ÿWPCY  Šon&(60Ù‹7ô+žaþωbf›…“o† ±ÓÂ]¢l¼×·îWâ[çÕpdˆAB ¡%—/躳~RÅ&ï­óôóO*½ü*ÅØw7äQàÆ|’”‡àj·¸à2³{bÌò»lÈ:ȶþ"È~’ï«Ô[yøþbèãŠvù P–¹bWS¢pO5x&ûf h(áÉ;ArÞ?ºv–Ì2–¡œ¼Õ¾œ¢q î~ëæJy/À©¥)w9ßdµæ4z"á„VSGŠe+EÉÞv_jιnÕ1.?‹Ý¨¶ÅÔÑš‚s*,-%ͺØìô,^µž¥0x¤lo¤Šo¥>zPú¢c(*J§ yr§“BD½g´`±ßY¡cZ)PCÇYÐõT­à<@d{Ù½‰¢'ÂE–JÊçë–=èF¶éÎ ÈSåŽýµ m᱋mI*õ¨^KYnÌ6CŸÄÄQ<þ..q˜›¡¡FU°†Nh¿·ÿwŠ\Ñ÷¿ëO8ŽŠßàfµftõá󈞇r²™Ð3wr§bqRÊ$vùî«1q4ô°'@ÛR÷xoò†ãjÛdÆ%ó\Y›-V*i³27_,ÝÝ÷ ÝÅu;@€½Õè*# LU:W %‘ 0(—b ¿w@Ë4 ¹. 0lç 0DS—U:˜ Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò Ò BÚ AQ÷ ÆH 0D 0DR 0D– – D/Ú Ú B D3& ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ, øð AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡- ù - HIJKELMDNOPÓ€ZF&< ôF\h:3|xZ ¯Ò€°ÒÒ„°ÒÓ  ÓÔ€ô–Ù ôXXÔÝ ƒ þÝÿÝà Ø àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝObviously€the€plaintiff€recognizes€the€problems€he€faces€by€pressing€both€types€of€damages.€Ð ° ÐOne€is€that€the€product€liability€act€does€not€cover€claims€for€purely€economic€losses.€€The€other€is€thatÏto€recover€for€economic€losses€our€state€still€has€a€privity€requirement.((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó ÷Ý ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ X?„XXXÔÔ€ EmX X?„ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X?„X EmÔÐ  ÐÌMay€25,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular d!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝñPñ›ñPñÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ÑÑ7€?„XXdædÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñò òÔ€¼x¼XXÔÓ  ÓñZññPñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` 8ttxP,°ð  rßñPññZññZññZññPñ›ñPñà@  êàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌñZñœßt€ )>.*jxÓþ` `€€@EÇÂ` 8ttxPÿúð È tß›ñZñà@¦¦(êàAT€NASHVILLEó óÔ€X?„X¼¼xÔˆÐ Ä ÐÌÌGILES€DAMRON,€on€behalf€of€himselfà  à)Ð ¤ô Ðand€all€others€similarly€situated,à 8 àà  à)Ð Š Ú Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ð V ¦ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à01„A„01„9805„CV„00251Ð < Œ ÐVS.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð " r  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àLincoln€CircuitÐ X  ÐMEDIA€GENERAL,€INC.,€NES,€II,€INC.,à  à)à è àNo.€C„96„00043à ð àà H! àà  # àœÐ î>  Ðd/b/a€ONDULINE€SALES€and€à 8 àà  à)Ð Ô$  ÐSERVICE,€and€GARDEN€STATE€à  à)Ð º  ÐPAPER€COMPANY,€INC.,€a€whollyà  à)Ð  ð  Ðowned€subsidiary€ofà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð †Ö  ÐMEDIA€GENERAL,€INC.,à à àà 8 àà  à)›Ð l¼ Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendants/Appellants.à 8 àà  à)Ð 8ˆ М̛Ìà@H H êàAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€LINCOLN€COUNTYˆÌœà@ßß!êàAT›€œFAYETTEVILLE,€TENNESSEE›ˆÌÌà@Ñ Ñ êàTHE€HONORABLE€œF.€LEE€RUSSELL,€JUDGE›ˆÌÌC.J.€GIDEON,€JR.ÌBRYAN€ESSARYÌEDWARD€A.€HADLEYÌSuite€1900,€NationsBank€PlazaÌœNashville,›€Tennessee€37219„1782ÌÌRAYMOND€W.€FRALEY,€JR.Ì205€East€Market€StreetÌFayetteville,€Tennessee€37334Ìà Ø àAttorneys€for€Plaintiff/AppelleeÌÌE.€CLIFTON€KNOWLESÌROBERT€E.€COOPER,€JR.ÌSAMUEL€L.€FELKERÌE.€œSTEELE›€CLAYTON,€IVÌœSuite€2700,€First›€American€CenterÌNashville,€Tennessee€37238„2700Ìà Ø àAttorneys€for€Defendants/AppellantsÌÌW.€OVID€COLLINS,€JR.ÌJOSEPH€R.€WHEELERÌSuite€2700,€Nashville€City€CenterÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ìà Ø àAttorneys€for€Tennessee€Association€of€BusinessÌÌà@‘‘#êàREVERSED€AND€DISMISSEDˆÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àBEN€H.€CANTRELLÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àà è àà @ àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌCONCUR:ÌKOCH,€J.ÌCAIN,€J.ÌÓÓò òÔ€„ìm„XX?„Ôòòà@tt(êàO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óÔ€X?„X„„ìmԈР:^5;9 Їà Ø àà 0 àIn€this€œaction,€the€plaintiff€sought›€to€represent€a€class€of€purchasers€ofÏa€roofing€œproduct.€€The›€defendants€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€the€productÏliability€statute€of€repose,€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations,€the€economic€lossÏdoctrine€and€laches.€€The€Circuit€Court€of€Lincoln€County€overruled€the€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€and€granted€the€plaintiffððs€motion€for€class€certification.€€WeÏgranted€the€defendantsðð€motion€for€an€interlocutory€appeal€under€Rule€9,€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€Proc.€€We€reverse€the€lower€courtððs€order€and€dismiss€the€action.ÌÌà@²²-êàò òI.ó óˆÐ ` ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àOnduline€roofing€material€is€made€of€compressed€paper€fibersÏimpregnated€with€asphalt.€€In€the€fall€of€œ1979,›€Mr.€Giles€Damron,€a€Lincoln€CountyÏfarmer,€bought€approximately€5,300€square€feet€of€the€material€to€roof€a€pig€barn.€ÏBefore€he€completed€the€œroof,›€he€noticed€that€water€collected€on€œits›€underside€œand›Ïdripped€on€the€barn€floor.€€This€problem€turned€out€to€be€persistent,€and€despite€Mr.ÏDamronððs€efforts€œto€correct€it€by€painting›€the€underside€of€the€roof€and€installing€aÏventilation€system,€the€roof€continued€to€œsweat.€€However,›€the€water€no€longer€drippedÏon€the€floor.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThree€years€later,€the€roof€developed€cracks€and€started€to€leak.€€Mr.ÏDamron€patched€the€roof€with€roofing€œcement,›€which€temporarily€stopped€the€œleaks.›ÏœOver›€the€next€two€œyears,›€œadditional›€cracks€appeared,€however,€and€Mr.€Damron€finallyÏcovered€the€roof€with€tin.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àOn€March€27,€1996,€Mr.€Damron€filed€suit€in€the€Circuit€Court€for€LincolnÏCounty€against€three€defendants€that€allegedly€manufactured€and€distributed€OndulineÏroofing€materials.€€The€complaint€sought€damages€for€breach€of€contract,€breach€ofÏexpress€and€implied€warranties,€misrepresentation,€negligence,€strict€liability,€andÏfraud.€€Mr.€Damron€sought€to€represent€a€class€of€plaintiffs€that€had€been€damagedÏby€the€failure€of€Onduline€products.Ð Ø8(4: Їà Ø àà 0 àThe€defendants€moved€for€summary€œjudgment,›€alleging€that€Mr.ÏDamronððs€claims€were€barred€by€the€product€liability€statute€of€repose,€the€applicableÏstatute€of€limitations,€the€economic€loss€doctrine,€and€laches.€€The€plaintiff€respondedÏto€the€defendantsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€moved€for€certification€of€theÏclass.€€The€court€denied€the€motion€for€summary€judgment€and€granted€the€classÏcertification.€€The€trial€court€and€this€court€granted€the€defendantsðð€Rule€9,€Tenn.€R.ÏApp.€Proc.€motion€for€permission€to€appeal.ÌÌà@––-êàò òII.ó óˆÐ 0€ Ðà@Î Î êàòòò òthe€statute€of€limitations/statute€of€reposeó óóóˆÐ ` ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àActions€seeking€to€recover€damages€for€the€harm€caused€by€goods€thatÏfail€to€meet€the€promises€of€the€sellers€or€are€defective€or€unreasonably€dangerousÏmust€be€brought€within€specified€time€periods,€depending€on€the€harm€alleged€and€„„Ïsometimes€„„€on€the€cause€of€action.€€òòSee€Turner€v.€œAldor›€Co.€of€Nashville,€Inc.óó,€827Ð p&À!$ ÐS.W.2d€318€(Tenn.€App.€1991).€€In€general,€actions€for€damages€to€property€must€beÏbrought€within€three€years€of€the€accrual€of€the€cause€of€action,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ððÏ28„3„105(1),€except€where€the€action€is€based€on€a€breach€of€warranty,€in€which€caseÏthe€action€may€be€brought€within€four€years€of€œaccrual.›€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„¼725(1).€€ð ðAccrualðð€occurs€at€different€times€for€the€different€claims.€€Under€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€28„3„105(1)€the€cause€of€action€does€not€accrue€until€discovery,€òòPrescott€v.Ð °1-0 ÐAdamsóó,€627€S.W.2d€134€(Tenn.€App.€1981);€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€47„2„725(1),Ð 3à.2 Ðhowever,€the€cause€of€action€generally€accrues€upon€tender€of€delivery,€and€the€timeÏâ âmay€run€even€before€the€breach€is€discovered.€€òòLayman€œv.›€œKeller›€Ladders,€Inc.óó,€455Ð P7 26 ÐS.W.2d€594€(Tenn.€1970);€òòœPoppenheimer›€v.€Bluff€City€Motor€Homesóó,€658€S.W.2d€106Ð ° Ð(Tenn.€App.€1983).Ìâ âÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€discovery€rule€allows€actions€to€be€brought€well€beyond€theÏlimitation€period€measured€from€the€sale€of€the€product€or€the€negligent€act.€€To€addÏan€outside€limit€to€the€exposure€period€the€legislature€has€seen€fit€to€pass€variousÏstatutes€of€repose€beyond€which€a€cause€of€action€cannot€accrue.€€òòœCronin›€v.€Howeóó,Ð ð@  Ð906€S.W.2d€910€(Tenn.€1995).€€Thus,€there€is€a€three€year€statute€of€repose€forÏmedical€malpractice€claims,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„26„116(a)(3),€a€four€year€statuteÏof€repose€for€the€defective€design€or€construction€of€improvements€to€real€estate,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ28„3„202,›€and€a€four€year€statute€of€repose€for€a€faulty€survey,ÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€28„3„114(a)(running€from€the€date€the€survey€is€recorded€on€theÏœplat.)€€In€one€form€or€another€all€these€statutes€of€repose€incorporate€a€tolling€featureÏtriggered€by€fraudulent€concealment.›ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€1978€the€legislature€passed€the€ð ðTennessee€Product€Liability€Act€ofÏ1978.ðð€€It€applied€to€all€actions€seeking€to€recover€for€personal€injuries,€death,€orÏproperty€damage€caused€by€defective€or€unreasonably€dangerous€products,€i.e.€œbyÏtangible›€objects€or€goods.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„102(5)€and€(6).€€Any€actionÏð ðunder€any€substantive€legal€theory€in€tort€or€contractðð€came€within€œthe€Actððs€›Ïdefinitions.€€òòId.óó€at€(6).Ð 0*€%( ÐÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€Product€Liability€Act€contained€its€own€statute€of€repose:ÌœÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ à(1)à à àAny€action€against€a€manufacturer€or€sellerÐ Ð/ +. Ðof€a€product€for€injury€to€person€or€property€caused€by€itsÏdefective€or€unreasonably€dangerous€condition€must€beÏbrought€within€the€period€fixed€by€ðððð€28„3„104,€28„3„105,Ï28„3„202€and€47„2„725,€but€notwithstanding€anyÏexceptions€to€these€provisions€it€must€be€brought€withinÏsix€(6)€years€of€the€date€of€injury,€in€any€event,€the€actionÏmust€be€brought€within€ten€(10)€years€from€the€date€onÏwhich€the€product€was€first€purchased€for€use€orÏconsumption,€or€within€one€(1)€year€after€the€expiration€ofÏthe€anticipated€life€of€the€product,€whichever€is€theÏshorter,€except€in€the€case€of€injury€to€minors€whoseÐ  :p59 Ðaction€must€be€brought€within€a€period€of€one(1)€year€afterÏattaining€the€age€of€majority,€whichever€occurs€sooner.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„103(a).ÌÌÓÓÌ›à Ø àà 0 àœUnder›€this€statute,€an€action€must€first€meet€the€requirements€of€theÏð ðordinaryðð€statutes€of€limitations;€but€if€any€exceptions€to€these€statutes€make€themÏinapplicable,€there€is€an€outside€limit€of€ten€years€from€the€date€the€product€is€firstÏpurchased€for€use€or€consumption.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àMr.€Damron€was€able€to€avoid€summary€judgment€in€the€court€below€by€Ïcontending€that€there€are€facts€in€dispute€relative€to€whether€the€defendantsÏfraudulently€concealed€the€cause€of€action€from€him.€€The€defendants€argue€that€thereÏis€no€fraudulent€concealment€exception€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„103.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€are€persuaded€that€the€defendants€are€correct.€€An€exception€is€notÏfound€in€the€statute€itself,€and€it€appears€that€the€choice€not€to€include€the€exceptionÏwas€deliberately€made€by€the€legislature.€€When€the€House€of€RepresentativesÏdebated€the€bill€in€1978,€one€of€the€members€proposed€the€following€amendment:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àð ðAny€defect€discovered€in€a€product€during€the€10€yearÏperiod€for€claims€which€is€known€to€the€manufacturer€orÏseller,€and€is€concealed€by€him,€shall€toll€the€running€ofÏthe€10€year€period€and€the€computation€shallÏrecommence€only€when€the€manufacturer€or€seller€makesÏa€bona€fide€effort€to€inform€persons€who€possess€or€useÏthe€product.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌÓÓà Ø àà 0 àOne€of€the€sponsors€moved€to€table€the€amendment€and€the€motionÏcarried€by€a€vote€of€fifty„two€to€forty.€€Although€the€amendmentððs€sponsor€was€notÏcrystal€clear€in€his€explanation€of€the€amendment,€the€amendment€itself€is€clear€andÏits€defeat€is€a€powerful€indication€that€the€House€of€Representatives€intended€that€aÏten€year€period€would€be€the€outside€limit€and€would€not€be€affected€by€concealmentÏof€a€defect€by€the€manufacturer€or€seller.ÌÐ  :p59 Ðà Ø àà 0 àMr.€Damron€cites€òòKing„œBradwell›€Partnership€v.€Johnson€Controls,€Inc.óó,Ð ° Ð865€S.W.2d€18€(Tenn.€App.€1993)€as€authority€for€the€proposition€that€fraudulentÏconcealment€will€toll€the€products€liability€statute€of€repose.€€In€that€case,€however,€theÏcourt€did€not€address€the€question€directly.€€While€assuming€that€fraudulentÏconcealment€would€toll€the€statute,€the€court€found€that€the€facts€in€the€case€wereÏinsufficient€œto›€support€a€finding€of€fraudulent€concealment.€€So€far€as€we€have€beenÏable€to€discover,€this€is€the€first€case€where€the€parties€have€joined€issue€in€the€stateÏcourts€on€the€question€of€whether€fraudulent€concealment€will€toll€the€products€liabilityÏstatute€of€repose.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€issue€was€raised€in€the€federal€court€in€òòHayes€v.€General€MotorsÐ pÀ ÐCorporationóó,€œNo.€95„5713,€1996€U.S.€App.€LEXIS€22345€(6th€Cir.€Aug€8,€1996),›€andÐ P  Ðthe€Sixth€Circuit€concluded€that€the€sweeping€language€in€the€statute€(ð ðin€any€event,Ïthe€action€must€be€brought€within€ten€years€.€.€.ðð)€allowed€for€no€exceptions.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àMr.€Damron€also€relies€on€an€earlier€case,€œòòPatten›€v.€Standard€Oil€Co.€ofÐ Ð  ÐLouisianaóó,€55€S.W.2d€759€(Tenn.€1933),€for€the€proposition€that€all€statutes€ofÐ °"  Ðlimitations€in€Tennessee€are€statutes€of€repose€and€that€fraudulent€concealment€willÏtoll€the€running€of€the€statute.€€That€conclusion€is€drawn€from€a€statement€by€the€courtÏnear€the€end€of€that€opinion,€after€the€court€had€already€found€that€the€plaintiff€had€notÏalleged€facts€amounting€to€fraud,€that€ð ðthe€statute€of€limitations€is€looked€œupon€withÏfavor›€as€a€statute€of€repose.ðð€€55€S.W.2d€at€762.€€We€think,€however,€if€that€was€theÏview€of€the€Supreme€Court€in€1933,€the€court€abandoned€that€view€completely€inÏsubsequent€cases.€€òòSee€Harrison€v.€œSchrader›óó,€569€œS.W.2d›€822€(Tenn.€1977);€òòWattsÐ Ð/ +. Ðv.€œPutnam›€Co.óó,€525€œS.W.2d›€488€(Tenn.€œ1975)€(dealing›€with€the€question€of€howÐ °1-0 Ðdiscovery€affects€statutes€of€limitation€and€statutes€of€repose.)ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe€are€also€aware€of€cases€in€which€the€courts€have€tolled€the€runningÏof€a€statute€of€repose€for€reasons€not€recognized€in€the€statute€itself.€€òòSee€Bowers€v.Ð 09€48 ÐHammondóó,€954€œS.W.2d›€752€(Tenn.€App.€1997)(medical€malpractice€statute€of€reposeÐ ° Ðtolled€by€minority€of€the€plaintiff).ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àIn€none€of€these€cases,€however,€do€we€have€a€strong€indication€fromÏthe€legislature€of€its€intent€to€make€the€statute€of€repose€the€outside€limit€in€which€theÏcause€of€action€could€accrue.€€We€hold€that€the€statute€of€repose€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.Ïðð€29„28„103(a)€is€a€bar€to€Mr.€Damronððs€claim.ÌÌœñEñà@zz,êàò òIII.ˆÐ ° Ðà@ææ&êàòòthe€class€actionóóó óˆÐ à Ðà Ø àà 0 àMr.€Damron€moved€the€court€to€certify€a€class€of€plaintiffs€consisting€of€ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àð ðall€purchasers€of€ten€and€thirteen€corrugation€OndulineÏrelated€roofing€and€siding€products,€and€all€persons€andÏentities€that€own€œand/or›€previously€owned€structures€ofÏimprovements€to€real€property€upon€which€ten€andÏthirteen€corrugation€Onduline€related€roofing€and€sidingÏproducts€have€been€installed.€€Expressly€excluded€fromÏthe€class€are€claims€for€personal€injury€and€all€claims€byÏœanñ=ñyñ=ñ›€person€or€entity€that€has€already€been€certified€as€aÏclass€action.ððÐ 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌÓ:Óà Ø àà 0 àRule€23,€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€Proc.,€recognizes€that€actions€may€be€brought€onÏbehalf€of€or€against€a€class€of€persons€or€entities.€€The€rule,€however,€places€someÏstrict€requirements€on€what€must€be€shown€in€order€to€win€certification,€and€the€burdenÏis€on€the€one€seeking€certification€to€show€that€all€the€requirements€have€beenÏsatisfied.€€òòWarren€v.€Scottóó,€845€œS.W.2d›€780€(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€Rule€23.01€providesÐ ,`'* Ðthe€general€requirements:ÌœÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àOne€or€more€members€of€a€class€may€sue€or€beÏsued€as€representative€parties€on€behalf€of€all€only€if:€(1)Ïthe€class€is€so€numerous€that€joinder€of€all€members€isÏimpracticable;€(2)€there€are€questions€of€law€or€factÏcommon€to€the€class;€(3)€the€claims€or€defenses€of€theÏrepresentative€parties€are€typical€of€the€claims€orÏdefenses€of€the€class;€and€(4)€the€representative€partiesÏwill€fairly€and€adequately€protect€the€interest€of€the€class.›¼à ˆ àà à àÐ 0 ¤0 ¤ Ð̜Р09€48 ЛÓÓà Ø àà 0 àIn€addition,€Rule€23.02€requires€a€finding€that€one€or€all€of€three€otherÏfactors€are€present.€€In€this€case€the€plaintiff€alleges€facts€that€bring€the€case€withinÏRule€23.02(3).€€That€section€œrequires:ÌÓÓà8 Ø àà80 Ø ü!Ø ü!àà ˆ àThe€court€finds€that€the€question€of€law€or€factÏcommon€to€the€members€of€the€class€predominate€overÏany€questions€affecting€only€individual€members,€and€thatÏa€class€action€is€superior€to€other€available€methods€forÏthe€fair€and€efficient€adjudication€of€the€controversy.€€TheÏmatters€pertinent€to€the€findings€include:€(1)€the€interest€ofÏmembers€of€the€class€in€individually€controlling€theÏprosecution€or€defense€of€separate€actions;€(b)€the€extentÏand€nature€of€any€litigation€concerning€the€controversyÏalready€commenced€by€or€against€members€of€the€class;Ï(c)€the€desirability€or€undesirability€of€concentrating€theÏlitigation€of€the€claims€in€the€particular€forum;€(d)€theÏdifficulties€likely€to€be€encountered€in€the€management€ofÏa€class€action.Ð 0 ¤0 ¤ ÐÌÌÌ›ÓÓà Ø àà 0 àAs€we€have€noted€Mr.€Damron€sued€for€breach€of€contract,€breach€ofÏexpressed€and€implied€warranties,€misrepresentation,€negligence,€strict€liability€andÏfraud.€€In€addition€to€compensatory€damages,€the€complaint€sought€an€award€ofÏpunitive€damages€ð ðto€each€member€of€the€class.ðð€€The€class€includes,€withoutÏlimitation€as€to€time€or€geography,€all€purchasers€of€.€.€.€Onduline€products.ðð€€AlthoughÏthe€class€action€does€not€include€any€claims€for€personal€injuries,€the€plaintiff€doesÏseek€damages€for€economic€losses€and€for€injuries€to€propertyœ×ƒ ×Ý ƒ %ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×›€(water€damages€to€theÐ €%Ð # Ðbarn€caused€by€the€leaking€roof).ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWhere€Rule€23.01€requires€common€questions€of€law€or€facts,€RuleÏ23.02(3)€raises€that€threshold€to€require€a€finding€that€such€common€questionsÏpredominate€over€any€questions€affecting€only€individual€members.€€òòSee€œAmchñ>ñeñ>ñm›Ð à.0*- МñAñPñAñroducts,›€Inc.€v.€Windsoróó,€117€œS.Ct›.€2231€(1997).€€We€note€also€that€subsection€(3)Ð À0,/ Ðrequires€a€finding€that€a€class€action€is€superior€to€other€available€methods€for€the€fairÏand€efficient€adjudication€of€the€controversy.ÌÐ `6°15 Ðà Ø àà 0 àAlthough€Mr.€Damron€argues€that€the€Tennessee€choice„of„law€rulesÏwould€allow€the€claims€of€all€the€class€members€to€be€tried€under€the€laws€of€Virginia,Ïhis€secondary€position€is€that€the€class€action€would€be€ð ðmanageableðð€even€if€the€courtÏhad€to€apply€the€products€liability€laws€of€all€fifty€states.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àBut€under€either€eventuality€we€think€the€questions€of€fact€involving€theÏindividual€members€of€the€class€predominate€over€the€common€ones,€rather€than€theÏother€way€around.€€By€defining€the€class€without€respect€to€any€particular€time€periodÏduring€which€the€members€of€the€class€purchased€the€Onduline€product,€by€allegingÏthe€various€causes€of€action,€and€by€seeking€damages€œto›€œproperty€other€than€theÏproduct€itself,€the›€plaintiff€has,€it€seems€to€us,€created€a€class€where€each€claim€willÏhave€to€be€tried€separately.€€How€else€could€a€court€determine€how€much€the€leakingÏroof€had€damaged€Mr.€Damronððs€barn?€€How€could€the€court€decide€the€sameÏquestion€with€respect€to€a€class€member€in€Iowa€without€a€trial€involving€that€specificÏpiece€of€property?ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€plaintiff€cites€òòœMeighan›€œñBñvñBñ.›€U.S.€Sprint€Communicationsóó,€924€œS.W.2d›Ð °"  Ð632€(Tenn.€1996),€for€the€proposition€that€the€court€might€determine€an€aggregateÏdamage€amount€for€the€class€as€a€whole,€rather€than€conducting€separate€damageÏinquiries€for€each€class€member.€€That€is€an€accurate€statement€of€the€holding€in€thatÏcase,€but€we€think€there€is€a€significant€difference€between€finding€an€aggregateÏamount€of€damage€for€running€a€fiber€optic€cable€along€œ230›€miles€of€a€railroad€right„of„¼way€in€Tennessee€and€trying€to€find€an€aggregate€amount€of€damage€to€thousandsÏof€property€owners€in€all€fifty€states.€€We€think€it€cannot€be€done.ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àWe,€therefore,€hold€that€the€trial€judge€abused€his€discretion€in€certifyingÏthe€class.€€òòWarren€v.€Scottóó,€845€œS.W.2d›€œñCñ7ñCññEññEñ80›€(Tenn.€App.€1992).ñEññFñà Ø àñFññFñà 0 àñFññFñSince€we€hañFññGññFñeñFññGññHñve€held€that€Mr.€Damronððs€claim€must€be€dismissed,€theÏissue€of€his€ability€to€represent€a€class€ñHññIñof€ñIññMññHñoñHññMññNñOñNññHñnduline€pñHññMñ›ñMññJñurchasers€is€moot.€€WeñJññKññJñ.ñJññKññLñ,€therefore,Ïwill€not€address€that€issue.ñLñ›ÌÌà Ø àà 0 àThe€judgment€of€the€court€below€is€reversed€and€the€complaint€isÏdismissed.€€Remand€the€cause€to€the€Circuit€Court€of€Lincoln€County€for€any€furtherÏproceedings€that€may€become€necessary.€€Tax€the€costs€on€appeal€to€the€appellee.Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àÌ̛̜ÓÓà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à_________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  àPRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌ_____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌœÌ_____________________________›ÌWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÐ  P7 26 ÐÑ  ÑÔ€¼—Ò¼XX UÔò òà@êê.êàœñOñIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ ° Ðà@™™(êàAT€NASHVILLEñOñó óñOñÔ€X UX¼¼—ÒÔˆÐ Æ ÐÌÌœGILES€DAMRON,€on€behalf€of€himselfà  à)Ð ¼  Ðand€all€others€similarly€situated,à 8 àà  à)Ð ¬ ü Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àAppeal€No.Ð Œ Ü Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è à01„A„01„9805„CV„00251Ð | Ì ÐVS.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ð l ¼  Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àLincoln€CircuitÐ \¬  ÐMEDIA€GENERAL,€INC.,€NES,€II,€INC.,à  à)à è àNo.€C„96„00043à ð àà H! àà  # àÐ Lœ  Ðd/b/a€ONDULINE€SALES€and€à 8 àà  à)Ð <Œ  ÐSERVICE,€and€GARDEN€STATE€à  à)Ð ,|  ÐPAPER€COMPANY,€INC.,€a€whollyà  à)à è àReversedÐ l  Ðowned€subsidiary€ofà à àà 8 àà  à)à è àandÐ  \ ÐMEDIA€GENERAL,€INC.,à à àà 8 àà  à)à è àRemandedÐ üL Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendants/Appellants.à 8 àà  à)Ð Ü, ЛÌÌÔ€¼—Ò¼XX UÔò òòòà@uu'êàJ€U€D€G€M€E€N€œTóóó óˆÐ ¬ü ЛÌÌÓÓÔ€X UX¼¼—ÒÔà Ø àà 0 àThis€cause€came€on€to€be€heard€upon€the€record€on€appeal€from€theÐ î> ÐCircuit€Court€of€Lincoln€County,€briefs€and€argument€of€counsel;€upon€considerationÏwhereof,€this€Court€is€of€the€opinion€that€in€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€there€isÏreversible€error.Ìà Ø àà 0 àIt€is,€therefore,€ordered€and€adjudged€by€this€Court€that€the€judgment€ofÏthe€trial€court€is€reversed€and€dismissed.€€The€cause€is€remanded€to€the€Circuit€CourtÏof€Lincoln€County€for€any€further€proceedings€necessary€and€for€the€collection€of€theÏcosts€accrued€below.Ìà Ø àà 0 àCosts€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€against€Giles€Damron,€for€whichÏexecution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÓÓÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€PRESIDING€JUDGE,€M.S.ÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌñOñ›