏacquired€before€the€marriage,ðð€one€of€the€definitions€of€separateÏproperty.€€òòSeeóó€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(2)(B).€€Even€if€he€œis›€soÏcontending,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€such€aÏclassification€is€contrary€to€the€weight€of€the€œevidence.€ÏHowever,€as€we€understand€Husbandððs€position,€he€is€contendingÏthat€he€contributed€his€pre„marriage€estate€to€the€marriage€and€isÏentitled€to€more€than€50%€of€the€marital€estate€because€of€thisÏcontribution.€€We€agree.›ÌÌà àà àIn€order€to€achieve€an€equitable€division€of€the€maritalÏestate,€we€believe€the€shares€of€Astec€common€stock€should€beÏdivided€œ55%›€to€Husband€and€œ45%›€to€Wife.€€We€believe€the€remainderÏof€the€courtððs€judgment€is€fair€and€equitable.€€The€time€forÏexercising€the€option€has€œpassed,›€and€that€issue€is€now€moot.€€AsÍwe€have€previously€indicated,€the€terms€of€the€option€were€fair€toÏboth€parties,€especially€œHusband.€€We€decline€to€grant€Husband€aÏnew€option€as€a€part€of€our€redistribution€of€the€Astec€stock.›ÌÌà àà àThe€trial€courtððs€judgment€awarding€each€of€the€partiesÏ1,110,000€shares€of€Astec€stock€is€hereby€reversed.€€In€all€otherÏrespects€the€trial€courtððs€judgment€is€affirmed.€€This€case€isÏremanded€to€the€trial€court€œ(1)€for›€the€entry€of€an€orderÏœmodifying€its€earlier€order€so€as€to€award›€Wife€œ999,000›€œshares›€ofÏAstec€stock€and€œto€award›€Husband€œ1,221,000›€shares€of€that€stock,Ïhis€shares€to€include€the€40,000€shares€available€to€him€under€hisÏœoption;€(2)€for€enforcement€of€the€judgment,€as€modified;€and€(3)Ïfor€collection€of€costs€assessed€below,€pursuant€to€applicableÏlaw.›ÌÌà àà àCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€the€parties€equally.ÌÌÓӜ̛à àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àCharles€D.€œSusano›,€Jr.,€J.̛̜̜ÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌœÌ_______________________________›ÌHouston€M.€œGoddard›,€œP.J.›ÌœÌÌÌ_______________________________›ÌDon€T.€œMcMurray›,€J.