ÿWPC• …# VUNa %¯ 0·µU<l w@¨ 4è ü  0J 0T] 0^± 0h 0rw 0|é 0†e 0ë 1u{ 0dðU>TB)’DC» AMþU*Kšuv~ BvÓª D3} 0@° AOðÆ? 0D D/I Bx˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX(Ë-$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ Legal AØ'ÿ LegalTÑÔ€XTxXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman "D#$%D&D(¿)U*[+Ó€5DÒ 3|x52 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€- Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€"ÔÔ€"ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€"XÔÌÌFebruaryÏ12,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏW.ÏCrowsonÌAppellateÏCourtÏClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'h dStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÑ\R AØ'\ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ7€59XXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÑ  ÑÔ€ÔÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌà àà à€€€________________________________________________ÌÌò òTHOMAS€A.€DRIBER,€Ph.D.,€ó óÌà àÌà àPlaintiff„Appellant,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àDavidson€Chancery€No.€93„3002„IIÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€01A01„9607„CH„00310ÌÌò òPHYSICIANS€HEALTH€CARE,€INC.,€ÌPHC,€INC.,€d/b/a€MILESTONE€HEALTHÌSERVICES,€Z„2€CORPORATION,€and€ÌZ€CORPORATION,€ó óÌÌà àDefendants„Appellees.Ì___________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àFROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ELLEN€HOBBS€LYLE,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÌà@ àJ.€P.€Barfield€of€NashvilleÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌà@ àRobert€E.€Boston€of€Ìà@ àWaller,€Lansden,€Dortch€&€Davis€in€NashvilleÌà@ àFor€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòDISMISSED€IN€PART,€AFFIRMED€IN€PARTóóó óÌÌà@ àOpinion€filed:€ÌÙ€€ÙßR€!# A1-j|ãôB` à. `€€@ÿRßÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÑ7€59XXdìXXdì7Ñ›ÓÓà àPlaintiff,€Thomas€J.€Driber,€Ph.D.,€appeals€from€the€order€of€the€trial€court€grantingÏsummary€judgment€to€the€defendant.€€The€case€is€before€this€Court€for€the€third€time€because€ofÏprevious€procedural€defects.Ìà àBasically€the€case€involves€a€suit€for€damages€for€the€alleged€breach€of€an€employmentÏagreement€and€a€counter„claim€by€defendant€to€recover€on€a€promissory€note.€€Ìà àOn€June€2,€1992,€Southern€Medical€Imaging,€Inc.€(hereinafter€SMI)€entered€into€anÏAsset€Purchase€Agreement€with€Columbia€Diagnostic€Associates€(CDA),€a€wholly€ownedÏsubsidiary€of€Physicians€Health€Care,€Inc.€(PHC),€whereby€SMI€agreed€to€transfer€most€of€itsÏassets€to€CDA.€€Plaintiff,€Thomas€J.€Driber,€President€of€SMI,€signed€the€agreement€on€behalfÏof€SMI,€and€Albert€Ganier,€III,€Treasurer€and€Secretary€of€CDA,€signed€the€agreement€onÏbehalf€of€CDA.€€As€part€of€the€Asset€Purchase€Agreement,€it€was€agreed€that€Driber€would€beÏemployed€by€PHC€pursuant€to€the€terms€and€conditions€of€a€written€employment€andÏnoncompetition€agreement€which,€in€fact,€was€signed€on€June€2,€1992.€€Under€the€terms€of€theÏemployment€agreement,€Driber€agreed€to€serve€as€vice€president€of€PHC,€and€he€agreed€toÏperform€the€services€assigned€to€him€by€Ganier,€PHCððs€president,€including€services€forÏPHCððs€subsidiary€and€affiliated€companies.€€Also€on€June€2,€1992,€Driber€executed€aÏpromissory€note€in€favor€of€PHC€in€the€amount€of€$20,000.00,€which€note€was€conditionedÏupon€CDA€meeting€certain€specified€earnings€goals.€Ìà àIn€September€1993,€Driberððs€employment€was€terminated,€and€on€October€14,€1993,ÏDriber€filed€a€complaint€in€this€case€alleging€breach€of€employment€contract€against€defendants,ÍPhysicians€Health€Care,€Inc.;€PHC,€Inc.€d/b/a€Milestone€Health€Services;€Z„2€Corporation€andÏZ€Corporation.€€An€amended€complaint€was€filed€pursuant€to€court€order€restating€the€claimsÏagainst€Z€Corporation€and€Z„2€Corporation.€€PHC€filed€an€answer€to€the€complaint€and€aÏcounter„claim€against€Driber€for€the€balance€due€on€the€promissory€note€Driber€had€executed€inÏits€favor.€€At€some€point,€PHC€changed€its€name€to€Milestone€Health€Services,€Inc.,€andÏMilestone€subsequently€was€allowed€to€file€an€amended€counter„claim€against€Driber€allegingÏlibelous€and€defamatory€statements,€and€Milestone€was€also€permitted€to€add€Dawn€Neville€byÏcross„claim€alleging€libelous€and€defamatory€statements€made€by€Neville€against€Milestone.Ìà àBy€order€entered€September€28,€1994,€the€trial€court€granted€Milestoneððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€on€its€original€counterclaim€for€enforcement€of€the€promissory€note.€€TheÏtrial€court€also€determined€that€Milestone€was€entitled€to€attorneysðð€fees€and€costs€incurred€inÏconnection€with€its€original€counterclaim€to€enforce€the€promissory€note€and€directedÏMilestoneððs€attorney€to€file€an€affidavit€regarding€said€amounts.€€The€trial€court€incorporatedÏinto€the€September€28€order€the€ð ðmagic€languageðð€of€Rule€54.02€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€making€it€aÏfinal€judgment€as€to€Driberððs€liability€on€the€promissory€note.€€Ìà àThe€Z€defendants€and€Milestone€each€moved€for€summary€judgment€as€to€all€ofÏDriberððs€claims€on€December€13,€1994.€€By€order€entered€February€1,€1995,€the€trial€courtÏgranted€the€motions€for€summary€judgment€that€had€been€filed€by€Milestone,€Z€CorporationÏand€Z„2€Corporation€and€dismissed€all€of€Driberððs€claims€against€said€defendants.€€In€the€sameÏorder,€the€trial€court€awarded€attorneysðð€fees€incurred€in€connection€with€the€enforcement€of€theÏpromissory€note.€€Driber€filed€a€notice€of€appeal€on€February€17,€1995,€appealing€the€FebruaryÏ1€order.€€Ìà àThe€trial€courtððs€February€1€order€did€not€dispose€of€Milestoneððs€counterclaim€againstÏDriber€for€libel€and€defamation€or€its€claim€against€Dawn€Neville,€nor€was€it€made€finalÍpursuant€to€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€54.02.€€Therefore,€by€Order€entered€April€4,€1995,€this€CourtÏdismissed€the€appeal€for€Driberððs€failure€to€appeal€from€a€final€judgment€under€Rule€3ÏT.R.A.P.€€€Ìà àAfter€remand,€Milestone€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€its€counterclaimÏagainst€Driber€for€libel€and€defamation€and€its€claim€against€Dawn€Neville.€€The€trial€courtÏgranted€Milestoneððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€October€16,€1995,€but€reserved€the€issueÏof€damages€and€attorneysðð€fees€to€a€later€date.€€On€November€3,€1995,€Driber€filed€a€notice€ofÏappeal€from€the€trial€courtððs€October€16,€œ1995›€order€granting€summary€judgment.€€Because€theÏOctober€16€order€had€expressly€reserved€the€issue€of€damages€and€attorneysðð€fees€for€laterÏdetermination€and€because€the€order€had€not€been€made€final€under€Rule€54.02,ÏTenn.R.Civ.P.,€this€Court€again€was€compelled€to€dismiss€the€appeal€for€failure€to€appeal€fromÏa€final€judgment€by€order€filed€November€23,€1995.€€Thereafter,€Milestone€voluntarilyÏdismissed€its€counterclaim€against€Neville€for€libel€and€defamation.€€Ìà àOn€January€12,€1996,€Milestone€filed€a€motion€for€attorneysðð€fees€and€costs€incurred€inÏdefending€Driberððs€claims€for€breach€of€the€employment€contract.€€By€ð ðMemorandum€andÏOrderðð€filed€January€22,€1996,€the€trial€court€denied€Milestoneððs€motion€for€attorneysðð€fees€andÏcosts€relating€to€defense€of€the€breach€of€employment€contract€claim.€€For€reasons€discussedÏbelow,€that€order€would€have€dismissed€all€remaining€claims€and€would€have€been€a€finalÏjudgment€had€it€been€properly€entered.€€à àOn€March€18,€1996,€Driber€filed€a€ð ðMotion€ForÏA€Final€Orderðð€pursuant€to€Rule€54,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.,€and€Milestone€filed€a€response€and€aÏproposed€order.€€The€trial€court,€on€April€18,€1996,€entered€the€order€submitted€by€MilestoneÏwhich€was€styled,€ð ðFinal€Judgment€On€All€Claims€For€Relief€In€This€Civil€Action€Except€TheÏPromissory€Note€Claims€For€Which€A€Final€Judgment€Has€Already€Been€Entered.ðð€€That€orderÏpurported€to€ð ðfinalizeðð€all€remaining€claims,€except€Milestoneððs€claim€against€Driber€on€theÍpromissory€note€which€had€been€rendered€final€pursuant€to€Rule€54.02€in€September€1994.€ÏDriber€has€now€appealed€from€the€trial€courtððs€order€entered€April€18,€1996€and€presents€threeÏissues€for€review:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àI.€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€Milestoneððs€motionÏfor€summary€judgment€as€to€Driberððs€claims.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àII.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€the€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€filed€by€Z€Corporation€and€Z„2€Corporation.€€ÌÌà8 àà8 àIII.€€Whether€the€trial€courtððs€April€18,€1996€order€was€in€errorÏin€ruling€that€its€order€entered€September€28,€1994€was€a€finalÏjudgment€under€Rule€54,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€€€€ÌÌÓÓà àWe€will€first€consider€Driberððs€third€issue.€€Driber€asserts€that€the€September€28,€1994Ïorder€was€not€a€final€order€and€therefore€could€not€have€been€appealed€earlier€than€May€17,Ï1996.€€Driber€argues€that€the€order€was€interlocutory€because€it€did€not€adjudicate€all€the€claimsÏor€the€rights€and€liabilities€of€all€the€parties€and€did€not€contain€the€required€language€of€RuleÏ54.02,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.,€to€make€it€final€and€appealable.€€We€find€Driberððs€assertion€to€beÏwithout€merit.€€Ìà à€€€€Rule€3,€T.R.A.P.,€which€pertains€to€the€appeal€of€a€final€judgment€to€this€Court,Ïstates€in€pertinent€part:€€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àIn€civil€actions€every€final€judgment€entered€by€a€trial€court€fromÏwhich€an€appeal€lies€to€the€.€.€.€Court€of€Appeals€is€appealable€asÏof€right.€€òòExcept€as€otherwise€permitted€in€.€.€.€Rule€54.02ÏTennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedureóó,€if€multiple€parties€orÏmultiple€claims€for€relief€are€involved€in€an€action,€any€order€thatÏadjudicates€fewer€than€all€the€claims€or€the€rights€and€liabilitiesÏof€fewer€than€all€the€parties€is€not€enforceable€or€appealable€andÏis€subject€to€revision€at€any€time€before€entry€of€a€final€judgmentÏadjudicating€all€the€claims,€rights,€and€liabilities€of€all€parties.€Ï(emphasis€added).ÌÌÓÓà àRule€54.02,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWhen€more€than€one€claim€for€relief€is€present€in€an€action,Ïwhether€as€a€claim,€counterclaim,€cross„claim,€or€third€partyÏclaim,€or€when€multiple€parties€are€involved,€the€court,€whetherÍat€law€or€equity,€may€direct€the€entry€of€a€final€judgment€as€toÏone€or€more€but€fewer€than€all€of€the€claims€or€parties€òòonly€uponÏan€express€determination€that€there€is€no€just€reason€for€delayÏand€upon€an€express€direction€for€the€entry€of€judgment.óó€Ï(emphasis€added).ÌÌÓÓà àSpecific€compliance€with€the€requirements€of€Rule€54.02€is€mandatory€in€order€to€makeÏan€interlocutory€order€a€final€order€appealable€as€of€right€to€this€Court.€€Our€Supreme€CourtÏheld€in€òòò òFox€v.€Foxó óóó,€657€S.W.2d€747€(Tenn.€1983),€that€an€absolute€prerequisite€to€appealÏwas€the€certification€by€the€trial€court€that€it€had€directed€the€entry€of€a€final€judgment€and€that€itÏhad€made€the€determination€that€there€was€no€just€reason€for€delay.€€In€the€absence€of€suchÏdirection€and€determination,€an€order€is€interlocutory€and€may€be€revised€at€any€time€beforeÏentry€of€an€order€adjudicating€all€the€claims€and€the€rights€and€liabilities€of€all€parties.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€atÏ749.Ìà àIn€the€instant€case,€the€September€28,€1994€order€expressly€stated€in€relevant€part,ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€Court€finds€that€there€is€òòno€just€reason€for€delayóó€and€that€theÏaction€as€it€relates€to€said€counterclaim€should€be€terminatedÏbetween€Driber€and€Milestone.€€Therefore,€it€is€further€orderedÏthat€the€Clerk€and€Master€enter€final€judgment€in€MilestoneððsÏfavor,€pursuant€to€Rule€54€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure,€against€Driber€on€the€original€counterclaim€for€breachÏof€his€promissory€note€.€.€.€the€court€expressly€determiningÏpursuant€to€Rule€54.02€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€CivilÏProcedure€that€òòthere€is€no€just€reason€for€delay€and€that€said€finalÏjudgment€should€be€entered.óó€€(emphasis€added).€Ì€ÌÓÓà àContrary€to€Driberððs€position,€we€find€that€the€language€contained€in€the€trial€courtððsÏSeptember€28,€1994€order€complies€with€the€stringent€requirements€of€Rule€54.02,ÏTenn.R.Civ.P.,€as€interpreted€by€the€Supreme€Court€in€ò òòòFox€v.€Foxóóó ó.€€The€trial€courtÏexpressly€determined€not€once€but€twice€that€there€was€no€just€reason€for€delay€and€directed€theÏentry€of€a€final€judgment.€€Driber€maintains€that€the€order€is€flawed€because€the€trial€courtÏordered€the€Clerk€and€Master€to€enter€the€judgment,€and€the€trial€court€clerk€is€without€authorityÏto€direct€entry€of€judgments.€€This€argument€is€wholly€without€merit.€€Rule€58,ÍTenn.R.Civ.P.,€sets€forth€the€requirements€for€entry€of€judgment€and€provides€that€entry€ofÏjudgment€is€effective€upon€certain€actions€having€been€taken€by€the€clerk.€€Accordingly,€weÏfind€that€the€trial€courtððs€September€28,€1994€order€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€ofÏMilestone€for€recovery€on€the€promissory€note€is€a€final€judgment€under€Rule€54.02,ÏTenn.R.Civ.P.€€Driber€did€not€appeal€said€judgment€within€30€days€as€required€by€Rule€4(a),ÏT.R.A.P.€€Therefore,€an€attempt€to€appeal€said€order€by€the€notice€of€appeal€filed€on€May€17,Ï1996€is€untimely.€€The€appeal€as€to€this€issue€is€dismissed€with€prejudice€for€failure€to€appealÏtimely€from€entry€of€a€final€judgment.€€€Ì€ò òà àó óThe€Court€now€turns€its€attention€to€the€question€of€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÏgranting€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€Milestone€and€the€Z€Corporations.€€We€first€note,Ïhowever,€a€question€as€to€the€finality€of€the€so„called€final€judgment.€€Milestone€filed€a€motionÏrequesting€attorneysðð€fees€pursuant€to€the€employment€contract€on€January€12,€1996,€and€theÏtrial€court€denied€the€motion€by€order€noted€in€the€record€as€filed€and€entered€on€January€22,Ï1996.€€Rule€58,€Tenn.R.Civ.P.,€provides€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àEntry€of€a€judgment€or€an€order€of€final€disposition€is€effectiveÏwhen€a€judgment€containing€one€of€the€following€is€marked€onÏthe€face€by€the€clerk€as€filed€for€entry:Ìà8 àà8 à(1)€the€signatures€of€the€judge€and€all€parties€or€counsel,€orÌà8 àà8 à(2)€the€signatures€of€the€judge€and€one€party€or€counsel€with€aÏcertificate€of€counsel€that€a€copy€of€the€proposed€order€has€beenÏserved€on€all€other€parties€or€counsel,€orÌà8 àà8 à(3)€the€signature€of€the€judge€and€a€certificate€of€the€clerk€that€aÏcopy€has€been€served€on€all€other€parties€or€counsel.ÌÌÓÓThe€trial€courtððs€January€22,€1996€order€does€not€comply€with€Rule€58.€€The€chancellor€signedÏthe€order,€€but€it€has€no€signatures€of€counsel€nor€any€certificate€of€service.€€WithoutÏcompliance€with€Rule€58,€there€is€no€effective€filing€date.€€ò òòòSee€Grantham€v.€TennesseeÏState€Bd.€of€Equalizationó óóó,€794€S.W.2d€751€(Tenn.€App.€1990).€€Since€the€order€fromÏwhich€the€appeal€is€taken€does€not€dispose€of€the€attorneysðð€fees€issue,€the€attorneysðð€feeÍquestion€is€technically€still€not€resolved.€€Parenthetically,€we€note€that€it€appears€the€resolutionÏof€the€attorney€feesðð€question€in€the€January€12,€1996€order€would€have€effectively€disposed€ofÏall€claims€and€therefore€would€have€been€the€final€judgment€from€which€appeal€should€haveÏbeen€taken.€€Nonetheless,€it€appears€to€the€Court€that€Milestoneððs€request€for€attorneysðð€feesÏand€costs€was€not€part€of€the€pleadings,€but€rather€was€a€post„hearing€motion€filed€almost€oneÏyear€after€entry€of€the€order€granting€defendants€summary€judgment€on€the€underlying€issue.€ÏTherefore,€rather€than€dismiss€the€appeal€for€a€third€time€on€this€basis,€the€Court€finds€it€to€beÏin€the€interests€of€judicial€economy€and€efficiency€to€treat€the€question€of€attorneysðð€fees€as€aÏnon„issue,€to€permit€the€appeal€to€proceed,€and€to€address€the€issues€raised€by€Driber.Ìà àDriber€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€defendantsðð€motions€for€summaryÏjudgment€because€there€existed€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€to€preclude€summary€judgment.€ÏAfter€examination€of€the€record€before€the€Court,€we€find€that€the€trial€court€properly€grantedÏsummary€judgment€as€to€the€defendants.€€Ìà àA€trial€court€should€grant€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€only€if€the€movantÏdemonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€isÏentitled€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€Tenn.R.Civ.P.€56.03;€€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2dÏ208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòò òDunn€v.€Hackettó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€78,€80€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€TheÏparty€moving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€of€demonstrating€that€no€genuine€issueÏof€material€fact€exists.€òòò ò€Byrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210.€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€theÏcourt€must€consider€the€motion€in€the€same€manner€as€a€motion€for€directed€verdict€made€at€theÏclose€of€the€plaintiff's€proof;€that€is,€"the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€theÏevidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,Ïand€discard€all€countervailing€evidence."€òòò ò€Idó óóó.€at€210„211.€€In€òòò òByrdó óóó,€the€Tennessee€SupremeÏCourt€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€no€genuineÏissue€of€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€party€must€thenÏdemonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discovery€materials,€that€there€is€aÏgenuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€€In€this€regard,ÏRule€56.05€provides€that€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€simplyÏrely€upon€his€pleadings€but€must€set€forth€òòspecific€factsóó€showingÏthat€there€is€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€for€trial.Ì€à@ àÌòòò òÓÓIdó óóó.€at€211.€(citations€omitted,€emphasis€in€original).€€Where€a€genuine€dispute€exists€as€to€anyÏmaterial€fact€or€as€to€the€conclusions€to€be€drawn€from€those€facts,€a€court€must€deny€a€motionÏfor€summary€judgment.€òòò ò€Byrdó óóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€211€(citing€òòò òDunnó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€at€80).Ìà àThe€employment€agreement€that€is€the€subject€of€the€breach€of€contract€claim€wasÏexecuted€between€Driber€and€PHC,€later€known€as€Milestone.€€The€agreement€provided€that€inÏexchange€for€salary€and€other€consideration,€Driber€was€to€serve€as€vice„president€of€PHC€andÏwas€to€perform€whatever€employment€duties€were€assigned€to€him€by€Ganier.€€TheÏemployment€agreement€provided€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àPrior€to€the€end€of€the€Employment€Term,€the€Corporation€mayÏimmediately€discharge€Employee€for€cause€and€terminate€thisÏAgreement€without€any€further€liability€hereunder€to€EmployeeÏor€his€estate.€.€.€.€For€purposes€of€this€Agreement,€a€ð ðdischargeÏfor€causeðð€shall€mean€òòa€discharge€resulting€from€a€determinationÏby€the€President€that€Employee€.€.€.€has€willfully€or€grosslyÏnegligently€neglected€his€duties,€or€willfully€failed€to€follow€theÏCorporationððs€policies€and€directives€from€persons€to€whomÏEmployee€reports.óó€€Ìà àò òà àó ó(emphasis€added).ÌÌÓÓà àGanier€terminated€Driberððs€employment.€€Ganierððs€affidavit€filed€in€support€of€theÏmotion€for€summary€judgment€stated€in€relevant€part:ÌÓÓà àà8 àI€determined€that€Driber€had€both€willfully€and€in€a€grosslyÏnegligent€fashion€neglected€his€duties€and€willfully€failed€toÏfollow€company€policies€and€directives€given€to€him€by€me€or€atÏmy€express€direction.€ÌÌÓÓGanier€also€stated€in€his€affidavit€that€he€had€terminated€Driberððs€employment€pursuant€to€theÏterms€of€the€contract€and€in€his€capacity€as€president€of€the€company€and€as€one€of€the€personsÍto€whom€Driber€reported.€€Ganier€stated€that€the€decision€was€a€ð ðdischarge€for€causeðð€asÏcontemplated€in€the€employment€agreement€and€was€made€in€the€best€interests€of€the€company.€ÏExamination€of€the€record€on€appeal€reveals€that€Driber€did€not€refute€the€statements€made€byÏGanier.€€In€fact,€the€record€is€devoid€of€any€response€filed€by€Driber€addressing€the€motionsÏfor€summary€judgment€on€this€issue.€€In€his€brief,€Driber€asserts€that€there€exists€a€genuineÏissue€of€material€fact€as€shown€by€the€testimony€of€Martin€Johnson€in€his€discovery€deposition.€ÏJohnson€was€the€owner€of€Ultra€Imaging€which€purchased€the€assets€of€Columbia€DiagnosticÏfrom€Milestone€in€August€1993.€€In€his€February€24,€1994€deposition,€Johnson€testified:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQ.à àMr.€Johnson,€did€Al€Ganier€at€any€time€during€theÏpossible€negotiations€of€PHC€Diagnostic€Services,€did€he€say€toÏyou,€ð ðDonððt€worry€about€Tom€Driber.€€I€can€get€rid€of€him€atÏany€time.ððÌÌà8 àà8 àA.à àHe€didnððt€say€he€could€get€rid€of€him€at€any€time.€€HeÏsaid€that€Tom€didnððt€have€to€be€there,€is€what€he€told€me.€.€.€.ÏWhen€I€went€down,€when€I€paid€him€for€„„€took€him€a€check€forÏColumbia,€he€and€I€were€talking€about€the€mobile€service.€€AndÏthatððs€when€I€asked€the€question,€ð ðWell,€what€about€Tom€andÏthe€other€employees?ðð€€And€Ìà8 àà8 àhe€said,€ð ðWell,€we€donððt€necessarily€have€to€keep€Tom.ðð€Ì€€€€ÌÓÓà àDriber€attempts€to€demonstrate€a€disputed€issue€of€fact€through€an€inference,€by€castingÏdoubt€on€Ganierððs€true€motive€in€discharging€him.€€However,€accepting€Johnsonððs€testimonyÏas€true,€we€do€not€construe€the€testimony€to€imply€that€Driber€would€be€discharged€from€hisÏemployment€in€breach€of€the€contract.Ìà àIt€appears€to€the€Court€that€the€deposition€testimony€upon€which€Driber€relies€isÏinsufficient€to€create€a€disputed€issue€of€material€fact€in€order€to€overcome€summary€judgment.€ÏThe€mere€existence€of€a€scintilla€of€evidence€in€support€of€the€[nonmoving€partyððs]€positionÏwill€be€insufficient;€there€must€be€evidence€on€which€the€jury€could€reasonably€find€for€theÏ[nonmoving€party].€€ò òòòAnderson€v.€Liberty€Lobby,€Inc.óóó ó,€477€U.S.€242,€249„255,€106ÏS.Ct.€2505,€2511„2513€(1986).€€òòò òSee€also€Byrdóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€at€212.€€Driber€seeks€toÍdemonstrate€a€disputed€issue€of€fact€by€means€of€an€inference€that€there€was€another€motiveÏbehind€his€discharge.€€Johnsonððs€testimony€neither€addresses€nor€rebuts€the€primary€issue€inÏthis€case,€that€is,€whether€Driber€was€discharged€for€cause.€€Moreover,€it€is€rather€significantÏthat€Driber€does€not€deny€Ganierððs€affidavit€statements.€€Regardless€of€whether€other€motivesÏfor€the€discharge€existed,€the€unrebutted€and€unrefuted€evidence€established€that€MilestoneÏdischarged€Driber€for€cause€under€the€terms€of€the€employment€contract.€€In€the€absence€of€anyÏcountervailing€evidence€directly€addressing€the€ð ðjust€causeðð€issue,€we€are€compelled€to€find€thatÏthe€trial€court€properly€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€Milestone.€€Furthermore,€weÏfind€that€the€trial€court€properly€granted€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€defendants€ZÏCorporation€and€Z„2€Corporation€because€the€liability€of€the€Z€defendants€was€predicated€on€aÏfinding€of€liability€of€Milestone.€€Ìà àTherefore,€the€appeal€from€the€September€28,€1994€order€of€the€trial€court€is€dismissedÏfor€failure€to€timely€file€a€notice€of€appeal.€€The€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€summaryÏjudgment€to€defendants€is€affirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€œÌsuch›€further€proceedings€as€may€be€necessary.€€Costs€of€the€appeal€are€assessed€against€theÏœappellant.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à_________________________________›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ó óÌÌò òCONCUR:ÌÌ_________________________________ÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌ_________________________________Ìò òHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€JUDGEó óÌœ