ÿWPCD0 žÎ(iùR\ cÝŒa¢­LfcøaŠˆ,‹‰ªBø$ì{DJîsºÎŲclîZýÆö¾ïÉ]s—¯z®C]•)ƒQÄ®™K? Š9jÃ;‰yr¹ÓÿM df1Éž¡º¼_:µñ´ž 6æ‹ÆwŠgòë=r7 °]¿…G!‰ubרÄÍ5øfRÍÁzßOe D»Ü寬šˆ}@ƒì‰ýK‹÷¼i`¹Èï´XIäOïÉ„ƒ+Û¯¸Nð&ÒØ ôÓšhw”¼‘»|UÖÕŽB¹±¸8–æ-ª­6Ítî%½î ù±WÏòÚ~C§˜”௾saYáïéË÷Gba ÏÕ\¾.xr(©Û­5`!$âPw{¨åÕÞzèC4{³¢Ö3çâ¾ÙMÝ v”f ±Ä‘§FÚ „õ!ŒÇ^SIF|înÞ¡¦ çŠVáäpl¬À}÷ …Éë1"GiËb”[Q÷[1‹ô>ï,µ-P„ay Ua¡ªëÕJÁ8ŸL¡ ±³“ùÕΘ‚˜3ƒ;J‡4m¶™Z[)Ì7ªù粇6XÈ —°2QSAƒE¼M•h¬=ßµ\7Xœ˜ŠXÌ›_ šÛd 4# 9ýq½‡Í9šo.# „UN %Ý 0(ãw@ 4K_U%:n¨ 0§Á 0DhU :¬næU:T Ž U:oÊÈ9‹U:Œ ÆÁϼ ÃL#V$U:e&Ÿ& º( 0DÄ* 0D+ AQL+Æ+Lc,¯,-·, 0Dä, D/(- BW- Bt-‘- D3“.U:Æ.//U: 0˜HP LaserJet 4000 Series PCL 6HPBXLBÈÈÈÈÈÈÈÈ0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ÍÎDÏÐEÑÒEÓÔÓ€Þán~<$x3|xá, øð AZ"Arial Regular Ý ƒ ¿$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XEŽXXXÔÔ€ ôʰôX XEŽÔÚ  Ú1Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝÔ‡ôʰôô ôʰÔòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€62„13„101€òòet€seq.óóÔ#† ôʰôôôʰ~#Ô€(1997€&€Supp.€1998).(f2¿$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XVøXXXÔÔ€ ô*ôX XVøÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú.€€(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular dÝ ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú4Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€62„13„110(a)€provides,€ð ðAny€person€acting€as€a€broker€.€.€.€without€firstÐ ° Ðobtaining€a€license€commits€a€Class€B€misdemeanor.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„13„110(a)(1)€(1997).,kû¤AZ‹"Arial Regular øÝ ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú9Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝArticle€I,€section€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€provides:Ð ° ÐÌà8  àThat€no€man€shall€be€taken€or€imprisoned,€or€disseized€of€his€freehold,€liberties€or€privileges,Ïor€outlawed,€or€exiled,€or€in€any€manner€destroyed€or€deprived€of€his€life,€liberty€or€property,Ïbut€by€the€judgment€of€his€peers€or€the€law€of€the€land.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌTòòennóó.€Còòonstóó.€art.€I,€ðð€8.€€Article€XI,€section€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€provides:Ð ` ° ÐÌà8  àThe€Legislature€shall€have€no€power€to€suspend€any€general€law€for€the€benefit€of€anyÏparticular€individual,€nor€to€pass€any€law€for€the€benefit€of€individuals€inconsistent€with€theÏgeneral€laws€of€the€land;€nor€to€pass€any€law€granting€to€any€individual€or€individuals,€rights,Ïprivileges,€immunitie,€[immunities]€or€exemptions€other€than€such€as€may€be,€by€the€sameÏlaw€extended€to€any€member€of€the€community,€who€may€be€able€to€bring€himself€within€theÏprovisions€of€such€law.€€No€corporation€shall€be€created€or€its€powers€increased€or€diminishedÏby€special€laws€but€the€General€Assembly€shall€provide€by€general€laws€for€the€organizationÏof€all€corporations,€hereafter€created,€which€laws€may,€at€any€time,€be€altered€or€repealed€andÏno€such€alteration€or€repeal€shall€interfere€with€or€divest€rights€which€have€become€vested.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌTòòennóó.€Còòonstóó.€art.€XI,€ðð€8.,kû¤AZ‹"Arial Regular eÝ ƒ ¿$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XEŽXXXÔÔ€ ôʰôX XEŽÔÚ  Ú3Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝÔ‡ôʰôô ôʰÔThe€Tennessee€Attorney€General€was€made€a€party€based€upon€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€29„Ð ° Ð14„107(b),€which€provides€that€ð ðthe€attorney€general€of€the€state€Ô#† ôʰôôôʰ~#Ôshall€also€be€served€with€a€copy€of€theÐ n¾ Ðproceeding€and€be€entitled€to€be€heardðð€where€a€statewide€statute€is€alleged€to€be€unconstitutional.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð ,| ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€29„14„107(b)€(1980). ¾Ý ƒ ¿$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XEŽXXXÔÔ€ ôʰôX XEŽÔÚ  Ú2Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€4„5„101€òòet€seq.óó€(1998). Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú6Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝÔ‡ô­¶ôô ô­¶Ôð ðððPersonðð€means€and€includes€individuals,€corporations,€partnerships€or€associations,€foreign€andÐ ° Ðdomestic.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„13„102(3)(B)€&€(12)Ô#† ô­¶ôôô­¶~#Ô€(1997).,kû¤AZ‹"Arial Regular ÿÝ ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú7Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝAdditionally,€Bowdenððs€complaint€makes€a€conclusory›€assertion€that€the€òòCommissionóó€selectively€enforcedÐ ° Ðthe€Licensing€Act€in€an€improper€manner.€€œWe›€find€it€unnecessary€to€address€this€ð ðselective€enforcementððÏallegation,€however,€because€we€have€already€determined€that€the€Commission€was€not€a€proper€defendantÏfor€Bowdenððs€section€1983€claims. ·Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú8Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝThough€the€First€Amendment€pertains€solely€to€acts€of€Congress,€the€varying€rights€and€freedoms€securedÐ ° Ðthereunder€are€applied€to€the€states€through€the€concept€of€ð ðlibertyðð€established€by€the€FourteenthÏAmendment,€which€Bowden€has€also€relied€upon€in€support€of€its€section€1983€claims. ² Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú10Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„17„309,€which€is€a€criminal€statute€proscribing€ð ðCivil€rightsÐ ° Ðintimidation,ðð€provides:ÌÌà8  àà ` à(a)€The€general€assembly€finds€and€declares€that€it€is€the€right€of€every€personÏregardless€of€race,€color,€ancestry,€religion€or€national€origin,€to€be€secure€and€protected€fromÏfear,€intimidation,€harassment€and€bodily€injury€caused€by€the€activities€of€groups€andÏindividuals.€€It€is€not€the€intent€of€this€section€to€interfere€with€the€exercise€of€rights€protectedÏby€the€constitution€of€the€United€States.€€The€general€assembly€recognizes€the€constitutionalÏright€of€every€citizen€to€harbor€and€express€beliefs€on€any€subject€whatsoever€and€toÏassociate€with€others€who€share€similar€beliefs.€€The€general€assembly€further€finds€that€theÏadvocacy€of€unlawful€acts€by€groups€or€individuals€against€other€persons€or€groups€for€theÏpurpose€of€inciting€and€provoking€damage€to€property€and€bodily€injury€or€death€to€personsÏis€not€constitutionally€protected,€poses€a€threat€to€public€order€and€safety,€and€should€beÏsubject€to€criminal€sanctions.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(b)€A€person€commits€the€offense€of€intimidating€others€from€exercising€civil€rightsÏwho:Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(1)€Injures€or€threatens€to€injure€or€coerces€another€person€with€the€intent€toÏunlawfully€intimidate€another€from€the€free€exercise€or€enjoyment€of€any€right€or€privilegeÏsecured€by€the€constitution€or€laws€of€the€state€of€Tennessee;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(2)€Injures€or€threatens€to€injure€or€coerces€another€person€with€the€intent€toÏunlawfully€intimidate€another€because€that€other€exercised€any€right€or€privilege€secured€byÏthe€constitution€or€laws€of€the€United€States€or€the€constitution€or€laws€of€the€state€ofÏTennessee;Ð Ð Ð  Ðà@yy(ìà.€.€.ˆÌà8  àà ` à(d)€A€violation€of€subsection€(b)€is€a€Class€D€felony.€€.€.€.€.Ð Ð Ð  Ðà8  àà ` à(e)€The€penalties€provided€in€this€section€for€intimidating€others€from€exercising€civilÏrights€do€not€preclude€victims€from€seeking€any€other€remedies,€criminal€or€civil,€òòotherwiseÐ P Ðavailable€under€lawóó.ÐÈÐ Ð  ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€39„17„309€(1997)€(emphasis€added). ¹Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú5Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€4„5„223€and€„225€(1998). LÝ ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú11Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝÔ‡ô­¶ôô ô­¶ÔAs€set€forth€earlier€in€this€opinion,€determination€of€this€issue€depends€upon€whether€€BowdenððsÐ ° Ðemployees€are€duly€authorized€officers,€whether€its€employees€engage€in€selling€real€estate€as€a€vocation,Ïand€whether€its€employees€are€compensated€in€relation€to€the€value€of€the€real€estate.Ô#† ô­¶ôôô­¶#Ô€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð @ Ððð€62„13„104(a)(6)€(Supp.€1998).,kû¤AZ‹"Arial Regular Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú12Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝWe€need€not€resolve€whether€Bowdenððs€claims€for€injunctive€relief€were€asserted€solely€in€reliance€uponÐ ° Ðits€civil€rights€claims,€because€inasmuch€as€such€claims€for€injunctive€relief€òòmayóó€have€otherwise€beenÐ xÈ Ðasserted,€such€claims€would€be€predicated€on€the€determination€of€the€partiesðð€respective€rights€in€this€caseÏ(òòi.e.óó,€declaratory€relief). Ý ƒ TÌ$ÝÓ  ÓÔ€ XÑmXXXÔÔ€ ô­¶ôX XÑmÔÚ  Ú13Ú  Ú.€€Ý  ÝAt€one€point,€Bowdenððs€brief€states€that€it€is€ð ðengaged€in€the€business€of€acquiring€real€estate,€buildingÐ ° Ðhomes,€and€selling€that€real€estate€for€its€own€account€òòincludingóó€real€estate€in€Shelby€County,€Tennessee.ðð€Ð xÈ ÐLater,€Bowden€characterizes€the€real€estate€with€which€it€deals€as€ð ðòòmostlyóó€located€in€Shelby€County.ðð€(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý $%Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT #Ñ#€iXÿÿd#Ñ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó'''÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd øÝ ƒ¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€*XEŽXXXÔÔ€*±üX*XEŽÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€*XEŽX*±üÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€21,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó&&&&'ÿÿdxd,–ûyAZ‹"Arial Regular øÝ ƒ¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€-XEŽXXXÔÔ€-±üX-XEŽÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€-XEŽX-±üÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€20,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,–ûyAZ‹"Arial RegularÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ  ÓÔ€XEŽXXXÔÑ7€óéXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ€#ûïÑñÔñ›ñÔññÞññÔñßr€()<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx0°ð árßñÔññÞññáññÞñßr€,)<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` ttx0°ð árßñÞññáññáññáññáññÔñ›ñÔññáññáñ›ñáñà@g g ìàò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌñáññáñà@bb%ìàAT€JACKSONˆÌñáñœßt€,)>.*jx¹F` `€€@EÂ` ttx0¹|W & tß›ñáñÌÌBOWDEN€BUILDING€CORPORATION,à À à)€€Ð H˜ Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àà ` àó óPlaintiff/Appellee,à h àà À àò ò)€€Shelby€Chancery€No.€108519„2€R.D.Ð  d Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ÌVS.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9807„CH„00175Ð à 0 Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ÌTENNESSEE€REAL€ESTATEà h àà À à)Ð ¬ ü  ÐCOMMISSION,€ET€AL,à  àà h àà À à)Ð ’â  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àà ` àó óDefendants/Appellants.à À àò ò)ó óÐ ^®  ÐÌÌà@bbìàAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYˆÌà@ææ ìàAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEˆÌà@  ìàTHE€HONORABLE€FLOYD€PEETE,€JR.,€CHANCELLORˆÌÌÌò òPAUL€G.€SUMMERSó óÐ ŽÞ Ðò òAttorney€General€&€Reporteró óÐ tÄ Ðò òMICHAEL€E.€MOOREó óÐ Zª Ðò òSolicitor€Generaló óÐ @ Ðò òCHARLES€L.€LEWISó óÐ &v Ðò òAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÐ  \ Ðó óNashville,€TennesseeÐ òB ÐAttorneys€for€AppellantsÌÌÌò òRICHARD€GLASSMANÐ Š Ú ÐJOHN€BARRY€BURGESSÌHEATHER€W.€THOMPSONÌGLASSMAN,€JETER,€EDWARDS€&€WADE,€P.C.Ìó óMemphis,€TennesseeÐ "$r# ÐAttorneys€for€AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌœò òREVERSED€AñÍñND€DISMISSEDñÍñ›Ð l*¼%* ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌó óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àà È àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.Ð ‚2Ò-3 ÐÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ó óà  àœÐ ²95; ÐÓÓà  àThe›€Tennessee€Real€Estate€Commission€(ð ðthe€Commissionðð),€the€individualÐ ˜:è5< ÐÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑñáñÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑñáññÞñÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑñÞññÔñÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ#ûïÑÑ7€EŽXXdæXXdæ7ÑÑ  ÑñÔñmembers€of€that€commission€(ð ðthe€Commission€membersðð),€and€the€Tennessee€AttorneyÏGeneral€sought€permission€to€appeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€interlocutory€order€denying€theirÏmotion€to€dismiss.€€We€granted€their€application€for€permission€to€appeal€and,€for€theÏreasons€hereafter€stated,€we€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€Defendantsðð€motion€toÏdismiss.ÌÌà@00ìàò òFòòactsóó€òòandóó€Pòòroceduralóó€Hòòistoryóóó óˆÐ xÈ  ÐÌà  àThis€action,€which€was€originally€commenced€by€Bowden€Building€CorporationÏ(ð ðBowdenðð)€in€November€1996,€pertains€to€the€construction,€enforcement,€andÏconstitutionality€of€particular€provisions€of€the€Tennessee€Real€Estate€Broker€License€ActÏof€1973€(ð ðthe€Licensing€Actðð),׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€involves€claims€for€declaratory€relief,€injunctive€relief,Ð tÄ Ðcompensatory€damages,€punitive€damages,€and€attorney€fees.€€€Bowden€asserts€its€claimsÏfor€relief€in€reliance€upon:€€(1)€42€U.S.C.€sections€1983€and€1988€(for€alleged€violations€ofÏthe€First€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€the€United€States€Constitution);€(2)€Article€I,Ïsection€8€and€Article€XI,€section€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution;€(3)€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€39„17„309;€(4)€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€29„14„101€òòet€seq.óóÐ p!À  Ð(ð ðthe€Declaratory€Judgment€Actðð);€and€(5)€the€Uniform€Administrative€Procedures€Act.׃N×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р<#Œ" МClaims›€for€declaratory€and€injunctive€relief€are€asserted€against€the€Commission,€theÏAttorney€General׃Ô×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€(who€is€expressly€sued€in€his€official€capacity€only),€and€eachÐ Ô&$"& ÐCommission€member€(based€upon€both€the€individual€capacity€and€the€official€capacity€ofÏeach€such€member).€€€Bowdenððs€claims€for€compensatory€damages€are€asserted€onlyÏagainst€each€individual€Commission€member€(based€only€upon€the€personal€or€individualÏcapacity€of€each€such€member),€and€its€claim€for€punitive€damages€is€asserted€only€againstÏdefendant€œBobbi›€Gillis,€who€is€one€of€the€named€Commission€members.€€The€facts€allegedÏby€Bowden€to€support€its€claims€for€relief€are€set€forth€in€the€following€paragraph.Ð œ1ì,2 ÐÌà  àBowden€is€a€Tennessee€corporation€ð ðengaged€in€the€business€of€acquiring€andÏselling€real€estate€for€its€own€account€in€Shelby€County,€Tennessee,€through€.€.€.€corporateÏrepresentatives,ðð€some€of€which€are€not€licensed€real€estate€brokers.€€€These€corporateÏrepresentatives€ð ðare€salaried€employees€and€are€not€paid€on€a€commission€basis€in€relationÏto€the€value€of€the€corporate€real€estate€which€is€sold€by€the€representative.ðð€€On€or€aboutÏDecember€9,€1996,€the€Commission,€by€and€through€counsel,€notified€Bowden€that€ð ðtheÏCommission€voted€unanimously€to€request€counsel€to€take€action€to€prevent€violations€ofÏthe€Real€Estate€Brokerððs€Act€by€[Bowden].ðð€€€The€letter€that€was€sent€to€Bowden€explainedÏthat€an€investigation€had€revealed€that€Bowden€(through€its€employees)€was€violating€theÏLicensing€Act,€which€is€a€criminal€œoffense.›×ƒ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€letter€further€stated,Ð 0€ ÐÓÓà8  àThis€office€hereby€directs€[Bowden]€to€ò òòòCease€and€Desistóóó ó.€€Any€continuedÐ ` Ðillegal€activity€.€.€.€will€result€in€this€office€requesting€action€by€the€StateÏAttorney€General€and€also€by€the€local€District€Attorney.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓAlso,›€on€December€9,€1996,€the€Commission€sent€letters€to€two€named€Bowden€employeesÏsimilarly€informing€them€that€an€investigation€indicated€that€they€were€ð ðacting€as€real€estateÏœbroker[s›]€without€proper€licensure,ðð€and€explaining,€ð ðThis€activity€is€a€criminal€offense,Ïwhich€could€be€subject€to€criminal€prosecution,€or€to€civil€action€by€the€State€AttorneyÏGeneral.ðð€€œBowdenððs€complaint›€claims€that€the€òòCommissionððsóó€action,€through€its€members,Ð P( #& Ðamounts€to€ð ðbad€faith€harassmentðð€and€that€the€òòCommissionóó€has€selectively€enforced€theÐ 0*€%( ÐLicensing€Act€in€an€improper€manner.€€œOther›€allegations€were€asserted€by€Bowden€inÏrelation€to€specific€claims,€but€we€will€address€any€such€pertinent€allegations€below€inÏcontext€with€our€analysis€of€the€œclaims›€to€which€the€œallegations›€specifically€relate.ÌÌà  àBowdenððs€complaint,€as€amended,€requests€the€trial€court€to€afford€the€followingÏrelief:Ð p5À04 ÐÓÓà8  àà ` àa)à ¸ àEnter€a€judgment€against€all€defendants€declaring€that€theÐ ° Ðactions€of€the€plaintiff€through€its€duly€authorized€representatives€involvingÏthe€disposition€of€real€estate€owned€by€the€plaintiff€as€described€herein€areÏexempt€from€the€provisions€of€the€[Licensing€Act]€as€provided€by€T.C.A.€ðð€62„¼13„104.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àb)à ¸ àIn€the€alternative,€enter€a€judgment€declaring€T.C.A.€ðð€62„13„Ð P   Ð104(6)€to€be€unconstitutional€and€that€the€provisions€of€the€[Licensing€Act]Ïare€therefore€unenforceable€against€corporations€engaged€in€the€practice€ofÏselling€real€estate€owned€by€said€corporation.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àc)à ¸ àIssue€a€temporary€injunction€and€permanent€injunctionÐ P  Ðenjoining€future€enforcement€of€the€[Licensing€Act]€by€the€[Commission],€theÏAttorney€General,€in€his€official€capacity,€or€the€individual€members€of€theÏ[Commission]€in€their€personal/individual€and/or€official€capacities,€againstÏ[Bowden]€for€the€sale€of€property€owned€by€[Bowden]€by€authorized€œofficersÏand/or›€representatives€of€[Bowden].Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àd)à ¸ àIssue€a€temporary€injunction€and€permanent€injunctionÐ à Ðenjoining€the€future€enforcement€of€T.C.A.€ðð€62„13„109€or€ðð€62„13„110€by€theÏ[Commission],€the€Attorney€General,€in€his€official€capacity,€or€the€individualÏmembers€of€the€[Commission]€in€their€personal/individual€and/or€officialÏcapacities,€against€[Bowden]€in€relation€to€the€sale€of€any€property€owned€byÏ[Bowden]€through€duly€authorized€officers€and/or€representatives€ofÏ[Bowden].Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àe)à ¸ àAward€damages€against€the€individual€members€of€theÐ ` Ð[Commission]€in€their€personal€or€individual€capacities€to€[Bowden]€for€theÏdeprivation€of€[Bowdenððs]€fundamental€constitutional€and€civil€rights€in€theÏamount€of€$500,000.00€and€an€additional€$100,000.00€actual€andÏ$250,000.00€in€punitive€damages€against€the€Defendant,€Gillis.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àf)à ¸ àAward€attorneyððs€fees€pursuant€to€42€U.S.C.€Section€1988.а" Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àg)à ¸ àAward€[Bowden]€the€costs€of€this€action.Ð$à"Ð Ð  ÐÌÌÓÓà  àOn€August€6,€1997,€the€Defendants€collectively€filed€a€motion€to€dismiss€BowdenððsÏcomplaint,€as€amended.€€œIn›€their€motion€to€dismiss,€the€Defendants€asserted€that€dismissalÏwas€proper€as€to€œBowdenððs€general€claims›€for€declaratory€relief€because€Bowden€failed€toÏseek€such€relief€in€the€Davidson€Chancery€Court€in€accordance€with€the€UniformÏAdministrative€Procedures€Act.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€€The€Defendants€œalso›€asserted€that€dismissal€was€properÐ à.0*- Ðas€to€any€42€U.S.C.€section€1983€claims€because€ð ðthe€defendants€are€entitled€to€absoluteÏand/or€qualified€immunity,ðð€and€because€Bowden€ð ðfailed€to€state€a€claim€under€42€U.S.C.Ïðð€1983.ðð€€œFurthermore,›€the€Defendants€asserted€that€Bowden€ð ðfailed€to€state€a€claim€forÏrelief€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ39„17„309.ðð€€Last,€the€Defendants€sought€dismissal€of€thisÐ `6°15 Ðsuit€ð ðin€its€entiretyðð€based€upon€Bowdenððs€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€beÏgranted.€›ÌÌà  àOn€November€13,€1997,€the€trial€court€denied€the€Defendantsðð€motion€to€dismiss.€ÏIn€its€order,€it€stated:ÌÓÓà8  àBased€upon€T.C.A.€ðð€20„4„107,€it€is€the€opinion€of€the€Court€that€venue€isÏproper€within€this€judicial€district€and€that€further€this€Court€does€haveÏjurisdiction€over€the€issues€and€parties€outlined€in€the€pleadings.€€To€allow€forÏany€appeal€which€might€be€taken€as€to€this€ruling€of€the€Court,€theÏDefendantsðð€Motion€to€Dismiss€is€otherwise€denied€subject€to€theÏDefendantsðð€renewal€of€the€Motion€after€appropriate€discovery€is€conducted.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓBoth›€the€trial€court€and€this€Court€thereafter€granted€the€Defendants€permission€to€appealÏthis€interlocutory€order€pursuant€to€Rule€9€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Appellate€Procedure.ÌÌà@MM&ìàò òAòònalysisóóó óˆÐ @ МÌà  àBefore€reviewing€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€Defendantsðð€motion€to€dismiss,€we€findÏit€appropriate€to€note€that,€on€appeal,€Bowden€contends€that€the€trial€Court€expressly€ruledÏonly€upon€the€Defendantsðð€venue€challenge,€and€that€this€Courtððs€review€should€be€limitedÏto€jurisdictional€or€venue€matters€relating€to€Bowdenððs€general€claims€for€declaratory€relief.€ÏWe€reject€this€contention,€however,€because,€while€the€trial€courtððs€November€13,€1997Ïorder€may€have€specifically€discussed€the€Defendantsðð€venue€challenge,€the€order€furtherÏexpressly€provided,€ð ðthe€Defendantsðð€Motion€to€Dismiss€is€otherwise€denied.ðð€€Accordingly,Ïcontrary€to€Bowdenððs€position,€the€trial€courtððs€order€did€in€fact€deny€all€aspects€of€theÏDefendantsðð€motion€to€dismiss€(regardless€of€the€orderððs€added€language€stating€ð ðsubjectÏto€the€Defendantsðð€òòrenewalóó€of€the€Motion€after€appropriate€discovery€is€conductedðð).Ð à.0*- ЛÌà@ÔÔìàò òòòI.€€Federal€Civil€Rightsóóó óˆÐ  2ð-1 ÐÌòòà  àA.€€Section€1983€Claims€Against€the€StateóóÐ `6°15 ÐÌà  àœBowden€failed€to€state€a›€œclaim›€against€the€Commission€to€whatever€extent€that€œitsÐ  :p59 Ðclaims€were›€asserted€based€upon€section€1983.€€Section€1983€establishes,ÌÓÓà8  àEvery€òòpersonóó€who,€under€color€of€any€statute,€ordinance,€regulation,€custom,Ð à Ðor€usage,€of€any€State€.€.€.€subjects,€or€causes€to€be€subjected,€any€citizenÏof€the€United€States€or€other€person€within€the€jurisdiction€thereof€to€theÏdeprivation€of€any€rights,€privileges,€or€immunities€secured€by€theÏConstitution€and€laws,€shall€be€liable€to€the€party€injured€in€an€action€at€law,Ïsuit€in€equity,€or€other€proper€proceeding€for€redress€.€.€.€.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓ42›€U.S.C.S.€ðð€1983€(Supp.€1998)€(emphasis€added).€€A€state,€however,€is€not€a€"person"Ïas€contemplated€by€section€1983,€and€may€not€be€sued€under€the€statute.€€òòWill€v.€MichiganÐ P  ÐDep't€of€State€Policeóó,€491€U.S.€58,€64,€71,€109€S.Ct.€2304,€2308,€2312,€105€L.Ed.2d€45,Ð à0  Ð53,€58€(1989).€€Therefore,€section€1983€does€not€authorize€Bowdenððs€claims€against€theÏCommission.ÌÌòòà  àB.€€Section€1983€ð ðOfficial„Capacityðð€Claims€Against€State€OfficialsóóÐ `° ÐÌà  àœSimilarly,›€œBowden€failed€to€state€a›€section€1983€œclaim›€against€the€CommissionÏmembers,€to€the€extent€that€œits›€claims€were€asserted€against€the€Commission€members€inÏtheir€official€capacity,€and€against€the€Attorney€General,€who€was€sued€only€in€his€officialÏcapacity.€€In€œa›€œrecent›€opinion€òòHamilton€v.€Cookóó,€No.€02A01„9712„CV„00324,€1998€WLÐ À! Ð704528€(Tenn.€App.€Oct.€12,€1998),€this€Court€explained€the€following:ÌÓÓà8  àJust€as€section€1983€does€not€authorize€a€suit€against€the€state,€the€statuteÏalso€does€not€authorize€suits€for€damages€against€state€officials€in€theirÏofficial€capacities.€€òòWill€v.€Michigan€Dep't€of€State€Policeóó,€491€U.S.€58,€71,Ð `'°"% Ð109€S.Ct.€2304,€105€L.Ed.2d€45€(1989).€€The€rationale€for€this€rule€is€thatÏstate€officers€sued€for€damages€in€their€official€capacities€are€not€"persons"Ïwithin€the€meaning€of€section€1983€because€such€officers€"assume€theÏidentity€of€the€government€that€employs€them."€€òòHafer€v.€Meloóó,€502€U.S.€21,Ð  +p&) Ð27,€112€S.Ct.€358,€116€L.Ed.2d€301€(1991).€€In€an€official-capacity€suit,€theÏreal€party€in€interest€is€the€governmental€entity€and€not€the€named€official.€Ð -P(+ ÐòòId.óó€at€25.€€As€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€has€explained,Ðð-@),Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð à[A]€suit€against€a€state€official€in€his€or€her€official€capacity€is€not€a€suitÏagainst€the€official€but€rather€is€a€suit€against€the€official's€office.€ÏòòBrandon€v.€Holtóó,€469€U.S.€464,€471,€105€S.Ct.€873,€877,€83€L.Ed.2dÐ °1-0 Ð878€(1985).€€As€such,€it€is€no€different€from€a€suit€against€the€StateÏitself.€€Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àòòWill€v.€Michigan€Dep't€of€State€Policeóó,€491€U.S.€at€71.Ðp5À04Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àMoreover,€in€distinguishing€between€official-capacity€suits€andÏpersonal-capacity€suits,€the€Supreme€Court€has€explained:Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð àà ¸ àPersonal-capacity€suits€seek€to€impose€personal€liability€uponÐ  :p59 Ða€government€official€for€actions€he€takes€under€color€of€state€law.€...ÏOfficial-capacity€suits,€in€contrast,€"generally€represent€only€anotherÏway€of€pleading€an€action€against€an€entity€of€which€an€officer€is€anÏagent."€€Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àòòKentucky€v.€Grahamóó,€473€U.S.€159,€165,€105€S.Ct.€3099,€87€L.Ed.2d€114Ð ` ° Ð(1985)€(quoting€òòMonell€v.€New€York€City€Dep't€of€Soc.€Servs.óó,€436€U.S.€658,Ð P   Ð690€n.€55,€98€S.Ct.€2018,€56€L.Ed.2d€611€(1978)).Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓTherefore,›€section€1983€does€not€authorize€Bowdenððs€claims€against€either€theÏCommission€members€or€the€Attorney€General,€to€the€extent€that€such€claims€wereÏasserted€based€upon€those€defendantsðð€official€capacities.ÌÌà  àòòC.€€Section€1983€ð ðIndividual„Capacityðð€ClaimsóóÐ  ð ÐÌà  àSection€1983€claims€are€limited€to€cases€which€involve€ð ðthe€deprivation€of€any€rights,Ïprivileges,€or€immunitiesðð€secured€under€federal€law.€€Accordingly,€no€claim€for€relief€canÏbe€granted€absent€the€deprivation€of€such€rights.€€In€this€case,€Bowden€asserts€that€theÏCommission€membersðð€efforts€to€enforce€the€Licensing€Act€violated€Bowdenððs€constitutionalÏrights€based€upon€the€First€and€Fourteenth€Amendments€to€the€United€States€Constitution.€ÏTherefore,€in€order€to€resolve€whether€Bowdenððs€remaining€section€1983€claims€shouldÏhave€been€dismissed€for€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted,€we€findÏit€appropriate€to€construe,€as€a€matter€of€law,€the€Licensing€Act€as€it€relates€to€corporationsÏand€corporate€employees,€and€to€determine€whether€enforcement€of€the€Licensing€ActÏviolates€Bowdenððs€First€and€Fourteenth€Amendment€rights.ÌÌà  àà ` àòò1.€€The€Licensing€ActóóÐ -P(+ ÐÌà  àIn€òòBusiness€Brokerage€Centre€v.€Dixonóó,€874€S.W.2d€1€(1994),€the€TennesseeÐ À0,/ ÐSupreme€Court€set€forth€the€following€relevant€overview€of€the€Licensing€Act:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àThe€[Licensing€Act]€is€designed€to€protect€the€public€from€irresponsibleÏor€unscrupulous€persons€dealing€in€real€estate.€€òòProwell€v.€Parksóó,€767Ð p5À04 ÐS.W.2d€633,€634€(Tenn.1989).€€€To€achieve€this€end,€the€Act€requiresÏpersons€dealing€in€real€estate€to€obtain€a€real€estate€broker's€license,€œTenn.Ï›Code€Ann.€ðð€62-13-301,€and€the€failure€to€obtain€a€broker's€license€beforeÏengaging€in€acts€defined€as€"œbrokering›"€is€punishable€as€a€Class€BÏmisdemeanor.€€€œTenn.€›Code€Ann.€ðð€62-13-110(a)(1).€€€Moreover,€the€Act€alsoÐ  :p59 Ðdenies€a€œnonlicensed›€person€access€to€the€courts€to€recover€anyÏcommission,€finders€fee,€or€other€compensation€for€the€prohibited€acts.€€ÏœTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62-13-105.€€€To€maximize€the€deterrent€effect€of€the€Act,Ïthe€Legislature€drafted€its€provisions€broadly.€€The€basic€provision,€Tenn.Ï›Code€Ann.€ðð€62-13-103,€provides€thatÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð à(a)€Any€person€who,€directly€or€indirectly€for€another,€with€the€intentionÏor€upon€the€promise€of€receiving€any€valuable€consideration,€offers,Ïattempts€or€agrees€to€perform,€or€performs,€any€single€act€defined€inÏðð€62-13-102,€whether€as€a€part€of€a€transaction,€or€as€an€entireÏtransaction,€is€deemed€a€broker,€affiliate€broker€or€time€shareÏsalesperson€within€the€meaning€of€this€chapter.€€Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð à(b)€The€commission€of€a€single€such€act€by€a€person€required€to€beÏlicensed€under€this€chapter€and€not€so€licensed€constitutes€a€violationÏthereof.€€Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€term€"broker"€is€defined€in€ðð€62-13-102€asÐ Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà0` Ð Ð à[œA]ny›€person€who€for€a€fee,€commission,€finders€fee€or€any€otherÏvaluable€consideration,€or€with€the€intent€or€expectation€of€receivingÏthe€same€from€another,€solicits,€negotiates€or€attempts€to€solicit€orÏnegotiate€the€listing,€sale,€purchase,€exchange,€lease€or€option€to€buy,Ïsell,€rent€or€exchange€for€any€real€estate€or€of€the€improvementsÏthereon€or€any€time-share€interval€as€defined€in€the€TennesseeÏTime-Share€Act,€compiled€in€title€66,€chapter€32,€collects€rents€orÏattempts€to€collect€rents,€auctions€or€offers€to€auction,€or€whoÏadvertises€or€holds€himself€out€as€engaged€in€any€of€the€foregoing.€€Ð ` Ð ` Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àThe€term€"real€estate"€is€also€defined€broadly.€€€Section€62-13-102(4)Ïdefines€the€term€as€"leaseholds,€as€well€as€any€other€interest€or€estate€inÏland,€whether€corporeal,€incorporeal,€freehold€or€nonfreehold,€and€whetherÏthe€real€estate€is€situated€in€this€state€or€elsewhere."Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœòòÓÓBusiness›€Brokerage€Centre€v.€Dixonóó,€874€S.W.2d€at€3.€€As€defined,€ð ðbrokerðð€generallyÐ $à" Ðpertains€to€persons׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€who€œreceive€or€expect€to€receive›€some€form€of€consideration€òòfromÐ p&À!$ Ðanotheróó€for€their€efforts€in€soliciting€or€negotiating€the€listing,€sale,€or€purchase€of€realÐ P( #& Ðestate.€€The€mere€receipt€of€consideration€for€the€real€estate€itself€(and€not€for€efforts€inÏsoliciting€or€negotiating€the€listing,€sale,€or€purchase€of€the€real€estate)€does€òònotóó€satisfy€thisÐ ,`'* Ðgeneral€definition€of€broker.€€Accordingly,€an€owner€of€property€who€lists€or€sells€its€ownÏinterest€in€property€is€not€a€broker€requiring€licensing.€€Any€other€person,€including€anÏemployee€or€other€agent€of€the€owner,€who€lists€or€sells€that€property,€however,€qualifiesÏas€a€broker€œif€he€or€she›€œreceives€or€expects€to€receive›€any€valuable€consideration€that€isÏassociated€with€their€efforts€in€soliciting€or€negotiating€the€listing,€sale,€or€purchase€of€theÐ p5À04 Ðreal€estate.€€In€fact,€section€62„13„102€further€specifically€provides:ÌÓÓà8  àð ðBrokerðð€also€includes€any€person€òòemployed€byóó€or€on€behalf€of€òòthe€owneróó€orÐ à Ðowners€of€lots€or€other€parcels€of€real€estate,€at€a€salary,€fee,€commission,Ïor€any€other€valuable€consideration,€to€sell€such€real€estate€or€any€partÏthereof,€in€lots€or€parcels€or€other€disposition€thereof.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓTenn.›€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„13„102(3)(B)€&€(12)€(1997)€(emphasis€added).€€Moreover,€sectionÏ62„13„104€specifically€provides€that€the€provisions€of€the€Licensing€Act€do€not€apply€to€ð ðAnÏowner€of€real€estate€with€respect€to€the€property€owned€or€leased€by€such€person.ðð€€òòId.óó€ððÐ P  Ð62„13„104(a)(1)€(Supp.€1998).ÌÌà  àInsofar€as€we€have€thus€far€reviewed€the€Licensing€Actððs€provisions,€Bowden€wouldÏnot€òòdirectlyóó€violate€the€Licensing€Act€as€related€to€the€allegations€in€the€instant€caseÐ €Ð Ðbecause€Bowden€itself€is€not€required€to€obtain€a€real€estate€brokerððs€license.€€BowdenððsÏemployees€to€which€Bowden€refers€in€its€complaint,€however,€would€thus€far€be€requiredÏto€possess€a€real€estate€brokerððs€license.€€Our€analysis€of€the€Licensing€Actððs€provisions,Ïhowever,€is€not€yet€complete.€€Under€section€62„13„104(a)(6),€the€Licensing€Act€does€notÏapply€to€the€following:ÌÓÓà8  àA€œcorporation€...€acting›€through€an€officer€duly€authorized€to€engage€in€suchÏreal€estate€transaction,€where€the€transaction€occurs€as€an€incident€to€œthe€...Ïsale›€or€other€disposition€of€real€estate€owned€by€the€corporation;€however,Ïthis€exemption€does€not€apply€to€a€person€who€performs€an€act€described€inÏðð€62„13„102(3)(A)€either€as€a€vocation€or€for€compensation,€if€the€amount€ofÏthe€compensation€is€dependent€upon,€or€directly€related€to,€the€value€of€theÏreal€estate€with€respect€to€which€the€act€is€performed€œ..ñÍñ›ñÍñ..›Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœòòÓÓId.óó›€ðð€62„13„104(a)(6).€€According€to€Bowdenððs€complaint,€the€employees€used€for€sellingÐ @)$' Ðits€real€estate€who€are€not€licensed€real€estate€brokers€ð ðare€salaried€employees€and€are€notÏpaid€on€a€commission€basis€in€relation€to€the€value€of€the€corporate€real€estate€which€isÏsold€by€the€representative.ðð€€€Standing€alone,€however,€this€fact€does€not€satisfy€sectionÏ62„13„104(a)(6)ððs€exemption.€€These€employees€must€also€be€corporate€officers€authorizedÏto€engage€in€such€real€estate€transactions,€and€must€not€perform€such€real€estate€servicesÏas€a€vocation.€€Failure€to€satisfy€either€of€these€requirements€removes€BowdenððsÏemployees€from€section€62„13„104(a)(6)ððs€exemption,€and€they€would€be€required€toÏpossess€a€real€estate€brokerððs€license.ÌÐ  :p59 Ðà  àBowdenððs€section€1983€claims€are€premised€upon€the€argument€that€enforcementÏof€the€Licensing€Act€violates€Bowdenððs€constitutional€rights€(even€though€BowdenÏalternatively€sought€a€declaration€that€the€actions€of€its€œunlicensed›€employees€satisfiedÏsection€62„13„104(a)(6)ððs€exemption).€€More€specifically,€as€related€to€Bowdenððs€sectionÏ1983€claims€against€the€individual€Commission€members,€Bowden€asserted€that€theÏmembers€ð ðvoted€to€enforce€the€provisionsðð€of€the€Licensing€Act€and€that€their€enforcementÏand/or€threatened€enforcement€of€the€Licensing€Act€violates€Bowdenððs€constitutional€rights.€ÏœTherefore,›€for€purposes€of€œreviewing€whether€Bowden€stated€any›€section€1983€œclaims€uponÏwhich€relief€can€be€granted›€(and€for€purposes€of€œreviewing€Bowdenððs›€Tennessee€civil€rightsÏœclaims€„„›€discussed€below),€we€must€assume€that€Bowdenððs€unlicensed€employees€did€notÏsatisfy€section€62„13„104(a)(6)ððs€exemption€to€the€general€licensing€requirement€(òòi.e.óó,€weÐ pÀ Ðmust€assume€the€Licensing€Act€required€that€Bowdenððs€subject€employees€be€licensed).€ÏIf€enforcement€of€the€Licensing€Act€would€not€violate€Bowdenððs€asserted€federalÏconstitutional€rights€under€such€circumstances,€Bowdenððs€section€1983€claims€fail€to€stateÏany€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.ÌÌà  àà ` àòò2.€€Bowdenððs€Fourteenth€Amendment€RightsóóÐ °"  ÐÌà  àSection€one€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€United€States€ConstitutionÏprovides:ÌÓÓà8  àNo€State€shall€.€.€.€deprive€any€person€of€life,€liberty,€or€property€without€dueÏprocess€of€law;€nor€deny€any€person€within€its€jurisdiction€the€equalÏprotection€of€the€laws.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌœÓÓU.S.›€Còòonstóó.€amend.€XIV,€ðð€1.€€Bowden€contends€ð ðthat€an€owners€[sic]€right€to€alienateÐ ð-@), Ðproperty€is€a€fundamental€right€protected€by€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€to€the€UnitedÏStates€Constitution,ðð€and€that€the€Licensing€Act€œimpairs›€œits›€right€to€alienate€its€property€ifÏBowden€can€only€utilize€employees€who€are€licensed€real€estate€brokers€in€the€sale€of€itsÏproperty.€€œMoreover,›€Bowden€contends€that€the€Licensing€Act€creates€an€ð ðunreasonable,Ïirrational,€arbitrary€and€impermissibleðð€classification€as€between€individual€and€corporateÏowners€of€real€property,€in€that€an€individual€can€freely€engage€in€the€business€of€ð ðacquiringÐ 09€48 Ðand€selling€real€estate€for€[his€or€her]€own€accountðð€without€the€use€of€a€licensed€broker€(byÏutilizing€his€or€her€òòownóó€services),€but€a€corporation€cannot€act€as€such€because€ð ðaÐ à Ðcorporation€cannot€act€except€through€its€employees€or€officersðð€or€other€agents.€ÌÌà  àIn€the€context€of€òòtestamentaróóy€dispositions€of€real€property,€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ 0 € ÐCourt€has€stated,€ð ðThe€power€to€dispose€of€.€.€.€real€estate€.€.€.€depends€entirely€uponÏstatute.ðð€€òòœEpperson›€v.€Whiteóó,€156€Tenn.€155,€299€S.W.€812,€815€(1927).€€Moreover,€theÐ ð@  Ðright€to€dispose€of€real€property€by€will€ð ðis€not€a€natural€or€constitutional€right,€and€may€beÏlimited€and€regulated€by€legislation.ðð€€òòId.óó€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCalhoun€v.€Campbellóó,€763€S.W.2d€744,Ð ° Ð749€(Tenn.€1988).€€However,€even€though€the€power€to€dispose€of€property€ð ðis€not€a€naturalÏor€constitutional€right,ðð€it€has€been€commonly€referred€to€as€a€ð ðfundamentalðð€right.€€òòSeeóó,Ð pÀ Ðòòe.g.óó,€T.P.I.„„Còòivilóó€ðð€11.51€(2d€ed.€1988)€(stating,€ð ðThe€right€to€dispose€of€property€by€will€isÐ P  Ða€fundamental€right€assured€by€law€.€.€.ðð).€€Of€course,€this€ð ðfundamentalðð€right€is€limited€andÏcontrolled€by€state€statutes.ÌÌà  àAs€we€have€already€stated,€Bowden€asserts€that€an€ownerððs€right€to€alienateÏproperty€is€a€fundamental€right€protected€by€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€In€support€of€thisÏcontention,€œit›€cites€òòState€v.€Greesonóó,€174€Tenn.€178,€124€S.W.2d€253€(1939),€for€the€broadÐ $à" Ðand€generalized€proposition€that€the€Constitution€guarantees,€among€other€things,€ð ðtheÏright€to€acquire,€hold€and€dispose€of€property.ðð€€òòSeeóó€124€S.W.2d€at€256.€€As€with€the€rightÐ P( #& Ðto€dispose€of€real€property€by€will,€however:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àProperty€interests€.€.€.€are€not€created€by€the€Constitution.€€Rather€theyÏare€created€and€their€dimensions€are€defined€by€existing€rules€orÏunderstandings€that€stem€from€an€independent€source€such€as€state€law€„„Ïrules€or€understandings€that€secure€certain€benefits€and€that€support€claimsÏof€entitlement€to€those€benefits.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓVsÓòòBoard€of€Regents€of€State€Colleges€v.€Rothóó,€408€U.S.€564,€577,€92€S.Ct.€2701,€2709,€33Ð °1-0 ÐL.Ed.2d€548€(1972).€€Accordingly,€in€reviewing€the€constitutionality€of€state€legislation,€ð ð[t]heÏright€freely€to€alienate€real€property€is€not€a€œððfundamental›€œrightðð›€that€calls€for€application€ofÏstrict€scrutiny.ðð€€òòNational€Western€Life€Ins.€Co.€v.€Commodore€Cove€Improvement€Dist.óó,€678Ð P7 26 ÐF.2d€24,€26€(5th€Cir.€1982)€(citing€òòSeoane€v.€Ortho€Pharmaceuticals,€Inc.óó,€660€F.2d€146,Ð 09€48 Ð149€n.€6€(5th€Cir.€1981)).€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòCentral€Security€Natððl€Bank€of€Lorain€County€v.€RoyalÐ ° ÐHome,€Inc.óó,€371€F.Supp.€476,€482€(E.D.€Mich.€1974)€(recognizing€that€the€right€to€alienateÐ à Ðoneððs€property€is€not€a€fundamental€right€like€the€rights€of€privacy,€free€expression,€andÏinterstate€travel).€€Instead,€any€statute€that€impairs€the€ability€to€alienate€real€property€freelyÏmust€satisfy€only€the€ð ðrational€basisðð€standard€of€review.€€òòNational€Western€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,Ð 0 € Ð678€F.2d€at€26;€òòCentral€Security€Natððl€Bankóó,€371€œF.€›Supp.€at€482.€€Therefore,€in€this€case,Ð `  Ðwe€must€simply€determine€whether€the€Licensing€Act€is€a€reasonable€means€of€achievingÏa€legitimate€governmental€goal.€€òòNational€Western€Life€Ins.€Co.óó,€678€F.2d€at€26„27.Ð Ð  ÐÌà  àOur€review€of€the€Licensing€Act€leads€us€to€conclude€that€the€challenged€statutoryÏscheme€presents€a€reasonable€means€of€achieving€a€legitimate€governmental€goal.€€òòœCf›.óóÐ pÀ ÐòòBoise€Cascade€Home€&€Land€Corp.€v.€New€Jersey€Real€Estate€œCommððn›óó,€296€A.2d€545,Ð P  Ð553€(Super.€Ct.€Ch.€œDiv›.€1972)€(holding€that€legislation€requiring€a€corporate€plaintiffððsÏtelephone€operators/solicitors€to€be€licensed€real€estate€brokers€is€reasonably€related€toÏa€valid€state€interest).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€stated:ÌÓÓà8  àAfter€considering€the€[Licencing]€Act€as€a€whole,€and€after€reviewing€itsÏlegislative€history,€this€Court€firmly€believes€that€the€central,€overridingÏobjective€of€the€Act€is€to€protect€purchasers€against€unfair€and€deceptiveÏpractices€that€are€peculiar€to€the€sale€of€real€property.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÌ|ÓòòBusiness€Brokerage€Centre€v.€Dixonóó,€874€S.W.2d€1,€5€(1994).€€In€order€to€contest€theÐ €%Ð # Ðreasonableness€of€the€Licensing€Actððs€statutory€scheme,€Bowden€relies€in€part€uponÏòòFlorida€Real€Estate€œCommððn›€v.€œMcGregor›óó,€336€So.2d€1156€(Fla.€1976),€wherein€the€FloridaÐ @)$' ÐSupreme€Court€set€forth€the€following€analysis:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àIt€is€necessary€ordinarily€to€regulate€a€real€estate€broker€or€salesmanÏbecause€misrepresentations€of€œ[sic]€misconduct›€on€his€part€cannotÏnecessarily€be€visited€upon€the€person€or€entity€he€represents.€€A€memberÏof€the€public€who€is€injured€by€the€acts€or€representations€of€a€broker€orÏsalesman€does€not€necessarily€have€recourse€to€the€principal€whom€theÏbroker€or€salesman€represents.€€But€when€one€deals€with€the€employee€ofÏa€corporate€owner€of€property€the€conduct€of€such€employee€is€theÏresponsibility€of€the€employer€under€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior.€ÏWhile€sanctions€which€can€be€imposed€by€the€Florida€Real€EstateÏCommission€upon€an€errant€broker€or€salesman€obviously€are€necessary€toÏprotect€the€public€because€of€his€peculiar€legal€status€and€duties,€noÏœanalagous€[sic]€›argument€can€be€maintained€successfully€where€an€injuredÏthird€party€has€direct€recourse€to€the€owner€for€the€actions€of€the€employee.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ¡Ó336€So.2d€at€1159€(citations€omitted).€€We€œdo€not€concur,›€however,€œwith€the›€FloridaÐ  :p59 ÐSupreme€Courtððs€conclusion€that€ð ðno€œanalagous€[sic]€argument€can€be€maintainedÏsuccessfully€where€an€injured€third€party€has€direct€recourse€to€the€owner€for€the€actionsÏof€the€employee.›ðð€€Just€as€a€buyer€of€real€property€may€not€have€recourse€against€a€œmereÏprincipal›€œfor€a›€œbrokerððs€act€or€representations,›€a€buyer€may€not€be€able€to€obtain€òòeffectiveóóÐ P   Ðrelief€from€an€œemployer€for€an€employeeððs€acts€or€representations,›€as€any€type€of€businessÏdefendant€may€be€or€become€insolvent€prior€to€recovery.€€It€would€be€purely€speculativeÏfor€us€to€assume€that€every€buyer€who€purchases€property€through€an€employee€canÏsecure€effective€relief€from€the€employer/seller.€€The€Licensing€Act,€however,€requires:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àEach€licensee€who€is€licensed€under€[the€Licensing€Act]€shall,€as€aÏcondition€to€licensing,€carry€errors€and€omissions€insurance€to€cover€allÏactivities€contemplated€under€[the€Licensing€Act].Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓø†ÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€62„13„112(a)€(1997).€€The€terms€and€conditions€of€coverage€required,Ïincluding€the€minimum€limits€of€coverage,€the€permissible€deductible,€and€the€permissibleÏexemptions,€are€prescribed€by€the€Commission€in€accordance€with€section€62„13„112(f).€ÏThis€uniform€requirement€of€errors€and€omissions€insurance€serves€to€promote€theÏobjective€of€the€Licensing€Act€„„€ð ðto€protect€purchasers€against€unfair€and€deceptiveÏpractices€that€are€peculiar€to€the€sale€of€real€propertyðð€„„€in€òòallóó€instances€involving€the€saleÐ Ð  Ðof€real€property€through€any€form€of€agent€(whether€it€be€an€employee€or€otherwise).€ÏMoreover,€we€find€that€the€challenged€statutory€scheme€presents€a€reasonable€means€ofÏachieving€its€legitimate€governmental€goal.€€The€effect€of€the€Licensing€Act€presents€onlyÏa€limited€restriction€on€a€corporate€property€ownerððs€ability€to€alienate€its€property,€and€doesÏnot€deprive€it€of€that€property€or€prevent€it€from€disposing€of€that€property.ÌÌà  àAs€we€mentioned€earlier,€aside€from€œBowdenððs€substantive›€due€process€challengeÏto€the€Licensing€Act,€Bowden€also€asserts€an€equal€protection€challenge€to€the€LicensingÏAct€by€asserting€that€the€Licensing€Act€creates€an€ð ðunreasonable,€irrational,€arbitrary€andÏimpermissibleðð€classification€as€between€individual€and€corporate€owners€of€real€property,Ïin€that€an€individual€can€freely€engage€in€the€business€of€ð ðacquiring€and€selling€real€estateÏâ âfor€[his€or€her]€own€accountðð€without€the€use€of€a€licensed€broker,€but€a€corporation€cannotÐ P7 26 Ðact€as€such.œ×ƒ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  כР° Ðâ âÓÓà8  àà ` àThe€Equal€Protection€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€AmendmentÏcommands€that€no€State€shall€ð ðdeny€to€any€person€within€its€jurisdiction€theÏequal€protection€of€the€laws,ðð€which€is€essentially€a€direction€that€all€personsÐ pÀ Ðòòsimilarly€situatedóó€should€be€treated€alike.Ð` °Ð Ð  ÐÌÓÓŽÓòòCity€of€œCleburne›€v.€œCleburne›€Living€Centeróó,€473€U.S.€432,€439,€105€S.Ct.€3249,€3254,€87Ð @  ÐL.Ed.2d€313€(1985)€(emphasis€added).€€We€conclude€that€Bowden€has€failed€to€state€aÏclaim€based€upon€an€equal€protection€violation€because€Bowdenððs€equal€protectionÏchallenge€does€òònotóó€involve€similarly€situated€persons.€€The€fact€that€an€individual€can€freelyÐ à0  Ðengage€in€the€business€of€selling€real€estate€without€the€use€of€a€licensed€broker,€while€aÏcorporation€has€no€such€unlimited€ability,€results€from€the€plain€fact€that€a€corporationÏcannot€act€except€through€its€œemployees,›€officers,€or€other€agents.€€In€the€limited€contextÏof€the€present€case,€corporations€and€individuals€are€not€similarly€situated.ÌÌà  àEven€òòifóó€corporations€and€individuals€were€similarly€situated€for€purposes€of€theÐ  p Ðpresent€case,€Bowden€would€still€have€failed€to€state€a€claim€based€upon€an€equalÏprotection€violation.€€In€the€context€of€Fourteenth€Amendment€Equal€Protection€challengesÏto€legislation,€ð ð[t]he€general€rule€is€that€legislation€is€presumed€to€be€valid€and€will€beÏsustained€if€the€classification€drawn€by€the€statute€is€rationally€related€to€a€legitimate€stateÏinterest.ðð€€òòCity€of€Cleburne€v.€Cleburne€Living€Centeróó,€473€U.S.€at€440,€105€S.Ct.€at€3254.Ð €%Ð # Ðð ðThe€general€rule€gives€way,€however,€when€a€statute€classifies€by€race,€alienage,€orÏnational€origin,ðð€or€by€œsome€other€form€of€classification€expressly€recognized€to€receive€aÏhigher€standard€of€review.›€€òòId.óó€€In€this€case,€the€purported€classification€would€be€subjectÐ  +p&) Ðto€the€general€rule€requiring€the€ð ðrational€basisðð€standard€of€review€and,€as€we€have€alreadyÏdiscussed,€the€challenged€statutory€scheme€is€rationally€related€to€the€legitimate€stateÏinterest€of€protecting€purchasers€ð ðagainst€unfair€and€deceptive€practices€that€are€peculiarÏto€the€sale€of€real€property.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòBusiness€Brokerage€Centre€v.€Dixonóó,€874€S.W.2d€1,€5Ð  2ð-1 М(1994).€€òòCf.óó€òòalsoóó€òòBoise€Cascade€Home€&€Land€Corp.óó,€296€A.2d€at€553.›Ð €4Ð/3 Їà  àà ` àòò3.€€Bowdenððs€First€Amendment€RightsóóÐ ° ÐÌà  àBowdenððs€complaint€œfurther€asserts›€that€the€Commission€membersðð€conduct€violatedÏBowdenððs€right€to€free€speech€under€the€First€Amendment׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€ð ðby€unlawfully€preventing€andÐ P   Ðrestraining€[Bowden]€from€exhibiting€or€displaying€[its]€property€to€the€publicðð€and€ð ðbyÏunreasonably€preventing€[Bowden]€from€promoting€or€advertising€the€sale€of€property€whichÏit€owns.ðð€€œThis€case›€œinvolves›€what€has€been€characterized€as€ð ðcommercial€œspeech.ðð€€òòSeeóóÐ ð@  ÐòòCentral€Hudson€Gas€v.€Public€Service€Commððn€of€New€Yorkóó,€447€U.S.€557,€561,€100€S.Ct.Ð Ð  Ð2343,€2349,€65€L.Ed.2d€341€(1980).›ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àThe€First€Amendment,€as€applied€to€the€states€through€the€FourteenthÏAmendment,€protects€commercial€speech€from€unwarranted€governmentalÏregulation.€€However,€commercial€speech€enjoys€a€more€limited€measure€ofÏprotection,€commensurate€with€its€subordinate€position€in€the€scale€of€FirstÏAmendment€values,€and€is€subject€to€modes€of€regulation€that€might€beÏimpermissible€in€the€realm€of€noncommercial€expression.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àà ` àCommercial€speech€receives€a€limited€form€of€First€AmendmentÏprotection€so€long€as€it€concerns€a€lawful€activity€and€is€not€misleading€orÏfraudulent;€once€it€is€determined€that€the€First€Amendment€applies€to€theÏparticular€kind€of€commercial€speech€at€issue,€then€such€speech€may€beÏrestricted€only€if€the€governmentððs€interest€in€doing€so€is€substantial,€theÏrestrictions€directly€advance€the€governmentððs€asserted€interest,€and€theÏrestrictions€are€no€more€extensive€than€necessary€to€serve€that€interest.€€InÏorder€to€determine€whether€a€government€restriction€on€commercial€speechÏis€permissible,€a€court€examines€four€factors:€€(1)€whether€the€expressionÏconcerns€a€lawful€activity€and€is€not€misleading;€(2)€whether€theÏgovernmentððs€interest€is€substantial;€(3)€whether€the€restriction€directly€servesÏthe€asserted€interest;€and€(4)€whether€the€restriction€is€no€more€extensiveÏthan€necessary.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ0œÓ16A€Aòòmóó.€Jòòuróó.€2d,€òòConstitutional€Lawóó€ðð€480€(1998).€€òòSeeóó€œòòalsoóó€òòCentral€Hudson€Gasóó,€447Ð @)$' ÐU.S.€at€566,€100€S.Ct.€at€2351;€òòMemphis›€Publishing€Co.€v.€Leechóó,€539€F.€Supp.€405€(W.D.Ð  +p&) ÐTenn.€œ1982).€€As€indicated€above,€the€first€factor€(ð ðwhether€the€expression€concerns€aÏlawful€activity€and€is€not€misleadingðð),€pertains€to€whether€the€speech€receivesÏconstitutional€protection.€€Even€assuming€the€speech€receives€constitutional€protection,Ïhowever,€the€restriction€on€speech€is€constitutionally€permissible€if€the€second,€third,€andÏfourth€factors€are€satisfied,€òòi.e.óó€the€restriction€directly€serves€a€substantial€governmentalÐ €4Ð/3 Ðinterest€and€is€no€more€extensive€than€necessary.€€We€conclude€ñÄñthñÄñat€the€Licensing€ActððsÐ `6°15 Ðrestriction€of€commercial€speech€is€permitted€in€accordance€with€these€remaining€threeÏfactors.€€òòCf.óó€òòSanter€v.€Globe€Publications,€Inc.óó,€499€N.E.2d€389,€396€(Ohio€App.€1985).€€InÐ à Ðaddition€to€directly€serving€a€substantial€governmental€interest,€we€note€that€the€LicensingÏAct€does€òònotóó€create€an€outright€ban€on€real€estate€solicitation.€€Moreover,€we€note€thatÐ P   ÐBowden€has€not€asserted€the€existence€of€any€alternative€means€of€regulating€the€exerciseÏof€this€commercial€speech€that€would€serve€the€governmentððs€interest,€yet€be€lessÏextensive.ÌÌà  àòòD.€€ImmunitiesóóÐ ° ÐÌà  àOn€appeal,€the€individually€named€Real€Estate€Commission€member€defendantsÏcontend€that,€even€òòifóó€a€valid€constitutional€claim€existed,€they€are€absolutely€immune€fromÐ P  Ðliability€in€their€individual€capacities€under€42€U.S.C.€ðð€1983€òòas€to€Bowdenððs€damagesÐ 0€ Ðclaimsóó€because€they€acted€as€members€of€a€licensing€board€in€a€ð ðquasi„judicialðð€capacity.€Ð ` ÐThey€further€contend€that€they€possess€qualified€immunity€from€liability€in€their€individualÏcapacities€as€to€Bowdenððs€damages€claims€because€their€conduct€did€not€violate€anyÏclearly€established€constitutional€or€statutory€right.€€We€find€it€unnecessary€to€addressÏthese€issues,€however,€having€already€determined€that€Bowden€failed€to€state€a€1983€claimÏupon€which€relief€could€be€granted.€€We€therefore€pretermit€these€issues.Ì›Ìà  àœòòñÅñDñÅññÆñEñÆñ.›€€Section€1988€Claims€for€Attorney€FeesóóÐ 0*€%( ÐÌà  àBowdenððs€complaint€asserts€ð ðthat€pursuant€to€42€U.S.C.€Section€1988,€[Bowden]€isÏentitled€to€attorneys€fees€incurred€in€this€action€to€eradicate€the€deprivation€of€[Bowdenððs]Ïcivil€rights€by€the€acts€or€threatened€acts€of€the€defendants.ðð€€This€claim,€however,€isÏdependent€upon€a€valid€section€1983€claim.€€Because€we€have€already€determined€thatÏBowden€failed€to€state€a€valid€section€1983€claim,€œBowden›€has€likewise€failed€to€state€aÏvalid€section€1988€claim€for€attorney€fees.ÌÐ 09€48 Ðà@ìàò òòòII.€€Tennessee€Civil€Rightsóóó óˆÐ ° МÌà  àApart€from€Bowdenððs€section€1983€claims,€which€were€based€upon€purported€federalÏconstitutional€violations,€Bowdenððs€complaint€also€asserts€claims€for€relief€based€upon€theÏTennessee€Constitution€and€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€39„17„309.€€As€withÏBowdenððs€assertions€regarding€federal€constitutional€violations,€Bowden€asserts€that€theÏLicensing€Actððs€statutory€scheme€ð ðcreates€an€impermissible€classification€in€violation€ofÏArticle€1€ðð€8€and€Article€11€ðð€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€and€also€violates€dueÏprocess€provisions€under€said€constitution.ðð׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ° ÐÌà  àUnder€federal€law,€a€person€whose€federal€constitutional€rights€are€violated€by€aÏfederal€officer€can€maintain€a€private€cause€of€action€for€damages€against€the€federalÏofficer,€even€though€no€statute€expressly€creates€such€a€cause€of€action.€€òòSeeóó€òòBivens€v.Ð 0€ ÐSix€Unknown€Named€Agents€of€Federal€Bureau€of€Narcoticsóó,€403€U.S.€388,€395„97,€91Ð ` ÐS.Ct.€1999,€2004„05,€29€L.Ed.2d€619€(1971).€€Tennessee,€however,€has€not€recognizedÏany€such€implied€cause€of€action€for€damages€based€upon€violations€of€the€TennesseeÏConstitution.€€òòLee€v.€Laddóó,€834€S.W.2d€323,€324€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòCline€v.€Rogersóó,€87Ð °"  ÐF.3d€176,€179€(6th€Cir.€1995).€€Beyond€Bowdenððs€claims€for€damages,€however,€we€findÏthat€Bowden€otherwise€failed€to€state€any€due€process€or€equal€protection€claim€under€theÏTennessee€Constitution€for€the€reasons€explained€above€with€reference€to€BowdenððsÐ P( #& Ðsection€1983€claims€and€the€purported€federal€constitutional€violations.€€òòSeeóó€òòalsoóó€òòDickersonÐ ° Ðv.€Sanders€Manuf.€Co.óó,€658€S.W.2d€535,€539€(Tenn.€App.€1983)€(summarily€rejecting€stateÐ à Ðconstitutional€challenges,€including€an€Article€I,€section€8€challenge,€to€the€Licensing€Act).€ÏWhile€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€recognized€that€interpretations€of€the€federalÏconstitution€ð ðonly€establish€a€minimum€level€of€protectionðð€that€the€Tennessee€ConstitutionÏaffords,€and€that€the€Tennessee€Constitution€may€afford€a€higher€level€of€protection€inÏsome€cases,€we€find€no€authority€for€any€such€higher€protection€as€related€to€the€instantÏcase.€€òòSeeóó€òòBurford€v.€Stateóó,€845€S.W.2d€204,€207€(1992).€€Accordingly,€Bowden€failed€toÐ Ð  Ðstate€any€claim€based€upon€violation€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution.ÌÌà  àAs€to€Bowdenððs€section€39„17„309€claims,׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€we€are€unaware€of€any€prior€authorityÐ pÀ Ðrecognizing€such€an€implied€private€cause€of€action€for€damages.€€òòSeeóó€òòYoung€v.€StateÐ P  ÐFarm€Mut.€Auto.€Ins.€Co.óó,€868€F.€Supp.€937,941„42€(W.D.€Tenn.€1994);€òòVafaie€v.€Owensóó,Ð 0€ ÐNo.€92C„1642,€1996€WL€502133€*€5„6€(Tenn.€App.€Sept.€6,€1996).€€Moreover,€we€feel€itÏwould€be€anomalous€to€suggest€that€the€legislature€intended€an€òòimpliedóó€cause€of€action€forÐ ð@ Ðdamages€for€the€violation€of€a€òòstatutoryóó€right,€when€Tennessee€does€not€even€recognizeÐ Ð  Ðsuch€an€implied€cause€of€action€for€the€direct€violation€of€state€constitutional€civil€rights.€Ð ° ÐòòSeeóó€òòLee€v.€Laddóó,€834€S.W.2d€323,€324€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòCline€v.€Rogersóó,€87€F.3d€176,Ð à Ð179€(6th€Cir.€1995).€€Regardless€of€whether€section€39„17„309€creates€an€implied€causeÏof€action€for€damages,€however,€Bowden€still€would€not€have€stated€a€claim€upon€whichÏrelief€could€be€granted€under€section€39„17„309€because,€as€with€Bowdenððs€section€1983Ïclaims,€Bowdenððs€claim€based€upon€section€39„17„309€is€premised€upon€its€assertion€thatÏenforcement€of€the€Licensing€Act€would€violate€Bowdenððs€rights€to€due€process,€equalÏprotection,€or€free€speech.ÌÌà@› › ìàòòò òIII.€€Bowdenððs€Remaining€Claims€for€Relief€/€Venueó óóóˆÐ à ÐÌà  àAs€mentioned€earlier,€aside€from€Bowdenððs€civil€rights€claims,€Bowden€soughtÏdeclaratory€relief€as€to€whether€its€unlicensed€employees€are€subject€to€section€62„13„¼104(a)(6)ððs€exemption.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€(Bowden€also€sought€declaratory€relief€as€to€whether€theÐ ` ÐLicensing€Act€is€unconstitutional€as€applied€to€corporations€engaged€in€the€practice€ofÏselling€real€estate€owned€by€the€corporation,€though€it€was€necessary€for€usñÇñ€alreadyñÇñ€to€address€thisÏissue€of€law€ñÈñearñÈññÉññÈñiler€ñÈññÉññÊñlier€ñÊñin€the€context€of€Bowdenððs€civil€rights€claims.)€€€The€Defendants,Ïhowever,€sought€dismissal€of€Bowdenððs€general€claims€for€declaratory€relief€becauseÏBowden€did€not€seek€such€relief€in€Davidson€Chancery€Court€in€accordance€with€theÏUniform€Administrative€Procedures€Act.€€Therefore,€the€only€issue€remaining€before€thisÏCourt€that€has€been€raised€by€the€parties€is€whether€Bowdenððs€remaining€claim€forÏdeclaratory€relief€could€be€brought€in€Shelby€County.׃°×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ,`'* ÐÌà  àBowden€contends€that€venue€is€proper€in€Shelby€County€based€on€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€20„4„107,€which€provides:Ð °1-0 ÐÓÓà8  àNotwithstanding€any€other€provision€of€law€or€rule€of€procedure€to€theÏcontrary,€any€action€the€subject€matter€of€which€involves€real€property€inÏwhich€the€state€of€Tennessee,€or€any€agency€thereof,€is€a€party,€may€beÏproperly€instituted€in€any€county€in€which€such€property€is€located.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓgÃÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€20„4„107€(1994).€€Bowden€asserts€that€the€subject€matter€of€this€suitÏinvolves€real€property€located€in€Shelby€County,€Tennessee.€€We€first€note,€however,€thatÏBowden,€in€its€appellate€brief,€recognizes€that,€while€the€real€property€that€it€sells€is,€in€part,Ïlocated€in€Shelby€County,€its€business€is€not€limited€solely€to€properties€located€in€ShelbyÏCounty.׃×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Nor€is€there€any€specific€property€to€which€this€suit€relates.Ð à0  ÐÌà  àIn€reviewing€section€20„4„107's€application€to€the€instant€case,€we€are€guided€by€ourÏprior€opinion€in€òòBarry€v.€Commissioners€of€Commerce€&€Ins.óó,€No.€01A01„9404„CH„00156,Ð €Ð Ð1994€WL€485588€(Tenn.€App.€Sept.€9,€1994).€€In€òòBarryóó,€the€plaintiff,€who€was€not€licensedÐ `° Ðto€practice€architecture€or€engineering€in€Tennessee,€was€developing€a€specific€propertyÏthat€he€owned,€and€personally€developed€his€own€set€of€plans€for€remodeling€the€buildingÏon€that€property.€€1994€WL€485588€at€*1.€€After€proceeding€with€the€construction€withoutÏthe€benefit€of€a€licensed€architect€or€engineer,€he€received€an€order€from€the€Board€ofÏArchitectural€and€Engineering€Examiners€to€cease€the€unlicensed€practice€of€architectureÏand€engineering.€€òòId.óó€€After€he€filed€suit€for€declaratory€and€injunctive€relief€in€the€countyÐ  #ð! Ðin€which€the€property€was€located,€which€was€Wilson€County,€the€trial€court€dismissed€theÏcomplaint€for€lack€of€proper€venue.€€òòId.óó€€On€appeal,€the€plaintiff€argued€that€the€subjectÐ `'°"% Ðmatter€of€the€suit€involved€the€property€located€in€Wilson€County,€and€relied€upon€sectionÏ20„4„107€(quoted€above)€to€support€venue.€€òòId.óó€€We€determined,€however,€ð ðthat€theÐ  +p&) Ðgravamen€of€his€complaint€is€his€right€to€practice€unlicensed€architecture€or€engineering.ðð€ÏòòId.óó€€Accordingly,€because€the€official€residence€of€state€agencies€and€state€officers€lies€inÐ à.0*- ÐDavidson€County,€and€because€lawsuits€brought€against€state€officers€generally€must€beÏbrought€in€the€county€of€the€officerððs€official€residence,€we€affirmed€the€trial€courtððsÏdismissal€based€on€improper€venue.€€òòId.óó€(citing€òòDelta€Loan€&€Finance€Co.€of€Tennessee,Ð €4Ð/3 ÐInc.€v.€Longóó,€336€S.W.2d€5€(Tenn.€1960);€òòMorris€v.€Snodgrassóó,€871€S.W.2d€484€(Tenn.Ð `6°15 ÐApp.€1993)).€€We€similarly€find€that,€in€this€instant€case,€the€gravamen€of€BowdenððsÏcomplaint€relates€to€the€right€of€its€employees€to€engage€in€unlicensed€real€estateÏbrokering.€€Moreover,€section€4„5„225€of€the€Uniform€Administrative€Procedures€ActÏprovides:ÌÓÓà8  àà ` àThe€legal€validity€or€applicability€of€a€statute€.€.€.€to€specifiedÏcircumstances€may€be€determined€in€a€suit€for€a€declaratory€judgment€in€theÏchancery€court€of€Davidson€County,€unless€otherwise€specifically€providedÏby€statute,€if€the€court€finds€that€the€statute,€rule€or€order,€or€its€threatenedÏapplication,€interferes€with€or€impairs,€or€threatens€to€interfere€with€or€impair,Ïthe€legal€rights€or€privileges€of€the€complainant.€€The€agency€shall€be€madeÏa€party€to€the€suit.Ð Ð Ð  ÐÌÓ‡ÏÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„225(a)€(1998).€€Accordingly,€the€proper€venue€for€BowdenððsÏremaining€claims€is€in€Davidson€County.ÌÌà@ËË%ìàò òCòòonclusionó óóóˆÐ P  ÐÌà  àBased€upon€the€foregoing,€we€reverse€the€trial€courtððs€denial€of€the€DefendantððsÏmotion€to€dismissñÎñ.ñÎññÏñ€ñÏññÐññÏñANDñÏññÐññÑñand€dismiss€the€cñÑññÒññÑñmñÑññÒññÓñomplaint€herein.ñÓñ€€Costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€toÏBowden,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð P( #& Ðóóà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àà p àHIGHERS,€J.Ð @)$' ÐÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ À0,/ ÐCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÐ p5À04 ÐFARMER,€J.