ÿWPCò6 Ê%°ü!¥ÊîfŠ¥ï:~ü’.NÂIÕ²OÕÉPÈ£vîà~"w‰\Éj®m»»!ÑI‹ÖJqaØ…9ZèŠÔ²êÊ„PXϹơ¹òÎÅ]N³VY°®ð:~AÑn×"+9|y¬(ñ• “8)j®ägó‘bLX5ÅçF+¹>Bq{ë0ëìŠÚ°­Êð%ÏFü)¿Åh۫‡SÒmɳó<ÐõME.ùÓß÷›Udîe¸‹uºa‹Ã¢{ÁŽB Ó&$mpOêlÞ9‡•6#ÊÚ3ÞÙ§så1rμڦ5¼lÚ4ßkÜÿÞÁKfc¥–ÂE‡õµ#5ë .WúÍÍeÍxIŸt¯“²» êÿƒˆä­–‹¨x¶¹¨êKÝÝ´Ü Ô^.°\ÓtÐGÅKuŠ'³GDf§ ¢ïÇÏã¡pêJÈOήª<ûmmŽÄU&ŸÒ#º„‡_¼7vhÕÿb™†’³3ņ=N€Ïq†w»×ˆG”h´‰MÇ\ý9ïïxÇQ%˜®RŸ:'…8ß“ÿ¡{`kê,Ë:RM]Ò¤j}ÂNvŸuqBúveÆm®Âb#Á\^  %) 0ˆ/ U+N· w 4 z Ò— i x mz 0D‘ ÆÕ Æ› Æa Æ' 1uíNb 72d 1‡–E?U@^^^^"žžžžžžžž`À– }¶>33‰qLúúîF N4#b‚%QŠ%FÛ&Û&g!*ˆ+à¤-¤-¤-¤-¤-¤-c„0„0„0„0„0ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1ç1 0ëï1ï1ï1ï1 BÚ2Ú2 0¤÷2 D3›3 D-Î3 0Kû3û3 ASF4Æ™4 0¤_5 0D6 A«G6˜HP LaserJet 8000 Series PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0º–)â »(`£ª$¡¡Ñ€.ÑÑ8€½­»»d»»d8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  Ó(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular¡B )bk1˜ß¢ ˜C:\PROGRA~1\COREL\WORDPE~1\TEMPLATE\CUSTOM~1\REVISE~1.WPTC:\Program Files\Corel\WordPerfect Office 2000\Template\Custom WP Templates\revised standard opinion.wpt3|xÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5‚Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5„Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5…Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 53#37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)i)(Š½CEKQW]cioAutoList1A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A. 5Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔWe€note€parenthetically€that€we€would€reach€the€same€result€regarding€the€issue€of€standing€if€we€employedÐ ° Ða€res€judicata€analysis.(ÆúI Z‹(Times New Roman  Ñ ° ÑÑ ° Ñ VÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThere€is€no€question€regarding€who€Seanððs€biological€parents€are.€€Genetic€tests€have€confirmed€that€Mr.Ð ° ÐCihlar,€not€Mr.€Crawford,€is€Seanððs€biological€father. ŒÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔAs€far€as€this€record€shows,€the€Crawfords€remain€separated€with€no€thought€of€reuniting€or€of€obtaining€aÐ ° Ðdivorce.€€Ms.€Crawford€was€in€a€relationship€with€another€man€by€the€time€this€case€reached€the€Circuit€Court.€€ sÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€paternity€statutes,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€36„2„101,€„115€(repealed€1997),€provided€women€with€a€vehicleÐ ° Ðto€obtain€a€judicial€declaration€regarding€the€identity€of€their€childððs€father. 4Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThis€provision€was€the€sole€exception€to€the€general€statute€of€limitations€providing€that€actions€for€parentageÐ ° Ðcould€be€filed€up€until€three€years€beyond€the€childððs€age€of€majority.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„306(a)€(Supp.€1999).€Ð xÈ ÐIn€1998,€the€General€Assembly€amended€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(b)€to€shorten€the€two„year€limitations€period€toÐ @ Ðtwelve€months€and€to€limit€the€circumstances€to€which€it€would€apply.€€Following€the€1998€amendment,€the€shortenedÐ X Ðlimitations€period€could€only€be€invoked€when€(1)€the€mother€was€married€and€living€with€her€husband€at€the€time€ofÐ Ð  Ðconception,€(2)€if€she€has€ð ðremained€together€with€that€husband€through€the€date€a€petition€to€establish€paternity€is€filed,ððÐ ˜è Ðand€(3)€the€mother€and€her€husband€file€a€sworn€answer€stating€that€the€husband€is€the€father€of€the€child.€€òòSeeóó€Act€ofÐ ` ° ÐApril€29,€1998,€ch.€1098,€ðð€8,€1998€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€1113,€1116,€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(b)(2)(A).€Ð ( x ÐNeither€version€of€this€statute€of€limitations€period€figures€in€the€resolution€of€this€case€because€Mr.€Crawford€neverÐ ð @ Ðasserted€a€statute€of€limitations€defense€to€either€Mr.€Cihlarððs€legitimation€petition€or€to€the€parentage€action€filed€inÐ ¸   ÐAugust€1998. Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€legitimation€statutes,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€36„2„201,€„210€(repealed€1997),€provided€men€with€a€vehicleÐ ° Ðfor€obtaining€judicial€recognition€of€their€parental€rights€as€a€childððs€biological€father. BÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€suit€was€filed€by€Child€Support€Services,€Inc.,€a€private€company€with€whom€the€Tennessee€DepartmentÐ ° Ðof€Human€Services€had€contracted€to€provide€Title€IV„D€child€support€collection€services.€€òòSee€State€ex€rel.€Brown€v.Ð xÈ ÐBrownóó,€No.€01A0„9509„CV„00428,€1997€WL€749452,€at€*1€n.2€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Dec.€5,€1997)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.Ð @ Ð11€application€filed).€€ äÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔWhile€some€of€the€pleadings€include€Ms.€Crawfordððs€name,€they€do€not€consistently€indicate€whether€sheÐ ° Ðactively€opposed€the€petition€to€establish€parentage€filed€in€the€juvenile€court.€€All€the€early€pleadings€refer€only€to€Mr.Ð xÈ ÐCrawford€as€the€sole€ð ðrespondent,ðð€and€his€lawyerððs€motion€to€be€relieved€states€that€Mr.€Crawford€was€his€only€client.€Ð @ ÐMs.€Crawford€has€not€signed€any€of€Mr.€Crawfordððs€pro€se€papers.€€Accordingly,€we€will€refer€to€Mr.€CrawfordÐ X Ðindividually€in€this€opinion. DÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€juvenile€court€refereeððs€reasoning€that€collateral€estoppel€applies€only€to€issues€of€fact€is€incorrect€in€thisÐ °  Ðregard.€€However,€even€though€the€reasoning€is€flawed,€the€referee€correctly€determined€that€the€doctrine€of€collateralÐ ° Ðestoppel€did€not€bar€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ôððs€claim€under€the€parentage€statutes.Ô#†X.|X òô:P#Ô- ù- GÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔòòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€No.€01A01„9511„JV„00508,€1996€WL€557844€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.€2,€1996),€òòperm.Ð ° Ðapp.€grantedóó,€(Tenn.€Jan.€27,€1997).€€ <Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€parentage€statutes,€at€least€implicitly,€permit€more€than€one€person€to€claim€parentage€of€a€child.€€òòSeeóóÐ ° ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„305(b)(2)€(stating€that€ð ðseveral€men€may€be€named€as€the€fatherðð).€€These€persons€may€claimÐ xÈ Ðthe€benefit€of€one€or€more€of€the€presumptions€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a).€€Regrettably,€the€parentage€statutes,Ð @ Ðunlike€the€Uniform€Parentage€Act,€do€not€provide€direction€for€resolving€disputes€when€two€men€claim€parentage€ofÐ X Ðthe€same€child€based€upon€different€presumptions.€€òòSeeóó€Uniform€Parentage€Act€ðð€4(b),€9B€U.L.A.€299€(1987). ]Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ô:P òXX.|ÔThis€circumstance€clearly€implicates€a€vested€right.€€òòSee€Wyatt€v.€A„Best€Prods.€Co.óó,€924€S.W.2d€98,€103„04Ð ° Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ô#†X.|X òô:P#Ô Ý ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡ô:P òXX.|ÔThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€upheld€this€courtððs€reversal€of€the€earlier€finding€by€the€circuit€court€that€Mr.Ð ° ÐCihlar€was€Seanððs€biological€father.€€The€effect€of€reversing€and€dismissing€Mr.€Cihlarððs€earlier€legitimation€claim€wasÐ xÈ Ðto€vacate€the€circuit€courtððs€parentage€determination.Ô#†X.|X òô:P#Ô ÖÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€ô:P òXX.|ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202(c)€(repealed€1997)€required€maternal€consent€before€a€putative€father€could€fileÐ ° Ða€legitimation€petition.€€However,€four€months€before€the€court€handed€down€its€opinion€in€Mr.€Cihlarððs€case,€anotherÐ xÈ  Ðpanel€of€the€court€invalidated€this€maternal€consent€requirement€on€constitutional€grounds€after€the€Attorney€GeneralÐ ° Ðand€Reporter€conceded€that€it€deprived€prospective€fathers€of€due€process.€€òòSee€In€re€Hoodóó,€930€S.W.2d€575€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð xÈ ÐApp.€1996). YÝ ƒR¬ä$ÝÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»ÔÝ  ÝÔ_ÔòòÔ‡ô:P òXX.|ÔSeeóó€Act€of€May€29,€1997,€ch.€477,€1997€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€862,€codified€at€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€36„2„301,€„322Ð ° Ð(Supp.€1999).€€Ô#†X.|X òô:P#Ô (|G2¬ä$¤¤Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Q,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóÔ€X.|X»»Ô d(|3Íù$££Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Q,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝVVVV'ÿÿdxd)!ÈÈÈÈdxdx( ±þ$’’ò òFigure€Ú  Ú1Ú  Úó ó^_X`YEþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(|3Íù$¢¢Ý ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Q,»»d d 8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óX[Z&OLE 2.0 Box <=8ÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ HKKKKÝ ƒ£ª!ÝÑ€.ÑÑ8€Q,»»d dÈ8ÑÑ ý ÑÓ  ÓÝ  ÝÔ‡»ÝÅ »»»ÔÔ€¼ÝÅ » »»ÝÅÔÑ8€.|XXdê»»d 8ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ€dOÑà@ü ü ìàÔ‡îAëî »¼ÝÅÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEÔ#†¼ÝÅ »îîAë,#ԈРÖ& Ðà@¸¸ ìàFebruary€2000€SessionˆÐ üL ÐÔ‡X nX »¼ÝÅÔÌò òÔ#†¼ÝÅ »XX n#ÔÓ  ÓSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE€òòex€relóó.€THOMAS€MATTHEW€CIHLAR,€òòet€al.óó€Ð úJ Ðv.€RONALD€SHANE€CRAWFORD,€òòet€alóó.ó óÐ  ^ ÐÓ_ÓÌÔ€X nX »¼ÝÅÔà@œ œ ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Davidson€County€Juvenile€CourtˆÐ 4 „ Ðà@— — ìàNo.€9819„43323€€€Betty€Adams€Green,€JudgeˆÐ  p ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€V) °°` d€÷E<ã` A߈Ð ä4  ÐÌà@Ç Ç ìàNo.€M1999„00517„COA„R3„CV€„€Filed€August€22,€2000ˆÐ ß/  ÐÌßA€V) °°` dE<¶` Aßó óÐ · ÐÌThis€appeal€involves€Thomas€Matthew€Cihlarððs€second€attempt€to€obtain€a€judicial€declaration€thatÐ ² Ðhe€is€the€father€of€a€child€whose€mother€was€married€to€another€man€when€the€child€was€born.€€HisÐ žî Ðfirst€effort€ended€when€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€he€did€not€have€standing€to€legitimateÐ ŠÚ Ðthe€child€under€Tennesseeððs€now„repealed€legitimation€statutes.€€òòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2dÐ vÆ Ð431€(Tenn.€1998).€€Thereafter,€the€State€of€Tennessee,€joined€later€by€both€Mr.€Cihlar€and€his€child,€Ð b² Ðfiled€a€petition€in€the€Davidson€County€Juvenile€Court€seeking€to€establish€Mr.€Cihlarððs€parentageÐ Nž Ðunder€statutes€enacted€after€Mr.€Cihlar€filed€his€first€legitimation€petition.€€Following€a€bench€trial,Ð :Š Ða€juvenile€court€referee€determined€that€Mr.€Cihlar€was€the€childððs€biological€father,€ordered€Mr.Ð &v ÐCihlar€to€begin€making€child€support€payments,€and€prescribed€Mr.€Cihlarððs€visitation€privileges.€Ð b ÐThe€juvenile€court€judge€later€affirmed€the€refereeððs€order.€€On€this€appeal,€the€estranged€husbandÐ þN Ðof€the€childððs€biological€mother€asserts€that€Mr.€Cihlarððs€petition€to€establish€parentage€wasÐ ê: Ðforeclosed€by€òòEvans€v.€Steelmanóó.€€We€have€determined€that€the€current€parentage€statutes€areÐ Ö& Ðconstitutional€and€that€they€authorize€not€only€Mr.€Cihlar,€but€also€the€State€and€Mr.€Cihlarððs€child,Ð Â Ðto€file€an€action€to€establish€Mr.€Cihlarððs€paternity.€€Accordingly,€we€affirm€the€juvenile€court.Ð ®þ ÐÌò òà@}}ìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Juvenile€Court€Affirmedó óˆÐ †!Ö  ÐÌòòWilliam€C.€Koch,€Jr.,€óóJ.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòWilliam€B.€Cain€óóandÐ ^#®" ÐòòPatricia€J.€Cottrell,€JJ.óó,€joined.Ð J$š# ÐÌRonald€Shane€Crawford,€Joelton,€Tennessee,€Pro€Se.Ð "&r!% ÐÌPaul€G.€Summers,€Attorney€General€and€Reporter,€and€Stuart€Wilson„Patton,€Assistant€AttorneyÐ ú'J#' ÐGeneral,€for€the€appellee,€State€of€Tennessee.Ð æ(6$( ÐÌWayne€Detring,€Hendersonville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Thomas€Matthew€Cihlar.Ð ¾*&* ÐÌNannette€Clark,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€Guardian€Ad€Litem€for€Sean€Michael€Crawford.Ð –,æ', ÐÔ_ÔÐ ‚-Ò(-ý ÐÑdOÑâ âÑ°°ÑÑ°°Ñâ âÑ  Ñà@66'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àMary€Ann€Crawford€and€Ronald€Shane€Crawford€were€married€on€July€2,€1988,€after€sheÐ ˆØ Ðgave€birth€to€Mr.€Crawfordððs€child.€€They€separated€in€the€autumn€of€1990.€€Within€a€matter€ofÐ tÄ Ðweeks,€Ms.€Crawford,€who€was€working€as€a€topless€dancer€at€the€time,€moved€in€with€ThomasÐ `° ÐMatthew€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€whom€she€had€met€shortly€after€leaving€Mr.€Crawford.€€This€liaison€ended€in€AprilÐ L œ Ð1991€when€Ms.€Crawford€left€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€and€moved€in€with€her€mother.€€In€parting,€Ms.€CrawfordÐ 8 ˆ Ðtold€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€for€the€first€time€that€she€was€married€and€also€assured€him€that€she€was€not€pregnant.€Ð $ t ÐShe€proved€to€be€mistaken€about€the€latter.€€In€August€1991,€she€told€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€that€she€wasÐ  ` Ðpregnant€with€his€child.€€Ms.€Crawford€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€shopped€for€baby€clothes€and€even€agreedÐ ü L  Ðupon€the€childððs€name.€€Sean€Michael€Crawford€was€born€on€November€29,€1991.׃$×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àMs.€Crawford€permitted€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€to€develop€a€personal€relationship€with€his€son€soon€afterÐ À  ÐSeanððs€birth.€€She€allowed€regular€overnight€visits€on€most€weekends€and€accepted€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_ÔððsÐ ¬ü  Ðvoluntary€financial€contributions€for€Seanððs€support.€€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ôððs€liberal€access€to€his€son€continuedÐ ˜è  Ðeven€after€Ms.€Crawford€began€seeing€Mr.€Crawford€again€in€February€1992.€€Mr.€CrawfordÐ „Ô  Ðapparently€knew€that€he€was€not€Seanððs€father€and€did€not€object€to€the€developing€relationshipÐ pÀ Ðbetween€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€and€Sean€or€to€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ôððs€regular€financial€contributions€for€Seanððs€support.€Ð \¬ ÐThe€record€contains€little€information€regarding€the€relationship€between€Mr.€Crawford€and€Sean,Ð H˜ Ðand€there€is€certainly€no€evidence€that€Mr.€Crawford€maintained€any€sort€of€relationship€with€SeanÐ 4„ Ðafter€he€and€Ms.€Crawford€separated€for€the€second,€and€apparently€final,€time€in€September€1993.׃% ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р p ÐÌà  àThe€relationship€between€Ms.€Crawford€and€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€deteriorated€markedly€after€July€1994Ð øH Ðwhen€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€filed€a€petition€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€Davidson€County€to€legitimate€SeanÐ ä4 Ðpursuant€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€(repealed€1997).€€Ms.€Crawford€opposed€the€petition€andÐ Ð  Ðended€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ôððs€visitation€with€his€son.€€Mr.€Crawford,€even€though€estranged€from€Ms.Ð ¼  ÐCrawford,€also€opposed€the€petition.€€On€€October€27,€1995,€following€a€bench€trial,€the€circuit€courtÐ ¨ø Ðentered€an€order€declaring€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€to€be€Sean€Crawfordððs€biological€father€and€changing€theÐ ”ä Ðchildððs€surname€to€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô.€€The€trial€court€also€ordered€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€to€pay€child€support€andÐ €Ð Ðestablished€a€regular€visitation€schedule€with€Sean.€€The€Ô_ÔCrawfordsÔ_Ô€appealed.€€On€October€18,€1996,Ð l¼ Ðthis€court€reversed€the€trial€court€on€two€grounds.€€First,€the€court€held€that€the€legitimation€statutesÐ X ¨ Ðdid€not€give€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€standing€to€legitimate€his€son.€€Second,€the€court€concluded€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_ÔÐ D!” Ðcould€not€proceed€with€his€legitimation€petition€because€Ms.€Crawford€had€not€consented€to€it.€€òòSeeÐ 0"€  ÐIn€re€Crawfordóó,€No.€01A01„9602„CV„00070,€1996€WL€596953,€at€*4€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Oct.€18,€996).׃4x×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р#l! ÐThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€granted€permission€to€appeal€and€consolidated€the€case€with€anotherÐ ° Ðone€raising€the€same€issues.׃/Ò×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð œì ÐÌà  àWhile€these€two€cases€were€pending€before€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court,€the€GeneralÐ tÄ ÐAssembly€repealed€both€the€paternity€statutes׃&*×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€the€legitimation€statutes׃)‚ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€and€replaced€them€withÐ `° Ða€single€cause€of€action€for€establishing€the€parentage€of€a€child.׃:Ú ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€This€Act,€which€became€effectiveÐ L œ Ðon€July€1,€1997,€did€away€with€the€presumption€that€a€child€born€to€a€married€woman€was€theÐ 8 ˆ Ðoffspring€of€the€womanððs€husband.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a)(1),€„304(c).€€It€alsoÐ $ t Ðspecifically€authorized€any€man€claiming€to€be€a€childððs€father€to€file€suit€to€establish€parentageÐ  ` Ðregardless€of€the€marital€status€of€the€childððs€mother.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„305(b)(1)(C).€Ð ü L  ÐIn€addition,€the€Act€contained€a€limitations€provision€requiring€parentage€actions€that€would€rebutÐ è 8  Ðthe€presumption€of€parentage€based€on€the€marriage€of€the€childððs€parents€to€be€filed€within€two€yearsÐ Ô$  Ðof€the€birth€of€the€child.€€òòSeeóó€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€32„2„304(b)€(Supp.€1997).׃'2×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð À  ÐÌÌà  àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€handed€down€its€decision€in€both€cases€on€March€30,€1998.€Ð „Ô  ÐòòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2d€431€(Tenn.€1998).€€The€Court€found€that€the€now„repealed€Tenn.Ð pÀ ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„2„202€was€constitutional€and€that€Mr.€Ô_ÔCihlarÔ_Ô€did€not€have€standing€to€legitimate€hisÐ \¬ ÐÔ_Ôson.€€òòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2d€at€434.€€Even€though€the€Court€noted€that€the€GeneralÐ ° ÐAssembly€had€replaced€the€legitimation€and€paternity€statutes€with€the€action€to€establish€parentage,Ð œì Ðit€declined€to€permit€either€Mr.€Cihlar€or€Mr.€Evans€to€take€advantage€of€the€new€statutes€becauseÐ ˆØ Ðthe€General€Assembly€had€specifically€declined€to€make€the€new€statutory€provisions€apply€toÐ tÄ Ðlegitimation€or€paternity€actions€filed€before€July€1,€1997.€€òòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2d€atÐ `° Ð432.Ð L œ ÐÌà  àOn€August€10,€1998,€the€State€of€Tennessee,€acting€pursuant€to€its€federally€mandatedÐ $ t Ðprerogatives€under€Title€IV„D€of€the€Social€Security€Act,€filed€a€petition€in€the€Davidson€CountyÐ  ` ÐJuvenile€Court€to€establish€that€Mr.€Cihlar€was€Seanððs€biological€father.׃*×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€A€juvenile€court€refereeÐ ü L  Ðappointed€a€guardian€ad€litem€for€Sean,€and€the€guardian€later€filed€a€supplemental€petition€on€behalfÐ è 8  Ðof€Sean€seeking€a€formal€parentage€determination.€€Mr.€Cihlar€also€retained€a€lawyer€to€represent€hisÐ Ô$  Ðinterests€during€the€juvenile€court€proceedings.€€Mr.€Crawford€opposed€this€petition.׃,°×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€FollowingÐ À  Ða€hearing,€the€juvenile€court€referee€entered€an€order€concluding€that€Mr.€Cihlar€was€the€biologicalÐ ¬ü  Ðand€legal€father€of€Sean€Michael€Crawford.€€The€order,€which€was€affirmed€by€the€juvenile€courtÐ ˜è  Ðjudge€on€April€7,€1999,€also€established€Mr.€Cihlarððs€child€support€obligation€and€his€visitation€andÐ „Ô  Ðother€rights.€€Mr.€Crawford€as€appealed€from€the€juvenile€court€judgeððs€order.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àLess€than€one€month€after€Mr.€Crawford€filed€his€notice€of€appeal,€the€General€AssemblyÐ H˜ Ðagain€amended€the€statutes€governing€actions€to€establish€parentage€to€express€its€ð ðclear€andÐ 4„ Ðunequivocalðð€intent€for€the€new€parentage€statutes€to€apply€retroactively€to€biological€fathers€whoseÐ  p Ðlegitimation€actions€filed€prior€to€July€1,€1997€were€dismissed€either€because€of€the€biologicalÐ  \ Ðfatherððs€lack€of€standing€or€the€irrebuttable€presumption€of€parentage€arising€from€the€marital€statusÐ øH Ðof€the€childððs€mother.€€òòSeeóó€Act€of€May€24,€1999,€ch.€339,€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€756,€codified€at€Tenn.Ð ä4 ÐCode€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(b)(2)(B).€€There€can€be€little€doubt€that€the€General€Assembly€enacted€thisÐ Ð  Ðamendment€to€address€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€holding€in€òòEvans€v.€Steelmanóó€regarding€theÐ ¼  Ðretroactive€application€of€the€1997€statutes€creating€the€cause€of€action€to€establish€parentage.Ð ¨ø ÐÌÌÌÌà@¬¬)ìàò òI.ˆÐ D!” Ðà@  ìàòòStanding€To€Pursue€a€Parentage€DeterminationóóˆÐ 0"€  Ðó óÌà  àWe€turn€to€the€standing€issue€first.€€Clearly,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„305(b)(1)€empoweredÐ œì Ðnot€only€Mr.€Cihlar,€but€also€Sean€and€the€State,€to€file€an€action€to€establish€parentage.€€However,Ð ˆØ ÐMr.€Crawford€asserts€that€the€doctrines€of€res€judicata€and€collateral€estoppel€prevent€Mr.€Cihlar€andÐ tÄ Ðanyone€in€privity€with€him€from€filing€suit€seeking€this€remedy€because€the€Tennessee€SupremeÐ `° ÐCourt€had€already€determined€that€Mr.€Cihlar€lacked€standing€to€legitimate€Sean.€€We€disagree€forÐ L œ Ðtwo€reasons.€€First,€the€legal€relations€of€the€parties€changed€in€a€material€way€after€the€TennesseeÐ 8 ˆ ÐSupreme€Courtððs€opinion€when€the€General€Assembly€specifically€empowered€persons€like€Mr.Ð $ t ÐCihlar€to€file€actions€to€establish€parentage.€€Second,€even€if€Mr.€Cihlar€himself€could€not€file€anÐ  ` Ðaction€to€establish€parentage,€both€Sean€and€the€State€of€Tennessee€could€because€they€are€not€inÐ ü L  Ðprivity€with€Mr.€Cihlar,€even€though€their€interests€are€related.Ð è 8  ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ À  Ðà@´ ´ ìàò òòòRes€Judicata€and€Collateral€Estoppelóóó óˆÐ ¬ü  ÐÌà  àRes€judicata€and€collateral€estoppel€are€related€preclusion€doctrines€with€common€purposes.€Ð „Ô  ÐThey€promote€finality€in€litigation€in€order€to€conserve€judicial€resources€and€to€relieve€litigants€fromÐ pÀ Ðthe€cost€and€vexation€of€multiple€lawsuits.€€òòSee€Beaty€v.€McGrawóó,€15€S.W.3d€819,€824€(Tenn.€Ct.Ð \¬ ÐApp.€1998);€òòLien€v.€Couchóó,€993€S.W.2d€53,€55„56€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998).Ð H˜ ÐÌà  àRes€judicata€is€a€claim€preclusion€doctrine.€€òòSee€Moulton€v.€Ford€Motor€Co.óó,€533€S.W.2dÐ  p Ð295,€296€(Tenn.€1976).€€It€bars€a€second€suit€between€the€same€parties€or€their€privies€on€the€sameÐ  \ Ðcause€of€action€with€respect€to€all€issues€which€were€or€could€have€been€raised€in€the€former€suit.€Ð øH ÐòòSee€Richardson€v.€Tennessee€Bd.€of€Dentistryóó,€913€S.W.2d€446,€459€(Tenn.€1995);€òòHampton€v.Ð ä4 ÐTennessee€Truck€Sales,€Inc.óó,€993€S.W.2d€643,€645€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999).€€However,€a€previousÐ Ð  Ðjudgment€cannot€extinguish€a€claim€that€did€not€exist€and€could€not€possibly€have€been€sued€uponÐ ¼  Ðin€the€previous€case.€€òòSee€Lawlor€v.€National€Screen€Serv.€Corp.óó,€349€U.S.€322,€328,€75€S.€Ct.€865,Ð ¨ø Ð868€(1955);€òòSt.€Pierre€v.€Dyeróó,€208€F.3d€394,€400€(2d€Cir.€2000);òò€Landeros€v.€Pankeyóó,€46€Cal.€Rptr.Ð ”ä Ð2d€165,€169€(Ct.€App.€1995);òò€Lien€v.€Couchóó,€993€S.W.2d€at€56.€€In€addition,€a€prior€judgment€for€theÐ €Ð Ðdefendant,€although€valid€and€final,€does€not€bar€the€plaintiff€from€filing€another€action€on€the€sameÐ l¼ Ðclaim€when,€either€by€statute€or€rule€of€court,€the€judgment€does€not€operate€as€a€bar€to€another€actionÐ X ¨ Ðon€the€same€claim.€€òòSeeóó€Restatement€(Second)€of€Judgments€ðð€20(1)(c)€(1982).Ð D!” ÐÌà  àCollateral€estoppel€is€an€issue€preclusion€doctrine.€€òòSee€Dickerson€v.€Godfreyóó,€825€S.W.2dÐ #l! Ð692,€694€(Tenn.€1992);€òòGoeke€v.€Woodsóó,€777€S.W.2d€347,€349€(Tenn.€1989).€€Once€an€issue€has€beenÐ $X" Ðactually€or€necessarily€determined€by€a€court€of€competent€jurisdiction,€the€doctrine€of€collateralÐ ô$D # Ðestoppel€renders€that€determination€conclusive€on€the€parties€and€their€privies€in€subsequentÐ à%0!$ Ðlitigation,€even€when€the€claims€or€causes€of€action€are€different.€€òòSee€Massengill€v.€Scottóó,€738Ð Ì&"% ÐS.W.2d€629,€631€(Tenn.€1987);€òòKing€v.€Brooksóó,€562€S.W.2d€422,€424€(Tenn.€1978);€òòBeaty€v.Ð ¸'#& ÐMcGrawóó,€15€S.W.3d€at€824.€€It€applies€to€both€issues€of€law€and€issues€of€fact.׃-×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú11Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€òòSeeóó€RestatementÐ ¤(ô#' Ð(Second)€of€Judgments€ðð€27€(1982).€€Courts€in€other€jurisdictions€have€invoked€the€doctrine€ofÐ ° Ðcollateral€estoppel€to€prevent€the€relitigation€of€standing€issues€decided€in€earlier€proceedings.€€òòSeeÐ œì ÐFulani€v.€Bentsenóó,€862€F.€Supp.€1140,€1150„51€(S.D.N.Y.€1994);€òòGladysz€v.€Planning€&€ZoningÐ ˆØ ÐCommððnóó,€750€A.2d€507,€513€(Conn.€App.€Ct.€2000);€òòJanitschek€v.€Trustees€of€Friends€WorldÐ tÄ ÐCollegeóó,€671€N.Y.S.2d€490,€492€(App.€Div.€1998).€Ð `° ÐÌà  àThe€relitigation€of€an€issue€of€law€between€the€same€two€parties€is€not€precluded€when€a€newÐ 8 ˆ Ðdetermination€is€warranted€in€order€to€take€account€of€an€intervening€change€in€the€applicable€lawÐ $ t Ðor€to€avoid€the€inequitable€administration€of€the€law.€€òòSeeóó€Restatement€(Second)€of€Judgments€ððÐ  ` Ð28(2)€(1982);€òòJackson€v.€City€of€College€Parkóó,€496€S.E.2d€777,€780€(Ga.€Ct.€App.€1998);€òòEsslingerÐ ü L  Ðv.€Baltimore€Cityóó,€622€A.2d€774,€784€(Md.€Ct.€Spec.€App.€1993);€òòBorough€of€Prospect€v.€Baueróó,€715Ð è 8  ÐA.2d€1244,€1245„46€(Penn.€Commw.€Ct.€1998);€òòMarino€v.€State€Farm€Fire€&€Cas.€Ins.€Co.óó,€787Ð Ô$  ÐS.W.2d€948,€950€(Tex.€1990);€òòThompson€v.€Department€of€Licensingóó,€982€P.2d€601,€610€(Wash.Ð À  Ð1999).€Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà@)ìàò òB.ó óˆÐ „Ô  Ðà@ÆÆ ìàòòò òMr.€Cihlarððs€Standingó óóóˆÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àAt€the€outset,€we€must€determine€whether€the€question€of€Mr.€Cihlarððs€standing€implicatesÐ H˜ Ðthe€doctrine€of€res€judicata€or€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€or€both.€€The€question€of€standingÐ 4„ Ðis€an€issue€rather€than€a€substantive€claim.€€Accordingly,€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel,€asÐ  p Ðopposed€to€the€doctrine€of€res€judicata,€applies€in€this€case.€€We€will,€therefore,€limit€our€discussionÐ  \ Ðto€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú12Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€The€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€does€not€prevent€Mr.Ð øH ÐCihlar€from€pursuing€his€parentage€claim€for€three€reasons.€€First,€the€law€had€changed€significantlyÐ ä4 Ðbetween€the€time€Mr.€Cihlar€brought€his€original€legitimation€claim€and€the€time€he€filed€suit€underÐ Ð  Ðthe€1997€parentage€statutes.€€Where€the€prior€legitimation€statutes€had€been€construed€not€to€provideÐ ¼  Ðputative€fathers€like€Mr.€Cihlar€standing,€the€new€statutes€were€much€broader.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÐ ¨ø Ð36„2„305(b)(1)(C)€specifically€gives€Mr.€Cihlar€standing€to€file€suit€to€establish€his€paternity€evenÐ ”ä Ðthough€Ms.€Crawford€was€married€to€another€man€both€when€the€child€was€conceived€and€born.Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àThe€second€reason€for€not€invoking€collateral€estoppel€in€this€case€is€that€the€new€parentageÐ X ¨ Ðstatutes€specifically€exempt€certain€litigants€from€the€operation€of€res€judicata€and€collateral€estoppel.€Ð D!” ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(b)(2)(B)€states€that€both€doctrines€shall€not€apply€to€putative€fathersÐ 0"€  Ðwho€petitioned€to€legitimate€their€children€prior€to€July€1,€1997€and€whose€petitions€were€dismissedÐ #l! Ðbased€on€the€motherððs€marriage€to€another€man€at€the€time€of€conception€or€the€putative€fatherððs€lackÐ $X" Ðof€standing.€€Mr.€Cihlar€complies€with€both€of€these€requirements.Ð ô$D # ÐÐ à%0!$ Ðà  àThe€third€reason€for€granting€Mr.€Cihlar€standing€to€assert€his€parentage€claim€is€based€onÐ ° Ðfairness€and€equity.€€The€1997€parentage€statutes€reflect€a€legislative€liberalization€of€theÐ œì Ðrequirements€imposed€on€biological€fathers€seeking€legal€recognition€of€their€parentage.€€It€wouldÐ ˆØ Ðbe€inequitable€to€prevent€fathers€like€Mr.€Cihlar€who€have€vigorously€pursued€legal€recognition€ofÐ tÄ Ðtheir€relationship€with€their€children€from€taking€advantage€of€the€new€statutes€simply€because€ofÐ `° Ðtiming.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€Mr.€Cihlar€has€standing€to€pursue€his€parentage€claim€under€theÐ L œ Ð1997€parentage€statutes.Ð 8 ˆ ЀÌà@‹‹)ìàò òC.ó óˆÐ  ` Ðà@’’ìàòòò òThe€Other€Partiesðð€Standingó óóóˆÐ ü L  ÐÌà  àIt€could€also€be€argued€that€the€doctrine€of€collateral€estoppel€precludes€Sean€and€the€StateÐ Ô$  Ðfrom€relitigating€the€standing€question€because€they€are€in€privity€with€Mr.€Cihlar.€€This€argumentÐ À  Ðfails€for€three€reasons.€€First,€Mr.€Cihlar€has€standing.€€Second,€the€1997€parentage€statutesÐ ¬ü  Ðspecifically€afford€these€parties€standing€independent€of€Mr.€Cihlar.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„Ð ˜è  Ð305(b)(1)(A),€(D).€€Third,€even€though€their€claims€are€related€to€Mr.€Cihlarððs,€neither€Sean€nor€theÐ „Ô  ÐState€are€in€privity€with€Mr.€Cihlar€for€collateral€estoppel€purposes.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àIn€the€context€of€both€res€judicata€and€collateral€estoppel,€the€concept€of€privity€relates€to€theÐ H˜ Ðsubject€matter€of€the€litigation,€òòsee€Harris€v.€St.€Maryððs€Med.€Ctr.,€Inc.óó,€726€S.W.2d€902,€905€(Tenn.Ð 4„ Ð1987);€òòShelley€v.€Gipsonóó,€218€Tenn.€1,€7,€400€S.W.2d€709,€712€(1966),€not€to€the€relationshipÐ  p Ðbetween€the€parties€themselves.€€òòSee€Cantrell€v.€Burnett€&€Henderson€Co.óó,€187€Tenn.€552,€557„58,Ð  \ Ð216€S.W.2d€307,€309„10€(1948).€Privity€connotes€an€identity€of€interest,€òòsee€Kelly€v.€Cherokee€Ins.Ð øH ÐCo.óó,€574€S.W.2d€735,€738€(Tenn.€1978);€òòCotton€v.€Underwoodóó,€223€Tenn.€122,€127,€442€S.W.2dÐ ä4 Ð632,€634„35€(1969),€that€is,€a€mutual€or€successive€interest€to€the€same€rights.€€òòSee€Fultz€v.€Fultzóó,€180Ð Ð  ÐTenn.€327,€330,€175€S.W.2d€315,€316€(1943);€òòPhillips€v.€General€Motors€Corp.óó,€669€S.W.2d€665,Ð ¼  Ð669€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àWhile€the€Stateððs€and€Seanððs€interests€are€related€to€Mr.€Cihlarððs,€they€are€not€identical.€€ThisÐ €Ð Ðlack€of€identity€is€most€pronounced€between€the€Stateððs€interests€and€Mr.€Cihlarððs€interests.€€TheÐ l¼ ÐStateððs€interests€are€essentially€two„fold:€(1)€to€see€that€ð ðjustice€is€doneðð€and€(2)€to€reduce€theÐ X ¨ Ðnumber€of€persons€forced€to€enter€the€welfare€rolls.€€òòSee€Mills€v.€Habluetzelóó,€456€U.S.€91,€103,€102Ð D!” ÐS.€Ct.€1549,€1557€(1982)€(OððConnor,€J.,€concurring).€€In€contrast,€Mr.€Cihlarððs€interests€involve€notÐ 0"€  Ðonly€support€matters€but€also€personal€matters€such€has€his€emotional€bonds€with€the€child,€theÐ #l! Ðability€to€continue€his€name,€and€other€rights€stemming€from€a€parent„child€relationship.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.Ð $X" ÐCode€Ann.€ðððð€€36„2„311,€„313.€The€lack€of€identity€between€the€interests€of€the€government€andÐ ô$D # Ðthose€of€the€parents€or€the€child€have€prompted€a€number€of€courts,€including€Tennesseeððs€courts,Ð à%0!$ Ðto€decline€to€invoke€either€collateral€estoppel€or€res€judicata€in€disputed€parentage€cases.€€òòSeeÐ Ì&"% ÐTennessee€Depððt€of€Human€Servs.€v.€Skinneróó,€Shelby€Cir.€No.€54,€1987€WL€25384,€at€*1„2€(Tenn.Ð ¸'#& ÐCt.€App.€Dec.€4,€1987)€(No€Tenn.€R.€App.€P.€11€application€filed);€òòsee€also€In€re€Hallóó,€977€P.2d€776,Ð ¤(ô#' Ð781€(Ariz.€1999);€òòS.O.V.€v.€People€ex€rel.€M.C.óó,€914€P.2d€355,€360€(Colo.€1996);€òòMarsh€v.€PaternityÐ )à$( Ðof€Rogersóó,€659€N.E.2d€171,€173€(Ind.€Ct.€App.€1995);€òòState€ex€rel.€Smith€v.€Smithóó,€674€N.E.2d€398,Ð |*Ì%) Ð401„02€(Ohio€Ct.€App.€1996);€òòIn€re€Chad€M.G.óó,€535€N.W.2d€97,€99€(Wis.€Ct.€App.€1995).Ð h+¸&* Їà  àSimilarly,€courts€have€determined€that€a€childððs€interest€in€a€determination€of€his€or€herÐ ° Ðparentage€is€not€identical€to€either€or€both€of€the€parentsðð€interests.€€òòSee€T.K.S.€v.€State€ex€rel.€M.S.B.óó,Ð œì Ð673€So.€2d€429,€432€(Ala.€Civ.€App.€1995)€(mother);€òòIn€re€Parentage€of€Mayberryóó,€584€N.E.2d€533,Ð ˆØ Ð535€(Ill.€App.€Ct.€1991)€(mother);€òòDepartment€of€Human€Servs.€ex€rel.€Boulanger€v.€Comeauóó,€663Ð tÄ ÐA.2d€46,€48„50€(Me.€1995)€(both€parents);€òòIn€re€Estate€of€Quinteroóó,€569€N.W.2d€889,€894€(Mich.Ð `° ÐCt.€App.€1997)€(both€parents);€òòR.B.€v.€C.S.óó,€536€N.W.2d€634,€638€n.2€(Minn.€Ct.€App.€1995)€(bothÐ L œ Ðparents);€òòLeguillon€v.€Leguillonóó,€707€N.E.2d€571,€578€(Ohio€Ct.€App.€1998)€(both€parents);€òòShirleyÐ 8 ˆ Ðv.€Javanóó,€684€A.2d€1088,€1090€(Pa.€Super.€Ct.€1996)€(mother);òò€In€re€Paternity€of€Amber€J.F.óó,€557Ð $ t ÐN.W.2d€84,€86„87€(Wis.€Ct.€App.€1996)€(mother).€€One€court€has€also€aptly€noted€that€a€childððsÐ  ` Ðinterests€may€not€only€differ€from€the€interests€of€one€or€both€of€his€or€her€parents€but€may€alsoÐ ü L  Ðconflict€with€them.€€òòSee€In€re€Hallóó,€977€P.2d€at€781„82.Ð è 8  ÐÌà  àThe€existence€of€privity€or€identity€of€interest€for€the€purpose€of€applying€res€judicata€andÐ À  Ðcollateral€estoppel€depends€on€the€facts€of€each€case.€òòSee€Mower€County€Human€Servs.€v.€Gravesóó,Ð ¬ü  Ð611€N.W.2d€386,€388€(Minn.€Ct.€App.€2000).€€Based€on€the€facts€of€this€case,€we€find€that€the€StateððsÐ ˜è  Ðinterests€in€this€proceeding€differ€from€those€of€Mr.€Cihlar.€€We€also€find€that€Mr.€Cihlarððs€interestsÐ „Ô  Ðare€not€necessarily€identical€to€his€sonððs€interests.€€Accordingly,€for€the€purposes€of€applying€resÐ pÀ Ðjudicata€and€collateral€estoppel,€we€find€that€neither€the€State€nor€Sean€is€in€privity€with€Mr.€CihlarÐ \¬ Ðregarding€the€subject€matter€of€this€litigation.€€Without€this€privity€of€interest,€they€are€not€barredÐ H˜ Ðfrom€proceeding€in€their€own€right€by€the€earlier€judicial€determination€that€Mr.€Cihlar€lackedÐ 4„ Ðstanding€to€adjudicate€the€question€of€parentage€under€the€former€statutes.Ð  p ÐÌà@……)ìàò òII.ó óˆÐ øH Ðà@— — ìàòòò òThe€Constitutionality€of€the€Parentage€Statutesó óóóˆÐ ä4 ÐÌà  àMr.€Crawford€challenges€the€constitutionality€of€the€1997€parentage€statutes€on€the€groundÐ ¼  Ðthat€they€permit€persons€like€Mr.€Cihlar€to€interfere€with€his€constitutionally€protected€right€ofÐ ¨ø Ðparental€privacy.€€While€the€right€of€parents€to€raise€their€children€free€from€unwarrantedÐ ”ä Ðgovernmental€intrusion€is€entitled€to€constitutional€protection,€we€find€that€Mr.€Crawfordððs€attackÐ €Ð Ðon€the€parentage€statutes€must€fail€for€two€reasons.€First,€we€have€determined€that€the€GeneralÐ l¼ ÐAssembly,€in€enacting€the€1997€parentage€statutes,€has€struck€a€constitutionally€defensible€balanceÐ X ¨ Ðamong€the€competing€interests€implicated€whenever€a€childððs€parentage€is€in€question.€€Second,Ð D!” Ðunder€the€facts€of€this€case,€any€interest€in€preserving€whatever€may€remain€of€the€CrawfordsððÐ 0"€  Ðð ðfamilialðð€relationship€or€of€Mr.€Crawfordððs€relationship€with€Sean€is€weak.Ð #l! ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òA.ó óˆÐ ô$D # ÐÌà  àTennesseeððs€General€Assembly€and€judiciary€have€long€recognized€the€family€as€a€vitalÐ Ì&"% Ðsocietal€institution.€€For€example,€the€General€Assembly€has€stated€that€it€is€ð ðthe€long„standing€publicÐ ¸'#& Ðpolicy€of€this€state€to€recognize€the€family€as€essential€to€social€and€economic€order€and€the€commonÐ ¤(ô#' Ðgood€and€as€the€fundamental€building€block€of€our€society.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„3„113(a)€(1996).€Ð )à$( ÐSimilarly,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€noted€that€ð ðparental€autonomy€is€basic€to€the€structureÐ |*Ì%) Ðof€our€society€because€the€family€is€ððthe€institution€by€which€we€inculcate€and€pass€down€many€ofÐ h+¸&* Ðour€most€cherished€values,€moral€and€cultural.ðððð€òòDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€588,€601€(Tenn.€1992)Ð ° Ð(quoting€òòBellotti€v.€Bairdóó,€443€U.S.€622,€634,€99€S.€Ct.€3035,€3043€(1979)).€€Ð œì ÐÌà  àMany€of€these€statements€regarding€the€importance€of€families€have€been€made€withÐ tÄ Ðreference€to€the€traditional€notion€of€a€nuclear€family€„€a€married€woman€and€man€with€their€children,Ð `° Ðif€any.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„3„113(b);€òòPerrin€v.€Perrinóó,€201€Tenn.€354,€366,€299€S.W.2d€19,Ð L œ Ð24€(1957)€(noting€that€marriage€is€the€foundation€of€the€family€and€society);€òòMcCormick€v.€Stateóó,€135Ð 8 ˆ ÐTenn.€218,€226,€186€S.W.€95,€97€(1916)€(noting€that€the€State€had€a€deeply€rooted€interest€in€theÐ $ t Ðprotection€of€the€peace€of€families€and€in€the€maintenance€of€the€sacred€institution€of€marriage);Ð  ` ÐòòLonas€v.€Stateóó,€50€Tenn.€(3€Heisk.)€€287,€309€(1871)€(characterizing€marriage€as€the€most€elemental€Ð ü L  Ðand€useful€social€relation);€òòMcKinney€v.€Clarkeóó,€32€Tenn.€(2€Swan)€321,€324€(1852)€(€characterizingÐ è 8  Ðmarriage€as€the€very€foundation€of€all€social€order€and€morality).€€However,€the€courts€haveÐ Ô$  Ðexpanded€the€concept€of€ð ðfamilyðð€to€include€other€relationships,€such€as€a€child€living€with€hisÐ À  Ðgrandmother,€uncle,€and€cousin€in€subsidized€housing,€òòsee€Moore€v.€City€of€East€Clevelandóó,€431€U.S.Ð ¬ü  Ð494,€504„05,€97€S.€Ct.€1932,€1938€(1977),€or€a€divorced€parent€with€custody€of€her€child€or€children.€Ð ˜è  ÐòòSee€Rust€v.€Rustóó,€864€S.W.2d€52,€55€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€Ð „Ô  ÐÌà  àThe€integrity€of€these€ð ðfamilyðð€units€has€found€protection€against€unwarranted€governmentalÐ \¬ Ðinterference€in€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€and€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€8.€Ð H˜ ÐòòSee€Cleveland€Bd.€of€Educ.€v.€LaFleuróó,€414€U.S.€632,€639„40,€94€S.€Ct.€791,€796€(1974);€òòIn€reÐ 4„ ÐSwansonóó,€2€S.W.3d€180,€187€(Tenn.€1999);€òòBroadwell€v.€Holmesóó,€871€S.W.2d€471,€475€(Tenn.Ð  p Ð1994);òò€Hawk€v.€Hawkóó,€855€S.W.2d€573,€579€(Tenn.€1993).€€A€parentððs€right€to€raise€his€or€herÐ  \ Ðchildren€without€unwarranted€governmental€interference€is€a€fundamental€liberty€interest,€òòsee€StateÐ øH Ðex€rel.€T.H.€v.€Minóó,€802€S.W.2d€625,€626€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Accordingly,€the€State€may€notÐ ä4 Ðinterfere€with€a€parentððs€exercise€of€these€rights€unless€it€has€a€compelling€interest€for€doing€so.€€òòSeeÐ Ð  ÐDavis€v.€Davisóó,€842€S.W.2d€at€602;€òòState€Depððt€of€Human€Servs.€v.€Ogleóó,€617€S.W.2d€652,€656Ð ¼  Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1980).Ð ¨ø ÐÌà  àMore€recently,€the€courts€have€recognized€that€the€biological€father€of€a€non„marital€childÐ €Ð Ðmay€have€parental€rights€commensurate€with€those€of€married€parents€or€divorced€custodial€parents.€Ð l¼ ÐThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€held€that€a€biological€father€of€a€non„marital€child€who€hasÐ X ¨ Ðdeveloped€a€substantial€relationship€with€the€child€has€a€fundamental€liberty€interest€entitled€to€dueÐ D!” Ðprocess€protection.€€òòSee€Petrosky€v.€Keeneóó,€898€S.W.2d€726,€728€(Tenn.€1995);€òòNale€v.€Robertsonóó,Ð 0"€  Ð871€S.W.2d€674,€678€(Tenn.€1994).€€This€court€has€also€held€that€the€biological€father€of€a€non„Ð #l! Ðmarital€child€who€has€attempted€in€good€faith€to€establish€a€relationship€with€his€child€has€a€right€toÐ $X" Ðattempt€to€create€a€legally€recognized€parent„child€relationship.òò€€See€In€re€Hoodóó,€930€S.W.2d€575,Ð ô$D # Ð578„79€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1996).€€As€a€result€of€these€decisions,€the€parental€rights€of€biological€fathersÐ à%0!$ Ðof€non„marital€children€are€entitled€to€the€same€constitutional€protection€as€the€rights€of€marriedÐ Ì&"% Ðparents€and€divorced€custodial€parents,€as€long€as€the€biological€father€has€established€a€substantialÐ ¸'#& Ðrelationship€with€the€child.€Ð ¤(ô#' ÐÌà@)ìàò òB.ó óˆÐ |*Ì%) ÐÐ h+¸&* Ðà  àIn€contrast€to€the€judicial€efforts€to€give€constitutional€substance€to€the€parental€rights€ofÐ ° Ðmarried€parents,€divorced€custodial€parents,€and€biological€fathers€of€non„marital€children,Ð œì ÐTennesseeððs€courts€have€avoided€providing€any€sort€of€constitutional€protection€to€biological€fathersÐ ˆØ Ðof€children€whose€mother€is€married€to€another€man.€€While€marital€infidelity€is€certainly€not€aÐ tÄ Ðmodern€phenomenon,€òòsee,€e.g.,€Cannon€v.€Cannonóó,€26€Tenn.€(7€Humph.)€410€(1846),€the€courts€haveÐ `° Ðheld€that€a€putative€fatherððs€biological€relationship€to€a€child€does€not,€by€itself,€counterbalanceÐ L œ Ðsocietyððs€interests€in€preserving€the€traditional€family€unit,€maintaining€family€harmony,€andÐ 8 ˆ Ðpromoting€what€the€courts€perceive€to€be€the€childððs€best€interests.€€òòSee€In€re€A.óó,€735€S.W.2d€232,Ð $ t Ð237€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1987).€€Accordingly,€the€courts€have€used€a€procedural€device€to€prevent€theseÐ  ` Ðfathers€from€even€seeking€a€judicial€determination€of€their€parentage.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àAt€common€law,€a€child€born€to€a€married€woman€was€presumed€to€be€the€child€of€theÐ Ô$  Ðwomanððs€husband.€€Many€jurisdictions,€either€by€statute€or€court€decision,€viewed€this€presumptionÐ À  Ðas€conclusive€absent€proof€of€the€non„access€or€sterility.€€Tennessee,€however,€was€among€the€statesÐ ¬ü  Ðthat€permitted€the€presumption€to€be€rebutted€by€clear€and€convincing€evidence€of€matters€other€thanÐ ˜è  Ðnon„access€or€sterility.€€òòSee€Jackson€v.€Thorntonóó,€133€Tenn.€36,€39,€179€S.W.€384,€384€(1915);Ð „Ô  ÐòòFrazier€v.€McFerrenóó,€55€Tenn.€App.€431,€440,€402€S.W.2d€467,€472€(1964).€€Thus,€the€TennesseeÐ pÀ ÐSupreme€Court€has€permitted€a€decedentððs€family€members€to€challenge€an€individualððs€right€to€shareÐ \¬ Ðin€the€estate€on€the€ground€that€the€decedent€was€not€her€biological€father.€€The€decedentððs€familyÐ H˜ Ðprevailed€by€presenting€proof€of€the€decedentððs€wifeððs€ð ðnotoriously€licentious€conductðð€and€herÐ 4„ Ðð ðhabit€of€intimacyðð€with€another€man.€€òòCannon€v.€Cannonóó,€26€Tenn.€(7€Humph.)€at€411.€€Ð  p ÐÌà  àEven€though€Tennesseeððs€common„law€presumption€of€marital€paternity€was€rebuttable,€theÐ øH ÐTennessee€courts€have€consistently€declined€to€give€biological€fathers€of€children€born€to€womenÐ ä4 Ðmarried€to€another€the€opportunity€to€establish€their€parentage.€€Reflecting€their€disapproval€of€menÐ Ð  Ðhaving€affairs€with€married€women,€the€courts€have€declined€to€even€give€standing€to€biologicalÐ ¼  Ðfathers€who€seek€a€judicial€declaration€of€their€parentage.€€In€the€first€reported€case€on€this€subject,Ð ¨ø Ðthis€court€based€its€decision€that€a€biological€father€lacked€standing€on€an€extremely€narrowÐ ”ä Ðinterpretation€of€the€legitimation€statutes.€€The€statutes€permitted€legitimation€proceedings€only€forÐ €Ð Ða€ð ðchild€not€born€in€lawful€wedlock.ðð€€The€court€construed€the€phrase€to€include€only€children€bornÐ l¼ Ðto€unmarried€women.€€Thus,€said€the€court,€the€statute€did€not€apply€to€children€whose€mothers€wereÐ X ¨ Ðmarried,€even€if€they€were€married€to€someone€other€than€the€childððs€biological€father.€òòSeeÐ D!” ÐCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€652€S.W.2d€910,€912„13€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1983).€Ð 0"€  ÐÌà  àThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€addressed€the€standing€question€for€the€first€time€in€1998€inÐ $X" Ðthe€precursor€to€this€proceeding.€€On€that€occasion,€the€court€simply€chose€to€adopt€the€reasoning€ofÐ ô$D # ÐòòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó.€€To€support€its€decision,€the€court€noted€that€the€General€Assembly€hadÐ à%0!$ Ðacquiesced€for€fifteen€years€in€the€interpretation€of€the€legitimation€statutes€in€òòCunningham€v.Ð Ì&"% ÐGoldenóó€and,€therefore,€that€the€General€Assembly€must€not€have€intended€to€give€biological€fathersÐ ¸'#& Ðof€children€born€to€married€women€any€sort€of€legally€protected€interest€in€their€relationship€withÐ ¤(ô#' Ðtheir€child.€€òòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2d€at€434„35.€€Accordingly,€the€court€made€a€markedÐ )à$( Ðdistinction€between€the€rights€of€biological€fathers€of€children€born€to€unmarried€women€and€thoseÐ |*Ì%) Ðof€biological€fathers€of€children€born€to€married€women.Ð h+¸&* Їà@‹‹)ìàò òC.ó óˆÐ ° ÐÌà  àAs€the€preceding€discussion€indicates,€Tennesseeððs€pre„1997€law€governing€disputes€over€theÐ ˆØ Ðparentage€of€children€born€to€married€women,€like€the€law€in€many€other€states,€was€a€curiousÐ tÄ Ðadmixture€of€ancient,€common„law€presumptions,€statutes,€judicial€interpretations€of€these€statutes,Ð `° Ðand€legislative€acquiescence€in€the€judicial€interpretations.€€òòSee€Brian€C.€v.€Ginger€K.óó,€92€Cal.€Rptr.Ð L œ Ð2d€294,€298€(Ct.€App.€2000).€€Both€this€court€and€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€had€recognized€theÐ 8 ˆ ÐGeneral€Assemblyððs€authority€to€permit€putative€biological€fathers€of€children€born€to€marriedÐ $ t Ðwomen€to€establish€their€parentage€but€had€concluded€that€the€General€Assembly€had€chosen€not€toÐ  ` Ðdo€so.€€òòSee€Evans€v.€Steelmanóó,€970€S.W.2d€at€434;€òòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€652€S.W.2d€at€911,€913.€Ð ü L  ÐIn€1997,€the€General€Assembly€exercised€its€prerogative€to€repeal€the€former€paternity€andÐ è 8  Ðlegitimation€statutes€and€to€replace€them€with€the€current€parentage€statutes.€€These€new€statutesÐ Ô$  Ðmark€a€watershed€in€this€stateððs€recognition€of€the€right€of€putative€biological€fathers€to€establishÐ À  Ðtheir€parentage€notwithstanding€the€marital€status€of€the€childððs€mother.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà  àGreat€changes€in€our€societyððs€social€structure€had€occurred€by€the€time€the€GeneralÐ „Ô  ÐAssembly€revisited€the€matter€of€the€rights€of€biological€fathers€to€establish€the€parentage€of€theirÐ pÀ Ðchildren.€€Among€these€changes€were€(1)€the€increasing€number€of€children€born€to€unmarriedÐ \¬ Ðwomen,€(2)€the€increasing€rate€of€divorce,€(3)€the€increasing€number€of€children€living€in€householdsÐ H˜ Ðin€which€one€or€both€of€their€biological€parents€are€absent,€and€(4)€the€increasing€awareness€of€theÐ 4„ Ðreality€of€extra„marital€sexual€conduct€by€both€men€and€women.€€During€the€same€period,€minimallyÐ  p Ðinvasive€scientific€tests€had€been€developed€to€reliably€determine€a€childððs€parentage.€€The€courts€hadÐ  \ Ðalso€recognized€the€rights€of€biological€fathers€who€desire€to€shoulder€their€parental€responsibilities,Ð øH Ðand€both€the€federal€government€and€the€states€had€stepped€up€their€efforts€to€require€biologicalÐ ä4 Ðfathers,€whether€married€to€the€childððs€mother€or€not,€to€fulfill€their€obligation€to€support€theirÐ Ð  Ðchildren€financially.Ð ¼  ÐÌà  àIn€no€sense€did€the€General€Assembly€retreat€from€its€expressed€policy€favoring€theÐ ”ä Ðimportance€of€the€traditional€family€unit.€€However,€in€1997€and€in€practical€recognition€of€modernÐ €Ð Ðrealities,€the€General€Assembly€unambiguously€disavowed€òòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€thereby€signalingÐ l¼ Ðthat€it€no€longer€acquiesced€in€the€courtsðð€deference€to€the€ancient€presumption€of€marital€parentage.€Ð X ¨ ÐTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(c)€explicitly€abolishes€this€presumption.€€In€its€place,€the€GeneralÐ D!” ÐAssembly€recognized€five€rebuttable€parentage€presumptions.€€Two€of€these€presumptions€are€theÐ 0"€  Ðpresumption€of€parentage€arising€from€a€manððs€marriage€to€a€childððs€mother€at€the€time€ofÐ #l! Ðconception,€òòseeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a)(1),€and€the€presumption€of€parentage€arising€fromÐ $X" Ða€genetic€test€showing€a€statistical€probability€of€95%€or€more€that€a€particular€man€is€a€childððsÐ ô$D # Ðbiological€father.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a)(5).׃0×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú13Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€In€addition,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„Ð à%0!$ Ð305(b)(1)(C)€permits€any€man€claiming€to€be€a€childððs€father€to€file€suit€to€establish€parentageÐ ° Ðwithout€reference€to€the€marital€status€of€the€childððs€mother.Ð œì ÐÌà@‹‹)ìàò òD.ó óˆÐ tÄ ÐÌà  àLike€the€courts€that€decided€òòEvans€v.€Steelmanóó€and€òòCunningham€v.€Goldenóó,€the€courts€inÐ L œ Ðother€jurisdictions€have€recognized€that€balancing€the€competing€interests€when€a€childððs€paternityÐ 8 ˆ Ðis€disputed€is€essentially€a€legislative€prerogative.€€Thus,€when€legislatures€recognized€a€conclusiveÐ $ t Ðpresumption€of€parentage€stemming€from€a€manððs€marriage€to€a€childððs€mother,€the€courts€noted€thatÐ  ` Ðthey€were€essentially€making€a€public€policy€statement€that€the€scales€should€be€balanced€in€favorÐ ü L  Ðof€preserving€the€integrity€of€the€family€unit.€€òòSee€Vincent€B.€v.€Joan€R.óó,€179€Cal.€Rptr.€9,€10€(Ct.Ð è 8  ÐApp.€1981).€€They€likewise€noted€that€a€legislature€may€give€greater€weight€to€the€interests€ofÐ Ô$  Ðbiological€fathers€if€it€desires€to€do€so.€òòSee€Michael€H.€v.€Gerald€D.óó,€491€U.S.€110,€128„30,€109€S.Ð À  ÐCt.€2333,€2345„46€(1989);€òòK.S.€v.€R.S.óó,€669€N.E.2d€399,€404€(Ind.€1996)€(holding€that€states€mayÐ ¬ü  Ðregulate€a€putative€fatherððs€interests€through€properly€drawn€statutes);€òòDavid€V.R.€v.€Wanda€J.D.óó,€907Ð ˜è  ÐP.2d€€1025,€1028€(Okla.€1995)€(deferring€to€the€presumption€established€by€the€legislature);€òòIn€reÐ „Ô  ÐJ.W.T.óó,€872€S.W.2d€189,€202€(Tex.€1994)€(Cornyn,€J.,€dissenting)€(noting€that€the€legislature€couldÐ pÀ Ðchoose€to€protect€the€marital€family€over€the€rights€of€the€biological€father).€€A€great€majority€ofÐ \¬ Ðstates€now€give€all€biological€fathers€the€right€to€establish€their€parentage€by€rebutting€theÐ H˜ Ðpresumption€that€a€child€born€to€a€married€woman€is€the€child€of€the€womanððs€husband.€òòSeeÐ 4„ ÐWeidenbacher€v.€Duclosóó,€661€A.2d€988,€999€(Conn.€1995).Ð  p ÐÌà  àThe€husband€of€a€childððs€mother€at€conception€or€birth€presumptively€has€interests€in€hisÐ øH Ðrelationship€with€the€child€that€are€entitled€to€constitutional€protection.€€While€the€TennesseeÐ ä4 ÐConstitution€does€not€require€that€the€relationship€be€placed€beyond€any€sort€of€government€control,Ð Ð  Ðit€does€require€that€the€State€have€a€compelling€interest€for€intruding€into€the€otherwise€privateÐ ¼  Ðdomain€of€the€parent„child€relationship.€€We€have€identified€five€substantial€interests€that€supportÐ ¨ø Ðproviding€a€procedure€for€assuring€the€timely€and€accurate€resolution€of€parentage€disputes.€€First,Ð ”ä Ðthe€State€has€an€interest€in€eliminating€uncertainty€and€confusion€regarding€a€childððs€parentage.€Ð €Ð ÐSecond,€the€State€has€an€interest€in€enforcing€a€biological€fatherððs€obligation€to€support€his€childrenÐ l¼ Ðin€order€to€prevent€them€from€entering€the€welfare€rolls.€€Third,€the€State€has€a€responsibility€toÐ X ¨ Ðeliminate€disparate€treatment€between€marital€and€non„marital€children.€€Fourth,€the€State€has€anÐ D!” Ðinterest€in€protecting€the€interests€of€biological€fathers€who€have€made,€or€are€prepared€to€make,€aÐ 0"€  Ðsubstantial€personal€investment€in€their€relationship€with€their€children.€€Finally,€the€State€has€anÐ #l! Ðinterest€in€enabling€children€to€ascertain€the€identity€of€their€biological€parents€for€medical€or€otherÐ $X" Ðhealth€reasons.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€the€State€has€compelling€interests€that€justify€establishingÐ ô$D # Ða€procedure€for€resolving€parentage€disputes€and€for€making€this€procedure€available€to€not€only€theÐ à%0!$ Ðchild€and€the€childððs€mother€and€her€husband,€but€also€to€any€man€claiming€to€be€the€childððsÐ Ì&"% Ðbiological€father.€€Ð ¸'#& ÐÌà  àWe€must€still€decide,€however,€what€elements€must€be€included€in€a€statutory€procedure€forÐ )à$( Ðresolving€parentage€disputes€in€order€to€assure€that€the€interests€of€persons€like€Mr.€Crawford€areÐ |*Ì%) Ðprotected.€€There€are€two€essential€ingredients.€€First,€the€procedure€must€comply€with€minimumÐ h+¸&* Ðprocedural€due€process€requirements€which€include€adequate€notice,€an€opportunity€to€presentÐ ° Ðevidence,€and€a€decision€based€on€the€evidence€by€an€impartial€trier„of„fact.€€Second,€the€procedureÐ œì Ðshould€enable€the€trier„of„fact€to€consider€the€level€of€commitment€to€parenthood€that€theÐ ˆØ Ðpresumptive€father€or€fathers€have€demonstrated.€€Accordingly,€courts€called€upon€to€resolveÐ tÄ Ðparentage€disputes€should€be€able€to€take€into€consideration:€(1)€the€stability€of€the€childððs€currentÐ `° Ðfamily€environment,€(2)€the€existence€of€an€on„going€family€unit,€(3)€the€source€or€sources€of€theÐ L œ Ðchildððs€support,€(4)€the€childððs€relationship€with€the€presumptive€father,€and€(4)€the€childððs€physical,Ð 8 ˆ Ðmental,€and€emotional€needs.€€òòSee€Turner€v.€Whistedóó,€607€A.2d€935,€940€(Md.€1992).Ð $ t ÐÌà  àTennesseeððs€1997€parentage€statutes,€as€amended,€contain€these€necessary€elements.€€WeÐ ü L  Ðhave€concluded€that€they€do€not€impermissibly€interfere€with€familial€privacy€interests,€òòsee€FinnertyÐ è 8  Ðv.€Boyettóó,€469€So.€2d€287,€292€(La.€Ct.€App.€1985),€or€with€the€rights€and€interests€of€a€husband€ofÐ Ô$  Ða€woman€whose€childððs€parentage€is€disputed.€€Accordingly,€we€find€that€the€1997€parentage€statutesÐ À  Ðare€constitutional€on€their€face.Ð ¬ü  ÐÌà@)ìàò òE.ó óˆÐ „Ô  ÐÌà  àEven€though€we€have€upheld€the€facial€constitutionality€of€the€1997€parentage€statutes,€weÐ \¬ Ðmust€still€determine€whether€these€statutes€were€constitutionally€applied€to€Mr.€Crawford.€€Mr.Ð H˜ ÐCrawford€has€not€taken€issue€with€the€procedural€aspects€of€the€proceedings€below.€€Accordingly,Ð 4„ Ðthe€only€remaining€issue€is€whether€the€juvenile€court€based€its€conclusion€that€Mr.€Cihlar€wasÐ  p ÐSeanððs€biological€father€on€the€proper€factors.€€We€have€determined€that€the€record€overwhelminglyÐ  \ Ðsupports€the€juvenile€courtððs€decision€that€Mr.€Cihlar€is€Seanððs€biological€father.Ð øH ÐÌà  àThis€case€is,€in€reality,€a€dispute€between€two€men€who€are€presumptively€Seanððs€father.€€Mr.Ð Ð  ÐCrawford€is€presumptively€the€boyððs€father€because€he€was€married€to€Seanððs€mother€both€when€theÐ ¼  Ðboy€was€conceived€and€when€he€was€born.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a)(1).€€But€Mr.€CihlarÐ ¨ø Ðis€also€presumptively€Seanððs€father€because€genetic€testing€has€confirmed€his€parentage€by€aÐ ”ä Ðprobability€factor€of€99.98%.€€òòSeeóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(a)(5).€€In€addition€to€the€geneticÐ €Ð Ðproof,€the€partiesðð€conduct€since€December€1990€indicates€that€each€of€them,€including€Sean€himself,Ð l¼ Ðhave€known€that€Mr.€Cihlar€is€Seanððs€biological€father.€€Mr.€Cihlar€has€thus€presented€evidence€toÐ X ¨ Ðrebut€the€presumption€of€Mr.€Crawfordððs€parentage€by€far€more€than€the€preponderance€of€theÐ D!” Ðevidence€required€by€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„2„304(b)(3).€€There€can€be€no€reasonable€doubt€that€Mr.Ð 0"€  ÐCihlar€is€Seanððs€biological€father.Ð #l! ÐÌà  àIn€addition€to€being€supported€by€the€overwhelming€weight€of€the€evidence,€the€conclusionÐ ô$D # Ðthat€Mr.€Cihlar€is€Seanððs€biological€father€is€supported€by€weighty€policy€considerations.€€As€far€asÐ à%0!$ Ðthis€record€shows,€Sean€has€never€been€part€of€a€traditional€family€unit.€€He€was€conceived€and€bornÐ Ì&"% Ðwhile€his€mother€and€her€husband€were€separated.€€Even€though€his€mother€and€her€husband€reunitedÐ ¸'#& Ðfrom€February€1992€until€September€1993,€they€have€since€separated€again.€€Even€though€theÐ ¤(ô#' ÐCrawfords€apparently€have€no€immediate€plans€to€divorce,€Ms.€Crawford€has€entered€a€relationshipÐ )à$( Ðwith€yet€another€man.€€Mr.€Crawford€has€known€that€Sean€was€not€his€child€since€the€boy€was€born.€Ð |*Ì%) ÐThere€is€little€evidence€in€the€record€that€he€has€contributed€significantly€to€Seanððs€support€or€thatÐ h+¸&* Ðhe€has€made€efforts€to€establish€a€substantial€relationship€with€the€child.€€Under€these€facts,€theÐ ° ÐStateððs€interests€in€protecting€the€Crawford€family€or€Mr.€Crawfordððs€relationship€with€Sean€areÐ œì Ðextremely€weak.Ð ˆØ ÐÌà  àIn€circumstances€such€as€this€one,€a€parentððs€interest€and€ability€to€provide€a€child€monetaryÐ `° Ðand€parental€support€are€relevant.€€òòSee€In€re€Paternity€of€B.J.H.óó,€573€N.W.2d€99,€104€(Minn.€Ct.€App.Ð L œ Ð1998).€€The€weight€of€the€evidence€again€overwhelmingly€favors€Mr.€Cihlar.€€While€Mr.€CrawfordððsÐ 8 ˆ Ðefforts€or€desire€to€provide€any€sort€of€support€to€Sean€are€unclear,€Mr.€Cihlarððs€on„going€efforts€toÐ $ t Ðbe€Seanððs€father€are€clear€and€sustained.€€Even€before€the€child€was€born,€Mr.€Cihlar€demonstratedÐ  ` Ðhis€willingness€to€accept€his€parental€responsibilities.€€After€the€child€was€born,€Mr.€CihlarÐ ü L  Ðconsistently€supplied€monetary€support€and€took€advantage€of€every€opportunity€to€develop€aÐ è 8  Ðrelationship€with€Sean.€€As€a€result€of€Mr.€Cihlarððs€efforts,€Sean€treats€him€as€his€father.Ð Ô$  ÐÌà  àRather€than€severing€an€existing€parental€relationship,€the€order€finding€Mr.€Cihlar€to€beÐ ¬ü  ÐSeanððs€biological€father€simply€confirms€and€gives€legal€effect€to€a€relationship€known€to€all€theÐ ˜è  Ðparties.€€Accordingly,€the€juvenile€courtððs€order€declaring€Mr.€Cihlar€to€be€Seanððs€biological€fatherÐ „Ô  Ðsimply€provides€legal€substance€to€a€relationship€that€has€existed€throughout€the€boyððs€life.€€UnderÐ pÀ Ðthese€facts,€determining€that€Mr.€Cihlarððs€parentage€claims€are€weightier€than€Mr.€Crawfordððs€doesÐ \¬ Ðnot€impermissibly€interfere€with€any€rights€Mr.€Crawford€may€have€stemming€from€his€marriage€toÐ H˜ ÐMs.€Crawford.Ð 4„ ÐÌà@^^(ìàò òIII.ó óˆÐ  \ Ðà@  ìàòòò òThe€Retrospective€Application€of€the€Parenting€Statutesó óóóˆÐ øH ÐÌà  àAs€a€final€issue,€Mr.€Crawford€asserts€that€permitting€Mr.€Cihlar€to€establish€his€parentageÐ Ð  Ðunder€the€1997€parentage€statutes,€as€amended,€violates€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€20's€prohibition€ofÐ ¼  Ðretrospective€laws€that€impair€vested€rights.€€Even€though€the€parentage€statutes€create€a€new€remedyÐ ¨ø Ðfor€Mr.€Cihlar€that€did€not€exist€prior€to€1997,€we€have€determined€that€the€statutes€do€not€impair€Mr.Ð ”ä ÐCrawfordððs€vested€rights.€€Mr.€Crawford€does€not€have€a€vested€right€in€preventing€Mr.€Cihlar€fromÐ €Ð Ðestablishing€that€he€is€Seanððs€biological€father.Ð l¼ ÐÌà  àTenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€20€prohibits€the€General€Assembly€from€enacting€retrospective€laws€or€Ð D!” Ðlaws€that€impair€contractual€obligations.€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€characterized€aÐ 0"€  Ðretrospective€law€as€one€that€takes€away€or€impairs€vested€rights€acquired€under€existing€laws.€€òòSeeÐ #l! ÐMorris€v.€Grossóó,€572€S.W.2d€902,€907€(Tenn.€1978);€òòMiller€v.€Sohnsóó,€225€Tenn.€158,€162„63,€464Ð $X" ÐS.W.2d€824,€826€(1971).€€Although€the€characteristics€of€vested€rights€elude€precise€definition,€theÐ ô$D # Ðcourt€views€a€vested€right€as€one€ð ðwhich€it€is€proper€for€the€state€to€recognize€and€protect€and€ofÐ à%0!$ Ðwhich€the€individual€could€not€be€deprived€without€injustice.ðð€€òòMorris€v.€Grossóó,€572€S.W.2d€at€905.€Ð Ì&"% ÐIt€also€adopted€a€multi„factor€analysis€for€identifying€vested€rights€that€includes€consideration€of€theÐ ¸'#& Ðfollowing€factors:€(1)€whether€the€public€interest€is€advantaged€or€retarded€by€the€challenged€statute,Ð ¤(ô#' Ð(2)€whether€the€challenged€statute€gives€effect€to€or€defeats€the€affected€personððs€bona€fide€intentionsÐ )à$( Ðor€reasonable€expectations,€and€(3)€whether€the€statute€surprises€persons€who€have€long€relied€on€aÐ |*Ì%) Ðcontrary€state€of€the€law.€€òòSee€Doe€v.€Sundquistóó,€2€S.W.3d€919,€924€(Tenn.€1999).Ð h+¸&* Їà  àTo€decide€this€issue,€we€must€first€ascertain€the€nature€of€the€vested€right€Mr.€Crawford€isÐ ° Ðclaiming.€€He€is€not€asserting€a€right€akin€to€a€statute€of€limitations€defense€to€a€cause€of€action€forÐ œì Ðwhich€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations€has€already€expired.׃2×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú14Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Nor€is€he€claiming€some€sort€ofÐ ˆØ Ðinterest€in€an€earlier€judicial€determination€that€Mr.€Crawford€is€Seanððs€biological€father€because€noÐ tÄ Ðcourt€has€addressed€the€merits€of€that€issue.׃3 ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú15Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Mr.€Crawford€appears€to€be€asserting€that€he€had€someÐ `° Ðsort€of€reasonable€expectation€that€Mr.€Cihlar€will€forever€be€procedurally€unable€to€obtain€a€judicialÐ L œ Ðdeclaration€that€he€is€Seanððs€biological€father.€€Any€such€expectation,€if€in€fact€Mr.€Crawford€has€it,Ð 8 ˆ Ðis€unreasonable.Ð $ t ÐÌà  àMr.€Crawford€has€known€that€he€is€not€Seanððs€biological€father€since€the€day€the€child€wasÐ ü L  Ðborn.€€The€record€contains€no€evidence€that€he€undertook€to€support€Sean€or€to€establish€a€parentingÐ è 8  Ðrelationship€with€him€in€reliance€on€the€assumption€that€he€was€Seanððs€father.€€To€the€contrary,€thisÐ Ô$  Ðrecord€indicates€that€Mr.€Crawford€knowingly€permitted€Mr.€Cihlar€to€support€Sean€financially€andÐ À  Ðthat€Mr.€Crawford€eventually€turned€his€back€on€Ms.€Crawford€and€Sean€in€September€1993€whenÐ ¬ü  Ðhe€and€Ms.€Crawford€separated€for€the€second€and€final€time.€€There€is€likewise€no€evidence€in€theÐ ˜è  Ðrecord€that€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Courtððs€1998€decision€caused€Mr.€Crawford€to€alter€hisÐ „Ô  Ðrelationship€with€Sean.Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àAll€the€factors€identified€by€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòDoe€v.€Sundquistóó€militateÐ H˜ Ðagainst€Mr.€Crawfordððs€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€20€claim.€€The€publicððs€interests€were€advanced€by€theÐ 4„ Ðenactment€of€the€1997€parentage€statutes.€€Providing€a€new€remedy€to€biological€fathers€like€Mr.Ð  p ÐCihlar€did€not€impair€any€reasonable€expectation€by€Mr.€Crawford€that€his€claim€to€be€Seanððs€fatherÐ  \ Ðwould€remain€undisturbed€nor€destroy€any€previous€adjudication€that€Mr.€Crawford€was€SeanððsÐ øH Ðbiological€father.€€Likewise,€the€enactment€of€the€1997€parentage€statutes€and€the€filing€of€Mr.Ð ä4 ÐCihlarððs€parentage€petition€did€not€have€the€effect€of€increasing€Mr.€Crawfordððs€obligations.€€To€theÐ Ð  Ðcontrary,€Mr.€Cihlarððs€pursuit€of€a€declaration€of€parentage€will€eliminate€any€legal€obligation€thatÐ ¼  ÐMr.€Crawford€might€have€had€to€support€Sean.€€Accordingly,€we€find€no€Tenn.€Const.€art.€I,€ðð€20Ð ¨ø Ðviolation€in€permitting€Mr.€Cihlar€to€file€a€petition€under€the€new€parentage€statutes€to€establish€thatÐ ”ä Ðhe€is€Seanððs€biological€father€with€all€the€accompanying€rights€and€obligations.Ð €Ð ÐÌà@dd)ìàò òIV.ó óˆÐ X ¨ ÐÌà  àWe€affirm€the€juvenile€court€judgment€determining€that€Mr.€Cihlar€is€Seanððs€biological€fatherÐ 0"€  Ðand€establishing€Mr.€Cihlarððs€parental€rights€and€obligations€in€accordance€with€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ð #l! Ððððð€36„2„311€through€„313.€€We€remand€the€case€to€the€juvenile€court€for€whatever€furtherÐ $X" Ðproceedings€may€be€required€and€we€tax€the€costs€of€this€appeal€to€Ronald€Shane€Crawford€for€whichÐ ô$D # Ðexecution,€if€necessary,€may€issue.Ð à%0!$ ЇÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à__________________________________Ð œì Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€Ô#†X.|XXX n{#ÔÔ_Ô