ÿWPCð  £Plc&.³Á•f'HäÙBOÃ÷Q¢E[ÝÛy}×—4fƒ«Þ3Æ‘?½Ûj@‘þ¤È’­ò‰aO[Ë#ˆ»ù‹ûúÒVÏixKœpå‡ë^HŠp;©ýû¬µã%£`γ.Vý—ø¥Nìž18‹×þ÷7êh§YÅK“]]€µG™æ‚ÒÇØÊð-ð ÆÙ: : ‡¦à½Ë}‡À€šY›ƒ=öÉÚ¶]ˆ^›¥cý¥ËÏïg«h¦àsæÇŽ[Ù¸œú”¤»q÷^!Ýᆆܳ&Ý­.*jxàÿ` `€€@EÔ` 8ttxP ?ð È tß›ñÄñà@  êàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@¦¦(êàAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€X×X¼¼¶eԈР ÐÌÌÌÌMARY€JEAN€BREWER,à à àà 8 àà  à)Ð È À Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à àà 8 àà  à)Ð ”Œ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ð zr  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à01„A„01„9710„CH„00611Ð `X  ÐœVS›.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð F>  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àRutherford€ChanceryÐ ,$  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€œ95DR›„493Ð   ÐEDWARD€œLELON›€BREWER,€JR.,à  à)à è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H! àà  # àÐ øð  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à 8 àà  à)Рļ ÐÌÌà@¤¤êàAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€RUTHERFORD€COUNTYˆÌà@]]!êàAT€œMURFREESBORO›,€TENNESSEEˆÌÌà@  êàTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€E.€œCORLEW›,€III,€CHANCELLORˆÌÌÌÌÌJERRY€SCOTTÌJOHN€KEAÌSCOTT€&€KEAÌ110€City€Center€BuildingÌ100€East€Vine€StreetÌœMurfreesboro›,€Tennessee€37133„1216Ìà Ø àAttorney€for€Plaintiff/AppellantÌÌJIM€œWISEMAN›€ÌœWISEMAN›€&€SCHNEIDERÌ131€North€Church€StreetÌœMurfreesboro›,€Tennessee€37130Ìà Ø àAttorney€for€Defendant/AppelleeÌÌÌÌÌÌà@||$êàREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDˆÌÌÌÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌCAIN,€J.ÌœCOTTRELL›,€J.ÌÌÓÓò òÔ€„Œj„XX×Ôòòà@tt(êàO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€X×X„„ŒjԈР€;x4:ç Їà Ø àà 0 àThis€case€tests€the€power€of€the€trial€court€to€order€an€adult,€slightlyÏhandicapped€child€to€visit€his€father.€€The€Chancery€Court€of€Rutherford€County€heldÏthat€it€was€the€duty€of€the€court€to€require€the€visitation.€€We€hold€that€under€theÏcircumstances€of€this€case€the€court€exceeded€its€jurisdiction.ÌÌà@²²-êàò òI.ó óˆÐ ü  ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àEdward€œLelon›€Brewer,€Jr.€and€Mary€Jean€Brewer€married€on€August€26,Ï1972.€€They€had€two€children,€Shaun€and€Ryan.€€Both€children€were€adults€when€theÏparties€divorced€on€June€3,€1996.€€Shaun€Brewer€is€borderline€to€mildly€retarded.€€HeÏcontinued€to€live€with€his€mother,€and€the€parties€agreed€that€he€needed€supportÏbeyond€the€age€of€eighteen.€€The€marital€dissolution€agreement€provided€that€Mr.ÏBrewer€would€pay€Ms.€Brewer€$552€a€month€as€long€as€Shaun€resided€in€her€homeÏas€a€dependent.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€agreement€also€provided€that€Mr.€Brewer€would€have€liberalÏvisitation€rights€with€Shaun€and€that€neither€party€would€try€to€estrange€the€child€fromÏthe€other€or€try€to€hamper€the€free€and€natural€development€of€the€love€and€respectÏof€the€child€for€the€other€party.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€March€of€1997€Mr.€Brewer€filed€a€petition€for€contempt€alleging€thatÏMs.€Brewer€had€refused€to€let€Shaun€visit€with€him€and€that€she,€by€various€means,Ïhad€hindered€the€development€of€a€relationship€between€Shaun€and€himself.€ÏAlthough€Shaun€was€not€a€party,€his€preference€became€an€issue,€and€the€proofÏshowed€that€he€did€not€wish€to€visit€his€father.€€Nevertheless,€the€court€set€anÏelaborate€visitation€schedule€upon€the€following€finding:ÌÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àIn€this€case,€the€Court€must€recognize€its€duty€toÏprovide€for€the€custody€of€the€young€man,€to€require€theÏpayment€of€support,€and€to€require€the€establishment€ofÏa€schedule€for€visitation.€€The€Court€appreciates€theÐ J:B39 Ðdesire€of€Shaun€to€make€his€own€decisions€as€to€whetherÏhe€will€visit€and€when€he€will€visit.€€He€must€understand,Ïhowever,€that€it€is€the€duty€of€the€Court€to€require€him€toÏvisit€with€his€father,€just€as€it€is€the€duty€of€the€Court€toÏrequire€Shaunððs€father€to€pay€child€support€to€ShaunððsÏmother,€and€to€require€Shaunððs€mother€to€house€and€careÏfor€Shaun€as€a€custodial€parent.€€A€part€of€being€aÏresponsible€adult€is€compliance€with€the€law€and€theÏorders€of€the€Court.€€Visitation€schedules€are€arranged€inÏa€number€of€cases€where€parties€have€been€unable€toÏwork€out€such€matters€among€themselves.€€The€CourtÏmust€recognize€that€in€order€to€arrange€visitationÏschedules,€particularly€in€this€case,€three€or€more€adultsÏmust€arrange€their€schedules,€which€perhaps€they€haveÏbeen€unable€to€do€consistently.€€While€Shaun€has€his€ownÏschedule,€the€Court€is€mindful€of€the€fact€that€Mrs.€BrewerÏdoes€likewise,€and€Mr.€Brewer€does€similarly.à ˜ àà ð à€Ðh`0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€court€also€declined€to€hold€Ms.€Brewer€in€contempt.ÌÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àShaun€himself€moved€for€relief€from€the€order€and€Ms.€Brewer€filed€aÏnotice€of€appeal.€€We€stayed€the€appeal€to€allow€the€lower€court€to€make€Shaun€aÏœparty,›€and€to€rule€on€his€motion€for€relief€from€the€judgment.€€The€lower€court€allowedÏShaun€to€œintervene,›€and€ordered€that€he€be€examined€to€determine€his€current€mentalÏcondition.€€The€court€received€the€examinersðð€reports,€but€denied€any€relief€from€theÏorder€of€visitation.ÌÌà@––-êàò òII.ó óˆÐ 4-0 ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àUnder€the€common€law,€children€shed€the€disabilities€of€minority€at€ageÏtwenty„one.€€òòSeeóó€42€Am.€œJur›.€œ2d›€òòInfantsóó€ðð€3.€€The€age€of€majority€is€however,€subjectÐ ¨9 26 Ðto€change€by€the€legislature,€and€in€1971€Tennessee€lowered€the€age€of€majority€toÏeighteen.€€The€Act€provides:ÌÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!à(a)à ˆ àNotwithstanding€any€laws€to€the€contrary,€anyÐ ¨   Ðperson€who€is€eighteen€(18)€years€of€age€or€older€shallÏhave€the€same€rights,€duties,€and€responsibilities€as€aÏperson€who€is€twenty„one€(21)€years€of€age,€except€asÏprovided€in€subsection€(b)€relative€to€the€rights€toÏpurchase,€possess,€transport,€and€consume€alcoholicÏbeverages,€wine,€or€beer€as€those€terms€are€defined€inÏtitle€57.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€1„3„113(a).ÌÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àThe€enactment€of€this€statute€completely€emancipated€those€overÏeighteen€years€from€the€control€of€their€parents.€€òòœNichols›€v.€œAtnip›óó,€844€S.W.2d€œ655,Ð ¸° Ð659›€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€Emancipation€occurs€even€though€the€child€continues€to€liveÏwith€his€or€her€parents.€€òòœGlover›€v.€œGlover›óó,€319€S.W.2d€œ238,€243›€(Tenn.€App.€1958).€Ð xp Ðð ð[A]€person€who€has€reached€his€majority€is€entitled€to€the€management€of€his€ownÏaffairs€and€to€the€enjoyment€of€civic€rights.ðð€€42€Am.€œJur›.€œ2d›€òòInfantsóó€ðð€3.€€Among€theÐ 8"0 Ðrights€enjoyed€by€all€adult€citizens€are€the€freedom€of€association,€òòRoberts€v.€UnitedÐ $ ÐStates€Jayceesóó,€468€U.S.€609€(1984),€the€freedom€to€travel,€òòDunn€v.€œBlumstein›óó,€405Ð ø%ð! ÐU.S.€330€(1972),€and€„„€in€Tennessee,€perhaps€the€most€fundamental€of€all€„„€the€rightÏto€be€free€from€governmental€interference,€the€celebrated€right€to€be€let€alone.€€òòDavisÐ ¸)°"% Ðv.€Davisóó,€842€œS.W.2d›€œ588,€599›€(Tenn.€1992).Ð ˜+$' ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€chancellor€sought€to€avoid€those€general€laws€by€finding€that€ShaunÏwas€disabled€and€that€Mr.€Brewer€had€a€continuing€duty€of€support.€€ShaunððsÏdisability,€however,€does€not€prevent€him€from€ð ðmaking€major€decisions€in€his€life€suchÏas€when€and€under€what€conditions€he€would€visit€with€parents€or€friends,ðð€accordingÏto€one€evaluation.€€Another€evaluation€found€him€to€have€ð ða€relative€calm,€assuredÏapproach€to€problem„solving;€short„term€memory€and€attention;€the€ability€to€focus€orÐ ¸8°15 Ðconcentrate;€an€ability€to€comprehend€and€reason€out€practical€or€social€situations;€aÏsensitivity€toward€others;€an€ability€to€look€after€his€personal€needs€.€.€.€andÏappropriate€use€of€manners.ðð€€He€is€currently€employed€and€is€on€a€waiting€list€forÏacceptance€in€a€group€home.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€rights€of€association€to€which€we€have€referred€may€be€forfeited€byÏcriminal€œconduct,›€or€regulated€to€promote€a€compelling€state€interest,€òòCampbell€v.Ð H@  ÐœSundquist›óó,€926€S.W.2d€œ250,€262›€(Tenn.€App.€1966),€but€we€know€of€no€authority€toÐ (  Ðsupport€the€deprivation€of€these€rights€on€the€basis€of€ð ðborderlineðð€or€ð ðmildðð€retardation.€ÏThe€only€cases€we€have€found€on€the€subject€hold€to€the€contrary.€€In€òòœSchmidt›€v.Ð èà ÐœSchmidt›óó,€459€A.œ2d›€421€(Pa.€Super.€1983),€the€Court€œdecided›€a€case€involving€a€victimÐ ÈÀ Ðof€Downððs€Syndrome€whose€mental€age€ranged€between€four€and€a€half€and€eight.€ÏThe€Court€held€that€an€order€compelling€her€to€visit€her€father€could€not€stand€againstÏher€constitutional€rights.€€The€Court€said:Ìà Ø àà 0 àÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àKimberly€œSchmidt›€is€chronologically€an€adult.€€She€has€notÏbeen€adjudicated€incompetent.€€Her€mental€limitations€doÏnot€compel€the€conclusion€that€she€lacks€capacity€to€makeÏrational€decisions€regarding€parental€preferences.€ÏBecause€she€is€an€adult€she€enjoys€many€of€the€sameÏrights€and€privileges€enjoyed€by€other€adult€citizens.€ÏThese€include€a€constitutionally€protected€freedom€ofÏchoice€to€make€certain€basic€decisions€regardingÏmarriage,€procreation,€family€life€and€privacy.€€See,€e.g.:€ÏòòRoe€v.€Wadeóó,€410€U.S.€113,€93€œS.Ct›.€705,€35€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€147Ð ˜+$' Ð(1973);€òòStanley€v.€Illinoisóó,€405€U.S.€645,€92€œS.Ct›.€1208,€31Ð ˆ,€%( ÐœL.Ed›.œ2d›€551€(1972);€òòœEisenstadt›€v.€œBaird›óó,€405€U.S.€438,€92Ð x-p&) ÐœS.Ct›.€1029,€31€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€349€(1972);€òòGriswold€v.Ð h.`'* ÐConnecticutóó,€381€U.S.€479,€85€œS.Ct›.€1678,€14€œL.Ed›.œ2d›€510Ð X/P(+ Ð(1965);€òòMeyer€v.€Nebraskaóó,€262€U.S.€390,€43€œS.Ct›.€625,Ð H0@), Ð67€œL.Ed›.€1042€(1923).€€This€freedom€of€choice,€it€wouldÏseem,€should€include€the€same€right€which€an€adult€hasÏto€refuse€to€visit€a€parent.€€In€the€absence€of€anÏadjudication€of€incompetency,€a€handicapped€adult€shouldÏnot€be€deprived€of€the€freedom€to€make€for€himself€orÏherself€the€same€family€related€decisions€which€otherÏadults€enjoy.€€Such€a€person€has€the€same€needs€asÏother€adults€for€social€approval,€respect€and€privacy,€asÏwell€as€freedom€to€make€important€decisions€regardingÏpersonal€preferences€and€associates.Ш9 260 ¤0 ¤ Ї459€A.œ2d›€at€422„23.€€òòSee€alsoóó,€òòWalker€v.€Walkeróó,€523€A.œ2d›€782€(Pa.€Super.€1987).Ð  ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àWe€agree€with€the€Pennsylvania€Courtððs€assessment€of€the€rights€ofÏadults€„„€even€mildly€retarded€adults€„„€to€make€choices€about€their€associations.€€WeÏdo€not€mean,€however,€to€place€too€much€emphasis€on€the€effect€of€an€adjudicationÏof€incompetency.€€The€appointment€of€a€conservator€or€a€personal€representativeÏmight€be€made€for€any€number€of€reasons€that€do€not€go€to€the€individualððs€right€toÏhave€œhis›€choices€respected.€€œòòSeeóó€Title€34,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€€Such›€an€adjudicationÐ (  Ðwould€only€be€one€factor€to€consider€in€deciding€whether€an€adult€had€lost€theÏfundamental€right€to€be€let€alone.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àFinally,€the€argument€is€made€that€Mr.€Brewerððs€right€to€have€Shaun€visitÏhim€is€derived€from€Mr.€Brewerððs€payment€of€child€support.€€Mr.€Brewer,€however,Ïvoluntarily€assumed€that€obligation€in€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,€and€we€knowÏof€no€authority€establishing€a€linkage€between€the€obligation€to€support€an€adult€childÏand€the€right€to€œñ¯ñinvoke€the€power€of€the€state€to€force€an€adult€child€to€visit€the€ñ¯ññ²ñ›ñ²ññ¯ñobligorñ¯ññ³ññ²ñœñ²ññ³ññ³ñœñ³ññ¯ñÏparent.ñ¯ññ°ñcoercive,›€state„imposed›€visitation›€orders.›€ñ°ññ²ñ›ñ²ññ±ñ€ñ±ñ›€Again,€the€only€cases€dealing€with€the€subject€seem€to€run€against€any€suchÏlinkage.€€òòSee€œFernald›€v.€œFernald›óó,€302€A.œ2d›€470€(Pa.€Super.€1973)€and€òòœSchmidt›€v.Ð è&à" ÐœSchmidt›óó,€459€A.œ2d›€421€(Pa.€Super.€1983)Ð È(À!$ ÐÌà@zz,êàò òIII.ó óˆÐ ˆ,€%( ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àMs.€Brewer€also€asserts€that€the€lower€courtððs€order€placedÏimpermissible€burdens€on€her.€€Since€we€have€held€that€the€court€did€not€have€theÏpower€to€order€Shaun€to€visit€his€father,€the€burdens€of€which€she€complains€haveÏbeen€considerably€mitigated.€€We€take€no€position€on€the€remaining€parts€of€the€lowerÏcourtððs€order.ÌÐ ¨9 26 Ðà Ø àà 0 àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€ordering€Shaun€Brewer€to€visit€with€hisÏfather€is€reversed.€€Remand€the€cause€to€the€Chancery€Court€of€Rutherford€County€Ïfor€further€proceedings.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellee.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H! àà  # à¼à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àà ˜ àà ð àà H! àà  # à¼à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è à______________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌPATRICIA€J.€œCOTTRELL›,€JUDGEÌÐ  $ ÐÑ  ÑÔ€¼÷¨¼XXiYÔò òà@êê.êàœñ¹ñIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  Ðà@™™(êàAT€NASHVILLEñ¹ñó óñ¹ñÔ€XiYX¼¼÷¨ÔˆÐ  ÐÌÌÌMARY€JEAN€BREWER,à à àà 8 àà  à)Ð  ü Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ð ä Ü Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à01„A„01„9710„CH„00611Ð ÔÌ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àРļ  ÐœVS›.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àRutherford€ChanceryÐ ´¬  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àNo.€œ95DR›„493Ð ¤œ  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àÐ ”Œ  ÐEDWARD€œLELON›€BREWER,€JR.,à  à)à è àReversed€andà ð àà H! àà  # àÐ „|  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àRemandedÐ tl  Ðà Ø àDefendant/Appellee.à 8 àà  à)Ð d\ ÐÌÔ€¼÷¨¼XXiYÔò òòòà@uu'êàJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€Tóóó óˆÐ D< ÐÌÓÓÔ€XiYX¼¼÷¨Ôà Ø àà 0 àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€theÐ ph ÐChancery€Court€of€œñ´ñRutherfordñ´ññ¹ññµñDavidson›€ñµññ¹ññ¶ñ€ñ¶ñCounty,›€briefs€and€argument€of€counsel;€uponÏconsideration€whereof,€this€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€in€the€decree€of€the€ChancellorÏthere€is€reversible€error.Ìà Ø àà 0 àIn€accordance€with€the€opinion€of€the€Court€filed€herein,€it€is,€therefore,Ïordered€and€decreed€by€this€Court€that€the€decree€is€reversed.€€The€cause€isÏremanded€to€the€Chancery€Court€of€œñ·ñRutherfordñ·ññ¹ññ¸ñDavidsonñ¸ññ¹ñ›€County€for€any€further€proceedingsÏand€for€the€collection€of€the€costs€accrued€below.Ìà Ø àà 0 àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€against€Edward€œLelon›€Brewer,€Jr.,€forÏwhich€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àPATRICIA€J.€œCOTTRELL›,€JUDGEÌÌÌñ¹ñ›