ÿWPC ÄLãüÂtx¾¥ín'ïkÓ"¡[88¯´Í~— ödx»~U¿¾€Âª¸˜ŸrN·à‡Vÿ¼C]Æpû*Öyðú+ ‰¬–ƒ˜BþŽt÷@5D ½¶>–a ö8-S/[£×òT©¿TSý{pyÝ"45–Çwÿ[œ¿Ç5óà×ZÓXL"{Zü¼84ôíSE8ÊEÖúMç:× µMæ÷_©$>]nät6¶pä•n:?'l–ª´U¼éÔ7@qß³`ØLáûü+0e¿LݘŸ\w®¯”K§5t-ÈžÓ4û¬È Të£wÉ$†”¾dÖRÉÀyÖïÌ{»ZS ¯}cGÀ‡SÔhS»ÝÐdgªîN‘¹=/¼œçµn]ê¨Ç†-Ð;Y"µ…e…¡z¶z¶Ë!ࢦ n:¥¤Ä½X/6¿×Õ ¨-΂®”ë¡ÚÚÀ÷…4F Z 0(i ‘ w@™ Ù UN÷ U:E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E UB %Á Á Á Á Á Á Á Á Á Á Á BÇ Ç Ç Ç Ç D3ä ä ä 0D                                                                                  AO[ ƪ ª 0Dp D/´ Bã ýhµ&ÔøÔô3|xî($¡¡ ÚDÛÜDÝDÞDßàUáUâUãÓ€ Ô€XXXXÔÔ€îù–îXXÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Äîîù–ÔÐ  ÐÌò òJuly€13,€1999Ð ¶¶ ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôo ôÄÔAppellate€CourtÐ –– ÐClerkó ó(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX d%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€J XXdÈXXdð7ÑÔ€X"XXXÔÔ€Š$¨ŠXX"Ôñàññàññãññãññàññàññãñßr€*<,(j 8 `€€@E  tt0"H¨ÓrßñãññàñÌñàñ›€€€€à@j j ‚àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  ÐÌà@>>%‚àAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌó óÌœñáñÌñáñ›ÌÌIN€THE€ESTATE€OF€à < àà ” àà ì à)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9810„PB00335Ð  ÐMAX€CHRISTIAN€CARPENTER,à ì à)Ð   ÐGRACE€CARPENTER,€Administratrix,à ì à)€SCOTT€COUNTY€PROBATEÐ   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellee/Crossà ” àà ì à)€HON.€JAMES€L.€COTTON,€JR.,Ð   Ðà 4 àAppellant,à ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€JUDGEÐ   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìv.à 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)ÌIN€RE:€SULLIVAN,à < àà ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àAppellee/Cross„Appellant,à ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìandà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)ÌLUCCHESI,€à ä àà < àà ” àà ì àœ)€AFFIRMED›Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àœ)€AND›Ìà 4 àAppellant/Cross„Appellee.à ” àà ì àœ)€REMANDED›Ð   ÐÌÌÌœñâñÌñâññâñÌñâñ›ÌDAVID€M.€SULLIVAN,€Memphis,€òòpro€se.Ð '  ÐóóÌTHOMAS€E.€HANSOM,€Memphis,€for€Appellant/Cross„Appellee,€Ronald€Lucchesi.ÌÌÌÌÌà@%‚àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óˆÐ .'' ÐÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àà œ àFranks,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThis€action€œis€based€on€a›€dispute€between€two€attorneys€over€theÏdivision€of€attorneysðð€fees.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€attorneysðð€fees€were€generated€by€representation€of€the€Estate€in€aÏcivil€rights€action,€which€was€settled,€and€the€law€firm€which€was€to€distribute€theÐ :þ23ýS Ðattorneysðð€fees€filed€a€Complaint€for€Interpleader€and€Declaratory€Relief.€€BothÏSullivan,€appellee,€and€Lucchesi,€appellant,€answered€the€Interpleader.€€LucchesiÏrequested€the€court€divide€the€fees€equally€between€the€two€attorneys,€and€SullivanÏrequested€that€he€be€awarded€90%€of€the€fees.€€The€Estate€filed€an€Answer€to€theÏComplaint,€asserting€that€Lucchesiððs€request€for€one„half€of€the€fee€is€in€violation€ofÏDR€2„106,€and€that€his€portion€of€the€fee€should€be€awarded€to€the€Estate.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€Trial€Court€awarded€83%€of€the€fee€to€Sullivan€and€17%€of€the€feeÏto€Lucchesi.€€Lucchesi€has€appealed.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€family€of€the€deceased€contacted€œLucchesi€for€representation,›€whoÏadvised€that€he€did€not€have€the€expertise€to€handle€cases€of€this€nature,€andÏrecommended€Sullivan.€€The€Administratrix€of€the€of€the€Estate,€entered€into€aÏcontingency€fee€contract€with€both€Sullivan€and€Lucchesi.€€There€was€no€discussionÏbetween€Lucchesi€and€Sullivan€as€to€how€they€would€divide€their€share€of€the€fee.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àAfter€hearing€the€proof€in€this€case,€the€Trial€Judge€issued€its€OpinionÏand€Ruling,€and€we€quote€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà 4 àà8 Œ àà ä àAlthough€Sullivan€and€Lucchesi€were€friends,€worked€outÏof€the€same€law€building€in€Memphis€with€internal€offices€inÏclose€proximity€of€each€other,€shared€a€receptionist€andÏð ðassociatedðð€together€by€representing€their€client€in€the€Lawsuit,Ïin€what€Lucchesi€characterized€in€his€testimony€as€a€ð ðjointÏventureðð,€even€more€importantly€and€controlling,€Sullivan€andÏLucchesi€were€sole€practitioners€of€law,€operating€out€ofÏsegregated€and€exclusive€offices,€and€having€separate€and€distinctÏletterhead€containing€only€their€individual€names,€wherefrom€theÏCourt€finds€that€Sullivan€and€Lucchesi€were€not€an€association€ofÏattorneys€or€partners€in€a€law€firm€as€defined€under€the€rules€ofÏprofessional€ethics€governing€the€practice€of€law€in€this€state€.€.€.€Ð Œ Ð Œ Ð  ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àFirst,€Lucchesi€insists€that€the€Trial€Court€applied€incorrect€law€inÏdetermining€a€division€of€the€fees€between€the€parties.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€standard€of€review€in€this€case€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€of€theÐ 6// ÐTrial€Court,€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€the€correctness€of€the€findings€of€factÏby€the€Trial€Court,€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€otherwise.€€T.R.A.P.€Rule€13(d);Ð :33 ÐòòUnion€Carbide€Corp.€v.€Huddlestonóó,€854€S.W.2d€87,€91€(Tenn.€1993).€€Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àDisciplinary€Rule€2„107€provides:Ìà 4 àà Œ àà8 ä àò òDR€2„107.€€Division€of€Fees€Among€Lawyersó óÐ ä Ð ä Ð  ÐÓÓñÙñœñÙñœò òà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä à(A)ó ó›€A€lawyer€shall€not€divide€a€fee€for€legal€services€with€œanother›Ð (  Ðlawyer€who€is€not€the€lawyerððs€partner€in€or€associate€of€the€lawyerððsÏlaw€firm€or€law€office,€unless:Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌñÙñœñÙñœà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä à(1)›€The€client€consents€to€employment€of€the€other€lawyer€œafter›€aÏfull€disclosure€that€a€division€of€fees€will€be€made.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌœà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä à(2)›€òòThe€division€is€made€in€proportion€to€the€œservices€performed›Ð D< Ðand€responsibility€assumed€by€each.€(óóEmphasis€added).òòÐH@Œ (#Œ (# ÐóóÌñÙñœñÙñœà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä à(3)›€The€total€fee€of€the€lawyers€does€not€clearly€exceedÏœreasonable›€compensation€for€all€legal€services€they€rendered€the€client.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌñÙñœñÙñœò òà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä à(B)ó ó›€This€Disciplinary€Rule€does€not€prohibit€payment€to€a€œformer›Ð \T Ðpartner€or€associate€pursuant€to€a€separation€or€retirement€agreement.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌSup.€Ct.€Rule€8,€Code€of€Prof.€Resp.€DR€2„107.ÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àœCoñÚñurtsñÚññÛñntractsñÛñ›€in€violation€of€public€policy€are€not€enforceable,€òòNewton€v.Ð p!h ÐCoxóó,€878€S.W.2d€105,€108€(Tenn.€1994),€òòcert.€deniedóó,€115€S.€Ct.€189€(1994);€òòSpiegelÐ x#p Ðv.€Thomas,€Mann€&€Smith,€P.C.óó,€811€S.W.2d€528,€530„531€(Tenn.€1991);€òòAlexander€v.Ð €%x ÐInmanóó,€903€S.W.2d€686,€694€(Tenn.€App.€1995),€òòappeal€deniedóó,òò€appeal€after€remandóóÐ ˆ'€  Ð974€S.W.2d€689€(Tenn.€1998).€€A€contract€provision€which€violates€the€DisciplinaryÏRules€of€the€Code€of€Professional€Responsibility€violates€public€policy,€thus€it€isÏunenforceable.€€òòSee€Spiegelóó,€811€S.W.2d€at€531.Ð  -˜&& Ðà 4 àà Œ àIn€this€case,€the€facts€as€found€by€the€Trial€Judge€are€supported€by€theÏtestimony€of€both€Lucchesi€and€Sullivan.€€The€evidence€does€not€preponderate€againstÏthe€Trial€Courtððs€determination€that€the€two€attorneys€were€not€partners€or€associates,Ïas€contemplated€by€the€Disciplinary€Rule.Ìà 4 àà Œ àSince€Lucchesi€and€Sullivan€were€not€partners€or€associates,€the€RuleÏprohibits€them€from€dividing€a€fee€for€legal€services€unless€the€client€consents€to€theÐ Ð9È22 Ðemployment€of€the€other€lawyer,€the€division€is€made€in€proportion€to€the€servicesÏperformed€and€responsibilities€assumed€by€each,€and€the€total€fee€is€not€clearlyÏexcessive.€€Here,€there€is€no€dispute€that€the€client€consented€to€the€employment€ofÏboth€attorneys€and€œñÜñthat›€ñÜñthe›€total€fee€charged€to€the€client€is€reasonable,€but€Lucchesi€isÏattempting€to€claim€a€fee€that€is€not€in€proportion€to€the€services€he€performed€andÏresponsibilities€assumed.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àLucchesi€attempts€to€get€around€the€Rule€by€arguing€that€he€and€SullivanÏwere€engaged€in€a€ð ðjoint€venture,ðð€which€should€be€considered€as€an€associationÏbetween€two€lawyers€to€represent€a€party€in€a€single€specific€lawsuit.€€He€is€correctÏthat€this€is€not€a€case€where€one€attorney€refers€the€case€to€another,€does€nothing,€andÏexpects€a€fee.€€However,€that€is€not€the€only€situation€where€the€Rule€applies.€€ByÏincluding€the€provision€that€the€fee€is€to€be€made€in€proportion€to€services€performedÏand€responsibilities€assumed,€the€rule€contemplates€the€situation€where€two€attorneysÏfrom€different€law€firms€or€law€offices€work€jointly€on€a€case.€€Calling€such€a€situationÏa€ð ðjoint€ventureðð€does€not€take€the€case€out€of€the€province€of€the€Rule.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àLucchesiððs€reliance€on€the€case€of€òòHaynes€v.€Daltonóó,€848€S.W.2d€664Ð €%x Ð(Tenn.€App.€1992)€as€support€for€his€position€is€misplaced.€€In€that€case,€Dalton€beganÏworking€in€Haynesðð€law€office,€with€the€agreement€that€Haynes€would€provide€officeÏspace€and€overhead€to€Dalton€in€exchange€for€forty€percent€of€Daltonððs€fees.€€DaltonÏadmitted€that€he€was€an€associate€of€Haynes,€working€in€Haynesðð€law€office.€€SinceÏDalton€was€an€associate€of€Haynes,€the€agreement€to€share€attorney€fees€did€notÏviolate€DR€2„107.€€òòIdóó.€at€665.€€Unlike€the€case€of€òòHaynes,óó€in€this€œcaseñÝñ,ñÝñ›€both€attorneysÐ °1¨** Ðasserted€that€they€were€sole€practitioners€and€neither€was€an€associate€of€the€other,Ïthus€DR€2„107€explicitly€œappliesñÞñ€to›€this›€caseñÞñ.›€€€€€€Ìò òà 4 àó óà Œ àHaving€determined€that€DR€2„107€applies€to€this€case,€and€that€the€feeÐ È7À00 Ðmay€not€be€divided€between€the€attorneys€except€in€proportion€to€the€servicesÐ Ð9È22 Ðperformed€and€responsibility€assumed€by€each,€the€evidence€at€trial€does€notÏpreponderate€against€the€Trial€Courtððs€decision€to€award€83%€of€the€fees€to€SullivanÏand€17%€to€Lucchesi.€€T.R.A.P.€Rule€13(d).€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àNeither€party€disputes€that€Sullivan€did€the€lionððs€share€of€the€work€inÏthis€case.€€Sullivan€logged€1031€hours€of€legal€services,€while€Lucchesi€only€loggedÏ269.50€hours.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àBoth€Sullivan€and€the€Estate€argue€that€Lucchesi€is€not€entitled€to€anyÏfee€because€of€his€attempt€to€collect€50%€of€the€fee,€in€violation€of€the€DisciplinaryÏrule.€€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àDisciplinary€Rule€2„106€of€the€Code€of€Professional€ResponsibilityÏprovides€in€relevant€part:€ð ð(A)€A€lawyer€shall€not€enter€into€an€agreement€for,€charge,Ïor€collect€an€illegal€or€clearly€excessive€fee.ðð€€The€case€of€òòWhite€v.€McBrideóó,€937Ð `X ÐS.W.2d€796€(Tenn.€1996)€recognizes€that€in€many€cases€an€attorney€may€be€able€toÏcollect€a€fee€from€a€client€under€the€theory€of€òòquantum€meruit€óówhen€the€fee€contractÐ p!h Ðitself€is€unenforceable,€but€then€holds€that€a€fee€may€not€be€collected€when€theÏattorney€attempts€to€collect€a€fee€that€is€clearly€excessive€under€DR€2„106.€€TheÏSupreme€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä àWe€agree€that€attorneys€should€not€be€penalized€for€innocentÏsnafus,€such€as€an€oversight€in€drafting€that€might€render€their€feeÏcontracts€unenforceable.€€To€do€so€would€be€unfair€to€the€lawyer€whoÏhad€otherwise€diligently€pursued€the€clientððs€interest,€and€it€would€resultÏin€a€windfall€to€the€client€who€had€benefitted€from€these€services.€€ThusÏa€recovery€under€a€theory€of€òòquantum€meruitóó€is€warranted€in€theseÐ ¤.œ'' Ðsituations.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àà ä àWe€are€of€the€opinion€however,€that€an€attorney€who€enters€into€aÏfee€contract,€or€attempts€to€collect€a€fee,€that€is€clearly€excessive€underÏDR€2„106€should€not€be€permitted€to€take€advantage€of€the€òòCummingsóóÐ ¸3°,, Ðrule.€€A€violation€of€DR€2„106€is€an€ethical€transgression€of€a€mostÏflagrant€sort€as€it€goes€directly€to€the€heart€of€the€fiduciary€relationshipÏthat€exists€between€attorney€and€client.€€To€permit€an€attorney€to€fallÏback€on€the€theory€of€òòquantum€meruitóó€when€he€unsuccessfully€fails€toÐ È7À00 Ðcollect€a€clearly€excessive€fee€does€absolutely€nothing€to€promote€ethicalÏbehavior.€€On€the€contrary,€this€interpretation€would€encourage€attorneysÐ Ð9È22 Ðto€enter€exorbitant€fee€contracts,€secure€that€the€safety€net€of€òòquantumÐ  Ðmeruitóó€is€there€in€case€of€a€subsequent€fall.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌòòÓÓIdóó.€at€803.€€Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àWhile€this€Rule€and€the€case€applying€it€indicate€that€an€attorney€mayÏnot€receive€a€fee€if€he€or€she€attempts€to€collect€a€clearly€excessive€fee,€the€languageÏlimits€this€rule€to€a€situation€where€the€attorney€is€attempting€to€collect€a€clearlyÏexcessive€fee€from€the€client.€€In€this€case,€no€one€disputes€that€the€total€fee€chargedÏthe€client€is€reasonable.€€Thus,€Lucchesi€is€not€attempting€to€collect€an€unreasonableÏfee€from€the€client.€€Instead,€he€is€attempting€to€collect€one„half€of€the€reasonable€feeÏwhich€had€been€established.€€We€believe€this€is€not€the€type€of€situation€which,€underÏthe€Rule,€would€deny€Lucchesi€any€fee,€and€accordingly,€we€affirm€the€Trial€CourtððsÏdecision€awarding€Lucchesi€17%€of€the€total€fee.Ìà 4 àà Œ àFinally,€we€find€no€error€in€the€Trial€Courtððs€ruling€on€the€evidenceÏrelating€to€the€œñßñpayment€of€some€of€Sullivanððs€ñßñexpenses.›€€€Lucchesi€insists€the€TrialÏCourt€should€have€allowed€him€to€introduce€evidence€of€pre„trial€expenses€paid€for€byÏLucchesi.€€Lucchesi€was€allowed€to€testify€that€he€incurred€$5,000.00€in€expensesÏwhich€were€reimbursed€prior€to€the€hearing.€€The€Trial€Court€explicitly€consideredÏthese€expenses€in€evaluating€Lucchesiððs€contributions€to€the€case,€by€finding€LucchesiÏð ðbrought€needed€financial€resources€to€the€case€by€carrying€the€load€of€a€significantÏamount€of€Lawsuit€expenses.ðð€Ì€à 4 àà Œ àTrial€Courts€are€given€broad€discretion€in€the€admission€of€evidence,€andÐ ¤.œ'' Ðabsent€an€abuse€of€that€discretion,€their€decision€will€be€upheld.òò€€Otis€v.€CambridgeóóòòÐ ¬0¤)) ÐòòóóMut.€Fire€Ins.€Co.,óó€850€S.W.2d€439,€442€(Tenn.€1992).€€We€find€no€abuse€ofÐ ´2¬++ Ðdiscretion,€and€it€appears€that€any€payment€of€Sullivanððs€expenses€that€are€not€relatedÏto€the€case€has€no€relevance€in€determining€Lucchesiððs€contribution€to€the€case,Ïespecially€in€light€of€the€fact€that€he€was€not€asked€to€pay€such€expenses€as€a€conditionÐ Ì8Ä11 Ðof€maintaining€the€case.Ìà 4 àà Œ àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€we€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€andÏremand€with€cost€of€the€appeal€assessed€to€the€appellant.ÌÓÓÌÌà@‚‚+‚àòòˆà D àÐ (  Ðóóà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à__________________________Ð ,$  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌH.€David€Cate,€Sp.J.Ì