ÿWPC¥ 2# ÌUN× %% 0˜+U <Ãw@ÿ4?SbU Dj AQ® 0Üÿ 0DÛ 0J 0Ti 0^½ 0h 0rƒ 0|õ 0†q 0÷ 1u‡ 0dü 0@` D3  U>Ó B)DC: AM}U*Ê BôÆ 0D× 0D D/_ BŽ©«v~TvÓÒ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLÜÏ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(püƒ$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman "#E$[%&î'U()Ó€56§aö"Ô3|x68 ±ZŠ,Century-WP Regular*+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(Œ(3Od$¤¤Ý ƒüƒ!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d%%%%7Border 1dd* &Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd ŸÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€(ÔÔ€(ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€(XÔÌÌò òSeptemberÏ5,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€(ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€$ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÝ  ÝÑ7€_XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÓ  ÓÑ  ÑÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÙ€*ÙßR€'/&A1-j|Šþö` à. `€€@ÿRßà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€________________________________________________ÌÌò òWILLIAM€J.€CHASE,€JR.,€As€AdministratorÌC.T.A.€of€the€Estate€of€BETTY€LOU€ÌSTIDHAM,€Deceased,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellee,ÌÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„211„CV„00327Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Circuit€No.€36934€T.D.Ìò òTHE€CITY€OF€MEMPHIS,€ó óÌÌà àDefendant„Appellant.Ì___________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JAMES€E.€SWEARENGEN,€JUDGEÌÌÌà@ àÌà@ àJohn€J.€Heflin€III,€Bourland,€Heflin,Ìà@ àAlvarez,€Holley€&€Minor,€PLC,€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€Plaintiff„AppelleeÌÌà@ àMonice€Moore€Hagler,€City€AttorneyÌà@ àRobert€M.€Fargarson,€Assistant€City€AttorneyÌà@ àMartin€W.€ZummachÌà@ àFor€Defendant„AppellantÌÌÌÌà@ àÌà@ àòòò òAFFIRMEDÌÌó óóóà@ àOpinion€filed:ÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEÌÌÓÓó ó›à àThis€appeal€involves€a€suit€for€wrongful€death€based€on€negligence€underÏthe€Tennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act,€T.C.A.€€ðð€29„20„101€òòet€seq.óóÏ(1980)€and€for€wrongful€death€based€on€the€creation€of€a€special€relationshipÏand€a€nuisance.€€Defendant,€the€City€of€Memphis,€appeals€from€the€trial€courtððsÏjudgment€in€favor€of€plaintiff,€William€J.€Chase,€as€Administrator€C.T.A.€of€theÏEstate€of€Betty€Lou€Stidham.€€The€trial€court,€sitting€without€a€jury,€found€thatÏplaintiffððs€damages€totaled€$1,897,713.03,€and€that€the€Cityððs€negligence€causedÏ40€percent€of€those€damages.€€However,€because€of€the€application€of€theÏTennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act€(hereinafter€the€Act),€the€courtÏlimited€plaintiffððs€recovery€to€$130,000.00,€and€entered€a€judgment€in€thatÍamount.à àÌà àThe€issues€to€be€decided€are€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€thatÏthe€defendantððs€acts€were€not€immune€from€liability€under€the€Act;€and€if€notÏimmune,€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€finding€that€the€defendantððs€negligenceÏwas€a€proximate€cause€of€Betty€Lou€Stidhamððs€death;€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€finding€that€the€defendant€assumed€a€special€duty€to€Ms.€Stidham€toÏundertake€acts€that€would€have€protected€her;€and€finally,€whether€claimsÏagainst€municipalities€arising€out€of€the€creation€of€a€nuisance€are€encompassedÏwithin€the€Act;€and€if€so,€whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€grantÏplaintiff€a€recovery€based€on€nuisance.€€The€plaintiff€also€asks€this€Court€toÏconsider€whether€the€doctrine€of€sovereign€immunity€should€be€discarded€byÏthe€courts€of€Tennessee.ÌÓ  ÓI.Ìò òÓ  Óà àó óBetty€Lou€Stidham€died€on€June€18,€1990,€after€being€mauled€to€death€byÏtwo€pit€bull€dogs€owned€by€her€next€door€neighbor,€Edwin€Hill.€€Prior€to€thisÏincident,€Hill€had€a€variety€of€problems€with€the€dogs.€€In€February€of€1988,€theÏdogs€attempted€to€attack€Hillððs€mother,€and€on€October€30,€1988,€theyÏsucceeded.€€Both€times,€city€employees,€either€police,€paramedics,€or€both,€wereÍcalled€to€the€scene€to€assist.€€After€the€October€1988€incident,€the€police€sent€aÏreport€about€the€attack€to€the€City€of€Memphis€Animal€Shelter.€€EarlÏGrouchau,€who€owned€Ms.€Stidhamððs€home€prior€to€selling€it€to€her,€also€hadÏproblems€with€Hillððs€dogs.€€Grouchau€testified€that€Hillððs€dogs€caused€him€toÏfear€for€his€life.€€He€built€a€six„foot€wooden€fence€on€his€side€of€the€propertyÏafter€Hillððs€dogs€began€to€burrow€underneath€the€chain€link€fence.€€Undaunted,Ïthe€dogs€continued€to€burrow€underneath€the€new€fence€and€enter€his€yard.€ÏAfter€the€pit€bull€dogs€chased€his€son,€Grouchau€complained€to€the€City€ofÏMemphis€Police.€€He€complained€to€the€police€about€the€dogs€at€least€twoÏtimes€between€1987€and€1989€and€also€filed€a€complaint€with€the€AnimalÏShelter.€€He€informed€Robert€Lee,€the€manager€of€the€Animal€Shelter,€about€hisÏproblems€with€Hillððs€dogs.€€à àÌà àOn€January€3,€1990,€Hillððs€dogs€attacked€Ms.€Stidhamððs€small€dog,€whichÏresulted€in€Ms.€Stidham€filing€a€ð ðvicious€animal€complaintðð€with€the€AnimalÏShelter.€€As€a€result€of€the€complaint,€Hillððs€dogs€were€impounded€forÏevaluation.€€While€the€dogs€were€in€the€care€of€the€city,€the€female€dogÏattempted€to€attack€an€Animal€Shelter€worker,€Pamela€Topping.€€During€theÏevaluation€period,€Animal€Shelter€employees€performed€tests€on€the€dogs€toÍevaluate€their€behavior€and€found€that€neither€of€the€dogs€exhibited€overtlyÏaggressive€behavior.Ìà àOn€January€23,€1990,€a€vicious€animal€hearing€took€place€at€the€AnimalÏShelter.€€Despite€the€fact€that€the€Animal€Shelter€is€supposed€to€keep€records€ofÏdog€attacks€received€from€the€police,€fire€department,€and€hospitals,€it€had€noÏrecord€of€the€prior€attacks€by€Hillððs€dogs.€€Robert€Lee,€who€conducted€theÏhearing,€did€not€allow€testimony€to€be€elicited€from€Hill€concerning€the€violentÏnature€of€the€dogs.€€Lee€decided€that€the€dogs€were€not€ð ðviciousðð€based€on€theÏtests€performed€during€the€evaluation€period.€€Lee€concluded€that€the€dogs€didÏnot€show€a€vicious€nature€toward€humans€or€other€animals€and,€therefore,€theÏdogs€were€released€to€Hill.€€Instead,€Lee€determined€that€the€dogs€wereÏð ðdangerousðð€because€they€were€capable€of€inflicting€serious€injury.€€Lee€issued€aÏletter€on€January€29,€1990,€which€stated€that€the€dogs€were€dangerous€andÏordered€that€Hill€correct€any€fencing€deficiencies€around€his€property€and€thatÏHill€enroll€himself€and€the€dogs€in€a€basic€obedience€training€program€within€90Ïdays.€€According€to€the€letter,€Hillððs€failure€to€do€either€would€result€in€aÏdeclaration€that€the€dogs€were€vicious€and€immediate€seizure€of€the€dogs.€€TheÏletter€was€sent€to€both€Hill€and€Ms.€Stidham.€€Ìà àHillððs€dogs€were€released€to€him€on€January€26,€1990.€€On€two€occasions,ÏAnimal€Shelter€employees,€including€Lee,€visited€Hillððs€property€to€inspect€theÏfencing.€€Lee€ordered€that€the€back€gate€remain€locked.€€Hill€assured€Lee€that€heÏwould€enroll€the€dogs€in€obedience€school€and€would€inform€the€Animal€ShelterÏwhen€the€training€was€complete.€€However,€Hill€€never€enrolled€the€dogs€inÏobedience€school,€and€the€Animal€Shelter€never€followed€up€their€order.€ÏAlthough€Hill€did€not€comply€with€the€administrative€order,€the€Animal€ShelterÏdid€not€seize€the€dogs€or€declare€them€vicious.€€The€Animal€Shelter€did€notÏreceive€any€further€complaints€about€Hillððs€dogs€until€the€day€of€the€tragedy€ofÏMs.€Stidhamððs€death.€€Ìà àThe€trial€court€held€that€the€defendantððs€actions€were€not€discretionaryÏand,€therefore,€were€not€immune€under€the€Act.€€The€trial€court€held€that€theÏdefendant€was€negligent,€and€that€the€negligence€was€a€proximate€cause€of€Ms.ÏStidhamððs€death.€€The€court€stated€that€the€failure€to€follow„up€on€theÏobedience€training€and€the€failure€to€pick€up€the€dogs€was€an€act€of€negligence.€ÏThe€court€also€felt€that€the€vicious€dog€hearing€was€conducted€improperly.€ÏHowever,€the€court€stated€that€the€inadequate€inspection€of€the€fence€was€not€aÏproximate€cause€of€the€death.€€In€addition,€the€court€rejected€the€claim€ofÍnuisance€because€there€was€no€affirmative€act€by€the€defendant.€€Finally,€theÏtrial€court€believed€that€the€defendant€assumed€a€special€duty€to€Ms.€StidhamÏto€undertake€acts€to€protect€her€and€negligently€failed€to€take€reasonable€andÏappropriate€action€to€do€so.€€Ìà àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€reviewÏthe€case€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€theÏfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€Unless€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€findings,€we€must€affirm,€absent€error€of€law.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€€In€ò òòòSmith€v.ÏBullingtonó óóó,€499€S.W.2d€649€(Tenn.€App.€1973),€this€Court€noted€that€theÏreview€by€this€Court€of€the€amount€of€a€non„jury€judgment€for€damages€wasÏgoverned€by€then€T.C.A.€€ðð€27„303,€which€has€been€supplanted€by€T.R.A.P.Ï13(d).€€ÌÓ  ÓII.ÌÓ  Óà àThis€negligence€action€was€brought€pursuant€to€section€29„20„205€of€theÏAct€which€provides€for€removal€of€immunity€for€injury€caused€by€negligent€actsÏor€omissions€of€government€employees.€€T.C.A.€ððÔ€ Ô€Ô€Ô29„20„205€(1980).Ìà àIn€order€for€plaintiffs€to€recover,€the€court€must€first€determine€if€theÏcity€is€immune€from€suit,€and€if€not,€the€plaintiffs€must€prove€the€necessaryÍelements€of€negligence.€€ò òòòBowers€v.€City€of€Chattanoogaóóó ó,€826€S.W.2d€427,€429Ï(Tenn.€1992).€€With€respect€to€the€threshold€issue€of€immunity,€sectionÏ29„20„205€provides€in€pertinent€part,ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àImmunity€from€suit€of€all€governmental€entities€isÏremoved€for€injury€proximately€caused€by€a€negligentÏact€or€omission€of€any€employee€within€the€scope€ofÏhis€employment€except€if€the€injury:€€Ìà8 àà8 à(1)€Arises€out€of€the€exercise€or€performance€or€theÏfailure€to€exercise€or€perform€a€discretionary€function,Ïwhether€or€not€the€discretion€is€abused;€ÌÌà àà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*ÌÌà8 àà8 à(4)€Arises€out€of€a€failure€to€make€an€inspection,€orÏby€reason€of€making€an€inadequate€or€negligentÏinspection€of€any€property;€ÌÌà8 àà8 à(5)€Arises€out€of€the€institution€or€prosecution€of€anyÏjudicial€or€administrative€proceeding,€even€ifÏmalicious€or€without€probable€cause.ÌÌÓÓT.C.A.€ððÔ€ Ô€Ô€Ô29„20„205.Ô€ ÔÌà àÔ€ÔThe€defendant€argues€that€their€actions€are€included€in€all€three€citedÏsub„sections€of€T.C.A.€ððÔ€ Ô€Ô€Ô29„20„205Ô€ Ô€Ô€Ôbecause€the€actions€are€discretionary,€aÏfailure€to€inspect€or€an€inadequate€inspection,€and€arise€out€of€a€quasi„judicialÏor€an€administrative€proceeding.€€We€have€three€actions€of€the€defendant€toÏconsider:€(1)€the€acts€during€the€vicious€dog€hearing;€(2)€the€inspection€of€theÍfencing€on€the€Hill€property;€and€(3)€the€failure€to€follow„up€the€obedienceÏschool€training€and€the€resulting€failure€to€impound€the€dogs.Ìà àAs€a€preliminary€matter,€we€believe€that€the€actions€of€Lee€during€theÏvicious€dog€hearing€are€immune€from€liability€because€they€arise€in€anÏadministrative€hearing.€€Lee,€sitting€as€judge,€had€the€opportunity€to€hearÏevidence,€examine€witnesses€and€hear€arguments€of€informed€counsel€andÏinterested€parties.€€The€parties€had€the€right€to€appeal€his€decision€butÏneglected€to€exercise€this€right.€€Even€if€Leeððs€actions€during€the€proceedingÏwere€negligent,€they€are€immune€from€liability.€€Ìà àIn€addition,€we€will€not€consider€whether€the€inspection€of€the€fence€onÏHillððs€property€properly€is€immune€under€the€Act€because€the€trial€court€heldÏthat€the€inspection€was€not€a€proximate€cause€of€the€death.€€Even€if€we€holdÏthat€the€inspection€is€not€immune€and,€therefore,€could€have€been€negligent,€theÏevidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€of€no€proximateÏcause.€€Therefore,€the€only€act€of€the€defendant€to€consider€is€the€decision€notÏto€follow„up€and€enforce€the€obedience€school€requirement,€which€theÏdefendant€argues€is€a€discretionary€act€for€which€immunity€has€not€beenÏremoved.Ìà àIn€ò òòòBowersó óóó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€provided€guidance€as€to€whichÏactivities€fall€under€the€discretionary€function€and€adopted€the€ð ðplanning„operationalðð€test.€€òòò òBowersó óóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€430.€€Under€the€planning„operationalÏtest,€decisions€that€rise€to€the€level€of€planning€or€policy„making€are€consideredÏdiscretionary€acts€which€do€not€give€rise€to€tort€liability,€while€decisions€thatÏare€merely€operational€are€not€considered€discretionary€acts€and,€therefore,€doÏnot€give€rise€to€immunity.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Supreme€Court€outlined€the€analysis€aÏcourt€must€follow€to€determine€if€a€decision€falls€under€the€discretionaryÏfunction€exception:€€€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àUnder€the€planning„operational€test,€discretionaryÏfunction€immunity€does€not€automatically€attach€toÏall€acts€involving€choice€or€judgment.€€Such€an€analysisÏrecognizes€that,€to€some€extent,€every€act€involvesÏdiscretion.€€Rather,€the€underlying€policy€ofÏgovernmental€immunity€is€better€served€by€examiningÏ(1)€the€decision„making€process€and€(2)€the€proprietyÏof€judicial€review€of€the€resulting€decision.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àA€consideration€of€the€decision„making€process,€asÏwell€as€the€factors€influencing€a€particular€decision,Ïwill€often€reveal€whether€that€decision€is€to€be€viewedÏas€planning€or€operational.€€If€a€particular€course€ofÏconduct€is€determined€after€consideration€or€debateÏby€an€individual€or€group€charged€with€theÏformulation€of€plans€or€policies,€it€strongly€suggestsÏthe€result€is€a€planning€decision.€€These€decisionsÏoften€result€from€assessing€priorities;€allocatingÍresources;€€developing€policies;€or€establishing€plans,Ïspecifications,€or€schedules.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àOn€the€other€hand,€a€decision€resulting€from€aÏdetermination€based€on€preexisting€laws,€regulations,Ïpolicies,€or€standards,€usually€indicates€that€its€makerÏis€performing€an€operational€act.€€SimilarlyÏoperational€are€those€ad€hoc€decisions€made€by€anÏindividual€or€group€not€charged€with€the€developmentÏof€plans€or€policies.€€These€operational€acts,€whichÏoften€implement€prior€planning€decisions,€are€notÏ"discretionary€functions"€within€the€meaning€of€theÏTennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act.€€In€otherÏwords,€"the€discretionary€function€exception€[will]€notÏapply€to€a€claim€that€government€employees€failed€toÏcomply€with€regulations€or€policies€designed€to€guideÏtheir€actions€in€a€particular€situation."€€Ìà8 àà8 àAnother€factor€bearing€on€whether€an€act€should€beÏconsidered€planning€or€operational€is€whether€theÏdecision€is€the€type€properly€reviewable€by€the€courts.€ÏThe€discretionary€function€exception€"recognizes€thatÏcourts€are€ill„equipped€to€investigate€and€balance€theÏnumerous€factors€that€go€into€€an€executive€orÏlegislative€decision"€and€therefore€allows€theÏgovernment€to€operate€without€undue€interference€byÏthe€courts.Ô€ Ô€ÌÌò òòòÔ€ÔId.ó óóó€at€431€(citations€omitted).Ìà àà àÌÓÓà àThe€defendants€ask€us€to€rely€upon€a€case€decided€by€the€Supreme€CourtÏof€the€State€of€Florida,€ò òòòCarter€v.€City€of€Stuartó óóó,€468€So.2d€955€(Fla.€1985).€€InÏò òòòCarteró óóó,€€the€Florida€Supreme€Court€was€faced€with€a€similar€issue€as€in€the€caseÏòòsub€judiceóó.€€In€that€case,€the€City€of€Stuart€was€sued€after€a€dog€attacked€andÍseriously€injured€a€child.€€The€plaintiff€claimed€that€the€city€was€negligentÏbecause€it€failed€to€enforce€its€ordinance€requiring€impoundment€of€dangerousÏdogs.€€The€plaintiff€also€alleged€that€the€city€should€have€impounded€the€dogÏafter€prior€incidents€of€biting.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€956.€€The€Florida€Supreme€Court,€applyingÏthe€planning„operational€test€adopted€by€Tennessee€in€ò òòòBowersó óÔ€ Ôóó,Ô€ Ô€Ô€Ôheld€that€the€cityÏwas€immune€because€the€decision€not€to€enforce€the€ordinance€and€impoundÏthe€dog€was€discretionary.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€957.€€The€Court€stated€the€rationale€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àA€government€must€have€the€flexibility€to€setÏenforcement€priorities€on€its€police€power€ordinancesÏin€line€with€its€budgetary€constraints.€€Without€theÏability€to€make€such€choices€a€government€mustÏeither€pay€the€high€cost€of€total€enforcement€orÏforego€the€exercise€of€its€police€power.€€NeitherÏoption€serves€the€public€interest.ÌÌà8 àà8 àDeciding€which€laws€are€proper€and€should€be€enactedÏis€a€legislative€function.€€How€and€in€what€mannerÏthose€laws€are€enforced€is,€in€most€instances,€aÏjudgmental€decision€of€the€executive€branch.€€TheÏjudicial€branch€should€not€trespass€into€the€decisionalÏprocess€of€either.€€Ìò òòòÓÓId.ó óóó€Ìà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€the€City€of€Memphis€Animal€Shelter€wasÏunderstaffed€and€underfunded.€€The€record€indicates€that€the€Shelter€made€theÍdecision€not€to€follow„up€its€administrative€order€because€of€budgetary€andÏmanpower€restraints.€€The€Shelter€established€a€lower€priority€of€enforcing€thisÏparticular€order.€€Although€the€results€are€unfortunate€for€the€plaintiff,€this€isÏthe€type€of€decision€that€was€protected€in€ò òòòCarteró óóó€by€the€Florida€Supreme€Court.€ÏWe€are€impressed€with€the€reasoning€of€the€Florida€Supreme€Court.€€OurÏSupreme€Court€also€recognized€the€need€to€balance€priorities€and€allocateÏresources.€€òòò òBowersó óóó,€826€S.W.2d€at€431.€€Decisions€that€include€the€allocation€ofÏlimited€resources€among€competing€needs€do€not€need€interference€from€theÏcourts,€absent€clear€guidance€from€the€legislature€to€the€contrary.€€ò òòòHelton€v.ÏKnox€Countyó óóó,€922€S.W.2d€877,€887€(Tenn.€1996).€€œ€Accordingly,€we€find€thatÏthe€city€performed€a€discretionary€function€for€which€it€is€›immuneœ.€€T.C.A.€€ððÏ29„20„205(1).€€However,€this€finding€cannot€end€our€inquiry.›ÌÓ  ÓIII.ÌÓ  Óà àThe€trial€court€also€decided€that€the€defendants€assumed€a€special€duty€toÏthe€decedent,€Ms.€Stidham,€to€undertake€actions€to€protect€her€from€HillððsÏdogs.€€The€plaintiffs€characterize€the€Animal€Shelterððs€letter€and€administrativeÏorder€as€a€promise€to€Ms.€Stidham€that€went€unfulfilled.€€The€defendant€arguesÏthat€the€duty€owed€by€the€City€of€Memphis€was€to€the€public,€not€to€a€specificÍindividual.€€The€defendant€claims€that€the€danger€posed€by€the€dogs€was€to€theÏpublic€at€large,€and€that€the€ordinances€in€place€governing€vicious€animals€wereÏenacted€for€the€general€welfare.€€As€stated€above,€the€issue€to€be€decided€isÏwhether€the€defendant€assumed€a€special€duty€to€the€plaintiff.Ìà àIn€ò òòòEzell€v.€Cockrelló óóó,€902€S.W.2d€394,€400€(Tenn.€1995),€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€decided€that€the€Act€did€not€abolish€the€common€law€publicÏduty€doctrine.€€The€Supreme€Court€said,€Ô€ Ôð ð[W]e€are€not€persuaded€that€theÏTennessee€Governmental€Tort€Liability€Act,€which€actually€reiteratesÏand€extends€the€rule€of€governmental€immunity,€abolished,€or€wasÏintended€to€abolish,€the€longstanding€common„law€public€dutyÏdoctrine.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€€€Ìà àÔ€ÔThe€public€duty€doctrine€originated€at€common„law€and€shields€a€publicÏemployee€from€suits€for€injuries€that€are€caused€by€the€public€employee's€breachÏof€a€duty€owed€to€the€public€at€large.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€397.€€A€private€citizen€cannotÏmaintain€an€action€complaining€of€the€wrongful€acts€of€public€officials€unlessÏsuch€private€citizen€avers€special€interest€or€a€special€injury€not€common€to€theÏpublic€generally.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€(quoting€ò òòòBennett€v.€Stuttsó óóó,€521€S.W.2d€575,€576€(Tenn.Ï1976)).€€If€the€public€employeeððs€duty€is€to€the€public,€then€the€municipalityÍcannot€be€held€liable.€€However,€if€that€employee€assumes€a€special€relationshipÏwith€an€individual,€the€municipality€can€be€found€liable€for€that€employeeððsÏnegligent€acts.€€ò òòòEzell,€ó óóó902€S.W.2d€at€401.€€The€Supreme€Court€stated,€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àStates€adhering€to€the€public€duty€doctrine,€includingÏTennessee,€have€recognized€an€exception€to€the€rule€ofÏno„liability€that€applies€where€a€"special€relationship"Ïexists€between€the€plaintiff€and€the€public€employee,Ïwhich€gives€rise€to€a€"special€duty"€that€is€moreÏparticular€than€the€duty€owed€by€the€employee€to€theÏpublic€at€large.ÌÌà àà àà àà à*à àà à*à àà à*Ìà àÌà8 àà8 àHaving€decided€that€the€public€duty€doctrine€is€viable,Ïwe€consider€it€both€desirable€and€necessary€to€retain,Ïand€further€refine,€the€"special„duty"€exception.€€AfterÏconsidering€the€various€formulations€of€the€doctrine,Ïwe€conclude€that€a€special€duty€of€care€exists€when€1)Ïofficials,€by€their€actions,€affirmatively€undertake€toÏprotect€the€plaintiff,€and€the€plaintiff€relies€upon€theÏundertaking;€€2)€a€statute€specifically€provides€for€aÏcause€of€action€against€an€official€or€municipality€forÏinjuries€resulting€to€a€particular€class€of€individuals,€ofÏwhich€the€plaintiff€is€a€member,€from€failure€toÏenforce€certain€laws;€€or€3)€the€plaintiff€alleges€a€causeÏof€action€involving€intent,€malice,€or€recklessÏmisconduct.€€ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€at€401„02.ÌÌÓÓà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€the€only€applicable€special€duty€would€be€whenÏofficials€affirmatively€undertake€to€protect€a€plaintiff.€€There€is€no€specialÍstatute;€the€plaintiff€does€not€allege€intent€or€malice;€and€the€record€does€notÏshow€reckless€misconduct.€€à àThe€plaintiffs€ask€us€to€follow€a€case€from€theÏState€of€Washington,€ò òòòChampagne€v.€Spokane€Humane€Societyó óóó,€737€P.2d€1279Ï(Wash.€App.€1987).€€In€ò òòòChampagneó óóó,€a€neighborððs€pit€bull€dog€brutally€attackedÏthe€Champagneððs€child.€€The€Humane€Society€had€previously€received€numerousÏcomplaints€concerning€these€pit€bull€dogs,€including€at€least€ten€from€Ms.ÏChampagne.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1281.€€The€Humane€Society€told€Ms.€Champagne€that€theyÏwould€patrol€the€area€and€apprehend€any€stray€dogs.€€Unfortunately,€the€dogsÏwere€not€apprehended€until€the€day€after€the€attack.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1282.€€TheÏChampagnes€argued€that€the€special€duty€exception€to€the€public€duty€doctrineÏwas€applicable€to€their€case.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€In€this€appeal€of€a€grant€of€summary€judgmentÏto€defendant,€the€court€held€that€there€were€sufficient€facts€alleged€to€establishÏeach€element€of€the€special€duty€exception€and€reversed€and€remanded€the€case.€Ïò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1284.Ìà àThe€ò òòòChampagneó óóó€case€is€similar€to€the€case€at€bar.€€In€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,Ïthe€City€of€Memphis€Animal€Shelter€sent€Ms.€Stidham€a€letter€that€informedÏher€that€the€fencing€would€be€corrected€and€that€the€dogs€would€be€trained€atÏobedience€school.€€Ms.€Stidham€was€informed€that€if€Hill€did€not€comply€withÍthe€order,€the€dogs€would€be€impounded.€€Because€she€made€no€furtherÏcomplaints,€the€trial€court€apparently€found,€inferentially,€that€she€relied€uponÏthis€assurance.€€We€believe€that€the€Animal€Shelter€ð ðaffirmatively€under[took]Ïto€protect€the€plaintiffðð€and€the€ð ðplaintiff€relie[d]€upon€the€undertaking.ðð€€ò òòòSeeÏEzelló óóó,€902€S.W.2d€at€402.€€Obviously€the€neighborhood€and€the€public€at€largeÏwould€have€also€benefited€from€the€Shelterððs€actions€for€Ms.€Stidham.€However,Ïthis€does€not€mean€that€the€defendant€did€not€assume€a€special€duty€to€her.€ÏWe€hold€that€the€defendant,€City€of€Memphis,€through€the€actions€of€theÏAnimal€Shelter,€assumed€a€special€duty€to€Ms.€Stidham.Ìà àHowever,€the€plaintiff€must€still€show€a€breach€of€that€special€duty€andÏproximate€cause€of€the€injury.€€ò òòòSee€Haynes€v.€Hamilton€Countyó óóó,€883€S.W.2dÏ606,€611€(Tenn.€1994).€€Obviously€this€duty€was€breached€because€the€AnimalÏShelter€did€not€follow„up€on€the€assurances€to€Ms.€Stidham.€€The€defendantÏargues,€however,€that€their€actions€were€not€the€proximate€causes€of€Ms.ÏStidhamððs€death,€but€instead€that€tÔ€ Ôhe€Ô€Ôcriminal€conduct€and€the€gross€negligenceÏof€Hill€were€the€independent€intervening€proximate€causes€of€the€death.€€TheÏdefendant€also€argues€that€Ms.€Stidham€assumed€a€known€risk€and€was€theÏproximate€cause€of€her€own€injury€and€death.Ô€ ÔÌà àÔ€ÔThe€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€finding€thatÏthe€failure€to€follow„up€the€obedience€training€requirement€and€to€impound€theÏdogs€was€a€proximate€cause€of€Ms.€Stidhamððs€death.€€The€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€has€outlined€a€three„prong€test€for€proximate€cause:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(1)€the€tortfeasorððs€conduct€must€have€been€aÏð ðsubstantial€factorðð€in€bringing€about€the€harm€beingÏcomplained€of;€and€(2)€there€is€no€rule€or€policy€thatÏshould€relieve€the€wrongdoer€from€liability€because€ofÏthe€manner€in€which€the€negligence€has€resulted€in€theÏharm;€and€(3)€the€harm€giving€rise€to€the€action€couldÏhave€reasonably€been€foreseen€or€anticipated€by€aÏperson€of€ordinary€intelligence€and€prudence.€Ì€€€€€Ìòòò òÓÓHaynesó óóó,€883€S.W.2d€at€612.€€If€the€Shelter€had€impounded€the€dogs€like€theÏadministrative€order€required,€then€the€dogs€would€not€have€been€present€toÏattack€Ms.€Stidham.€€Obviously€this€was€a€substantial€factor€in€bringing€aboutÏthe€harm.€€In€addition,€an€attack€by€the€dogs€and€the€resulting€injury€wereÏreasonably€foreseeable€because€of€the€complaints€received€by€the€ShelterÏconcerning€Hillððs€dogs.€€à àWe€believe€that€there€is€no€merit€to€the€defendantððsÏargument€that€Ms.€Stidham€assumed€a€known€risk€by€walking€to€the€sidewalk€toÏget€her€mail.€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððsÏfinding€on€this€issue.€€From€the€record,€we€find€that€defendant€owed€a€specialÏduty€to€Ms.€Stidham,€that€this€duty€was€breached,€and€the€breach€of€this€dutyÍwas€the€proximate€cause€of€Ms.€Stidhamððs€death.€€The€trial€court€was€correct€inÏthe€judgment€for€the€plaintiff.€Ô€ ÔÌÓ  ÓÔ€ÔIV.ÌÓ  Óà àThe€plaintiff€has€also€presented€the€issue€of€whether€claims€againstÏmunicipalities€arising€out€of€the€creation€of€a€nuisance€are€encompassed€withinÏthe€Act.€€We€have€held€on€previous€occasions€that€a€claim€of€nuisance€isÏcovered€by€the€Act.€€In€ò òòòCollier€v.€Memphis€Light,€Gas€&€Water€Divisionó óóó,€657ÏS.W.2d€771,€776€(Tenn.€App.€1983),€this€Court€stated,€ð ðThe€legislature€left€littleÏif€any€room€for€doubt€that€actions€against€governmental€entities€for€damagesÏbased€on€activities€historically€labeled€ððnuisanceðð€are€now€included€in€andÏcovered€by€the€Act.ðð€€In€that€case,€we€distinguished€some€of€the€cases€that€theÏplaintiff€now€relies€upon€to€hold€otherwise.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€We€believe€that€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court€case,€ò òòòPaduch€v.€City€of€Johnson€Cityó óóó,€896€S.W.2d€767€(Tenn.Ï1995),€speaks€on€this€issue.€€The€Supreme€Court€stated,€ð ð[A]n€action€forÏdamages€resulting€from€the€creation€or€maintenance€of€a€temporary€nuisance€byÏa€governmental€agency€may€be€allowed€under€the€act.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€772.€€We€holdÏagain€today€that€an€action€for€nuisance€is€covered€by€the€Act.Ìà àIn€the€case€òòsub€judiceóó,€even€if€a€claim€for€nuisance€was€not€covered€by€theÍAct,€we€believe€that€the€trial€court€was€correct€in€its€decision€that€there€was€noÏact€that€constituted€the€creation€of€a€nuisance€by€the€defendant.€€The€evidenceÏdoes€not€preponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings€on€the€issue€of€theÏcreation€of€a€nuisance.€€€Ìà àFinally,€the€plaintiff€asks€this€Court€to€consider€whether€the€doctrine€ofÏsovereign€immunity€should€be€discarded€by€the€courts€of€Tennessee.€€In€òòò òAustinÏv.€City€of€Memphisó óóó,€684€S.W.2d€624€(Tenn.€App.€1984),€this€Court,€inÏconsidering€the€abolishment€of€sovereign€immunity,€said:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[P]laintiffs€urge€this€court€to€change€[the€law€ofÏgovernmental€immunity]€by€virtue€of€judicial€decree.€ÏWe€decline€this€invitation.€€As€pointed€out€by€JudgeÏTodd€in€ò òòòJones€v.€L€&€N€Railroad€Co.óóó ó,€617€S.W.2d€164Ï(Tenn.€App.€1981):ÌÌà8 àà8 àà8 àThe€rule€of€sovereign€immunity€inÏTennessee€is€both€constitutional€andÏstatutory.€€It€is€not€within€the€power€ofÏthe€courts€to€amend€it.€€ÌÌà àà àà8 àòòò òId.ó óóó€at€170.€€ÌÌò òòòÓÓAustinó óóó,€684€S.W.2d€at€637;€ò òòòsee€also€City€of€Lavergne€v.€Southern€Silver,€Inc.ó óóó,Ï872€S.W.2d€687,€689€(Tenn.€App.€1993).ÌÓ  ÓV.ÌÓ  Óà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€of€thisÍappeal€are€assessed€against€the€appellant.€€ÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌÌœ_________________________________›ÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌ_________________________________Ìò òHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌœ