ÿWPCÊ …# VU>a %Ÿ 0(¥4Íáðw@ø 0l8 0D¤ 0Lè 0J4 0T~ 0^Ò 0h0 0r˜ 0| 0†† 0 1uœ U, 0d=U,¡ 0NÍU 6B)QDCz AM½ B  D3'U*Z$„ 0@¨ìèv~ÔvÓR AO%Æt 0D: D/~ B­˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 <èÀ( 9Z &Courier RegularX($¡¡DÒ x°°3|xÀ  ® ¯ ° U± E² ³ D´ O-µ U¶ Ó€À ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó> ÿÿ$Small Circleððà0 à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco>‡¦$"Small Circleð"ðà0  à< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d))))'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌAugust€28,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò âÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Ô€%ôÔTo€elaborate,€defendant's€gross€monthly€income€in€1988€wasÏ$11,066.00.€€In€the€first€nine€months€of€1994,€defendant's€gross€monthlyÏincome€was€$10,823.00.€€We€determined€defendant's€1988€gross€monthly€income€byÏdividing€the€gross€income€reported€by€defendant€on€a€document€titled€"IncomeÏHistory"€by€twelve.€€We€determined€defendant's€gross€monthly€income€for€1994Ïby€fist€adding€together€the€figures€provided€by€defendant€for€his€photographyÏbusiness€gross€income,€rental€property€income,€and€renovation€income.€€We€thenÏdivided€the€sum€by€nine.€€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€##X„d&ÓÑ#€##Xd#ÑÔ€%ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ ` Ü‚Xœ ’X ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€®XdÈdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñ›KATHERINE€THERESA€DeVAULT,à à)Ìà àà à)ÌÓ#` Ü‚Xœôx‘X#Óà àPlaintiff/Appellant,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9601„CV„00012Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àDavidson€Circuit̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€(,';+'h|­v` ç `€€Lß›JAMES€CANON€DeVAULT,€JR.,à à)à àNo.€93D„3363Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellee.à à)ÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÔ€%¼ÔCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€MURIEL€ROBINSON,€JUDGEÌÓ ` Ü‚XœÈ“X ÓÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÔ€%XÔMARY€FRANCES€LYLEÌBruce,€Weathers,€Corley,Ì€€Dughman€&€LyleÌFirst€American€CenterÌ315€Deaderick€Street,€Twentieth€FloorÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37238„2075Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌMIKE€W.€BINKLEYÌ150€Second€Avenue€NorthÌSuite€300ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37201Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àœÔ€%¼ÔAFFIRMED€IN€PART,›€œREVERSED€IN€PART,Ìà@ à›€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌœ›ÌÓ  ÓSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÓÓòòÓ  ÓÔ€%°ÔOÔ€%¼Ô€P€I€N€I€O€NÌÓ  ÓÓ#` Ü` ä œÈ“X#ÓóóÔ€%XÔà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€plaintiff/appellant,€Katherine€TheresaÏDeVault,€from€those€parts€of€the€trial€court's€divorce€decree€thatÏawarded€the€parties€joint€custody€of€their€minor€twin€sons,Ïawarded€child€support,€and€granted€defendant/appellee,€James€CanonÏDeVault,€Jr.,€two€months€œof›€visitation€during€the€summer.ÌÌà àThe€parties€married€in€January€1972.€€In€1984,€theyÏseparated€allegedly€because€of€defendant's€infatuation€with€theÏmanager€of€his€photography€studio.€€The€parties€later€reconciledÏand€reunited.€€On€2€February€1989,€the€parties€had€twin€sons,ÏSamuel€and€Daniel.ÌÌà àIn€September€1993,€defendant€moved€out€of€the€marital€homeÏafter€stating€that€he€wanted€a€œ"looser,›€freer,€less€rigidÏœlifestyle."›€€He€told€plaintiff€that€he€did€not€love€her€anymoreÏand€that€he€wanted€to€date€other€women.€€Plaintiff€testified€thatÍshe€felt€œ"grief›€as€if€someone€had€œdied"›€when€defendant€moved€out.ÌÌà àDuring€the€previous€year,€defendant€had€been€very€hostileÏand€angry.€€According€to€plaintiff,€he€drank€heavily€when€he€wasÏhome.€€He€allegedly€used€foul€language€and€instigated€arguments.€€ÌÌà àPrior€to€leaving€the€marital€home,€defendant€spentÏincreasing€amounts€of€time€away€from€home€where€he€was€allegedlyÏrenovating€the€parties'€rental€property.€€Defendant€later€admittedÏthat€he€had€spent€much€of€the€time€with€his€paramour.€€€DefendantÏhelped€his€paramour€find€her€current€residence€and€spends€ten€toÏfifteen€hours€per€week€there.€€The€trial€court€issued€aÏrestraining€order€in€October€1993€preventing€defendant€from€havingÏthe€minor€children€around€anyone€with€whom€he€was€romanticallyÏinvolved.ÌÌà àDefendant€is€a€professional€photographer.€€He€has€alsoÏdeveloped€a€business€in€property€renovation.€€Plaintiff€is€a€self„employed€graphic€designer€and€art€director.€€She€has€an€office€inÏher€home.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€filed€a€complaint€for€divorce€on€13€SeptemberÏ1993.€€During€the€period€preceding€the€trial,€plaintiff€filedÏmotions€for€restraining€orders.€€Claiming€that€defendant€violatedÏthe€restraining€orders,€plaintiff€filed€a€petition€for€contempt€ofÏcourt€which€she€amended€twice.€€On€one€occasion,€plaintiff€calledÍthe€police€who€arrested€defendant€for€disorderly€conduct.€ÏDefendant€also€filed€a€motion€for€a€restraining€order,€numerousÏmotions€to€dissolve€the€restraining€orders€issued€against€him,€andÏa€counter„petition€for€contempt.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€held€a€trial€on€the€9th€and€10th€ofÏNovember€1994.€€The€final€decree€granted€plaintiff€an€absoluteÏdivorce€on€the€grounds€of€defendant's€inappropriate€maritalÏconduct.€€The€court€awarded€joint€custody€to€the€parties.€€ItÏgranted€plaintiff€physical€custody€and€defendant€visitation€everyÏother€weekend€and€Wednesday€evenings.€€Defendant€also€receivedÏphysical€custody€of€the€children€in€June€and€July€with€plaintiffÏreceiving€custody€during€the€middle€weekend€of€each€of€thoseÏmonths.€€The€court€alternated€the€children's€holiday€scheduleÏbetween€the€parties.€€As€to€child€support,€the€court€deviated€fromÏthe€child€support€guidelines€based€on€its€finding€that€defendantÏwas€underemployed€and€ordered€defendant€to€pay€child€support€ofÏ$800.00€a€month.€€ÌÌà àPlaintiff€filed€a€notice€of€appeal€on€12€May€1995.€€ThisÏcourt,€however,€held€that€the€order€was€not€final€because€it€didÏnot€address€the€contempt€petitions€and€because€the€parties€had€notÏgiven€notice€that€defendant€had€satisfied€his€repayment€obligationÏas€required€by€the€final€decree.€€On€8€August€1995,€the€trialÏcourt€entered€an€order€dismissing€plaintiff's€and€defendant'sÏpetitions€for€contempt€and€stating€that€defendant€had€satisfiedÍhis€obligation.€€Thereafter,€plaintiff€filed€a€notice€of€appeal€onÏ6€September€1995€and€moved€to€consolidate€the€records€of€the€twoÏappeals.€€On€appeal,€plaintiff€presented€four€issues€and€defendantÏpresented€one€issue.€€Plaintiff's€first€two€issues€are€as€follows:€ÌÓÓÓ ` °§XÓà8 àI.à0 àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€ordering€jointÏcustody€of€twin€boys€where€Husband€and€Wife€œ"cannot›Ïget€œalong›œ"›€and€are€incapable€of€reaching€agreementÏon€matters€concerning€the€children.ÌÌà8 àII.à0 àWhether€the€trial€court€erred€in€not€awarding€soleÏcustody€to€Wife€where€Husband's€admitted€andÏinappropriate€marital€conduct€caused€the€break„upÏof€the€marriage,€€and€where€his€relationship€withÏhis€paramour€continues€in€the€presence€of€theÏchildren.ÌÌÓÓÌà àA€trial€court€œ"is›€vested€with€wide€discretion€in€matters€ofÏdivorce,€alimony€and€attorney's€fee,€custody€and€support€of€minorÏchildren€and€appellate€courts€will€not€interfere€except€upon€aÏclear€showing€of€an€abuse€of€that€œdiscretion.›œ"›€€ò òòòMarmino€v.ÏMarminoó óóó,€34€Tenn.€App.€352,€355,€238€S.W.2d€105,€107€(1950).€€œ"In›Ïcases€involving€child€custody,€the€decision€of€the€Trial€Judge€whoÏsaw€and€heard€the€witnesses,€is€to€be€given€great,€if€notÏcontrolling€effect,€and€[this€court]€will€interfere€only€where€weÏfind€a€palpable€abuse€of€discretion,€or€a€judgment€against€theÏgreat€weight€of€the€œevidence.›œ"›€€ò òòòCecil€v.€State€ex€rel.€Ceciló óóó,Ï192€Tenn.€74,€77,€237€S.W.2d€558,€559€(1951).ÌÌà àIn€determining€matters€of€child€custody,€the€primary€concernÏis€the€best€interest€and€welfare€of€the€parties'€minor€children.€ÏAll€rights€of€the€parties€will€yield€to€that€primary€concern.€€TheÍbest€interest€of€the€child€is€the€paramount€consideration.€€It€isÏthe€œ"polestar,›€the€alpha€and€œomega.›œ"›€€ò òòòBah€v.€Bahó óóó,€668€S.W.2d€663,Ï665€(Tenn.€App.€1983).ÌÌà àAlthough€not€expressly€barred€by€statute,€courts€have,€inÏgeneral,€disfavored€joint€custody€over€the€years.€€ò òòòGray€v.€Grayó óóó,Ï885€S.W.2d€353,€354€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€Courts€have€expressed€aÏconcern€that€joint€custody€arrangements€harm€rather€than€helpÏchildren.€€ò òòòGarner€v.€Garneró óóó,€773€S.W.2d€245,€248€n.3€(Tenn.€App.Ï1989).€€This€court,€more€than€fifty€years€ago,€stated€that€œ"[i]t›Ïis€generally€very€unwise€to€divide€the€custody€of€a€child€betweenÏcontending€parties€because€it€is€hardly€possible€for€a€child€toÏgrow€up€and€live€a€normal,€happy€life€under€such€œcircumstances.›œ"›€Ïò òòòLogan€v.€Logan,€ó óóó26€Tenn.€App.€667,€674,€176€S.W.2d€601,€603Ï(1943).€€Just€this€year,€however,€the€General€Assemblyòòò ò€óóó ópassed€theÏfollowing€act:€Ìà8 àÓÓà àSection€1.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated.€€Section€36„6„101.€€Is€amended€by€designating€the€existing€languageÏof€subsection€(a)€as€(a)(1)€and€by€adding€the€followingÏnew€section€(a)(2):ÌÌà8 àà0 àà à(2)€Except€as€provided€in€the€followingÏsentence,€neither€a€preference€nor€a€presumption€Ïfor€or€against€joint€legal€custody,€joint€physicalÏcustody€or€sole€custody€is€established,€but€theÏcourt€shall€have€the€widest€discretion€to€order€aÏcustody€arrangement€that€is€in€the€best€interest€ofÏthe€child.€€Unless€the€court€finds€by€clear€andÏconvincing€evidence€to€the€contrary,€there€is€aÏpresumption€that€joint€custody€is€in€the€bestÏinterest€of€a€minor€child€where€the€parents€haveÏagreed€to€joint€custody€or€so€agree€in€open€courtÏat€a€hearing€for€the€purpose€of€determining€theÏcustody€of€the€minor€child.€€For€the€purpose€ofÏassisting€the€court€in€making€a€determinationÍwhether€an€award€of€joint€custody€is€appropriate,Ïthe€court€may€direct€that€an€investigation€beÏconducted.€€The€burden€of€proof€necessary€to€modifyÏan€order€of€joint€custody€at€a€subsequentÏproceeding€shall€be€by€a€preponderance€of€theÏevidence.ÌÌÓÓ1996€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€1046€(amending€òòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€36„6„101).€ÏBy€enacting€this€chapter,€the€General€Assembly€of€Tennessee€hasÏadopted€as€the€public€policy€of€this€state€the€concept€that€thereÏbe€neither€a€preference€nor€a€presumption€for€or€against€jointÏlegal€custody,€€joint€physical€custody,€or€sole€custody.ÌÌà àWhile€the€facts€of€the€instant€case€indicate€that€the€partiesÏwill€have€some€problem€with€joint€custody,€it€is€evident€that€mostÏof€these€problems€come€from€plaintiff.€€It€is€clear€from€a€readingÏof€the€record€that€the€present€relationship€between€the€partiesÏis,€at€best,€acrimonious.€€We€are€of€the€opinion,€however,€that€aÏgreat€deal€of€the€acrimony€is€a€result€of€plaintiff's€feelings€ofÏbeing€spurned€by€defendant.€€We€are€also€of€the€opinion€that€anÏaward€of€sole€custody€to€plaintiff€would€restrict€defendant's€roleÏin€his€children's€lives.€€Such€a€restriction€€would€be€highlyÏdisruptive€to€the€children€because€defendant€has€beenÏextraordinarily€involved€in€his€sons'€lives€in€the€past.ÌÌà àWe€find€nothing€in€the€statute€that€provides€that€courtsÏshall€allow€joint€custody€only€in€cases€where€the€parties€are€onÏfriendly€terms.€€Plaintiff's€argument,€in€essence,€attempts€toÏhave€us€adopt€a€rule€of€law€to€this€effect.€€Under€thisÍinterpretation,€the€child's€best€interest€would€be€decided€as€aÏmatter€of€law€given€a€certain€set€of€objective€facts€rather€thanÏdetermined€according€to€the€trial€judge's€observations€andÏassessment€of€the€unique€facts€of€each€case.ÌÌà àThe€trial€court,€after€seeing€and€hearing€the€witnesses€andÏreviewing€the€entire€record,€deemed€it€in€the€children's€bestÏinterest€that€their€custody€be€joint.€€The€trial€court€based€uponÏan€assessment€of€the€parties'€character,€demeanor,€and€credibilityÏhad€an€optimistic€view€in€this€regard.€€We€cannot€say€that€herÏoptimism€is€an€abuse€of€discretion.€€We€defer€to€the€trial€court'sÏdecision€to€award€joint€custody.€€In€joint€custody€cases€as€in€allÏcustody€cases,€the€determination€œ"rests›€within€the€soundÏdiscretion€of€the€Trial€Judge€who€is€in€a€superior€position€toÏjudge€the€credibility€and€competency€of€the€parents€asÏœcustodians.›œ"›€€ò òòòGray,€ó óóó885òòò ò€óóó óS.W.2d€at€354.ÌÌà àThe€evidence€in€this€case€does€not€preponderate€against€theÏtrial€court's€decision€to€award€joint€custody.€€We€are€not€in€theÏposition€to€second€guess€the€trial€court€based€upon€a€rule€ofÏthumb€disfavoring€joint€custody€where€parties€are€antagonistic.€ÏIf€the€joint€custody€is€unworkable,€it€would€be€a€material€changeÏin€circumstances€warranting€the€court's€reanalysis€of€theÏcustodial€arrangement.€€ò òòòDalton€v.€Daltonó ó,€óó858€S.W.2d€324,€326Ï(Tenn.€App.€1993).€€In€the€past,€this€court€has€deferred€to€aÏtrial€judge's€discretion€in€awarding€joint€custody.€€In€doing€so,Íwe€stated€as€follows:ÌÓÓÓ#` Üä ¦œÈ“X#Óà8 àà àThe€bitterness€between€mother€and€father€makeÏany€division€of€custody€difficult€for€the€children.€ÏHowever,€if€they€can€endure€it,€and€they€areÏapparently€doing€so,€there€is€no€reason€why€theÏchildren€should€not€receive€such€benefit€as€may€beÏavailable€from€the€society€of€both€parents.Ìà àà à.€.€.€.Ìà8 àà àThis€court€has€expressed€reservations€aboutÏœ"joint›€œcustody",›€however€that€expression€may€beÏdefined.€€Those€reservations€continue,€and€may€wellÏcome€into€play€in€the€future€in€this€case,€becauseÏthe€children€may€find€that€they€are€unable€toÏendure€the€weekly€shift€from€one€parent€to€theÏother.€€Moreover,€the€emotional€state€of€theÏchildren,€their€progress,€or€lack€of€progress€inÏschool,€or€other€matters€relating€to€their€welfareÏmay€require€a€re„examination€of€the€presentÏarrangement.€ÌÌòòò òÓÓEnglish€v.€Shouseó óóó,€No.€01„A„01„9108„CH„00285,€1991€WL€274517,€atÏ*3„*4€(Tenn.€App.€27€Dec.€1991).€€From€a€review€of€this€record,€weÏcannot€say€that€a€preponderance€of€the€evidence€is€against€theÏtrial€court's€order.€€In€this€case,€as€in€most€divorce€cases,€the€Ïevidence€focusing€on€the€welfare€of€the€children€is€sparse.€ÏPlaintiff's€first€two€issues€are€without€merit.ÌÌà àPlaintiff's€third€issue€is€œ"[w]hether›€the€trial€court€erredÏin€giving€Wife€insufficient€visitation€during€the€summer€vacationÏto€allow€appropriate€bonding€with€the€œchildren.›œ"›ÌÌà àThe€standard€of€review€in€custody€and€visitation€cases€isÏthe€same.ÌÓÓà8 àà àOur€review€of€a€trial€court's€decisionÏregarding€visitation€and€custody€is€governed€byÏTenn.R.App.P.€13(d).€€Thus,€we€review€the€record€deÏnovo€with€the€presumption€that€the€trial€court'sÍfindings€of€fact€are€correct.€€However,€we€reviewÏthe€details€of€the€trial€court's€custody€andÏvisitation€arrangements€to€determine€whether€theÏtrial€court€abused€its€discretion.ÌÌÓÓòòò òNeely€v.€Neelyóóó ó,€737€S.W.2d€539,€544€(Tenn.€App.€1987)€(citationsÏomitted).€€œ"As›€a€general€rule,€the€details€of€custody€andÏvisitation€are€peculiarly€within€the€broad€discretion€of€the€trialÏœjudge.›œ"›€€òòò òCollins€v.€Collinsóóó ó,€1993€WL€177159,€at€*2€(Tenn.€App.Ï1993).€€As€with€custody€issues,€the€best€interest€of€the€child€isÏthe€paramount€concern€when€establishing€visitation€rights.€Ïòòò òPizzillo€v.€Pizzillo,€Jr.ó óóó,€€884€S.W.2d€749,€755€(Tenn.€App.Ï1994).€€œ"A›€child's€interests€are€well„served€by€a€custody€andÏvisitation€arrangement€that€promotes€the€development€ofÏrelationships€with€both€the€custodial€and€noncustodial€œparent.›œ"›€Ïòòò òId.ó óóó€at€755.€€We€are€of€the€opinion€that€the€trial€court€did€notÏabuse€its€discretion€by€awarding€defendant€extended€visitationÏduring€the€summer€months€and€that€the€evidence€preponderates€inÏfavor€of€the€trial€court's€judgment.ÌÌà àPlaintiff's€primary€complaint€with€the€visitationÏarrangement€is€that€it€does€not€give€her€enough€time€to€bond€withÏthe€children€during€the€summer€months.€€This€argument€is€withoutÏœeffect.›€€First,€€plaintiff€argues€that€defendant€has€nearly€nineÏconsecutive€weeks€of€visitation€while€she€only€has€two€weeks€ofÏuninterrupted€visitation.€€In€truth,€defendant€does€not€have€nineÏweeks€of€uninterrupted€visitation.€€During€defendant's€visitationÏin€June€and€July,€plaintiff€has€visitation€the€middle€weekend€ofÍeach€month.€€Second,€as€pointed€out€by€defendant,€plaintiff€hasÏthe€remaining€ten€months€of€the€year€to€bond€with€the€twins.€ÏFinally,€plaintiff€argued€that€her€two€weeks€of€visitation€œ"would›Ïnecessarily€be€devoted€to€generally€getting€the€boys€ready€forÏschool,€including€€purchasing€clothes€and€school€œsupplies.›œ"›€€It€isÏnot€true€that€plaintiff's€two€weeks€must€be€spent€on€theseÏactivities.€€While€the€last€few€weeks€of€summer€are€often€spentÏshopping€for€the€new€school€year,€that€does€not€have€to€be€theÏcase.€€Plaintiff€can€shop€earlier€in€the€summer€or€early€in€theÏschool€year.€€Moreover,€defendant€could€help€in€preparing€theÏchildren€for€school€by€taking€them€shopping€near€the€end€of€July.€ÏFinally,€purchasing€clothes€and€school€supplies€does€not€requireÏtwo€weeks€of€effort.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€compares€this€case€with€the€case€of€òòò òMahaffey€v.ÏMahaffeyó óóó,€No.€01„A„01„9306„PB„00251,€1993€WL€496833€(Tenn.€App.Ï1993).€€In€òòò òMahaffeyóóó ó,€this€court€merely€affirmed€the€decision€ofÏthe€trial€court€which€awarded€the€mother€six€weeks€ofÏuninterrupted€visitation€during€the€child's€summer€break.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€atÏ*4.€€òòò òMahaffeyó óóó€did€not€set€a€precedent€for€courts€to€follow€inÏevery€case.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€failed€to€show€the€trial€court€abused€itsÏdiscretion€regarding€the€details€of€the€visitation€arrangement.€ÏThus,€the€trial€court's€visitation€schedule€is€affirmed.ÌÌà àPlaintiff's€final€issue€is€œ"[w]hether›€Wife€should€beÏawarded€her€attorney€fees€and€other€costs€necessitated€by€thisÏœappeal.›œ"›€€ÌÌà àThis€court€may€award€attorney's€fees€incurred€during€anÏappeal€œ"[w]here›€the€services€of€a€parent's€attorney€inures€to€theÏbenefit€of€a€minor€child€or€children€.€.€.€œ.›œ"›€€òòò òDalton€v.€Daltonóóó ó,Ï858€S.W.2d€324,€327€(Tenn.€App.€1993)€(citing€òòò òSalisbury€v.ÏSalisburyóóó ó,€657€S.W.2d€761€(Tenn.€App.€1983)).€€In€òòò òDaltonóóó ó,€thisÏcourt€explained:€œ"It›€is€true€that€parents€are€equally€responsibleÏfor€furnishing€necessaries€for€their€children.€T.C.A.€Sec.€34„1„101.€€However,€the€expense€of€dealing€with€a€situation€created€byÏone€of€the€parents€is€properly€chargeable€to€that€parent€in€theÏexercise€of€sound€œdiscretion.›œ"›€€ò òòòId.óóó ó;€òòò òRagan€v.€Raganóóó ó,€858€S.W.2dÏ332,€333„34€(Tenn.€App.€1993).ÌÌà àPlaintiff€relies€on€both€òòò òDaltonóóó ó€and€òòò òRaganóóó ó€to€support€herÏclaim€to€attorney's€fees.€€In€òòò òDaltonóóó ó,€the€court€awarded€the€motherÏher€attorney's€fees€incurred€on€appeal€and€affirmed€the€award€ofÏattorney's€fees€incurred€at€the€trial€level.€€òòò òDaltonóóó ó,€858€S.W.2dÏat€327.€€The€facts€of€the€case,€unlike€the€present€case,€revealedÏthat€the€father's€actions€caused€the€case€to€come€to€trial.€ÏBecause€he€made€it€impossible€for€the€couple€to€exercise€jointÏcustody,€the€mother€was€forced€to€seek€a€change€of€custody.€€€òòò òId.óóó óÏat€326„27.€€The€court€also€awarded€the€mother€her€attorney's€feesÏincurred€on€appeal€in€òòò òRaganóóó ó.€€Once€again,€the€court€recognizedÍthat€the€father€caused€the€mother€to€incur€the€expenses€because€heÏbrought€the€appeal.€€òòò òRaganóóó ó,€858€S.W.2d€333„34.ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€there€is€no€evidence€that€defendant'sÏactions€created€a€situation€which€caused€plaintiff€to€bring€anÏappeal€for€the€benefit€of€the€children.€€While€it€is€true€that€theÏtrial€court€awarded€plaintiff€a€divorce€because€of€defendant'sÏinappropriate€marital€conduct,€that€conduct€was€not€whatÏinstigated€the€present€appeal.€€Instead,€it€was€plaintiff'sÏadherence€to€her€belief€that€joint€custody€was€unworkable€whichÏprompted€the€appeal.€€For€these€reasons,€we€are€of€the€opinionÏthat€plaintiff€is€not€entitled€to€her€attorney's€fees€resultingÏfrom€this€appeal.ÌÌà àIn€his€brief,€defendant€raised€the€issue€of€œ"[w]hether›€theÏtrial€judge€abused€her€discretion€in€deviating€from€the€childÏsupport€guidelines€based€upon€her€subjective€feelings€that€theÏfather's€economic€picture€would€improve€rather€than€basing€theÏfather's€child€support€obligation€upon€the€objective€andÏundisputed€evidence€of€the€father's€earning€capacity,€earningÏhistory,€and€his€income€at€the€time€of€œtrial.›œ"›ÌÌà àThe€child€support€guidelines€œ"shall›€be€applied€as€aÏrebuttable€presumption€in€all€child€support€œcases.›œ"›€€òòTenn.€Comp.€R.Ï&€Regs.óó€ch.€1240„2„4„.02(7)€(1994).€€The€trial€court€may€award€anÏamount€different€than€that€required€by€the€guidelines,€if€it€findsÍœ"the›€evidence€is€sufficient€to€rebut€the€presumption€that€theÏapplication€of€the€guidelines€is€the€correct€amount€.€.€.€œ.›œ"›€€òòò òId.ó óó󀜛ÌÓÓà8 àœ[T]he€court€must›€make€a€written€or€specific€findingÏthat€the€application€of€the€child€supportÏguidelines€would€be€unjust€or€inappropriate€in€aÏparticular€case€[and]€must€state€the€amount€thatÏwould€have€been€required€under€the€guidelines€andÏinclude€a€justification€for€deviation€from€theÏguidelines€which€takes€into€consideration€the€bestÏinterest€of€the€child.ÌÌòòò òÓÓId.€€óóó óÌÌà àIt€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€it€is€impossible€toÏmake€the€determinations€necessary€to€deviate€from€the€guidelinesÏbased€on€the€information€in€the€record€of€this€case.€€To€explain,Ïit€is€impossible€to€determine€if€the€evidence€of€defendant'sÏincome€reflects€his€business'€income€or€his€personal€income.€ÏMoreover,€it€is€obvious€that€the€net€income€figures€were€notÏcalculated€in€accordance€with€the€guidelines.€€For€example,Ïdefendant€claims€that€in€1988€his€gross€income€was€$132,800.00€andÏhis€net€income€was€€€$„2,782.00.€€Under€the€guidelines,€the€courtÏis€to€calculate€the€obligor's€net€income€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àNet€income€is€calculated€by€subtracting€from€grossÏincome€of€the€obligor's€FICA€(6.2%€Social€SecurityÏ+€1.45%€Medicare€for€regular€wage€earners€and€12.4%ÏSocial€Security€+€2.9%€Medicare€for€self„employed,Ïas€of€1991,€or€any€amount€subsequently€set€byÏfederal€law€as€FICA€tax)€the€amount€of€withholdingÏtax€deducted€for€a€single€wage€earner€claiming€oneÏwithholding€allowance€.€.€.€and€the€amount€of€childÏsupport€ordered€pursuant€to€a€previous€order€ofÏchild€support€for€other€children.ÌÌÓÓòòò òId.óóó ó€1240„2„4„.03(4).€€Given€that€defendant€does€not€pay€any€otherÏchild€support,€it€is€inconceivable€that€the€subtraction€of€theÍother€tax€items€listed€in€the€guidelines€from€defendant's€grossÏincome€would€produce€a€negative€net€income.ÌÌà àNot€only€does€the€evidence€fail€to€provide€the€informationÏnecessary€to€apply€the€guidelines,€it€does€not€establish€thatÏdefendant€was€underemployed.€€The€only€evidence€is€that€either€hisÏor€his€business'€gross€income€has€decreased€since€the€1988€grossÏincome€amount€of€$132,800.00.€€Nevertheless,€the€gross€incomeÏamount€reported€for€the€first€nine€months€of€1994,€$97,415.00,€isÏnot€much€less€than€that€reported€for€1988.× ƒ. ××  ×€€We€are€of€the€opinionÏthat€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€in€favor€of€the€trialÏcourt's€finding€that€defendant€is€underemployed.€ÌÌà àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€as€to€child€support€isÏreversed€and€remanded.€€On€remand,€the€trial€court€shall€hearÏevidence€on€the€amount€of€defendant's€net€income€as€defined€in€the€Ïguidelines€and€determine€the€correct€net€income€amount.€ÏThereafter,€the€court€shall€enter€an€order€requiring€defendant€toÏpay€child€support€equal€to€thirty„two€percent€of€his€net€income€asÏrequired€by€the€guidelines.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€1240„2„4„.03(5).ÌÌà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€decision€of€the€trial€courtÏis€affirmed€as€to€all€findings€except€as€to€child€support.€€InÏregard€to€child€support,€the€finding€of€the€court€that€defendantÏis€underemployed€is€reversed.€€The€case€is€remanded€to€the€trialÏcourt€to€determine€the€amount€of€defendant's€net€income,€to€awardÏthe€proper€amount€of€child€support,€and€to€hear€any€furtherÏnecessary€proceedings.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€one„half€toÏplaintiff/appellant,€Katherine€Theresa€DeVault,€and€one„half€toÏdefendant/appellee,€James€Canon€DeVault,€Jr.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà à__________________________________Ìà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌœÌÌÌCONCUR:›ÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌHenry€F.€Todd,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌBen€H.€Cantrell,€J.Ì