ÿWPC0  1="Ÿ`ŒÈžÂ&QfŸÆç¥>Õõ{Pœ×‹ÕôA'­|}Ãl ¼—Λø žJwæ–mÑy3îï¹q€×3†Ú]·7óëí׊“ú«ö«**Æ[é§ÂÊø¥# ýØßŽRýw+@ŸñÙøˆéuÂág©šI›}ý÷À€VÃå‰hÁRÝ Á/Hc-ñ|¸Cš#J—iOÌê©5w;JÌÎA”ùwÆ*¶q_û%JRk-+/•'ò*1>\w”ZK¡º^{›+}ø)¤ƒÊèâN~ŽRôΡ¤é»$ág6öhÌÚ‰"so‹Ô#ÔW 0ߤñéÅâƒVs«Z&.ɉ6€ö®ÎlÃ…§8„7mã´èó+öT.äë‹CUÞÉŸQ#ªªÝERD=ÍÙLÏþF_ñ®ÌrÏÛtÚïËp/ú¾âÕªÎí?4O }ëe8kßRß½„ —%Eð3b¼F¥ó'±hLi×ÐXª‘/ó öJm¤4+­ÁJ£¡>Fl¡Ä߱îÅ' @3©E „$q3oKÆ'´‰[3<2ÊóƒFñVC“0%SåüLîÞ|7²æ £¶C¢„Jw~õLåø|К€v]´ˆÚûˆ*4L` 0(o—w@ŸßUNáU://///////////////UBi %«««««« AQ±Æ 0DÈ 0D  0DPP D/” Bà Bà D3ý©yË&ÔøÔô3|xœ($¡¡ Š‹ŒDDŽDD‘E’“Ó€ øÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X¯XXXÔÔ€0,XX¯ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X¯X0,ÔÐ  ÐÌJune€29,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýñ“ñ›ñ“ñѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ÊXXdÈXXdð7ÑÔ€X@{XXXÔÔ€Š´õŠXX@{ÔÔ‡X@{XŠŠ´õÔñ“ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@EÈ ` 8ttxPð  rß›ñ“ñJANET€K.€BAKER,à ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Appeal€No.Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellee,à < àà ” àà ì à)€€01A01„9809„CH„00498Ð Ì Ä Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ìv.à 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ð ¤ œ Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€Davidson€ChanceryÌMUNDACA€INVESTMENTà ” àà ì à)Ð | t ÐCORPORATION,à ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ð h` Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ìà 4 àDefendant„Appellant,à < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ð @8  ÐÌÌÌà@ì ì ‚àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@dd‚àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€CAROL€L.€McCOY,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌROBERT€D.€TUKE€and€W.€EDWARD€RAMAGEÌTUKE€YOPP€&€SWEENEY,€PLCÌ414€Union€Street,€Suite€1100ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219Ìà 4 àAttorney€for€Plaintiff„AppelleeÌÌJEFFREY€A.€GREENE€and€G.€MILLER€HOGAN,€IIÌCASTLEMAN€&€GREENE,€PLLCÌ110€Glancy€Street,€Suite€109ÌGoodlettsville,€Tennessee€€37072Ìà 4 àAttorney€for€Defendant„AppellantÌÌÌÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àÌà@LL!‚àAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDˆÌÌÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àHERSCHEL€P.€FRANKS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌœGODDARD,€P.J.›ÌCANTRELL,€J.ÌÌÌÌÌÐ ”;Œ49ý Ðà@VV%‚àòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NóóˆÐ  ÐÌÌÌÌÔ#†Š´õŠXX@{#ÔÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThis€action€involves€a€dispute€over€loan€brokerage€fees.€€Defendant„Ð ¤ œ Ðappellant€Mundaca€Investment€Corp.€(ð ðMundacaðð)€purchased€ð ðloan€packagesðð€atÏauction.€€A€single€package€typically€consisted€of€several€individual€loans€secured€byÏreal€estate.€€Mundaca€hired€Plaintiff€Janet€Baker€to€assist€it€in€obtaining€financing€toÏbid€on€these€packages.Ìà 4 àà Œ àUnder€the€partiesðð€initial€agreement,€Baker€received€a€1.5%€commissionÏon€all€closed,€funded€loans.€€In€December,€1992,€the€parties€orally€modified€thisÏagreement.€€According€to€Mundaca,€the€parties€agreed€that€Baker€would€not€receive€aÏnew€commission€each€time€Mundaca€paid€down€its€indebtedness€and€re„borrowed€onÏthe€same€line€of€credit.€€In€exchange,€Baker€was€to€receive€1.5%€of€the€entire€amountÏof€the€line€of€credit€at€the€beginning,€regardless€of€the€amount€Mundaca€actuallyÏborrowed.€€Mundaca€contends€that€the€parties€did€not€modify€the€portion€of€theÏagreement€requiring€the€loans€to€be€closed€before€Baker€earned€her€fee.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àAccording€to€Baker,€the€parties€agreed€that€she€would€receive€only€oneÏcommission€on€a€given€line€of€credit.€€In€exchange,€Mundaca€would€pay€herÏcommission€when€the€lender€committed€to€lend€rather€than€when€the€loan€actuallyÏclosed.Ìà 4 àà Œ àBaker€helped€Mundaca€to€obtain€a€$5,000,000.00€loan€commitmentÏfrom€SouthTrust€Bank.€€A€commitment€agreement€was€signed€on€February€3,€1995,Ïbut€the€loan€never€closed.€€Baker€sought€a€$75,000.00€commission,€which€MundacaÏrefused€to€pay.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThis€action€resulted,€and€Baker€initially€brought€four€claims€for€unpaidÏfees.€€Mundaca€paid€fees€for€two€of€the€claims€before€trial€and€Baker€moved€forÏsummary€judgment€on€the€remaining€claims.€€The€Court€granted€summary€judgmentÐ ¤9œ23 Ðon€the€second€claim€but€denied€it€on€the€first.€€The€case€was€tried€before€a€jury,€whereÏBaker€asserted€alternative€claims€for€breach€of€contract€or€òòquantum€meruitóó.€€The€TrialÐ   ÐCourt€directed€a€verdict€for€Mundaca€on€the€òòquantum€meruitóó€claim,€and€the€juryÐ   Ðreturned€a€verdict€for€Baker€on€the€contract€claim€for€$75,000.00.€€ÌÓ  Óà @ àÓ­Óà 4 àà Œ àMundaca€contends€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€admitting€the€testimonyÏof€plaintiffððs€two€expert€witnesses,€and€argues€that€the€witnesses€were€not€qualifiedÏand€did€not€substantially€assist€the€jury.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àQuestions€regarding€the€admissibility,€qualifications,€relevancy€andÏcompetency€of€an€expertððs€testimony€are€generally€left€to€the€discretion€of€the€trialÏcourt.€òòMcDaniel€v.€CSX€Transp.,€Inc.,óó€955€S.W.2d€257€(Tenn.€1997),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€118Ð XP ÐS.Ct.€2296€(1998).€Ìà 4 àà Œ àMundaca€contends€that€the€plaintiffððs€expert€witnesses€were€notÏqualified€because€they€lacked€experience€with€the€type€of€loans€involved€in€this€case.€ÏSpecifically,€neither€had€significant€experience€working€with€notes€secured€by€realÏestate€mortgages€rather€than€the€real€estate€itself.€€Both€witnesses,€however,€hadÏextensive€experience€in€the€mortgage€banking€and€brokerage€industry.€€The€witnessesÏtestified€that,€in€their€opinion,€there€was€no€difference€between€the€loans€involved€inÏthis€case€and€other€types€of€loans€with€which€they€were€experienced.€€They€testifiedÏthat€the€underlying€security€was€the€same€in€either€instance.€€œñ|ñÌà 4 àà Œ àñ|ñThe›€Trial€Court€has€wide€discretion€in€assessing€the€qualifications€ofÏexperts.€€We€find€no€abuse€of€discretion€by€the€Trial€Court.€€òòSeeóó€òòOtis€v.€CambridgeÐ °1¨** ÐMut.€Fire€Ins.€Coòòóó.óó,€850€S.W.2d€439€(Tenn.€1992).Ð ¸3°,, Ðà 4 àà Œ àMundaca€also€argues€œthñ}ñatñ}ññ~ñeñ~ñññ›€the›€Trial›€Court›€erred›€because›€theññ›€expertsðð€testimony€did€not€ð ðsubstantiallyÏassistðð€the€jury.€€Generally,€the€question€of€what€will€ð ðsubstantially€assistðð€the€jury€isÏfor€the€trial€court€to€determine.€òòPrimm€v.€Wickesóóòò€òòóóLumber€Co.óó,€845€S.W.2d€768Ð Ð9È22 Ð(Tenn.App.€1992).€€In€this€case,€the€Trial€Court€limited€the€content€of€the€expertsððÏtestimony€to€the€common€practices€in€the€industry,€and€did€not€allow€any€expertÏtestimony€concerning€how€the€parties€set€fees€in€this€case,€nor€did€it€permit€testimonyÏconcerning€the€industry€standards€of€setting€a€fee.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àœñ€ñAdditionally,€›tñ€ñññTññhe›€testimony€concerning€common€practices€in€the€industry€wasÏrelevant€to€the€plaintiffððs€òòquantum€meruit€óóclaim.€€Although€the€Trial€Court€ultimatelyÐ 0(  Ðgranted€a€directed€verdict€on€œthñ‚ñisñ‚ññƒñatñƒñ›€issue,€the€motion€for€directed€verdict€was€not€madeÏuntil€after€plaintiff€had€presented€her€experts.€€Thus,€the€òòquantum€meruit€óóclaim€was€atÐ @8 Ðissue€when€the€evidence€was€admitted.€€òòSee€Barr€v.€Plastic€Surgery€Consultantsóó,€760Ð H@ ÐS.W.2d€585€(Mo.Ct.App.€1988)€(evidence€relating€to€claim€disposed€of€by€directedÏverdict€was€relevant€and€material€at€trial€as€issue€was€still€viable).€Moreover,€MundacaÏwas€permitted€to€present€its€own€œexpertñ„ñ€on€the€issueñ„ñ.›€Ìà 4 àà Œ àMundaca€also€argues€that€despite€the€Trial€Courtððs€limitation,€one€of€theÏplaintiffððs€experts€improperly€testified€that€plaintiff€had€earned€her€fee€under€the€factsÏof€this€case.€€The€Trial€Court€sustained€Mundacaððs€objection€and€issued€a€detailedÏcurative€instruction€to€the€jury.€€The€jury€is€presumed€to€have€followed€thisÏinstruction.€òò€State€v.€Smith,óó€893€S.W.2d€908€(Tenn.€1994).€€Taking€into€account€otherÐ ˆ'€  Ðmaterial€evidence€in€favor€of€plaintiffððs€position,€the€brevity€of€the€question€andÏresponse€and€the€detailed€curative€instruction,€the€Court€did€not€err€on€this€issue.€Ïœñ…ñMoreover,€ñ…ññ†ñTñ†ññ‡ñtñ‡ñhere›€is€other€evidence€to€support€plaintiffððs€position,€including€her€ownÏtestimony€and€evidence€concerning€the€partiesðð€course€of€conduct.€œñˆñWe›€find›€the›€issue›€to›€be›€without›€merit.ñˆñ›Ìà 4 àà Œ àMundaca€next€contends€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€admitting€evidence€ofÏits€financial€condition.€€Specifically,€the€Trial€Judge€permitted€counsel€for€plaintiff€€toÏquestion€John€Groomes,€the€Chairman€of€Mundaca,€concerning€the€ð ðcreated€valueðð€ofÏthe€company.€€According€to€the€witness,€ð ð[c]reated€value€is€an€estimate€of€what€is€outÏthere€to€be€collected€.€.€.ðð€The€plaintiff€argues€that€this€evidence€was€important€toÐ Ð9È22 Ðestablish€her€òòquantum€meruit€óóclaim,€which€was€still€at€issue€at€that€point€in€the€trial.€Ð  ÐSpecifically,€she€argues€that€the€information€was€necessary€to€show€that€MundacaÏbenefitted€from€her€services.€€Mundaca€contends€that€this€evidence€was€irrelevantÏeven€to€the€òòquantum€meruitóó€claim€because€only€the€payment€for€the€SouthTrust€loanÐ   Ðwas€at€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àIn€this€case,€the€evidence€concerning€ð ðcreated€valueðð€was€introducedÏonly€for€the€years€during€which€plaintiff€provided€brokerage€services€for€Mundaca.€ÏNo€evidence€was€introduced€concerning€Mundacaððs€actual€value€at€or€near€the€time€ofÏtrial.€€Additionally,€the€witness€repeatedly€explained€that€Mundacaððs€ð ðcreated€valueððÏwas€different€from€its€actual€value.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àAssuming,€òòarguendoóó,€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€admitting€thisÐ XP Ðevidence,€œñ‰ñany›€error›€was›€not›€prejudicial›€to›€Mundacañ‰ññŠñwe€find€no€reversible€errorñŠñ.›€€The€Trial€Court€instructed€the€jury€to€disregardÏall€evidence€concerning€œñ‹ñdefendantððs€ñ‹ñfinancial›€condition€and€not€to€consider€that€theÏplaintiffððs€contribution€was€a€substantial€or€significant€reason€for€Mundacaððs€success.€ÏAdditionally,€the€Trial€Court€noted€œñŒñthat›€the›€likelihood›€of›€prejudice›€was›€small,›€since›€ñŒñthere›€were€numerous€other€figures€in€evidenceÏsubstantially€similar€in€magnitude€to€the€ð ðcreated€valueðð€numbers.€€Some€of€the€loansÏwere€for€millions€of€dollars€and€one€loan€package€was€approximately€$20,000,000.00.€€œññThe›Ïintroduction›Ïof›Ïthe›Ïð ðcreated›Ïvalueðð›Ïevidence›Ïdid›Ïnot›Ïunfairly›Ïprejudice›ÏMundaca.ññ›Ìà 4 àà Œ àFinally,€Mundaca€argues€that€the€Trial€Court€erred€in€granting€summaryÏjudgment€on€plaintiffððs€claim€for€a€commission€due€on€two€loan€renewals.€€TheÏplaintiffððs€compensation€for€these€loan€renewals€is€not€related€to€the€modification€ofÏthe€partiesðð€oral€contract.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àIn€her€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment,€plaintiff€stated€that€she€andÏMundaca€agreed€that€she€would€receive€a€1.5%€fee€annually€upon€the€renewal€of€theseÏtwo€loans.€€She€received€a€fee€for€January€1994€through€December€1995,€but€not€forÏthe€1996€renewal.€€She€also€stated€that€she€had€always€received€renewal€fees€directlyÏfrom€Mundaca€and€that€these€fees€were€not€related€to€the€interest€rates€paid€to€the€twoÐ Ð9È22 Ðlenders.€€The€record€also€contains€the€affidavit€of€one€of€the€lenders,€K.R.€Stanfill,Ïwho€stated€that€John€Groomes€informed€him€that€plaintiffððs€fee€was€ð ðin€addition€to€theÏinterest€rate.ðð€Ìà 4 àà Œ àIn€response€to€plaintiffððs€motion,€Mundaca€included€the€affidavit€of€JohnÏGroomes.€€Groomes€stated€that€he€did€not€ð ðbelieveðð€that€plaintiff€was€entitled€to€a€feeÏon€these€loan€renewals.€€He€further€stated€that€because€of€an€ð ðapparentÏmiscommunication,ðð€his€company€ð ðbelievedðð€the€renegotiated€rate€for€1996€includedÏthe€plaintiffððs€fees.€€The€affidavit€fails€to€set€forth€specific€facts€contradictingÏplaintiffððs€affidavits.€€We€therefore€conclude€that€Mundacaððs€counter„affidavit€did€notÏœñŽñset›Ïforth›Ïspecific›Ïfacts›ÏñŽñestablishññingññññ€aññ›€disputed€material€œñ‘ñevidenceñ‘ññ’ñfact€on€the€issueñ’ñ.›€€òòSee€Bain€v.€Wellsóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,Ð PH Ð622€(Tenn.€1997).Ìà 4 àà Œ àWe€affirm€the€Trial€Courtððs€judgment€approving€the€jury€verdict€and€theÏgranting€of€the€summary€judgment.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€cost€of€the€appeal€is€assessed€to€the€appellant€and€the€causeÏremanded.ÌÓÓ€Ìà 4 àÔ‡X{×XŠŠ€)ÔÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à________________________Ìà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.ÌÌÌ___________________________ÌBen€H.€Cantrell,€J.ÌÔ#†Š€)ŠXX{×a2#Ô