ÿWPCñ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µU<Ýw@ 4Y m | 0J„ 0TÎ 0^" 0h€ 0rè 0|Z 0†Ö 0\ 1uì U,a 0d U,ñ U>B)[DC„ AMÇU* B>-[v~ˆvÓ D3Ù 0@  AOLÆ› 0Da D/¥ BÔ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman %&E'(D)D*D+U,î-Ó€9;p‚ Ô3|x92 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d!!!!7Border 1dd€-"Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial d #Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÔ€$ÔÔ€$ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€$XÔÌÌò òApril€17,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€$ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA:Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA:Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÑ7€5/XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÒ  ÒÒ „ Òà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€Ï________________________________________________ÌÌò òMACK€BROWDER€d/b/a€MACKÌBROWDER€&€ASSOCIATES,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9502„CH„00016ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Equity€No.€102542ÌÙ€€ÙßL€#&";+'h|MÁ` Å `€€LßÌò òLOGISTICS€MANAGEMENT,€INC.,€ó óÌÌà àDefendant„Appellee.Ì___________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OFÏSHELBY€COUNTYÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€NEAL€SMALL,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌÌà@ àJef€Feibelman,€Burch,€Porter€&€Johnson€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àJohn€J.€Heflin,€III,€Bourland,€Heflin,€Alvarez,Ìà@ àHolley€&€Minor,€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óóóÌÌà@ àOpinion€filed:ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌ›Ñ7€5/XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÓÓà àThis€case€involves€construction€of€a€contract.€€Plaintiff„Appellant€Mack€Browder,€doing€business€as€Mack€Browder€andÏAssociates€(Browder),€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summaryÏjudgment€to€Defendant„Appellee,€Logistics€Management,€Inc.€(LMI).Ìà àMack€Browder€and€Associates€is€a€proprietorship€engaged€inÏrepresenting€owners€of€closely€held€businesses€in€locating€potentialÏbuyers€and€in€negotiating€and€closing€the€transaction.€€In€February€ofÏ1990,€Jim€Alvarez,€an€attorney,€approached€Browder€with€a€potentialÏclient€who€needed€financing€to€start€up€a€new€business.€€In€March€ofÏ1990,€Browder€met€with€Martin€Harshberger€and€Alvarez€(HarshbergerððsÍattorney)€to€discuss€the€possibility€of€Browder€raising€money€for€LMI,Ïthe€business€conceived€by€Harshberger€and€his€partner,€GeorgeÏRamsburg.€€LMIððs€concept€was€to€repair€computer€products€and€manageÏinventories€for€computer€service€companies,€reducing€the€number€ofÏspare€parts€a€company€had€to€carry€to€support€its€product€base€in€theÏfield.€€Ìà àAs€a€result€of€the€meeting€between€Browder€and€Harshberger,ÏBrowder€wrote€the€following€letter€to€George€Ramsburg,€Vice„President€of€LMI,€which€states,€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àà àOn€March€1st€.€.€.€I€met€with€MartinÏHarshberger€in€our€office€to€discuss€ourÏassistance€in€providing€financing€to€LogisticsÏManagement,€Inc.€€Martin€brought€us€a€copy€of€theÏbusiness€plan€and€offering€circular€that€had€beenÏput€together€by€Sunbelt€Financial€Securities,€Inc.Ïto€offer€12€1/2%€convertible€debentures€in€aÏmaximum€amount€of€$850,000€for€this€venture.€ÏApparently,€no€effort€was€made€to€sell€theÏœà àà àdebentures€.›€.€.€.Ìà8 àà8 àà àÌà8 àà8 à€à àWe€have€reviewed€the€materials€furnishedÏby€you€and€Martin€and€believe€we€can€assist€inÏraising€the€capital€specified€in€your€materials€.€.Ï.€.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àShould€a€party€or€parties€we€introduce€provideÏfunding€for€your€project€within€three€years€ofÍthe€date€of€introduction€by€us,€we€shall€be€paid€aÏfee€of€8%€of€the€gross€consideration€furnishedÏby€our€lender/investor.€€Our€fee€is€based€uponÏthe€total€consideration€furnished.€€For€example,Ïshould€an€individual€provide€$400,000€in€cashÏand€guarantee€a€$400,000€loan,€our€fee€is€basedÏupon€$800,000.€€ÌÌà@ à€*€*€*€*€€ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€€€€€€The€aforementioned€fee€shall€be€paid€inÏfull€within€three€days€of€the€initial€provision€ofÏfunds€to€Logistics€Management€Inc.€€The€fee€isÏpayable€in€full€at€that€time€without€regard€toÏthe€fact€that€a€portion€of€€the€fundingÏcommitment€might€be€deferred.€€If€during€theÏfirst€three€years€after€initial€funding,€theÏamount€of€the€financial€commitment€isÏincreased,€the€additional€fee€due€to€us€shall€beÏpaid€within€three€business€days€of€thatÏincreased€commitment€.€.€.€.€ÌÌà8 àà8 àà àIn€the€event€that€collection€efforts€areÏrequired€with€regard€to€our€fee,€you€agree€toÏreimburse€us€normal€attorney€and€otherÏcollection€costs.€€This€agreement€€.€.€.€is€the€soleÏagreement€between€the€parties€and€cannot€beÏmodified€except€in€writing.€€ÌÌÓÓBy€signing€this€letter,€Ramsburg€agreed€that€the€letter€was€acceptableÏand€set€forth€the€complete€agreement€between€the€parties.Ìà àFollowing€the€formation€of€this€contract,€Browder€met€withÏRamsburg,€Harshberger,€and€investors€approximately€six€times€betweenÍMarch€and€May€of€1990.€€In€his€efforts€to€procure€financing€for€LMI,ÏBrowder€contacted€Huxley€Nixon,€an€investment€advisor€in€Atlanta.€€InÏhis€letter€to€Nixon,€Browder€stated€that€he€had€an€agreement€to€be€paidÏa€fee€by€LMI€ð ðfor€securing€the€start€up€financing.ðð€€Browder€offered€toÏpay€Nixon€a€3%€commission€on€funds€raised€by€investors€located€byÏNixon.€€By€May€of€1990€Browder,€with€the€help€of€investors€found€byÏNixon,€had€secured€$850,000.00€in€start€up€financing.€€As€specified€byÏthe€partiesðð€contract,€Browder€received€a€commission€checkÏrepresenting€8%€of€the€$850,000.00€raised.€€Ìà àOn€September€25,€1992,€Browder€wrote€Ramsburg€regarding€hisÏright,€under€the€partiesðð€March€7,€1990€contract,€to€receive€commissionÏon€any€additional€financing€raised€through€Browderððs€investors.€ÏAlthough€additional€funding€within€the€first€three€years€of€LMIððsÏoperation€was€provided€by€some€of€the€initial€investors€provided€byÏBrowder,€LMI€refused€to€pay€Browder€any€additional€commission€andÏthis€suit€ensued.€€Ìà àThe€trial€courtððs€order€granting€summary€judgment€to€defendantÏreflects€that€the€trial€court€considered€the€entire€record€in€the€caseÏconsisting€of€pleadings,€affidavit€of€Huxley€Nixon,€depositions€of€MartinÍHarshberger€and€George€Ramsburg,€principals€of€defendant,€and€theÏdeposition€of€plaintiff,€Mack€Browder.€€Plaintiff€has€appealed,€and€theÏonly€issue€for€review€is€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€LMIððsÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.Ìà àIn€ò òòòGriswold€v.€Income€Properties,€ó óóóNo.Ï01„A„01„9310„CH„00469,€1995€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€285€(M.S.€May€3,Ï1995),€this€Court€said:.€€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àSummary€judgments€are€particularly€suited€forÏdisposing€of€purely€legal€issues.€òòò òByrd€v.€Halló óóó,Ï847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòò òBellamy€v.ÏFederal€Express€Corp.ó óóó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33Ï(Tenn.€1988).€Since€the€construction€of€a€writtenÏcontract€involves€legal€œissues,›€a€contractÏconstruction€case€such€as€this€one€isÏparticularly€suited€to€disposition€by€summaryÏjudgment.€òòò òRainey€v.€Stanselló óóó,€836€S.W.2d€117,Ï118„19€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992);€òòò òAnderson€v.€DTBÏCorpó óóó.,€App.€No.€89„172„II,€slip€op.€at€5„6,€15ÏT.A.M.€19„6€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Mar.€28,€1990)€(Tenn.ÏR.€App.€P.€11€application€not€filed).€ÌœSlip›€op.€at€œ5.›ÌÌÓÓà àA€trial€court€should€grant€a€motion€for€summary€judgement€whenÏthe€movant€demonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€materialÏfact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€ofÏlaw.€€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€56.03.€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgmentÍbears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact€exists.€€ò òòòByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993).€€On€aÏmotion€for€summary€judgment,€the€trial€court€and€the€appellate€courtÏmust€consider€the€matter€in€the€same€manner€as€a€motion€for€directedÏverdict€made€at€the€close€of€the€plaintiffððs€proof;€that€is,€the€trialÏcourt€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favorÏof€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€thatÏparty€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€210„11.€€TheÏphrase€ð ðgenuine€issueðð€as€stated€in€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€56.03€refers€toÏgenuine,€factual€issues€and€does€not€include€issues€involving€legalÏconclusions€to€be€drawn€from€the€facts.€€ò òòòIdó óóó.€at€211.€€In€ò òòòByrdó óóó,€the€courtÏstated:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€thereÏis€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact,€theÏnonmoving€party€must€then€demonstrate,€byÏaffidavits€or€discovery€materials,€that€there€isÏa€genuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€aÏtrial.€€ò òòòFowler€v.€Happy€Goodman€Familyó óóó,€575ÏS.W.2d€496,€498€(Tenn.€1978);€ò òòòMerritt€v.ÏWilson€Cty.€Bd.€of€Zoning€Appealsó óóó,€656ÏS.W.2d€846,€859€(Tenn.€App.€1983).€€In€thisÏregard,€Rule€56.05€provides€that€a€nonmovingÏparty€cannot€simply€rely€upon€his€pleadings€butÏmust€set€forth€ò òspecific€factsó ó€showing€thatÏthere€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€forÍtrial.€€ð ðIf€he€does€not€so€respond,€summaryÏjudgment€.€.€.€shall€be€entered€against€him.ðð€€RuleÏ56.05€(Emphasis€in€original).€ÌÌÓ` °‰XÕx‘XÓÓÓà àThe€cardinal€rule€for€interpretation€of€contracts€is€to€ascertainÏthe€intention€of€the€parties€and€give€effect€to€that€intention€consistentÏwith€legal€principles.€€ò òòòHMF€Trust€v.€Bankers€Trust€Co.ó óóó,€827€S.W.2dÏ296€(Tenn.€App.€1991).Ìà àThe€proper€interpretation€of€a€contract€is€a€matter€of€law.€€ò òòòParkÏPlace€Ctr.€Enters.,€Inc.€v.€Park€Place€Mall€Assocs.€L.P.ó óóó,€836ÏS.W.2d€113,€116€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€In€construing€a€contract,€œthe›€wordsÏexpressing€the€partiesðð€intentions€should€be€given€their€usual,€naturalÏand€ordinary€meaning.€€ò òòòTaylor€v.€White€Stores,€Inc.ó óóó,€707€S.W.2d€514Ï(Tenn.€App.€1985).€€In€the€absence€of€fraud€or€mistake,€a€contract€mustÏbe€interpreted€and€enforced€as€written,€even€œthough›€it€contains€termsÏwhich€may€seem€harsh€or€unjust.€€ò òòòHeyer„Jordan€&€Assoc.€v.€Jordanó óóó,Ï801€S.W.2d€814,€821€(Tenn.€App.€1990)€(citing€ò òòòBallard€v.€NorthÏAmerican€Life€&€Casualty€Co.ó óóó,€667€S.W.2d€79,€82€€(Tenn.€App.Ï1983)).€€We€must€determine€the€rights€of€the€parties€based€upon€whatÏthey€have€put€into€the€agreement.€€ò òòòCookeville€P.C.€v.€SoutheasternÏData€Sys.ó óóó,€884€S.W.2d€458,€461€(citing€ò òòòMills„Morris€Co.€v.ÍChampion€Spark€Plug€Co.ó óóó,€7€F.2d€38,€39€(6th€Cir.€1925)).€€€€AllÏprovisions€of€a€contract€should€be€construed€œin›€harmony€with€eachÏother,€if€such€construction€can€be€reasonably€made,€so€as€to€avoidÏrepugnancy€between€the€several€provisions€of€a€single€contract.€€ò òòòBankÏof€Comerce€&€Trust€Co.€v.€Northwestern€Natððl€Life€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€160ÏTenn.€551,€226€S.W.2d€135,€68€A.L.R.€1380€(1930).€€In€ò òòòCocke€CountyÏBoard€v.€Newport€Utilities€Boardó óóó,€the€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€construing€a€contract,€the€entire€contractÏshould€be€considered€in€determining€the€meaningÏof€any€or€all€of€its€parts.€€ò òòòCrouch€v.€Shepardó óóó,Ï44€Tenn.€(4€Cold.)€383,€387€(1867).€€It€is€theÏuniversal€rule€that€a€contract€must€be€viewedÏfrom€beginning€to€end€and€all€its€terms€mustÏpass€in€review,€for€one€clause€may€modify,Ïlimit,€or€illuminate€another.€€ò òòòAssociatedÏPress€v.€WGNS€Inc.ó óóó,€48€Tenn.€App.€407,€348ÏS.W.2d€507€(1961).€€ÌÌò òòòIdó óóó.,€690€S.W.2d€œ231,€237.›€€ÌÌÓÓà àWhere€there€is€no€ambiguity€in€a€contract,€this€Court€must€applyÏthe€words€used,€giving€those€words€their€ordinary€meaning.€€NeitherÏparty€is€to€be€favored€in€their€construction.€€ò òòòHeyer„Jordan€&€Assoc.ó óóó,Ï801€S.W.2d€at€821€(citing€ò òòòBrown€v.€Tennessee€Auto.€Ins.€Co.ó óóó,€192ÏTenn.€60,€237€S.W.2d€553€(1951)).€€A€contract€is€not€ambiguous€merelyÍbecause€the€parties€have€different€interpretations€of€the€contractððsÏvarious€provisions,€ò òòòCookeville€P.C.ó óóó,€884€S.W.2d€at€462€(citing€ò òòòOmanÏConstr.€Co.€v.€Tennessee€Valley€Authorityó óóó,€486€F.€Supp.€375,€382Ï(M.D.€Tenn.€1979)),€nor€can€this€Court€create€an€ambiguity€where€noneÏexists€in€the€contract.€€òòò òCookeville€P.C.ó óóó,€884€S.W.2d€at€462€(citingÏò òòòEdwards€v.€Travelers€Indem.€Co.ó óóó,€201€Tenn.€435,€300€S.W.2d€615,Ï617„18€(Tenn.€1957)).€€Parole€evidence€is€not€admissible€to€remove€aÏpatent€ambiguity,€but€is€admissible€to€remove€a€latent€ambiguity.€Ïò òòòWard€v.€Berryó ó€ò ò&€Assoc.€Incó ó.ò òóó,€ó ó614€S.W.2d€372€(Tenn.€App.€1981).Ìà àIn€ò òòòWardó óóó,€the€Court€explained€the€distinction€between€a€patentÏambiguity€and€a€latent€ambiguity:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€A€patent€ambiguity€is€one€produced€by€theÏuncertainty,€contradictoriness€or€deficiency€ofÏthe€language€of€an€instrument,€so€that€noÏdiscovery€of€facts€or€proof€of€declarations€canÏrestore€the€doubtful€sense€without€adding€ideasÏwhich€the€words€do€not€sustain.€€A€latentÏambiguity€is€one€where€the€equivocality€ofÏexpression€œor›€obscurity€of€intention€does€notÏarise€from€the€words€themselves,€but€from€theÏambiguous€state€of€extrinsic€circumstances€toÏwhich€the€words€of€the€instrument€œrefer,›€andÏwhich€is€susceptible€of€explanation€by€the€mereÏdevelopment€of€extraneous€facts€withoutÏaltering€or€adding€to€the€written€language€orÏrequiring€more€to€be€understood€thereby€thanÍwill€fairly€comport€with€the€ordinary€or€legalÏsense€of€the€words€and€phrases€used.€€ò òòòTeague€v.ÏSowderó óóó,€121€Tenn.€132,€114€S.W.€484€(1908).ÌÌ614€S.W.2d€at€374.ÌÌÓÓ€€à àIn€the€instant€suit,€the€contract€provides€that€it€is€the€soleÏagreement€between€the€parties.€€Both€parties€contended€in€oralÏargument,€òòinter€aliaóó,€that€the€contract€is€unambiguous.€€If€there€is€anyÏambiguity€in€the€letter€contract€at€issue,€it€certainly€appears€to€be€aÏpatent€ambiguity.€€The€Court€in€ò òòòWardó óóó€was€confronted€with€an€analogousÏsituation,€and€the€opinion€is€quite€instructive€in€explaining€the€extentÏto€which€extraneous€evidence€can€be€considered.€€The€Court€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]o€the€extent€that€the€letter€speaksÏunequivocally€and€certainly,€it€must€be€acceptedÏas€conclusive€without€oral€contradiction.€€To€theÏextent,€if€any,€that€the€meaning€of€the€words€isÏuncertain,€then€it€is€permissible€to€show€byÏcommunications€between€the€parties€or€otherÏcircumstances€what€the€òòmutualóó€intent€of€theÏparties€was,€not€inconsistent€with€the€words€inÏquestion.€€To€the€extent€that€the€words€showÏunequivocally€that€there€was€no€agreement€as€toÏa€given€matter,€then€evidence€to€supply€theÏomission€is€not€admissible€.€.€.€.ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€However,€the€mutual€intent€of€the€parties€isÏnot€shown€by€mere€evidence€of€how€one€partÏð ðfelt,ðð€or€ð ðintendedðð€or€ð ðunderstoodðð€orÍð ðbelievedðð€about€the€terms€of€an€agreement;€norÏis€such€evidence€competent€to€show€the€mutualÏintent€of€the€parties€unless€communicated€to€theÏopposite€party€and€assented€to€by€him.ÌÌ614€S.W.2d€at€374„375.ÌÌÓÓà àDespite€arguments€of€LMIððs€counsel€to€the€contrary,€œwe›€findÏnothing€in€the€contract€that€limits€Browderððs€commission€to€8%€of€theÏinitial€funding€goal€of€$850,000.00.€€There€is€no€question€that€theÏcontract€letter€references€a€prior€commitment€between€LMI€and€SunbeltÏFinancial€Securities,€Inc.€to€raise€$850,000.00.€€It€also€states€thatÏBrowder€agreed€to€raise€the€ð ðcapital€specified€in€your€materials,ððÏpresumably€the€business€plan€and€offering€circular€put€together€byÏSunbelt€and€also€referenced€in€the€partiesðð€contract.€€These€referencesÏto€prior€agreements€between€LMI€and€Sunbelt€are€not€dispositive,Ïhowever,€of€the€agreement€between€LMI€and€Browder.€€There€is€œnothing›Ïin€the€contract€œthat€limits›€the€amount€of€investment€upon€whichÏBrowderððs€8%€commission€shall€be€paid.€€The€contract€states:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àShould€a€party€or€parties€we€introduce€provideÏfunding€for€your€project€within€three€years€ofÏthe€date€of€introduction€by€us,€we€shall€be€paid€aÏfee€of€8%€of€the€gross€consideration€furnishedÏby€our€lender/investor.€€Our€œÌà àà àfee›€is€based€upon€the€total€consideration€furnished.€€œÌ›ÌÓÓThere€is€simply€no€way€to€read€the€contract€as€stating€ð ðwe€shall€beÏpaid€a€fee€of€8%€œof›€the€gross€consideration,€up€to€the€grossÏconsideration€of€œ$850,000.00.ð𛀜The›€contract€continues:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€aforementioned€fee€shall€be€paid€in€fullÏwithin€three€days€of€the€initial€provision€ofÏfunds€to€Logistics€Management,€Inc.€€The€fee€isÏpayable€in€full€at€that€time€without€regard€toÏthe€fact€that€a€portion€of€the€fundingÏcommitment€might€be€deferred.ÌÌÓÓWe€believe€this€paragraph€contemplates€the€possibility€of€ð ðshortÏfundingðð;€that€is,€if€Browder€found€an€investor€who€was€willing€to€payÏ$100.00€January€1€and€$200.00€February€1,€Browder€would€be€entitledÏto€commission€on€the€full€$300.00€on€January€1.€€The€next€sentence€ofÏthat€paragraph€states:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIf€during€the€first€three€years€after€initialÏfunding,€the€amount€of€the€financial€commitmentÏis€increased,€the€additional€fee€due€to€us€shallÏbe€paid€to€us€within€three€days€of€that€increasedÏcommitment.ÌÌÓÓApplying€the€natural€and€ordinary€meaning€to€the€words€of€the€contractÏleads€us€to€the€conclusion€that€Browder€included€this€clause€to€ensureÏthat€he€would€be€compensated€in€the€event€his€œinvestors›€increased€theirÏfinancial€commitment€ò òafteró ó€the€initial€funding.€Considering€theÍextraneous€evidence€to€the€extent€œpermissible€under€ò òòòWardó óóó,›€we€findÏnothing€to€change€the€intent€expressed€by€the€œlanguage€of€the€contract.›€€Ìà àAccordingly,€the€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€defendant€is€reversed.€€The€case€is€remanded€for€suchÏfurther€proceedings€as€may€be€necessary,€and€costs€of€the€appeal€areÏassessed€to€appellee.ÌÓÓœà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌ_________________________________Ìò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌ_________________________________ÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌ