ÿWPCÍ  …# VUNa %¯ 0Nµ 0Í bÐ w@Ø 4 , 0D;  †‡  m 0J& 0Tp 0^Ä 0h" 0rŠ 0|ü 0†x 0þ 1uŽ 0d BgU >„B)ÂDCë AM.U*{ D3¥.Ø+ 0@1fqv~×vÓU AO(Æw 0D= D/ B° ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 'í€"  Z 6Times New Roman Regular¼(&öy$¡¡Ó  ÓÙñÓ Ù(}(2‡þ$¤¤Ý ƒöy!ÝÓ  ÓÙñÓ ÙÝ  ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XõX¼¼Ôà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó- ù- % & D' D( ) {* + D, - Ó€7 DÒ 3|x7 (#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóCashion v. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation Í 7 ' IB011C20IB011C2 .    ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ d< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial$$$$'ÿÿdxd $Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€%¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ€)ÔÔ€)ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€)XÔÌÌMarch€19,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó !Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€%¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$ÝÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€%XÔà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý›The€Civil€Service€Commission€is€the€only€body€vested€with€the€authority€to€grantÏmonetary€relief€to€wrongfully€terminated€state€employees.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„328(e),€(f)€(1993)€(authorizing€the€Commission€to€award€back€pay€and€benefits€and€attorneyððsÏfees).€€However,€only€ð ðregular€employeesðð€are€entitled€to€this€relief.€€A€ð ðregular€employeeðð€isÏone€who€holds€a€regular€civil€service€position€and€who€has€completed€his€or€her€initialÏprobationary€period.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„101(a)(20)€(Supp.€1996);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„328(a)(2).Ì("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò \Ñ\R AØ'\ÑPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÔ€%¼ÔÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÑ Ü ÑÒ  ÒÒ ° ÒÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ  ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€Ïp¼¼ddÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àÔ€%„Ôò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLE̜ـ€ÙßR€(+'A1-j|Çÿ:` ç `€€@ÿRß›ÌÔ€%¼ÔÌó óAMANDA€œLINN›€CASHION,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€ChanceryÌà àà àà àà àà àà à)à àNo.€94„3739„IIÌEVELYN€C.€ROBERTSON,€JR.,€inà à)Ìhis€capacity€as€Commissioner,à àà à)à àAppeal€No.ÌTennessee€Dept.€of€Mental€Healthà à)à à01A01„9506„CH„00257Ìand€Mental€Retardation,€andà àà à)ÌDON€G.€HOLT,€in€his€capacity€asà à)ÌCommissioner,€Tennessee€Dept.€ofà à)ÌPersonnel,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà à)ÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€C.€ALLEN€HIGH,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌòòFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:à àà àà àà àòòFor€theÏDefendants/Appelleesóó:ÌÌAmanda€Linn€Cashion,€Pro€Seà àà àà àà àJohn€Knox€¢Walkup£ÌMemphis,€Tennesseeà àà àà àà àà àAttorney€General€andÏReporterÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àœSherry€E.€Martin›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€%„Ôò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDó óÌÌÔ€%¼ÔÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,ÏJUDGEÇÓ€ÓÔ€%„Ôà@ àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÌÔ€%¼ÔÌà àThis€appeal€involves€the€Department€of€Mental€Health€and€MentalÏRetardationððs€dismissal€of€a€probationary€staff€attorney€because€she€was€ð ðnotÏfitting€in.ðð€€After€unsuccessfully€seeking€a€declaratory€order€from€her€formerÏdepartment,€the€Civil€Service€Commission,€and€the€Department€of€Personnel,Ïthe€staff€attorney€filed€an€action€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€CountyÏchallenging€her€termination€and€seeking€back€pay,€expungement€of€herÏemployment€records,€and€attorneyððs€fees.€€The€trial€court€granted€the€motionÏto€dismiss,€and€the€staff€attorney€has€perfected€this€appeal.€€While€the€trialÏcourt€properly€held€that€it€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdiction€over€the€claimsÏfor€monetary€relief,€it€€erred€by€holding€that€it€lacked€subject€matterÏjurisdiction€over€the€claim€for€declaratory€relief.€€We€have€determined,Ïhowever,€that€the€complaint€fails€to€state€a€claim€for€a€declaratory€relief€underÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€(1991).€ÌÌà@ àò òI.ó óÌÌà àAmanda€Linn€¢Cashion£€began€working€for€the€Department€of€MentalÏHealth€and€Mental€Retardation€(ð ð¢DMHMR£ðð)€on€July€25,€1994.€€She€wasÏclassified€as€an€ð ðAttorney€IIIðð€and€was€assigned€to€the€ArlingtonÏDevelopmental€Center€in€Shelby€County.€€The€Arlington€DevelopmentalÏCenter€was€at€that€time€the€subject€of€€federal€litigation€commenced€by€theÏUnited€States€Department€of€Justice€concerning€¢DMHMR£ððs€failure€to€provideÏits€residents€with€a€safe€environment.ÌÌà àOn€her€second€day€at€work,€Joseph€Boyd,€the€Departmentððs€chiefÏcounsel,€invited€Ms.€¢Cashion£€to€accompany€him€to€a€conference€at€theÏUniversity€of€Tennessee€Medical€School€in€Memphis.€€While€traveling€to€theÏconference€site,€Mr.€Boyd€explained€the€pending€federal€lawsuit€to€Ms.Ï¢Cashion£€and,€according€to€her,€made€numerous€derogatory€remarks€about€herÏimmediate€supervisor€at€Arlington€and€about€an€assistant€state€attorney€generalÏrepresenting€the€¢DMHMR£€in€the€federal€litigation.€€Ms.€¢Cashion£€promptlyÏshared€Mr.€Boydððs€remarks€with€her€immediate€supervisor.ÌÌà àSeveral€days€later,€Ms.€¢Cashion£€and€the€other€¢DMHMR£€staff€attorneysÏmet€in€Nashville€to€discuss€the€Departmentððs€response€to€the€expected€federalÏinvestigations€of€the€Departmentððs€other€developmental€centers.€€During€thisÏmeeting,€Ms.€¢Cashion£€was€extremely€critical€of€the€¢DMHMR£ððs€handling€of€theÏfederal€investigation€and€of€its€standards€and€procedures€at€Arlington.€€SheÏreturned€to€Memphis€following€the€meeting€but€did€not€report€for€work€atÏArlington€for€several€days.€€She€decided€to€work€at€home€because€theÏDepartment€had€not€provided€her€with€ð ðproper€office€spaceðð€at€Arlington€andÏbecause€she€believed€that€her€work€was€on€hold€while€the€¢DMHMR£€decidedÏhow€to€respond€to€several€matters€in€the€pending€federal€litigation.€€ÌÌà àMs.€¢Cashion£€met€with€Stanley€¢Lipford£,€Arlingtonððs€interimÏsuperintendent,€and€Larry€¢Durbin£,€one€of€the€¢DMHMR£ððs€assistantÏcommissioners,€when€she€returned€to€Arlington€on€August€22,€1994.€€Dr.Ï¢Durbin£€informed€her€that€the€Commissioner€of€the€¢DMHMR£€had€decided€toÏterminate€her€because€her€comments€at€the€meeting€in€Nashville€indicated€thatÏshe€was€not€ð ðfitting€in.ðð€€When€Ms.€¢Cashion£€vehemently€protested€herÍdismissal,€Dr.€¢Durbin£€and€Mr.€¢Lipford£€instructed€her€to€clear€out€her€desk,Ïreturn€her€keys,€and€leave€the€Arlington€premises€by€the€end€of€the€day.ÌÌà àMs.€¢Cashion£€received€a€certified€letter€from€Mr.€¢Lipford£€on€August€27,Ï1994,€stating€that€she€had€been€placed€on€ð ðadministrative€leaveðð€on€August€22,Ï1994€and€that€her€termination€from€the€¢DMHMR£€was€effective€as€of€AugustÏ25,€1994.€€The€letter€did€not€recite€the€reasons€for€her€termination€but€ratherÏsimply€referred€to€her€discussion€with€Dr.€¢Durbin£.€€Ms.€¢Cashion£€later€Ïreceived€a€separation€notice€submitted€by€the€¢DMHMR£€to€the€Department€ofÏEmployment€Security€stating€that€she€had€been€employed€ð ðfrom€7/25/94€toÏ8/26/94.ðð€€She€also€received€a€copy€of€a€letter€from€the€¢DMHMR£€to€theÏCommissioner€of€Personnel€stating€that€she€had€been€terminated€on€August€25,Ï1994,€€because€her€ð ðconduct€in€meetings€and€in€other€personal€contact€withÏ¢DMHMR£€personnel€was€such€as€to€lead€us€to€conclude€that€she€would€notÏbecome€an€effective€member€of€¢DMHMR£ððs€management€and€service€team.ðð€ÏThe€letter€added€that€the€ð ðquality€of€the€performance€of€her€professionalÏduties€played€no€part€in€this€decision.ððÌÌà àOn€September€2,€1994,€Ms.€¢Cashion£€submitted€a€petition€for€aÏdeclaratory€order€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„223€(1991)€to€the€¢DMHMR£Ïand€the€Civil€Service€Commission€seeking€a€declaration€of€her€rights€as€aÏprobationary€employee€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312€(1993).€€TheÏ¢Commmissioner£€of€Personnel,€acting€as€the€secretary€to€the€Civil€ServiceÏCommission,€responded€that€the€Commission€did€not€have€authority€to€hearÏMs.€¢Cashion£ððs€ð ðappealðð€because€she€was€still€a€probationary€employee€who€hadÏnot€gained€career€status.€€The€¢DMHMR£€also€declined€to€make€a€declaratoryÍruling€on€the€ground€that€the€petition€was€within€the€jurisdiction€of€theÏCommissioner€of€Personnel.ÌÌà àFaced€with€these€refusals€to€respond€to€her€petitions,€Ms.€¢Cashion£€filed€aÏpetition€in€the€Chancery€Court€for€Davidson€County€seeking€a€declaratoryÏjudgment€pursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€concerning€her€rights€as€aÏprobationary€employee.€€She€also€sought€back€pay,€expungement€of€all€entriesÏin€her€employment€records€concerning€the€termination,€and€attorneyððs€feesÏand€court€costs.€€The€Commissioners€of€Personnel€and€the€¢DMHMR£€filed€aÏmotion€to€dismiss€the€complaint€asserting€that€the€trial€court€lacked€subjectÏmatter€jurisdiction,€that€the€doctrine€of€sovereign€immunity€barred€Ms.Ï¢Cashion£ððs€claims€for€monetary€relief,€and€that€the€complaint€failed€to€state€aÏclaim€upon€which€relief€could€be€granted.€€On€February€16,€1995,€the€trialÏcourt€entered€an€order€dismissing€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€complaint.€€Ms.€¢Cashion£€hasÏperfected€this€appeal.€ÌÌà@ àò òII.ó óÌà@ àò òòò¢Mootness£ó óóóÌÌà àThe€defendant€commissioners€assert€as€a€preliminary€matter€that€Ms.Ï¢Cashion£ððs€claims€are€moot€because€she€has€already€been€terminated.€€TheyÏargue€that€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€contemplates€a€continuing€statutoryÏviolation€on€which€judicial€declaration€might€have€some€effect.€€While€weÏagree€with€this€statement€in€principle,€we€do€not€find€that€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€claimsÏare€moot€under€the€facts€of€this€case.ÌÌà àThe€courts€should€decline€to€provide€judicial€relief€in€cases€that€do€notÏinvolve€a€genuine€and€existing€controversy€requiring€the€adjudication€ofÏpresent€rights.€€òòState€ex€rel.€Lewis€v.€State,óó€208€Tenn.€534,€537,€347€¢S.W.2d£Ï47,€48€(1961);€òò¢Dockery£€v.€¢Dockery£,óó€559€¢S.W.2d£€952,€954€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1977).€€Cases€must€remain€justiciable€throughout€the€entire€course€of€theÏlitigation,€and€the€concept€of€¢mootness£€involves€circumstances€that€render€aÏcase€no€longer€justiciable.€€òòMcIntyre€v.€¢Traughber£,óó€884€¢S.W.2d£€134,€137Ï(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€A€moot€case€is€one€that€has€lost€its€character€as€aÏpresent,€live€controversy.€€òò¢McCanless£€v.€Klein,óó€182€Tenn.€631,€637,€188Ï¢S.W.2d£€745,€747€(1945).€€A€case€will€generally€be€considered€to€be€moot€if€itÏno€longer€serves€as€a€means€to€provide€some€sort€of€relief€to€the€prevailingÏparty.€€òòMcIntyre€v.€¢Traughber£,óó€884€¢S.W.2d£€at€137;€òò¢Massengill£€v.€¢Massengill£,óóÏ36€Tenn.€Ap.€385,€388„89,€255€¢S.W.2d£€1018,€1019€(1952).ÌÌà àEven€though€Ms.€¢Cashion£€has€already€been€terminated,€we€do€not€findÏthat€she€is€seeking€relief€that€would€be€beyond€the€courtsðð€power€to€grant€in€anÏappropriate€case.€€Even€if€she€is€unsuccessful€in€convincing€the€courts€to€setÏaside€her€termination€or€to€grant€her€monetary€relief,€she€may€be€entitled€toÏjudicial€relief€with€regard€to€the€other€rights€she€might€have€under€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312.€€Accordingly,€we€decline€to€find€that€this€appeal€isÏmootòòò ò.ÌÌà@ àIII.Ìà@ àThe€Claims€for€Monetary€Reliefó óóóÌÌà àWe€need€not€tarry€long€with€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€claims€for€monetary€relief.€ÏBecause€of€the€sovereign€immunity€conferred€on€the€State€by€Tenn.€Const.€art.ÏI,€ðð€17€and€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€20„13„102(a)€(1994),€Ms.€¢Cashion£€can€seekÏmonetary€relief€in€the€courts€only€if€the€General€Assembly€has€enacted€aÏstatute€specifically€permitting€claims€for€monetary€relief€for€wrongfulÏdischarge€from€state€employment.€€Ms.€¢Cashion£€has€not€cited€and€our€researchÏhas€failed€to€uncover€a€statute€permitting€discharged€state€employees€to€fileÏsuit€against€the€state€for€monetary€damages.× ƒ, ××  ×€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€theÏtrial€court€correctly€determined€that€it€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdiction€overÏMs.€¢Cashion£ððs€claims€for€monetary€relief.€€òòSeeóó€òòStokes€v.€University€ofÏTennessee,óó€737€¢S.W.2d£€545,€546€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987)€(holding€that€Tenn.ÏConst.€art.€I,€ðð€17€bars€a€discharged€state€university€employeeððs€suit€forÏreinstatement€and€back€pay).ÌÌà@ àò òIV.€€ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Declaratory€Judgment€Claimó óóóÌÌà àBased€on€the€language€of€the€trial€courtððs€final€order,€we€must€presumeÏthat€the€trial€court€determined€that€it€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdiction€overÏMs.€¢Cashion£ððs€claim€for€a€declaratory€judgment€and€that€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððsÏpetition€failed€to€state€a€claim€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224.€€We€find€thatÍthe€trial€court€erred€with€regard€to€its€subject€matter€jurisdiction€but€that€Ms.Ï¢Cashion£ððs€complaint€fails€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.ÌÌà@ àò òA.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Trial€Courtððs€Subject€Matter€Jurisdictionó óóóÌÌà àThe€concept€of€subject€matter€jurisdiction€relates€to€a€courtððs€lawfulÏauthority€to€adjudicate€a€controversy€brought€before€it.€€òòTurpin€v.€ConnerÏBros.€Excavating€Co.,óó€761€¢S.W.2d£€296,€297€(Tenn.€1988);€òòStandard€Sur.€&ÏCasualty€Co.€v.€Sloan,€óó180€Tenn.€220,€230,€173€¢S.W.2d£€436,€440€(1943).€€ItÏhinges€upon€the€nature€of€the€cause€of€action€and€the€relief€sought.€€òòLanders€v.ÏJones,óó€872€¢S.W.2d£€674,€675€(Tenn.€1994).€€Subject€matter€jurisdiction€canÏonly€be€conferred€on€a€court€by€the€Constitution€of€Tennessee€or€by€legislativeÏact.€€òòKane€v.€Kane,óó€547Ñ€.ÑÇ¢S.W.2d£€559,€560€(Tenn.€1977);€òòBrown€v.€Brown,óó€198€Tenn.€600,€618„19,€281Ï¢S.W.2d£€492,€501€(1955).ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224(a)€empowers€the€Chancery€Court€ofÏDavidson€County€to€hear€and€decide€declaratory€judgment€actions€concerningÏthe€ð ðlegal€validity€or€applicability€of€a€statute,€rule€or€order€of€an€agency€toÏspecified€circumstances.ðð€€The€only€statutory€prerequisites€for€bringing€aÏdeclaratory€judgment€action€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€are€that€theÏcomplainant€must€first€have€requested€the€agency€for€a€declaratory€orderÏpursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„223€(1991)€and€that€the€agency€must€haveÏdeclined€to€issue€a€declaratory€order.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224(b).ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€unquestionably€had€subject€matter€jurisdiction€overÏdeclaratory€judgment€actions€brought€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ4„5„224.€€The€only€question€remaining€is€whether€Ms.€¢Cashion£€demonstratedÏthat€she€satisfied€the€statutory€requirements€for€bringing€such€an€action.€€HerÏpetition€demonstrates€that€she€first€requested€the€¢DMHMR£,€the€Civil€ServiceÏCommission,€and€the€Department€of€Personnel€to€render€€a€declaratory€orderÏconcerning€her€rights€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312€and€that€all€threeÏagencies€declined€to€render€a€declaratory€order.€€Accordingly,€the€trial€courtÏerred€when€it€concluded€that€it€lacked€subject€matter€jurisdiction€to€considerÏMs.€¢Cashion£ððs€claim€for€declaratory€relief.ÌÌà@ àò òB.ó óÌà@ àòòò òThe€Adequacy€of€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€Claimó óóóÌÌà àFinding€that€the€trial€court€had€¢suject£€matter€jurisdiction€to€hear€Ms.Ï¢Cashion£ððs€claim€does€not€necessarily€entitle€her€to€relief.€€Her€complaint€couldÏstill€fail€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€can€be€granted.€€Accordingly,€weÏmust€examine€her€petition€to€determine€whether€it€alleges€any€state€of€factsÏthat€would€entitle€Ms.€¢Cashion£€to€relief.€€òò¢Pemberton£€v.€American€DistilledÏSpirits€Co.,óó€664€¢S.W.2d£€690,€691€(Tenn.€1984);€òò¢Rampy£€v.€¢ICI£€Acrylics,€Inc.,óóÏ898€¢S.W.2d£€196,€198€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1994).€€In€doing€so,€we€must€take€allÏwell„pleaded€allegations€in€her€petition€as€true,€and€we€must€also€construe€theÏpetition€liberally€in€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€favor.€€òòCook€v.€Spinnakerððs€of€¢Rivergate£,ÏInc.,óó€878€¢S.W.2d£€934,€938€(Tenn.€1994);€òòDobbs€v.€¢Guenther£,óó€846€¢S.W.2d£€270,Ï273€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1992).ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€provides€that€the€courts€may€grantÏdeclaratory€relief€when€ð ðthe€statute,€rule€or€order,€or€its€threatenedÏapplication,€interferes€with€or€impairs,€or€threatens€to€interfere€with€orÏimpair,€the€legal€rights€or€privileges€of€the€complainant.ðð€€Thus,€our€inquiryÏmust€focus€on€whether€the€manner€in€which€the€¢DMHMR£,€the€Civil€ServiceÏCommission,€or€the€Department€of€Personnel€interpreted€and€applied€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312€interfered€with€or€impaired€any€of€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€legalÏrights€or€privileges.ÌÌà àProbationary€employees€in€civil€service€positions€enjoy€far€fewer€rightsÏand€privileges€than€their€counterparts€who€have€successfully€completed€theirÏprobationary€period.€€They€are,€however,€not€without€three€minimal€rightsÏunder€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312.€€First,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)Ïpermits€a€probationary€employee€to€work€for€at€least€one€month€before€beingÍterminated€unless€the€appointment€was€the€ð ðresult€of€fraud€or€error.ðð€€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(b).€€The€period€provides€employees€with€time€to€adjustÏto€the€position€and€to€demonstrate€their€ability€to€perform€the€required€work.€ÏòòSeeóó€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€¢Regs£.€r.€1120„2„.11(1)€(1988)€(defining€the€purposesÏof€the€probationary€period).€€Second,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)€specifiesÏthat€probationary€employees€may€be€terminated€either€because€they€are€unableÏor€unwilling€to€perform€their€duties€satisfactorily€or€because€their€habits€andÏdependability€do€not€merit€their€continued€employment.€€Third,€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€8„30„212(a)€requires€that€the€employee€be€informed€of€the€terminationÏand€the€reasons€therefor.ÌÌà@ àòòò òPremature€Terminationó óóóÌÌà àMs.€¢Cashion£€asserts€that€the€¢DMHMR£€violated€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)€by€deciding€to€terminate€her€and€by€informing€her€of€its€decisionÏduring€the€first€month€of€her€employment.€€She€interprets€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„312(a)€to€require€an€appointing€authority€to€put€off€even€consideringÏwhether€a€probationary€employee€should€be€retained€for€at€least€one€monthÏafter€employment.€€We€do€not€construe€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)€soÏrigidly.€€Public€employers,€like€their€counterparts€in€the€private€sector,€mustÏbe€able€to€continuously€monitor€an€evaluate€the€performance€of€theirÏemployees.€€An€employeeððs€conduct€during€the€first€month€of€his€or€herÏprobationary€period€may€provide€an€appointing€authority€with€sufficientÏgrounds€for€termination,€and€when€that€circumstance€arises,€all€that€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)€requires€is€that€the€termination€take€effect€oneÏmonth€after€the€employeeððs€initial€hiring€date.€€ÌÌà àMs.€¢Cashion£ððs€superiors€notified€her€of€her€termination€before€she€hadÏbeen€employed€for€the€¢DMHMR£€for€one€month,€but€her€termination€tookÏeffect€on€her€one„month€anniversary€date.€€Even€though€Ms.€¢Cashion£€wasÏplaced€on€administrative€leave€on€August€22,€1994,€she€was€paid€for€a€fullÏmonth€of€work.€€Accordingly,€the€timing€of€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€termination€did€notÏviolate€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a).ÌÌà@ àòòò òThe€Statement€of€the€Reasons€for€Terminationó óóóÌÌà àMs.€¢Cashion£€also€asserts€that€the€¢DMHMR£€violated€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ8„30„312(a)€by€failing€to€provide€her€with€an€adequate€statement€of€theÏreasons€for€her€termination.€€While€she€focuses€on€¢on£€Mr.€¢Lipford£ððs€AugustÏ25,€1994€letter,€she€overlooks€the€Commissioner€of€the€¢DMHMR£ððs€SeptemberÏ20,€1994€letter€to€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel.ÌÌà àTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„212(a)€requires€an€appointing€authority€toÏð ðreport€to€the€commissioner€[of€personnel]€and€to€the€employee€removed€suchÏaction€and€the€reasons€therefor.ðð€€While€the€better€practice€is€to€include€theÏstatement€of€reasons€for€the€termination€in€the€employeeððs€termination€letter,Ïan€appointing€authority€technically€complies€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a)€by€stating€its€reasons€in€the€notice€it€sends€to€the€Commissioner€ofÏPersonnel€and€the€employee.€€Mr.€¢Lipford£ððs€August€25,€1994€letter€does€notÏprovide€adequate€notice€of€the€reasons€for€terminating€Ms.€¢Cashion£€because€itÏrefers€only€to€her€ð ðdiscussion€with€Dr.€Larry€¢Durbin£.ðð€€However,€theÏSeptember€20,€1994€letter€to€the€Commissioner€of€Personnel€contains€aÍstatement€of€the€reasons€for€Ms.€¢Cashion£ððs€termination.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„5„224€only€empowers€the€courts€to€determine€whether€the€appointingÏauthority€informed€a€probationary€employee€of€its€reasons€for€terminating€theÏemployee;€it€does€not€empower€the€courts€to€second„guess€the€appointingÏauthorityððs€decision.€€Since€the€September€20,€1994€letter€contains€a€statementÏof€the€¢DMHMR£ððs€reasons€for€terminating€Ms.€¢Cashion£,€it€complies€with€Tenn.ÏCode€Ann.€ðð€8„30„312(a).€€ÌÌà@ àò òV.€ó óÌÌà àWe€affirm€the€judgment€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€forÏwhatever€further€proceedings€may€be€required.€€We€also€tax€the€costs€of€thisÏappeal€to€Amanda€Linn€¢Cashion£€and€her€surety€for€which€execution,€ifÏnecessary,€may€issue.ÌÌœ›ÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,ÏJUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.€ÌÌÌ________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGE€ÇÌà@ àœ›