ÿWPC8 Ýùœ;ð™Í´³»`'wa‚Ù*ó¬E[¥Û)¥îËÄpúžšµÃ; } ³ -uIå$ þý‹•¥€&̱jÞð,sIߨ,™åG`Ød¤B‘ÿ“Ç×ÝÚ36Ÿ7Là”YO#]4Ú[a-W:ý$—P÷ m„ 50mø-™ð‹¢.rúkskµ7¬ÉNõÍ+%–ÂÆ=0—ðCì¬Öˆ>@Ѷ¤.¡ WYÒ}4XÀÿP÷ #¶T€ËÖž{Ég/pÓ¢tTe¸õ!îI;åGñQþ%ÜØHžòn-䶯®õÚ%¸$Ú„ïסÕa•t!ÛEDÜÙù{ô©V«öü%æù“ÜdS}͑ծ|, vH޲єٻ"p$°EFù™BÌÍÆøß—{ˆßÉCÀóMW¢FRR¾[#Ü’¿Çb˜4ž)´ÞÃÛÏœnI‘Ë}mµ{ÊžW«°ê@þÅCqëÜC3ðgý;BzѦü•Gq$†÷wrGØ,Þ ×@³ZõbÚóÿ8Ëθ]ofvqFÁ²´¯ùÂ<[åPº';-Ñno„”cK¼‹ú—põË[?ìÇQ3ÊÃTº2Tે±­éµ¹ 0£Ý¯.ä†`#Á@UMN %O 0(U w} 4 • ¤ ¾ bÆ UNÎ N 0P ^ n z m| 0 D“ R× 0 ”) U9@½ U @ý U@= – } ê ýU NEëUNí!;\!´r!&$s¥%¥%(H (Ôh.h.t<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4<4 0D°6°6°6°6°6 Bô6ô6ô6ô6 A7 D?’7 BGÑ7˜HP LaserJet 4Si,ü,,,,,ü0(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ö~ì(tttttt3|xwaiver- ù-(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular((3/Q$««Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ d Ô+šõ(L ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó HÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ#€O@Xÿÿd#ÑÑ € Ñ(D(2,$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ  ÑÑÑà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóóô\  `(Times NewRomanTT(ÖÃ9 Z‹(Times New Roman (µ\Z  Z(Times New Roman  Œ Ý ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€factors€the€court€must€consider€in€setting€the€alimony€obligation€are:Ð ° ÐÔ‡XcŒXXXÔà  à(A)€The€relative€earning€capacity,€obligations,€needs,€and€financial€resources€of€each€party,Ð œì Ðincluding€income€from€pension,€profit€sharing€or€retirement€plans€and€all€other€sources;Ð ŒÜ Ѐ€à  à(B)€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€the€ability€and€opportunity€of€eachÐ |Ì Ðparty€to€secure€such€education€and€training,€and€the€necessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€educationÐ l¼ Ðand€training€to€improve€such€party's€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level;€€Ð \ ¬ Ðà8  à(C)€The€duration€of€the€marriage;€€ÐL œÐ Ð  Ðà8  à(D)€The€age€and€mental€condition€of€each€party;€€Ð< ŒÐ Ð  Ðà8  à(E)€The€physical€condition€of€each€party,€including,€but€not€limited€to,€physicalÐ, |Ð Ð  Ðdisability€or€incapacity€due€to€a€chronic€debilitating€disease;€€Ð  l  Ðà8  à(F)€The€extent€to€which€it€would€be€undesirable€for€a€party€to€seek€employmentÐ \ Ð Ð  Ðoutside€the€home€because€such€party€will€be€custodian€of€a€minor€child€of€the€marriage;€€Ð üL  Ðà8  à(G)€The€separate€assets€of€each€party,€both€real€and€personal,€tangible€andÐì< Ð Ð  Ðintangible;€€Ð Ü,  Ðà8  à(H)€The€provisions€made€with€regard€to€the€marital€property€as€defined€in€ððÐÌ Ð Ð  Ð36-4-121;€€Ð ¼  Ðà8  à(I)€The€standard€of€living€of€the€parties€established€during€the€marriage;€€Ð¬üÐ Ð  Ðà8  à(J)€The€extent€to€which€each€party€has€made€such€tangible€and€intangibleМìÐ Ð  Ðcontributions€to€the€marriage€as€monetary€and€homemaker€contributions,€and€tangible€and€intangibleÐ ŒÜ Ðcontributions€by€a€party€to€the€education,€training€or€increased€earning€power€of€the€other€party;€€Ð |Ì Ðà8  à(K)€The€relative€fault€of€the€parties€in€cases€where€the€court,€in€its€discretion,Ðl¼Ð Ð  Ðdeems€it€appropriate€to€do€so;€and€€Ð \¬ Ðà8  à(L)€Such€other€factors,€including€the€tax€consequences€to€each€party,€as€areÐLœÐ Ð  Ðnecessary€to€consider€the€equities€between€the€parties.€€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÚ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ <Œ ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ5 #Ô àÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXÔBy€statute,€courts€are€also€directed€to€consider€as€a€relevant€factor€the€ð ðstandard€of€living€ofÐ ° Ðthe€parties€established€during€the€marriage.ðð€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸{#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔððÔ#†Xw¸XXXw¸w#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸Ô36„5„101(d)(1)(I).€€That€factor€isÐ œì Ðmost€often€applied€in€determination€of€the€amount€of€support,€but€the€statute€authorizes€itsÐ ˆØ Ðconsideration€in€determination€of€the€nature€of€support.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸½#Ô –Ý ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€states:€Ð ° ÐÌà8  àIt€is€the€intent€of€the€general€assembly€that€a€spouse€who€is€economicallyÐ à Ðdisadvantaged,€relative€to€the€other€spouse,€be€rehabilitated€whenever€possible€by€theÐ €Ð Ðgranting€of€an€order€for€payment€of€rehabilitative,€temporary€support€andÐ pÀ Ðmaintenance.€€Where€there€is€relative€economic€disadvantage€and€rehabilitation€is€notÐ ` ° Ðfeasible€in€consideration€of€all€factors,€including€those€set€out€in€this€subsection,€theÐ P   Ðcourt€may€grant€an€order€for€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€on€a€long„termÐ @  Ðbasis€or€until€the€death€or€remarriage€of€€the€recipient€except€as€otherwise€providedÐ 0 € Ðin€subdivision€(a)(3).€€Rehabilitative€support€and€maintenance€is€a€separate€class€ofÐ  p  Ðspousal€support€as€distinguished€from€alimony€in€solido€and€periodic€alimony.€.€.€.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ{#Ô(í€"  Z6Times New Roman Regular(ÖÃ9 Z‹6Times New Roman Regular Ý ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€court€noted€that€a€rehabilitative€alimony€award€remains€in€the€courtððs€jurisdiction€andÐ ° Ðcan€be€modified€ð ðif€the€recipientððs€prospects€for€economic€rehabilitation€materially€changeðð€andÐ œì Ðnoting€that€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€may€be€awarded€if€rehabilitation€is€not€feasible.€òòÔ_ÔCrabtreeÔ_Ôóó,€16€S.W.3dÐ ˆØ Ðat€360. Ñ ° Ñ ªÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€Supreme€Court€apparently€did€not€consider€the€difference€between€the€husbandððs€recentÐ ° Ðincome€($362,500€average€over€past€5€years)€and€the€estimated€potential€income€of€the€wife€($65,000Ð œì Є€$100,000)€in€determining€whether€Ms.€Crabtree€was€rehabilitatable,€instead€stating€that€she€wasÐ ˆØ Ðcapable€of€improving€her€earning€capacity€to€ð ða€reasonable€level.ðð€€We€note€however,€that€Ms.Ð tÄ ÐCrabtree€practiced€her€profession,€albeit€on€a€part„time€basis,€throughout€her€marriage. uÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€trial€court€awarded€rehabilitative€alimony€in€the€amount€of€$1700€per€month€for€fiveÐ ° Ðyears€to€be€followed€by€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€in€the€amount€of€$1200€per€month€until€the€wifeððs€deathÐ œì Ðor€remarriage. iÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔSince€the€statute€frames€the€question€as€whether€the€spouse€can€improve€his€or€her€earningÐ ° Ðcapacity€to€a€ð ðreasonable€level,ðð€we€think€the€partiesðð€expectations€that€both€would€share€in€theÐ œì Ðfinancial€benefits€of€one€spouse€building€a€career,€just€as€both€share€in€the€benefits€of€otherÐ ˆØ Ðcontributions€to€the€family,€are€relevant€to€the€determination€of€what€constitutes€a€ð ðreasonableðð€levelÐ tÄ Ðof€income.  >Ý ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔIn€defending€the€amount€of€the€award€(as€well€as€its€nature),€òòóóÔ‡XcŒXXXÔWife,€citing€the€trial€courtððsÐ ° Ðfinding€that€ð ðwife€would€not€be€seeking€a€divorce,€but€for€husbandððs€adultery,ðð€relies€upon€theÐ ° Ðprinciple,€reaffirmed€inòòóó€òòLong€v.€Longóó,Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ¿#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€that€an€innocent€spouse€should€not€be€left€in€a€worse€financialÐ  ð Ðcondition€than€that€he€or€she€had€ð ðbefore€the€opposite€partyððs€misconduct€brought€about€the€divorce.ððÐ à ÐòòLongóó,€968€S.W.2d€at€294€(quoting€òòAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€410„11)€(citation€omitted).Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒæ#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸Ô€€To€the€extentÐ €Ð Ðthat€Husband€was€at€fault€in€the€divorce,€the€court€has€discretion€to€provide€ð ðclosing€inðð€money€toÐ € Ð ÐWife.€€The€purpose€of€the€award€of€alimony€is€to€approach€equity€between€the€spouses,€however,€notÐ l ¼ Ðto€punish€Husband€for€his€post„separation€adultery.€€òòSee€Duncan€v.€Duncanóó,€686€S.W.2d€568,€572Ð X ¨ Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984);€òòLancaster€v.€Lancasteróó,€671€S.W.2d€501,€503€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984).€€Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸]#ÔOurÐ D ” Ðholding€herein€is€not€inconsistent€with€the€principles€espoused€by€Wife,€especially€in€view€of€theÐ 0 €  Ðlimited€resources€available.€ ÊÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXÔ€€In€addition,€the€record€indicates€Husbandððs€annual€income€exceeded€$60,000€in€each€of€theÐ ° Ðyears€1995,€1996,€and€1997.×Ã'f ×× C ×€€The€decrease€is€attributed€to€the€lost€opportunity€for€overtime€work.€Ð  ð ÐHusband€will€continue€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ{#Ôto€receive€certain€performance€bonuses€and,€in€fact,€received€such€bonusesÐ à Ðduring€the€first€six€months€of€the€year€of€the€divorce.€€Those€bonuses€were€included€in€the€figuresÐ à Ðused€to€estimate€his€divorce„year€income€at€$45,000.€€Ô‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔThus,€his€average€gross€income€for€the€yearÐ |Ì Ðof€the€divorce€(as€projected)€and€the€three€preceding€years€was€more€than€$58,000€per€year.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒç#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Ð | Ì ÐConsidering€Husbandððs€income€based€on€the€average€income€for€those€four€years,€as€the€trial€courtÐ l ¼ Ðimplicitly€did€in€setting€alimony,€€Husbandððs€gross€income€on€his€Income€and€Expense€StatementÐ \ ¬ Ðis€understated€by€$19,749€($1645€per€month).€€We€do€not€base€our€decision€on€an€average€income,Ð L œ Ðbut€base€it€on€the€projected€annual€salary€in€the€year€of€divorce,€$45,000.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÄ#Ô jÝ ƒ,$ÝÓ  ÓÑ @ ÑÑ@Ñà  àòòÚ  Ú10Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ_ÔThe€decrease€is€attributed€to€the€lost€opportunity€for€overtime€work.€€Husband€will€continueÐ ° Ðto€receive€certain€performance€bonuses€and,€in€fact,€received€such€bonuses€during€the€first€sixÐ œì Ðmonths€of€the€year€of€the€divorce.€€Those€bonuses€were€included€in€the€figures€used€to€estimate€hisÐ ˆØ Ðdivorce„year€income€at€$45,000.€€The€parties€agreed€to€set€child€support€on€the€basis€of€HusbandððsÐ tÄ Ðcurrent€actual€income.€(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý dT^yúÿ  <<= 8ÀÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿÿCÿÿ____3 TripledxdCTriple 1+| d d dÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑ  ÑÑ€‡ÑÑ€OaÑÔ‡¼<”»XXÔÔ‡¼a »»¼<”Ôà@ü ü ìàÔ#†XcŒX»¼a Z#ÔÔ‡î-˜îXXcŒÔIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@kk$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ Ü, ÐÔ#†XcŒXîî-˜Í#Ôà@‡‡"ìàÔ‡¼a »XXcŒÔMay€1999€SessionÔ#†XcŒX»¼a #ԈРX ÐÌò òÔ‡¼a »XXcŒÔÓ  ÓRICHARD€HAROLD€DEMPSEYòòóó€v.€SANDRA€MUSCAT€DEMPSEYòòóóÔ#†XcŒX»¼a û#Ôó óÐ  ` ÐÓÓÌà@Þ Þ ìàò òAppeal€from€the€Circuit€Court€for€Williamson€CountyˆÐ  h Ðà@ç ç ìàNo.€97555€€€€€€€Henry€Denmark€Bell,€Judgeó óˆÐ  X ÐÌÌà@ìì*ìàßA€Y) °°` d€÷E<×` A߈Ð Ø(  ÐÌà@v v ìàNo.€M1998„00972„Ô_ÔCOAÔ_Ô„R3„CV€„€Filed€Ô_ÔJuly€21,€2000Ô_ԈР×'  ÐÌßA€Y) °°` dE<¶` AßÐ ·  ÐÌÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒy#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÓ  ÓThis€appeal€involves€the€award€of€alimonyòòóó€and€the€division€of€one€particular€piece€of€maritalÐ ¶ Ðproperty€at€the€dissolution€of€a€nineteen€year€marriage.€€Mr.€Dempsey€appeals€the€award€of€alimonyÐ ¦ö Ðòòin€futuroóó€rather€than€rehabilitative€alimony,€the€amount€of€alimony€as€beyond€his€ability€to€pay,€andÐ –æ Ðthe€award€of€a€tax€refund€for€the€year€of€the€divorce€to€Ms.€Dempsey.€€We€modify€the€award€ofÐ †Ö Ðalimony€òòin€futuroóó€to€an€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€and€affirm€the€distribution€of€maritalÐ vÆ Ðproperty.Ð f¶ ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒÝ#ÔÓüÓÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌò òà@SSìàTenn.€R.€App.€P.€3€Appeal€as€of€Right;€Judgment€of€the€Circuit€CourtˆÐ F– Ðà@² ² ìàAffirmed€as€Modified€and€Remandedó óˆÐ 6† ÐÌPòòatriciaóó€J.€Còòottrellóó,€J.,€delivered€the€opinion€of€the€court,€in€which€òòBen€H.€Ô_ÔCantrellÔ_Ô,€Ô_ÔP.J.Ô_Ô,Ð f ÐM.S.,óó€and€òòWilliam€B.€Cain,€J.óó,€joined.Ð V ÐÌJames€L.€Curtis,€Nashville,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellant,€Richard€Harold€Dempsey.Ð æ6 ÐÌEdward€P.€Silva,€Franklin,€Tennessee,€for€the€appellee,€Sandra€Muscat€Dempsey.Ð Æ  ÐÌà@55'ìàò òOPINIONó óˆÐ ¦"ö! ÐÌòòóóÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ³#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÓ  Óà  àThis€appeal€involves€the€award€of€alimonyòòóó€and€the€division€of€one€particular€piece€of€maritalÐ †$Ö# Ðproperty€at€the€dissolution€of€a€nineteen€year€marriage.€€Mr.€Dempsey€(ð ðHusbandðð)€appeals€theÐ v%Æ $ Ðaward€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€rather€than€rehabilitative€alimony€and€the€award€of€the€entire€tax€refundÐ f&¶!% Ðto€Ms.€Dempsey€(ð ðWifeðð).€€For€the€following€reasons€we€affirm€the€trial€courtððs€order€as€modified.Ð V'¦"& ÐÓ  ÓÌI.Ð 6)†$( ÐÓå ÓÌà  àAt€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€partiesðð€two€children€were€thirteen€and€sixteen€years€old.€Ð +f&* ÐHusband,€41,€was€the€primary€breadwinner,€earning€between€$45,000€and€$65,000€depending€on€hisÐ ,V'+ Ðovertime€and€bonuses.€€Wife,€38,€did€not€work€outside€the€home€for€most€of€the€marriage,€but€hadÐ ö,F(, Ðbegun€to€work€part„time€in€the€last€few€years,€earning€between€$7.00€and€$8.00€per€hour.€€WifeÐ æ-6)-} ÐчÑâ âÑÑÑ  ÑÑ8€w¸XXdìdÈ8ÑÑ€ Ñâ âÑ  ÑÔ_Ôtestified€that€she€would€like€to€go€to€school,€but€couldnððt€afford€it.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ¿ #ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Wife€and€the€childrenÐ ° Ðaccompanied€Husband€to€Tennessee€in€1994€when€he€moved€from€Michigan€to€work€for€Saturn.€€TheÐ  ð Ðparties€purchased€a€four€bedroom€house€in€Franklin,€valued€by€them€at€the€time€of€trial€at€$190,000,Ð à Ðbut€encumbered€by€two€mortgages€totaling€$104,709.€€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€the€parties€wereÐ €Ð Ðliving€in€separate€parts€of€the€marital€home,€but€Husband€planned€to€get€an€apartment€after€theÐ pÀ Ðproperty€was€divided.Ð ` ° ÐÌà  àThe€parties€filed€separate€petitions€for€divorce,€each€alleging€irreconcilable€differences€andÐ @  Ðinappropriate€marital€conduct.€€At€trial,€Wife€moved€to€include€adultery€as€grounds€for€divorce.€€TheÐ 0 € Ðcourt€consolidated€the€cases,€heard€the€evidence€and€granted€Wife€a€divorce€on€grounds€ofÐ  p  ÐHusbandððs€post„separation€adultery.€€The€court€awarded€sole€custody€of€the€children€to€Wife€withÐ `  Ðstandard€visitation€to€Husband.€€The€court€ordered€Husband€to€pay€$780€per€month€as€child€support.€Ð P  Ðò òó óThe€court€then€ordered€Husband€to€pay€Wife€$700€per€month€as€alimony€òòin€futuroóó,€continuing€ð ðuntilÐ ð@  Ðthe€death€or€remarriage€of€Mrs.€Dempsey.ðð€Ð à0  ÐÌà  àThe€court€equally€divided€the€stock,€savings€bonds€and€vested€retirement€benefitsÐ À Ðaccumulated€during€the€marriage.€€The€marital€home€was€ordered€to€be€retained€by€the€parties€asÐ ° Ðð ðtenants€in€common€in€equal€shares€subject€to€wifeððs€right€of€exclusive€occupancy€until€the€partiesððÐ  ð Ðyounger€child€attains€the€age€of€majority€[or]€wife€remarries,€whichever€first€occurs.ðð€€Wife€wasÐ à Ðmade€responsible€for€the€first€mortgage,€as€well€as€the€taxes€and€insurance.€€Husband€was€orderedÐ €Ð Ðto€make€ð ðsuch€payments€on€the€€second€mortgage€debt€as€necessary€to€prevent€foreclosure.ððÐ pÀ ÐÌà  àHusband€retained€his€truck,€valued€at€$9,000,€and€Wife€retained€her€car,€valued€at€$500.€Ð P  ÐHusband€was€ordered€to€pay€all€marital€debts,€except€the€first€mortgage.€€He€was€also€ordered€to€payÐ @ Ð$2,500€toward€Wifeððs€attorney€fees.€€The€court€awarded€Wife€the€1997€tax€refund€of€$3,448€ð ðto€beÐ 0€ Ðutilized€in€purchasing€a€substitute€vehicle€for€Mrs.€Dempsey.ðð€Ð  p ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà@‘‘)ìàII.ˆÐ P ÐÌà  àHusband€appeals€the€award€of€alimonyòòóó€and€the€award€of€the€entire€tax€refund€to€Wife.€€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ*#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔOurÐ à0 Ðreview€is€òòde€novo€óóand€the€record€before€us€is€accompanied€by€a€presumption€of€correctness€whichÐ Ð  Ðwe€must€honor€unless€we€find€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trial€court's€findings€ofÐ À! Ðfact.€€òòSee€óóTenn.€R.€App.€P.€13(d);€òòUnion€Carbide€Corp.€v.€Huddleston,óó€854€S.W.2d€87,€91€(Tenn.Ð °"  Ð1993).€€The€trial€court€has€wide€discretion€in€the€matters€under€review,€alimony€and€the€division€ofÐ  #ð! Ðmarital€property.€òò€See€Harrington€v.€Harrington,óó€798€S.W.2d€244,€245€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).Ð $à" ÐÓ  ÓÌIII.€The€Alimony€AwardÐ p&À!$ ÐÓ—ÓÌà  àHusband€first€challenges€the€award€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€and€argues€that€the€trial€court€erredÐ P( #& Ðin€failing€to€consider€whether€Wife€could€be€rehabilitated€in€light€of€the€legislative€preference€forÐ @)$' Ðrehabilitative€alimony€codified€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€(1996).€€He€also€argues€that€theÐ 0*€%( Ðtrial€court€erred€in€considering€only€Wifeððs€need€for€alimony,€but€not€his€ability€to€pay.€€Wife€pointsÐ  +p&) Ðto€Husbandððs€fault€and€responds€that,€as€the€innocent€spouse,€she€should€not€be€left€in€a€worseÐ ,`'* Ðfinancial€position€than€she€enjoyed€during€the€marriage.Ð ° ÐÌÓ  ÓA.€The€Type€of€AlimonyÐ à ÐÓà ÓÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒG#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà  àTennessee€law€provides€for€three€types€of€spousal€support:€(1)€rehabilitative€alimony,€whichÐ pÀ Ðprovides€modifiable,€temporary€support€for€a€period€of€adjustment€sufficient€to€enable€a€dependentÐ ` ° Ðspouse€to€become€partially€or€totally€self„sufficient;€(2)€periodic€alimony€or€alimony€òòin€futuroóó,€aÐ P   Ðcontinuing,€but€modifiable,€support€obligation€to€an€economically€disadvantaged€spouse;€and€(3)Ð @  Ðalimony€òòin€solidoóó,€an€unmodifiable€lump€sum€award€which€may€be€paid€over€time.€€òòSee€óóTenn.€CodeÐ 0 € ÐAnn.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€(Supp.€1999);€òòsee€also€Loria€v.€Loriaóó,€952€S.W.2d€836,€838€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð  p  Ð1997).€€The€legislatureððs€stated€preference€is€for€rehabilitative€alimony€whenever€possible.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒJ!#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€€òòSeeÐ `  ÐóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ"%#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô.Ð P  ÐÌà  àOur€Supreme€Court€has€addressed€the€statutes€on€alimony€a€number€of€times,€€most€recentlyÐ à0  Ðstating:Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àInòò€Self,óó€we€held€that€ðð€36„5„101€reflects€an€obvious€legislative€policy€to€eliminate€theÐ ° Ðdependency€of€one€ex„spouse€upon€the€other€and€to€relieve€the€parties€ofÐ  ð Ðð ðimpediments€incident€to€the€dissolved€marriage.ððòòóó€Accordingly,€alimony€òòin€futuroóóÐ à Ðshould€be€awarded€only€when€the€trial€court€finds€that€ð ðeconomic€rehabilitation€is€notÐ €Ð Ðfeasible€and€long„term€support€is€necessary.ððòòóóÐpÀÐ Ð  ÐÌòòCrabtree€v.€Crabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€356,€359€(Tenn.€2000)€(quoting€òòSelf€v.€Selfóó,€861€S.W.2d€360,€361Ð P  Ð(Tenn.€1993)€(citations€omitted).Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ§%#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ @ ÐÌÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒT)#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸Ôà  àThus,€one€task€of€a€trial€court€in€deciding€what€type€of€spousal€support,€if€any,€should€beÐ  p Ðawarded€is€to€determine€whether€rehabilitation€of€the€economically€disadvantaged€spouse€is€feasible.€Ð  \ ÐThe€question€raised€in€this€case,€however,€is€the€proper€measure€of€economic€rehabilitation€to€be€Ð øH Ðused€in€determining€if€the€disadvantaged€spouseððs€attainment€of€that€level€is€feasible.€€The€issue€isÐ ä4 Ðsquarely€presented€herein.Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸¬)#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôòòóó€€In€making€his€argument€that€Wife€can€be€rehabilitated,€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒò+#ÔHusband€pointsÐ Ð  ÐÑOaÑâ âѰ°Ñâ âÑ  Ñto€the€trial€courtððs€remark,€ð ðI€think€she€certainly€is€not€unrehabilitatable.ðð€€That€remark,€however,Ð ° Ðmust€be€considered€in€its€context.€€At€that€point€in€the€trial,€the€court€was€considering€the€disparityÐ œì Ðin€the€partiesðð€earning€capacities.€€The€court€said,€Ð ˆØ ÐÌÒܰÒà8  à...where€you€had€a€disparity€in€income,€which€youððve€got€here,€assuming€she€staysÐ `° Ðat€seven€an€hour,€which€I€think€for€the€foreseeable€future€you€canððt€concludeÐ L œ Ðanything€else,€although€I€think€she€certainly€is€not€unrehabilitatable€to€get€betterÐ 8 ˆ Ðstatus€than€that,€but€in€any€event,€heððs€ð!ð€if€she€makes€$7.00€an€hour€and€he€makesÐ $ t Ðhis€base€and€nothing€else,€thereððs€still€a€big€disparity.€Ô‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôò òó ó€Ð `¤¤ ÐÒ°Ü(.ÒÌà  àThe€courtððs€remark€about€Wifeððs€possible€rehabilitation€clearly€meant€that€he€thought€it€wasÐ P  Ðpossible€that€Wife€could€earn€more€than€she€was€making€at€the€time,€not€that€she€could€earn€a€salaryÐ ð@  Ðcomparable€to€Husbandððs.€€Wife,€still€young€and€having€a€desire€to€go€back€to€school,€can€likely€earnÐ à0  Ðmore€than€she€was€making€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€The€level€of€her€potential€earnings€is€less€clear,Ð Ð  Ðand€there€is€no€indication€that€she€could€be€rehabilitated€to€earn€a€salary€comparable€to€the€$45,000Ð À  Ðto€$60,000€that€Husband€earned€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€Wife€did€not€work€outside€the€homeÐ ° Ðduring€most€of€the€almost€nineteen€year€marriage,€while€Husbandððs€earnings€reflect€his€workÐ  ð Ðexperience€gained€during€that€time.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ#0#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔÐ à ÐÌà  àConsideration€of€the€economic€level€to€be€used€to€determine€feasibility€of€rehabilitation€hasÐ l¼ Ðnot€been€squarely€addressed€in€most€instances.€€Instructive,€however,€are€statements€by€our€courtsÐ X¨ Ðon€the€goals€of€rehabilitative€support.Ð D” ÐÌòòÔ#†Xw¸XXXw¸4#Ôà8  àà8` Ð Ð àóóThe€concept€of€rehabilitation€in€ordinary€usage€ð ðinvolves€the€processÐ l Ðof€restoring€an€individual€.€.€.€to€a€useful€and€constructive€place€inÐ X Ðsociety€through€some€form€of€vocational€.€.€.€retraining€or€throughÐ ôD Ðrelief,€financial€aid,€or€other€reconstructive€measure.ðð€€WebsterððsÐ à0 ÐThird€New€International€Dictionary€1949€(1961).€€In€legal€parlanceÐ Ì Ðand€in€connection€with€alimony,€rehabilitation€ð ðcontemplates€sumsÐ ¸ Ðnecessary€to€assist€a€divorced€person€in€regaining€a€useful€andÐ ¤ô Ðconstructive€role€in€society€through€vocational€or€therapeutic€trainingÐ  à Ðor€retraining€and€for€the€further€purpose€of€preventing€financialÐ |!Ì Ðhardship€on€society€or€individual€during€the€rehabilitative€process.ðð€Ð h"¸  ÐBlackððs€Law€Dictionary€1157€(5òòthóó€ed.€1979).€€Both€definitionsÐ T#¤! Ðcontemplate€the€enhancement€of€an€individualððs€capacity€to€functionÐ @$" Ðindependently€and€with€economic€security€in€society.€€Likewise,€theÐ ,%| # Ðstatute€in€question€expresses€the€General€Assemblyððs€intent€that€theÐ &h!$ Ðeconomically€disadvantaged€spouse€be€rehabilitated€wheneverÐ 'T"% Ðpossible€and€provides€guidelines€for€the€court€to€consider€whenÐ ð'@#& Ðð ðdetermining€the€nature,€amount,€length€of€term,€and€manner€ofÐ Ü(,$' Ðpayment.ðð€€ò òThe€concept€of€rehabilitation€in€the€statute€is€theÐ È)%( Ðimprovement€of€oneððs€present€and€future€capacity€to€functionÐ ¸*&) Ðindependently€in€society.€ó óФ+ô&*` x` x ÐòòÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔIsbell€v.€Isbell,óó€816€S.W.2d€735,€738„39€(Tenn.€1991)€(emphasis€added).€€Rehabilitative€alimony€hasÐ ° Ðalso€been€described€as€providing€ð ða€temporary€income€during€a€period€of€adjustment€and€effort€ofÐ œì Ðthe€dependent€spouse€to€become€partially€or€totally€self„sufficient.ðð€òòLoria,€óó952€S.W.2dòò€óóat€838.Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸™<#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔÐ ˆØ ÐÌà  àThe€statute€establishing€the€legislative€preference€for€rehabilitative€support€does€not€defineÐ `° Ðrehabilitation€and€gives€little€guidance€regarding€the€level€of€rehabilitation€which€should€beÐ L œ Ðconsidered€in€determining€whether€rehabilitation€is€feasible.€€However,€the€legislature€has€directedÐ 8 ˆ Ðthat€ð ðin€determining€whether€the€granting€of€an€order€for€payment€of€support€and€maintenance€to€aÐ $ t Ðparty€is€appropriate,€and€in€determining€the€nature,€amount,€length€of€term,€and€manner€of€payment,Ð  ` Ðthe€court€shall€consider€all€relevant€factors,€including:Ð ü L  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð à(B)€€The€relative€education€and€training€of€each€party,€the€ability€andÐ Ô$  Ðopportunity€of€each€party€to€secure€such€education€and€training,€andÐ À  Ðthe€necessity€of€a€party€to€secure€further€education€and€training€toÐ ¬ü  Ðò òimprove€such€partyððs€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level;ó óИè ` x` x ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸<>#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔððÔ#†Xw¸XXXw¸âB#Ô€36„5„101(d)(1)€(emphasis€added).Ð pÀ ÐÌà  àThus,€a€court€should€determine€whether€it€is€feasible€for€a€disadvantaged€spouse€to€improveÐ H˜ Ðhis€or€her€earning€capacity€to€a€ð ðreasonable€level.ðð€€Whether€that€ð ðreasonable€levelðð€is€related€to€theÐ 4„ Ðstandard€of€living€prior€to€the€divorce€or€to€the€other€spouseððs€earning€capacity€is€not€well„settled.Ô‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ׀Р p ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒÌD#ÔIn€some€cases,€the€courts€have€considered€the€appropriateness€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€where€theÐ  \ Ðdisadvantaged€spouse€was€not€capable€of€rehabilitation€such€that€his€or€her€earning€capacity€wouldÐ øH Ðbe€comparable€to€the€other€spouseððs€or€could€support€a€standard€of€living€approaching€that€enjoyedÐ ä4 Ðduring€the€marriage.€€For€example,€in€òòLong€v.€Longóó,€968€S.W.€2d€292€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1997),€thisÐ Ð  Ðcourt€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€on€the€basis€of€a€twenty„seven€yearÐ ¼  Ðmarriage,€during€which€the€husband€was€ð ðbuilding€a€career€outside€the€home,ðð€the€wifeððs€lack€of€aÐ ¨ø Ðcollege€education€and€very€limited€work€experience€outside€the€home,€and€the€wifeððs€medicalÐ ”ä Ðproblems.€€òòLongóó,€968€S.W.2d€at€294.€€The€court€further€found:Ð €Ð ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð àThe€record€clearly€shows€that€the€wife€is€a€disadvantaged€spouse€andÐ X ¨ Ðthat€rehabilitative€alimony€is€not€feasible€because€of€her€lack€of€workÐ D!” Ðexperience€and€her€medical€problems.€€ò òIt€is€unlikely€that€she€willÐ 0"€  Ðever€be€able€to€approach€the€level€of€income€which€her€husbandÐ  #p! Ðis€able€to€enjoy.ó ó€€We€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€alimony€òòin€futuroóóÐ  $\" Ðawarded€to€Ms.€Long€is€necessary€for€her€to€continue€to€maintain€aÐ ü$L # Ðreasonable€standard€of€living€which€is€at€least€ò òsomewhat€comparableÐ è%8!$ Ðto€that€which€she€experienced€before€the€breakup€of€herÐ Ø&("% Ðmarriage.ó ó€€Thus,€we€reject€the€husbandððs€challenge€to€the€trial€courtððsÐ ° Ðaward€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó.Рð` x` x ÐòòÌIdóó.€at€295€(emphasis€added);€òòsee€alsoò òó óóó€òòElkins€v.€Elkinsóó,€No.€03A01„9812„CH„00415,€1999€WLÐ xÈ Ð1076940€at€*3€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Nov.€30,€1999)€(perm.€app.€denied€July€10,€2000)ò ò.ó ó€Ô‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ d´ ÐÌà  àAnalogously,€our€Supreme€Court€has€directed€that,€ð ðWhile€alimony€is€not€intended€to€provideÐ D ” Ða€former€spouse€with€relative€financial€ease,€we€stress€that€alimony€should€be€awarded€in€such€a€wayÐ 4 „ Ðthat€ò òthe€spouses€approach€equityó ó.ðð€€òòAaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€408,€411€(Tenn.€1995)€(emphasisÐ $ t Ðadded)Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒƒM#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô,€òòsee€also€óóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d)(1)€(directing€that€the€court€consider€the€recipientÐ  d  Ðspouseððs€economic€disadvantage€ð ðrelative€to€the€other€spouseðð).Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ[O#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ T  ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ_P#ÔÌà  àThere€are€also€a€number€of€cases€finding€rehabilitation€to€be€feasible€or€not€feasible€without€Ð à0  Ðexpress€discussion€of€the€level€of€economic€rehabilitation€that€the€disadvantaged€spouse€wasÐ Ì  Ðexpected€to€achieve.€€òòSee,€e.g.€Goodman€v.€Goodmanóó,€8€S.W.3d€289,€293€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1999)Ð ¸  Ð(rehabilitation€not€feasible);€òòAnderton€v.€Andertonóó,€988€S.W.2d€675,€682„83ò òó ó€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998)Ð ¤ô  Ð(rehabilitation€feasible);€òòKincaid€v.€Kincaidóó,€912€S.W.2d€140,€144€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1995)Ð à Ð(rehabilitation€feasible);€€òòsee€alsoóó€Janet€L.€Richards,€Richards€on€Tennessee€Family€Law€ðð€12„4(a)Ð |Ì Ð(Supp.€2000)€(questioning€whether€the€òòLoriaóó€meant€ð ðnot€qualifying€for€welfareðð€or€ð ða€comparisonÐ h¸ Ðbetween€the€relative€economic€positions€of€the€partiesðð€when€it€discussed€ð ðself€sufficiencyðð€for€theÐ T¤ Ðdependent€spouse).òò€óó€In€a€recent€opinion,€however,€the€Supreme€Court€has€addressed€the€topic€ofÐ @ Ðrehabilitative€alimony€and,€although€not€addressing€the€specific€issue€under€discussion,€€provided€Ð ,| Ðguidance€applicable€herein.€€In€òòCrabtreeóó,€the€Court€vacated€an€award€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€inÐ h Ðconjunction€with€an€award€ofòòóó€rehabilitative€alimony.€€òòSee€Crabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€at€361.€€In€reviewingÐ T Ðthis€courtððs€ruling€in€the€case,€the€Supreme€Court€stated:Ð ð@ ÐÌà8  àIn€this€case,€the€Court€of€Appeals€recognized€that€the€award€of€rehabilitative€alimonyÐ È Ðwould€assist€Ms.€Crabtree€in€realizing€her€full€economic€potential.€€The€intermediateÐ ´ Ðappellate€court,€however,€was€concerned€that€rehabilitative€alimony€would:РðÐ Ð  ÐÌà8  àà8` Ð Ð ànot€place€her€anywhere€near€an€equal€footing€with€Husband€nor€willÐ x È Ðshe€be€able€to€continue€living€in€the€manner€in€which€she€had€becomeÐ d!´ Ðaccustomed€during€this€twenty„three€year€marriage.€€The€award€ofÐ P"   Ðalimony€òòin€futuroóó€will€further€assist€her€in€this€regard€and€provide€herÐ <#Œ! Ðwith€ð ðclosing€inðð€money.€€€Ð($x"` x` x ÐÌà8  àThe€court€cited€òòAaron€v.€Aaronóó,€909€S.W.€2d€408,€411€(Tenn.€1995),€in€support€ofÐ &P!$ Ðits€conclusion.Ðì&<"%Ð Ð  ÐÌà8  àWe€believe€that€the€Court€of€Appealsðð€reliance€on€òòAaronóó€was€misplaced.€€In€òòAaronóóÐ Ä($' Ðthis€Court€awarded€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€to€a€homemaker€with€a€high€school€educationÐ °)%( Ðwho€had€never€worked€outside€the€home.€€This€Court€noted€that€although€the€awardÐ œ*ì%) Ðwould€ð ðnot€put€her€in€the€same€position€in€which€she€was€prior€to€the€divorce,€it€willÐ ˆ+Ø&* Ðprovide€her€with€ððclosing€inðð€money;€that€is€she€will€be€enabled€to€more€closelyÐ ° Ðapproach€her€former€economic€position.ðð€€òòAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€411.€€This€statement,Ð œì Ðhowever,€was€intended€neither€to€provide€a€new€standard€for€awarding€alimony€norÐ ˆØ Ðto€suggest€that€every€spouse€should€be€entitled€to€be€placed€in€the€same€financialÐ tÄ Ðcondition€occupied€prior€to€the€divorce.€€òòAaronóó€merely€acknowledged€that,€whereÐ `° Ðrehabilitation€is€òònotóó€feasible,€an€award€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€will€not€always€beÐ L œ Ðsufficient€to€place€a€disadvantaged€spouse€in€the€financial€position€occupied€pre„Ð 8 ˆ Ðdivorce.Ð$ tÐ Ð  ÐÌÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔòòId.€óóat€359„60.Ð ü L  ÐÌà  àIn€its€primary€holding€in€òòCrabtreeóó,€the€Supreme€Court€held€that€a€concurrent€award€of€bothÐ Ü,  Ðalimony€òòin€futuroóó€and€rehabilitative€alimony׃ ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú3Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€is€inconsistent,€stressing€that€the€trial€court€must€makeÐ Ì  Ðan€initial€award€of€one€or€the€other,׃T×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú4Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€based€upon€the€partiesðð€circumstances.Ð ¼  ÐÌà8  àAt€the€time€of€the€decree,€a€trial€court€must€necessarily€find€that€the€recipient€ofÐ œì  Ðalimony€either€can€be€or€cannot€be€rehabilitated€although€that€determination€isÐ ŒÜ Ðsubject€to€later€modification.€€Allowing€concurrent€awards€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€andÐ |Ì Ðrehabilitative€alimony€would€require€a€trial€court€to€engage€in€an€act€of€clairvoyance.€Ð l¼ ÐThe€trial€court€would€not€only€be€required€to€anticipate€the€duration€necessary€forÐ \¬ Ðrehabilitation€but€would€also€be€required€to€anticipate€the€future€needs€of€a€spouseÐ Lœ Ðwho,€it€has€been€determined,€can€be€rehabilitated.Ð<ŒÐ Ð  ÐÌòòIdóó.€at€360.Ð l ÐÌà  àWhile€declaring€that€a€court€must€at€the€time€of€the€initial€setting€of€spousal€supportÐ üL Ðdetermine€if€an€economically€disadvantaged€spouse€can€be€rehabilitated,€the€Court€did€not€directlyÐ ì< Ðaddress€the€measure€a€trial€court€must€use€in€making€that€determination€(e.g.,€able€to€maintainÐ Ü, Ðoneself€at€least€minimally€or€able€to€maintain€a€standard€of€living€roughly€comparable€to€the€pre„Ð Ì Ðdivorce€standard€or€that€enjoyed€by€the€non„disadvantaged€spouse.)€€€However,€the€Courtððs€reviewÐ ¼  Ðof€the€feasibility€of€rehabilitation€by€Ms.€Crabtree€provides€some€insight€into€that€question.€€Ð ¬ ü ÐÌà  àThe€Court€approved€the€trial€courtððs€recognition€that€Ms.€Crabtreeððs€rehabilitation€wasÐ Œ"Ü  Ðfeasible.€€Ms.€Crabtree€was€a€43€year€old€college€graduate€who€was€a€certified€public€accountant.€Ð ° ÐAfter€working€for€a€large€accounting€firm€for€two€years€after€graduation,€€she€left€to€start€a€familyÐ  ð Ðand€had€worked€only€part„time€during€most€of€the€marriage,€presumably€€in€order€to€devote€moreÐ à Ðtime€to€the€household€and€the€children.€€It€was€estimated€that€her€earning€capacity€if€she€worked€full„Ð €Ð Ðtime€would€be€between€$65,000€and€$100,000€annually,€and€the€court€noted€that€her€youngest€childððsÐ pÀ Ðgraduation€from€high€school€would€diminish€Ms.€Crabtreeððs€need€to€work€part„time.€The€CourtÐ ` ° Ðspecifically€noted€that,€ð ðthere€has€been€no€testimony€that€Ms.€Crabtree€will€need€further€training€toÐ P   Ðððimprove€[her]€earning€capacity€to€a€reasonable€level,ðððð€òòId.óó€at€360€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒg_#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô(citing€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð36„5„Ð @  Ð101(d)(1)(B)).€€òòóó€Mr.€Crabtreeððs€income€as€a€stockbroker€had€varied€in€the€six€years€prior€to€divorce,Ð 0 € Ðwith€the€last€five€years€ranging€from€$254,437€to€$417,034.€€The€Court€reversed€the€award€ofÐ  p  Ðalimony€òòin€futuroóó€and€affirmed€the€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€for€five€years,€but€increased€theÐ `  Ðamount€of€the€rehabilitative€alimony€to€ð ðassist€Ms.€Crabtree€in€making€the€transition€from€part„timeÐ P  Ðto€full„time€employment€before€her€alimony€is€scheduled€to€end.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€361.Ð ð@  ÐÌà  àThe€trial€court€herein€made€no€explicit€finding€as€to€the€feasibility€of€Wifeððs€rehabilitationÐ Ð  Ðin€its€award€of€alimony.€Based€upon€the€courtððs€comments€quoted€above,€however,€we€believe€thatÐ À Ðimplicit€in€the€courtððs€holding€is€a€finding€that€rehabilitation€of€Wife€to€a€level€of€self„sufficiencyÐ ° Ðthat€ð ðapproaches€equityðð€with€Husbandððs€economic€position€is€not€feasible.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÁk#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ_p#ÔÔ‡ XcŒXXXw¸ÔThe€trial€court's€failureÐ  ð Ðto€make€a€specific€finding€regarding€that€issue€does€not€preclude€our€review.òò€€See,€e.g.,€Crabtreeóó,€16Ð à ÐS.W.3d€at€360òò;€Storey€v.€Storeyóó,€835€S.W.2d€593,€597€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.1992).Ô#†Xw¸XX XcŒ¢p#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Ð €Ð ÐÌà  àWife,€at€thirty„eight€years€old,€had€a€high€school€education.€At€the€time€of€the€divorce,€theÐ `° Ðpartiesðð€two€children€were€thirteen€and€sixteen€years€old.€€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒãq#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Wife€did€not€work€outside€the€home€untilÐ P  Ðshortly€before€the€divorce,€and€then€worked€part„time€for€$7.00€to€$8.00€per€hour.€€She€claimed€toÐ @ Ðhave€no€skills€other€than€those€needed€in€her€current€job€in€food€services,€but€said€she€was€a€ð ðpeopleÐ 0€ Ðpersonðð€and€ð ðgood€on€the€phone.ðð€€She€was€in€good€health€and€stated€that€she€would€like€to€go€toÐ  p Ðschool,€but€couldnððt€afford€it.€€Her€stated€intent€was€to€work€full„time€once€school€started€in€the€fall.Ð ` ÐÌà  àHusband€at€forty„one€years€old,€also€had€a€high€school€education.€€He€earned€in€excess€ofÐ ð@ Ð$60,000€the€three€years€preceding€the€divorce.€€At€the€time€of€the€trial,€in€July€1998,€HusbandððsÐ à0 Ðearnings€for€that€year€were€projected€at€about€$45,000.€€The€decrease€in€salary€was€explained€as€anÐ Ð  Ðinvoluntary€reduction€in€overtime.Ð À! ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒùr#ÔòòÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà  àÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒw#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔóóAs€in€òòAaron€óóandòò€Long,óó€but€unlike€the€disadvantaged€spouse€in€òòCrabtreeóó,€Wifeððs€earningÐ  #ð! Ðpotential€is€limited€by€her€lack€of€higher€education€and€her€lack€of€significant€experience.€€NeitherÐ $à" Ðher€health€nor€her€age€would€prevent€her€from€becoming€more€self„sufficient€through€either€full„timeÐ €%Ð # Ðwork€and€the€experience€gained€thereby€or€through€further€education€or€training.€€At€the€time€of€theÐ p&À!$ Ðdivorce,€Husband€and€Wife,€although€possessing€similar€educational€backgrounds,€had€òòóóÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒbw#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôvery€differentÐ `'°"% Ðearning€capacities€because€Husband€had€been€ð ðbuilding€a€career€outside€the€homeðð€for€nineteen€yearsÐ P( #& Ðwhile€Wife€had€contributed€to€the€marriage€by€taking€care€of€the€household€and€the€children.€€TheÐ @)$' Ðâ âholding€in€òòCrabtreeóó€indicates€that€this€differential€is€not€relevant€to€the€question€of€the€feasibility€ofÐ 0*€%( Ðrehabilitation,׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú5Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€at€least€at€the€time€of€the€initial€determination€of€whether€rehabilitation€is€feasible.׃!,×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú6Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ° Ðâ âÌà  àBased€upon€the€statutory€preference€for€rehabilitative€alimony€and€the€manner€in€which€theÐ à ÐSupreme€Court€applied€that€preference€in€òòCrabtreeóó,€we€are€of€the€opinion€that€an€award€ofÐ €Ð Ðrehabilitative€alimony,€rather€than€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€is€appropriate€in€this€case.€€We€cannot€presumeÐ pÀ Ðthat€it€is€not€feasible€that€Wife,€with€training€and/or€work€experience,€can€improve€her€earningÐ ` ° Ðcapacity€to€a€ð ðreasonable€level.ðð€€Her€age,€health,€and€desire€to€work€full„time€and/or€go€to€schoolÐ P   Ðare€factors€supporting€the€feasibility€of€rehabilitation.Ð @  ÐÌà  àAs€the€Supreme€Court€noted€in€òòCrabtreeóó,€an€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€remains€ð ðin€theÐ  p  Ðcourtððs€control€for€the€duration€of€such€award,€and€may€be€increased,€decreased,€terminated,Ð `  Ðextended,€or€otherwise€modified,€upon€a€showing€of€substantial€and€material€change€inÐ P  Ðcircumstances.ðð€€òòCrabtreeóó,€16€S.W.3d€at€359€(quoting€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒìy#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔÔ‡¼<”»XXw¸ÔððÔ#†¼<”»»¼<”d#ÔÔ#†Xw¸X»¼<”ƒ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€36„5„101(d)(2)).€€TheÐ ð@  ÐSupreme€Court€stated,€ð ðat€the€time€of€the€decree,€a€trial€court€must€necessarily€find€that€the€recipientÐ ^  Ðof€the€alimony€either€can€be€or€cannot€be€rehabilitated€ò òalthough€that€determination€is€subject€toÐ þN  Ðlater€modificationó ó.ðð€òòId.óó€at€360€(emphasis€added).€€We€take€this€language€to€mean€that€ifÐ î> Ðcircumstances€develop€that€Wife€is€unable€during€the€duration€of€the€rehabilitative€alimony€awardÐ Þ. Ðto€increase€her€earning€potential€to€a€reasonable€level,€the€court€could€then€revisit€the€issue€ofÐ Î Ðwhether€rehabilitation€was,€in€fact,€feasibleòòóó.€€òòSee€Loriaóó,€952€S.W.2d€at€840.Ð ¾ ÐÌà  àAccordingly,€the€award€of€alimony€òòin€futuroóó€is€vacated,€and€Wife€is€awarded€rehabilitativeÐ žî Ðalimony€for€six€years€from€the€date€of€the€final€decree€of€divorce.€€By€the€end€of€that€time,€theÐ ŽÞ Ðyoungest€child€will€have€attained€majority,€and€Wife€will€have€had€time€to€pursue€additionalÐ ~Î Ðeducation€and/or€to€establish€a€full„time€work€history.€€This€award€of€rehabilitative€alimony€requiresÐ n¾ ÐWife€to€attempt€to€increase€her€earning€potential€during€its€duration.€€At€the€same€time,€however,€sheÐ ^® Ðwill€also€need€to€increase€her€actual€earnings€in€order€to€maintain€a€standard€of€living€close€to€thatÐ Nž Ðshe€enjoyed€at€the€time€of€the€divorce.€€As€we€discuss€below,€we€recognize€that€€the€parties€can€notÐ >Ž Ðmaintain€two€separate€households€on€the€same€income€they€used€to€support€one.Ð .~ ÐÌÐ  ^ ЇÓ  ÓB.Ð ° ÐÓψÓà  àHusband€also€challenges€the€amount€of€the€alimony€award,€arguing€that€the€court€consideredÐ  ð ÐWifeððs€need€but€did€not€consider€his€ability€to€pay€in€setting€the€amount.€€A€court€must€considerÐ à Ðseveral€factors€in€setting€the€amount€and€manner€of€payment€of€any€spousal€support€awarded.׃×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú7Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒì#ÔòòóóÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€€òòSeeÐ €Ð ÐóóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d).€€ð ðThe€real€need€of€the€spouse€seeking€support€is€the€single€mostÐ pÀ Ðimportant€factor.ðð€€òòAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€410;òò€see€also€Cranford€v.€Cranfordóó,€772€S.W.2d€48,€50Ð ` ° Ð(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1989).€€In€addition€to€the€disadvantaged€spouseððs€need,€ð ðcourts€most€often€considerÐ P   Ðthe€ability€of€the€obligor€spouse€to€provide€support.ðð€€òòAaronóó,€909€S.W.2d€at€410;€òòCranfordóó,€772Ð @  ÐS.W.2d€at€50.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÍŠ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ9#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ 0 € Ðò òó óÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ|#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà  àWifeððs€Income€and€Expense€statement€indicated€that€her€monthly€expenses€were€$2,160.53.€Ð `  ÐHer€monthly€income€from€her€part„time€employment€averaged€almost€$600.€€The€court€ordered€childÐ P  Ðsupport€at€$780€per€month.€€The€money€Wife€needed€to€maintain€the€same€standard€of€living€asÐ ð@  Ðbefore€the€divorce€was,€then,€approximately€$780€€per€month.€€The€court€awarded€her€$700€perÐ à0  Ðmonth€as€alimonyòòóó.€€It€seems€clear,€then,€that€the€court€considered€Wifeððs€need€and€her€standard€ofÐ Ð  Ðliving€at€the€time€of€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÙ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔtheÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ„#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€divorce€in€making€its€award€and€provided€alimony€sufficientÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒÉ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€for€her€toÐ À Ðmaintain€that€lifestyle.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒG‘#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô׃$×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú8Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×Ð ° ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒÁ‘#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà  àÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒk’#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔHusbandððs€Income€and€Expense€Statement€indicates€that€his€monthly€expenses,€not€includingÐ à Ðalimony,€exceed€his€monthly€income€by€$850.€€In€other€words,€Husband€argues€that€he€is€unable€toÐ €Ð Ðsupport€himself,€pay€child€support,€and€pay€the€debts€assigned€to€him€even€if€he€were€required€to€payÐ pÀ Ðno€alimony.€€A€review€of€Husbandððs€expenses€reveals€his€inclusion€of€expenses€that€ended€shortlyÐ ` ° Ðafter€the€conclusion€of€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒº’#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔtheÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒì”#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€trial,€however.€€His€child€support€obligation€for€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ1•#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔtheÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ¦•#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€older€child€was€to€endÐ P   Ðshortly€after€this€case€was€appealed,€and€the€expenses€for€younger€childððs€bedroom€furniture€requiredÐ @  Ðonly€three€more€monthly€payments€at€the€time€of€the€trial.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒë•#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ—#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôò òó ó€In€addition,€his€responsibility€for€theÐ 0 € Ðpartiesðð€join€credit€card€debt€of€$800€is€a€temporary€obligation.€€When€those€three€expenses€areÐ  p  Ðsubtracted€from€his€total,€Husbandððs€expenses€will€decrease€by€approximately€$355€per€month.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒS—#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ `  ÐÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ°˜#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÌà  àHusbandððs€expenses,€with€the€€above€mentioned€obligations€subtracted,€still€exceed€his€statedÐ ð@  Ðincome.€€However,€Husbandððs€figures€are€based€on€a€gross€semi„monthly€income€figure€whichÐ à0  Ðcalculates€to€$38,251€per€year,€in€spite€of€the€fact€that€his€earnings€statement€for€January€throughÐ Ð  ÐJune€of€1998€reflect€a€figure€which€would€result€in€projected€annual€gross€income€of€$45,487.20.€Ð À ÐUsing€this€amount,€Husbandððs€income€is€understated€by€$600€per€month.׃%è ×Ý ƒ#ÃÝòòÚ  Ú9Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ™#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ ° Ðò òó óÌà  àWe€also€notice€from€our€comparison€of€the€partiesðð€statements€that€Wifeððs€stated€monthlyÐ à Ðexpenses€for€herself€and€the€two€children€were€$2,160€while€€Husbandððs€expenses,€when€childÐ ° Ðsupport€is€subtracted,€€are€$2,360.€€Wifeððs€expenses€include€the€first€mortgage€on€the€marital€homeÐ  ð Ðin€the€amount€of€$819€per€month;€Husband€claims€rent€expenses€of€$800€per€month€and€testified€thatÐ à Ðno€suitable€housing€was€available€for€less€than€that€amount.Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÈ›#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôò òó óÐ €Ð Ðò òÌÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒFž#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôó óà  àThis€case€presents€a€situation€not€uncommon€upon€the€dissolution€of€a€marriage:€twoÐ ` ° Ðhouseholds€cannot€be€maintained€as€cheaply€as€one.ò òà  àó óÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ§ž#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô€This€court€has€previously€addressed€theÐ P   Ðeconomic€situation€which€often€results€from€divorce:Ð @  ÐÌà8  àTwo€persons€living€separately€incur€more€expenses€than€two€persons€living€together.€Ð  p  ÐThus,€in€most€divorce€cases€it€is€unlikely€that€both€parties€will€be€able€to€maintainÐ `  Ðtheir€pre„divorce€lifestyle€once€the€proceedings€are€concluded.€€While€enabling€theÐ P  Ðeconomically€disadvantaged€spouse€to€maintain€the€pre„divorce€lifestyle€is€a€laudableÐ ð@  Ðgoal,€we€have€realistically€recognized€that€in€most€divorce€cases,€the€courts€must€beÐ à0  Ðsatisfied€with€awarding€ð ðclosing€in€moneyðð€ð!ð€that€is€awarding€the€spouse€sufficientÐ Ð  Ðfunds€to€return€as€closely€as€is€economically€possible€to€the€pre„divorce€lifestyle.ÐÀÐ Ð  ÐòòÌKinard€v.€Kinardóó,€986€S.W.2d€220,€234„35€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1998)€(citations€omitted).Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒ¤Ÿ#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ  ð ÐÌà  àUnfortunately,€these€two€people€cannot€both€live€the€same€lifestyle€separately€as€they€didÐ €Ð Ðtogether€on€the€same,€or€similar,€income.€€Where,€as€here,€the€level€of€income€has€been€reduced€fromÐ pÀ Ðthat€enjoyed€during€the€marriage,€the€problem€is€exacerbated.€€Neither€party€will€be€able€to€maintainÐ `° Ðthe€lifestyle€enjoyed€before€the€divorce,€which€does€not€appear€to€have€been€extravagant.€€Both€willÐ P  Ðbe€required€to€live€on€less€than€they€previously€had€and/or€to€increase€their€income€in€order€toÐ @ Ðmaintain€their€pre„divorce€lifestyle.€€Because€we€have€felt€compelled€to€modify€the€alimony€awardÐ 0€ Ðto€rehabilitative€alimony€for€a€period€of€six€years,€Wife€must€use€that€six€years€to€become€more€self„Ð  p Ðsufficient€or€increase€her€earning€potential.€€Wifeððs€statement€of€income€and€expenses€does€notÐ ` Ðinclude€any€expenses€for€further€education€or€training,€but€also€does€not€include€additional€incomeÐ P Ðfrom€full„time,€as€opposed€to€part„time,€employment.€Ð ð@ ÐÌòòóóà  àThe€trial€court€and€this€court€must€deal€with€the€partiesðð€financial€situations€as€they€are,€notÐ Ð  Ðas€we€would€hope€them€to€be.€€Wife€clearly€needs€support€and€needs€an€amount€sufficient€to€enableÐ À! Ðher€to€increase€her€earning€potential.€€Considering€Husbandððs€understating€of€income,€the€eliminationÐ °"  Ðof€some€expenses€shortly€after€trial,€and€the€level€of€Husbandððs€€expenses€in€comparison€to€those€ofÐ  #ð! ÐWife€and€children,€we€find€that€Husband€does€have€the€ability€to€pay€alimony.€That€ability€to€pay,Ð $à" Ðhowever,€is€limited€by€his€income,€which€has€been€adversely€affected€by€his€employerððs€reductionÐ €%Ð # Ðin€overtime.€€Having€considered€all€of€the€factors€established€in€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÆ£#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„5„101(d),€we€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒÏ«#ÔÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔÐ p&À!$ Ðare€of€the€opinion€that€the€award€of€alimony€should€be€modified.€€Therefore,€we€award€WifeÐ `'°"% Ðrehabilitative€alimony€in€the€amount€of€$700€per€month€for€twenty„four€months€after€the€finalÐ P( #& Ðjudgment€awarding€the€divorce€and€$500€per€month€for€forty„eight€months€thereafter.Ð @)$' ÐÐ  0*€%( Ðò òÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒ6¬#ÔòòóóÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôó óÓ  ÓIVÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒô­#ÔÔ€Xw¸XXXw¸Ôò ò.€€ó óThe€Tax€Refundò òÐ ° ÐÓ®ÓÌà  àó óHusband€also€appeals€the€trial€courtððs€award€of€the€entire€1997€tax€refund,€$3,448,€to€Wife.€Ð  ð ÐAs€salary€earned€and€refunded€to€the€parties€during€the€marriage,€the€tax€refund€is€marital€propertyÐ ŒÜ Ðand€subject€to€equitable€division.€€òòSee€óóTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(A).€€€Husband€argues€thatÐ xÈ Ðthe€distribution€of€the€tax€refund€was€inequitable€because€it€was€achieved€almost€exclusively€throughÐ d ´ Ðhis€efforts,€as€Wife€admitted€that€the€refund€represented€€as€little€as€$100€of€her€fundsÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ô.€Ô#†Xw¸XXXcŒö°#Ô€Husband€doesÐ P   Ðnot€dispute€the€remainder€of€Ô‡XcŒXXXw¸ÔtheÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒy±#Ô€trial€courtððs€distribution€of€marital€property.Ð P   ÐÌà  àHusband€relies€on€òòKelly€v.€Kellyóó,€679€S.W.2d€458€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1984)€for€the€propositionÐ < Œ  Ðthat€marital€property€is€presumed€€to€be€equally€owned€until€proven€otherwise.€€òòSee€Kellyóó,€679Ð (x  ÐS.W.2d€at€462.€€Seemingly,€Husband€would€have€the€trial€court€consider€each€piece€of€maritalÐ d  Ðproperty€ð ðequally€ownedðð€and€consider€each€partyððs€contributions€to€that€piece€of€property,€ratherÐ P  Ðthan€considering€the€marital€property€as€a€whole€when€making€the€division€of€property.€€Ð ì<  ÐÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸ÔÌà  àòòóóThe€appellate€court€in€òòKellyóó€did€state,€ð ðin€order€to€make€an€equitable€distribution€of€jointlyÐ Ä Ðowned€marital€property,€it€should€be€presumed€that€ownership€is€equal€until€proven€otherwise.ðð€€òòSeeÐ ° ÐKellyóó,€679€S.W.2d€at€462.€€ò òó óThis€case€is€easily€distinguishable,€however,€because€òòóóÔ#†Xw¸XXXw¸_´#ÔÔ‡Xw¸XXXw¸Ôthe€trial€court€in€thatÐ œì Ðcase,€with€no€findings€of€fact€to€explain€such€an€award,€ordered€that€the€husband€receive€90%€of€theÐ ˆØ Ðmarital€property.€€The€award€was€vacated€and€remanded€for€further€findings€of€fact.€€òòSee€Kellyóó,€679Ð tÄ ÐS.W.2d€at€462.€€At€no€point€did€the€appellate€court€in€òòKellyóó€direct€that€each€piece€of€property€beÐ `° Ðconsidered€separately€and€divided€in€proportion€to€each€partyððs€contribution.Ô#†Xw¸XXXw¸¶#Ô€€While€the€trial€courtÐ Lœ Ðmust€consider€all€of€the€marital€property€when€making€the€division€of€property,€the€court€is€notÐ 8ˆ Ðrequired€to€award€each€party€an€interest€in€each€piece€of€marital€property.€€òòSee€Thompson€v.Ð $t ÐThompsonóó,€797€S.W.2d€599,€604€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1990).€€Unless€the€facts€require€otherwise,€courtsÐ ` Ðgenerally€judge€the€fairness€of€a€property€division€by€the€final€result.€€òòSee€id.óó€€As€noted€above,Ð üL ÐHusband€did€not€challenge€the€final€result€in€the€distribution€of€€marital€property.€€The€one€half€ofÐ è8 Ðthe€tax€refund€which€Husband€claims€should€have€been€awarded€to€him€amounts€to€$1,724.Ð Ô$ ÐComparing€that€figure€to€the€total€amounts€distributed,€we€find€nothing€inequitable€in€the€trial€courtððsÐ À Ðaward.Ð ¬ü ÐÌà  àFurthermore,€we€note€the€trial€courtððs€statement€that€the€refund€was€awarded€to€Wife€ð ðto€beÐ „!Ô Ðused€in€purchasing€a€substitute€vehicle€.€.€.ðð€€Before€the€partiesðð€marital€difficulties,€Wife€had€a€newÐ p"À  Ðleased€vehicle.€€Upon€expiration€of€the€lease,€and€after€their€difficulties€began,€Husband€returned€theÐ \#¬! Ðnew€leased€vehicle€and,€for€$500,€purchased€Wife€a€1984€Skylark€with€more€than€100,000€miles€onÐ H$˜" Ðit.€€Husband€continued€to€drive€his€$9,000€truck.€€Considering€Wifeððs€earlier€vehicle€and€the€vehicleÐ 4%„ # ÐHusband€had€at€the€time€of€trial,€and€considering€the€overall€fairness€of€the€distribution€of€maritalÐ  &p!$ Ðproperty,€we€find€no€error€in€awarding€Wife€the€tax€refund€to€use€in€the€purchase€of€a€vehicle.Ð  '\"% ÐÓ  ÓÌÐ  ä(4$' ÐV.Ð ° ÐÓ+¿ÓÌà  àThe€order€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€as€modified.€€This€case€is€remanded€to€the€trial€courtÐ ˆØ Ðfor€such€proceedings€as€may€be€necessary.€€The€costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€equally€to€the€parties.Ð tÄ ÐÌÌÌÔ‡XcŒXXXw¸Ôà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  à___________________________________€Ð $ t Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àà  àPATRICIA€J.€COTTRELL,€JUDGEÔ#†Xw¸XXXcŒrÀ#ÔÐ  d Ð