ÿWPC˜ 7weŽÜïÇÕ{LWl‘BmN§Äª¢†‡‹ƒ¸]y‘ô²©Æ^eœÇ°õwQ¤O$G9!b1½¨ˆÔ€wxgôàÛÛ âáµt8PSãÒùf÷oÁ”G´OZ¤»Û<튴ÂÎÁðƒø7Áv˜:gµgÇ]™{ÎÈ(¡{ D?¡/HNÄÜÏk=­¯,cÐ6W?±E”Kbrà]>ðÎÊ)±/è?Æ& YU ¬Ö¯™°wÕn$õr™Ýè›â¦a´#,|Ù"ÒSHµè_1Ã6£ºc¸i5J¤à¸öÔɃiÄ_ªûWÇg½çŒ€’“ø­ü–Ò¸[ÌèÆÃâôK½‘ lŸŒÍçLŸæ¿E”ÞC³÷#{„\ Qª„ñ×Eé° ?áà ÁB\L:=b­øÐØ.T ÙËßWFµ8.*jx°` `€€@E¤ ` 8ttxPÜ Ð  tß›ñÉ ñà Ø àà  à)à  àWilliamson€CircuitÐ  P ÐAðâð€HOMECARE,€INC.€andà  à)à  àNo.€I„95381Ð  ` ÐJAMES€D.€SMITH,à  à)Ð  p Ðà Ø àà  à)Ìà Ø àDefendants/Appellees.à  à)à  àÐ @  Ðà Ø àà  à)ÌÌÌÔ#†XöRX¼¼Ü#8#ÔÔ‡»\ »XXöRÔÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ €Ð  ÐÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€ÌWILLIAMSON€COUNTYÌAT€FRANKLIN,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€CORNELIA€A.€CLARK,€JUDGEÌÓ9°,X‚Xì“X€ü(‚X˜‘X9ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓSTANLEY€M.€CHERNAUÌSuntrust€Center,€Suite€1750Ì424€Church€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219ÌÔ#†XöRX»»\ #ÔÔ‡¼Ü#¼XXöRÔà Ø àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLANTÐ À'#! ÐÔ#†XöRX¼¼Ü#¼#ÔÔ‡»\ »XXöRÔÌÌÌROBERT€E.€BOSTONÌ511€Union€Street,€Suite€2100ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219Ìà Ø àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANTS/APPELLEESÌÌÌÔ#†XöRX»»\ ?#ÔÔ‡¼Ü#¼XXöRÔÌÓ  ÓÌÌAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌñ¿ ñÑ foÑÑ7€öRXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  ÑÑ foÑÑ#€O@Xÿÿd#ÑÑ € ÑÑ  Ññ¿ ñÌñ¿ ñÑ foÑÑ7€öRXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ¿ ñÓ  Óà @ àà @ì àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÐ à:063w ÐÑ foÑÑ7€öRXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ¿ ñÑ foÑÑ7€övXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ€ ÑÑ  Ññ¿ ñÓÓÓ  ÓòòÔ#†XöRX¼¼Ü#_#ÔÔ‡°QA°XXöRÔOPINIONóóÐ ° ÐÓ  ÓÔ#†XöRX°°QAI #ÔÓ€ÓÓ9°,X°4ì“X°,X‚Xì“X9ÓÔ€¼Ü#¼XXöRÔà  àThis€is€an€appeal€by€the€plaintiff€from€summary€judgment€granted€to€theÐ T¤ ÐDefendants€in€a€complaint€asserting€retaliatory€discharge€with€the€action€basedÏsolely€upon€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304.ÌÌI.à  àTHE€FACTS€OF€THE€CASEà ¼ à€Ð ´  Ðà  àPlaintiff€was€employed€by€A+€Homecare,€Inc.€on€September€6,€1994€toÏbe€its€Director€of€Finance.€€He€was€hired€as€an€"at€will"€employee.€€A+€Homecare,ÏInc.,€through€its€agencies,€provides€home€health€services€to€individuals€throughoutÏthe€Middle€Tennessee€area.€€A+€Homecare,€Inc.€had€a€written€policy€prohibitingÏsexual€harassment€in€the€work€place€which€policy€was€known€to€Mitchell€Darnall.€ÏœIn›€late€October€1994,€one€of€Darnall's€female€co„workers€complained€to€A+Ïsupervisory€personnel€that€Darnall€had€made€inappropriate,€unwelcome,€sexuallyÏgraphic€comments€to€her€of€a€personal€nature€that€made€her€very€uncomfortable.€ÏThis€employee,€Diana€Rollinson,€made€her€complaints€to€Cindi€Smith,€ViceÏPresident€of€Human€Resources€at€A+.€€After€reporting€the€problem€to€RheaÏGarrett,€General€Counsel€for€A+,€Cindi€Smith€informed€Darnall€of€the€complaintÏasserted€by€Ms.€Rollinson.ÌÌà  àDarnall's€response€to€A+'s€motion€for€summary€judgment€reads€inÏpertinent€part,€as€follows:Ìò òÓ€ÓÓ?€ü(€ ä ¼è“X°,X°4ì“X?Óà  àòòDEFENDANT'S€ALLEGED€UNDISPUTED€FACT€„€NUMBER€3óóó óÐ 4(„#* ÐÌà8  àà ä àIn€late€October,€1994,€one€of€Darnall's€female€co„¼workers€complained€to€A+'s€supervisory€personnel€thatÏDarnall€had€engaged€in€inappropriate€behavior€which,Ïapparently€to€the€employee€and€certainly€to€A+,€was€deemedÏto€constitute€sexual€harassment.€€Garrett€aff.€at€ðð€ðð€2„3.€€ThatÏemployee,€Diana€Rollinson,€complained€that€Darnall€hadÏmade€inappropriate,€unwelcome€sexually€graphic€commentsÏto€her,€of€a€very€personal€nature,€that€made€her€veryÏuncomfortable.òò2óó€€...ÐÒ2".4 Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà ä àÔ‡XöRX¼¼Ü#ÔÐ  Ð  Ð  ÐÒ„ÒÒ" €ÒÓ9XƒX" —X€ü(€ ä ¼è“X9ÓÔ#†¼Ü#¼XXöR#Ô€€€€€€€€òò2óó€Specifically,€Ms.€Rollinson€reported€that,€while€the€twoÐ Î406 Ðwere€alone€at€A+'s€offices€one€evening,€Darnall€told€her€thatÏhe€had€learned€at€Lamaze€class€that€his€pregnant€wife's€laborÏcould€be€quickened€with€ejaculation€of€semen€and€massagingÏof€the€breasts.€€Garrett€Aff€at€ðð€2.€€€ÌÐ :n5; ÐÓ€ÓÓ  ÓœÌÌ*›€*€*ÌÓ  Óòòò òPLAINTIFF'S€RESPONSEó óóóÐ x È ÐÓ€Óà z àThe€only€true€reproach€by€anyone€at€Defendant€A+,Ïuntil€the€date€of€termination,€was€a€statement€by€Ms.€CindiÏSmith,€Vice€President€of€Human€Resources,€that€Plaintiff€hadÏpossibly€offended€Ms.€Dianna€Rollinson€with€a€commentÏregarding€his€wife's€pregnancy€in€late€October€1994.€€At€thatÏtime,€Plaintiff€could€not€recall€any€questionable€statementsÏmade,€and€Ms.€Smith€did€not€know€the€specifics.€€PlaintiffÏlater€realized€it€occurred€at€a€staff€meeting€on€a€MondayÏfollowing€a€Lamaze€class€he€attended€with€his€pregnant€wife.€ÏDuring€the€staff€meeting,€he€was€asked€many€questions€by€hisÏstaff.€€Plaintiff€answered€their€questions€concerning€the€classÏbecause€the€staff€members€appeared€to€be€genuinelyÏinterested.€€Apparently,€the€statement€was€made€by€PlaintiffÏwhile€answering€their€questions.€€At€no€point€did€PlaintiffÏacknowledge€that€any€conversation€had€gotten€out€of€hand.€ÏMs.€Smith€maintained€that€the€statement€was€simply€anÏunintentional€misunderstanding€and€definitely€was€not€aÏproblem.€€Further,€it€would€not€be€reported€in€his€personnelÏfile.€€He€apologized€to€Ms.€Rollinson.€€No€further€complaintsÏwere€made€known€to€Plaintiff€until€termination.€€...ÌÓ€ÓÌÒ€" ÒÒ„Òà Ø àShortly€after€he€began€his€employment€with€A+,€Darnall€became€concernedÏabout€the€accounting€practices€of€the€corporation.€€Particularly€he€found€that€aÏcheck€in€the€amount€of€$30,000€had€been€drawn€on€the€general€operating€accountÏof€A+€on€June€1,€1993,€payable€to€the€Defendant€James€Bradley€Smith,€with€€noÏsupporting€documentation.€€Darnall€questioned€Brad€Smith€and€received€fourÏdiffering€explanations€for€the€$30,000€check.€€First,€that€it€was€a€part€of€theÏproceeds€of€the€sale€of€a€previous€company€to€A+;€second,€it€was€a€loan€paybackÏfor€money€previously€loaned€by€Smith€to€A+;€third,€that€it€was€compensation€toÏhim€over€and€above€what€Medicare€would€allow€and€that€he€did€not€want€to€reportÏit€to€Medicare€or€the€IRS,€and€fourthly,€that€it€was€a€loan€to€him€by€A+€for€whichÏhe€had€documentation€at€home.€€Not€being€satisfied€with€these€explanations,ÏDarnall€went€to€the€outside€auditors€of€the€company€to€discuss€the€problem€withÏthem.€€On€January€20,€1995,€one€day€after€his€meeting€with€the€auditors,€DarnallÏwas€terminated.Ì̜РÍ95< ЇÌII.›à Ø àTENNESSEE€CODE€ANNOTATED€SECTION€50„1„304€Ð H˜ Ðà Ø à(Public€Protection€Act)Ìà Ø àAt€common€law€Tennessee€recognized€the€"employee„at„will"€rule€whichÏprovides€that€employment€for€an€indefinite€term€is€a€contract€at€will€and€can€beÏterminated€by€either€party€at€any€time€without€cause.€€òòCombs€v.€Standard€Oil€Co.óó,Ð ¨ ø  Ð166€Tenn.€88,€59€S.W.2d€525€(1933).ÌÌà Ø àIn€sustaining€the€common€law€rule€this€court€has€said:ÌÓ€ÓÓ6€ü(€ ä è“XXƒX" —X6Óà8  àà ä àThe€rule€has€been€well€established€in€this€state€that€aÏcontract€of€employment€for€an€indefinite€term€is€a€contract€atÏwill€and€can€be€terminated€by€either€party€at€any€time€withoutÏcause.€€òòGraves€v.€Anchor€Wire€Corp.€of€Tennesseeóó,€692Ð 8ˆ ÐS.W.2d€420€(Tenn.App.1985).€€In€òòPayne€v.€Western€&Ð H˜ ÐAtlantic€Railroad€Co.óó,€81€Tenn.€507€(1884),€the€SupremeÐ X¨ ÐCourt€said:Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà8ä  Ð  Ð àAll€may€dismiss€their€employees€at€will,€be€theyÏmany€or€few,€for€good€cause,€for€no€cause€or€evenÏfor€cause€morally€wrong€without€being€therebyÏguilty€of€legal€wrong.Ð ä ðä ð ÐÌòòRandolph€v.€Dominion€Bankóó,€826€S.W.2d€477,€478€(Tenn.€App.€1991).€Ð È ÐÌÌÓ€Óà  àThis€principle€is€still€viable€in€Tennessee€except€where€modified€byÏstatute.€€òòWhitaker€v.€Care„Moore,€Inc.óó,€621€S.W.2d€395€(Tenn.€App.€1981).Ð $à# ÐÌà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304€is€a€narrowly€craftedÏstatutory€exception€to€the€common€law€"employee„at„will"€rule.€ÌÌà  àTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304€provides€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓ€Óà8  à(a)€€No€employee€shall€be€discharged€or€terminated€solely€forÏrefusing€to€participate€in,€or€for€refusing€to€remain€silentÏabout,€illegal€activities.Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà  àà ä à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€*€*€*à è àÐ P1 ,2 Ðà8  à(c)€€As€used€in€this€section,€"illegal€activities"€means€activitiesÏwhich€are€in€violation€of€the€criminal€or€civil€code€of€this€stateÏor€the€United€States€or€any€regulation€intended€to€protect€theÏpublic€health,€safety€or€welfare.Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  à(d)€€any€employee€terminated€in€violation€of€subsection€(a)Ïshall€have€a€cause€of€action€against€the€employer€forÏretaliatory€discharge€and€any€other€damages€to€which€theÏemployee€may€be€entitled.ÐÐ9 5: Ð  Ð  Ðà  àÌÌÓ€Óà  àThe€historical€background€for€this€statute€and€our€limited€experienceÏunder€it€has€been€addressed€by€the€United€States€District€Court€for€the€EasternÏDistrict€of€Tennessee:ÌÓ€Óà8  àThis€statutory€cause€of€action,€enacted€in€1990,€embodies€aÏcommon€law€cause€of€action€previously€considered€by€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòWatson€v.€Cleveland€Chair€Co.óó,Ð ¸   Ð789€S.W.2d€538,€544€(Tenn.1989)€(recognizing€"a€cause€ofÏaction€for€retaliatory€discharge€.€.€.€when€an€at„will€employeeÏis€terminated€solely€for€refusing€to€participate,€or€remain€silentÏabout€illegal€activities")€and€in€òòChism€v.€Mid„South€MillingÐ øH  ÐœCo.,›€Inc.óó,€762€S.W.2d€552,€555„57€(Tenn.1988)€(recognizingÐ X Ðthe€cause€of€action,€though€not€on€the€facts€of€the€case).Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà ä àHowever,€both€cases€hesitated€to€fully€validate€the€causeÏof€action.€€The€òòWatsonóó€court€expressed€its€reluctance€"toÐ 8ˆ Ðestablish€public€policy€or€adopt€an€exception€to€the€commonÏlaw€by€placing€[its]€imprimatur€thereon€in€the€absence€ofÏsome€constitutional€or€legislative€precedent."€€òòWatsonóó,€789Ð h¸ ÐS.W.2d€at€544.€€The€òòChismóó€court€emphasized€resting€the€causeÐ xÈ Ðof€action€upon€public€policy€clearly€"evidenced€by€anÏunambiguous€constitutional,€statutory€or€regulatoryÏprovision."€€òòChismóó,€762€S.W.2d€at€556.€€Public€policyÐ ¨ø Ðguidance€is€necessary€because€at€the€heart€of€the€law€ofÏretaliatory€discharge€is€the€balance€between€the€employer'sÏundeniable€right€to€terminate€an€at„will€employee€overÏmanagement€and€policy€decisions€and€the€employee's€right€toÏprotection€from€unlawful€discharge.€€òòId.óó€at€555;€òòWatsonóó,€789Ð ø"H ÐS.W.2d€at€540;€òòClanton€v.€Cain„Sloan€óóCo.,€677€S.W.2d€441,Ð $X Ð445€(Tenn.1984).€Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà ä àAs€noted€above,€the€Tennessee€General€AssemblyÏenacted€the€Act€in€1990,€thereby€satisfying€the€TennesseeÏSupreme€Court's€concern€for€clear€public€policy€guidance.€ÏThe€statute's€language€nearly€adopts€verbatim€the€languageÏfound€in€the€earlier€cases.€€Recent€cases€specificallyÏaddressing€òòTenn.€Code€Annóó.€ðð€50„1„304,€though,€are€very€fewÐ x+È&& Ðin€number.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌÓ€ÓòòGriggs€v.€Coca„Cola€Employees'€Credit€Unionóó,€909€F.Supp.€1059,€1063€(E.D.Ð ¨.ø)) ÐTenn.€1995).ÌÌà  àIn€order€to€get€to€the€heart€of€the€issue€in€this€case,€it€is€necessary€toÏclearly€establish€the€distinction€between€retaliatory€discharge€under€other€statutoryÏand€common€law€exceptions€to€the€employee„at„will€doctrine€and€the€very€limitedÏœstatutory€exception›€thereto€established€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„¼1„304.€€In€òòJohnson€v.€St.€Francis€Hosp.,€Inc.óó,€759€S.W.2d€925€(Tenn.€App.€1998),Ð Ð9 57 Ðthe€Western€Section€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€was€dealing€with€a€retaliatoryÏdischarge€for€filing€a€workers€compensation€claim.€€Relying€on€òòHansome€v.€NorthÐ H˜ ÐWestern€Cooperage€Co.óó,€679€S.W.2d€273€(Mo.€1984),€the€court€asserted€fourÐ à0 Ðelements€to€establish€a€prima€facie€case€of€retaliatory€discharge,€to„wit:Ìà  à1.à ä àPlaintiff's€status€as€an€employee€of€the€defendant€before€injury.Ð  ` Ðà  à2.à ä àPlaintiff's€exercise€of€his€right€to€seek€workers€compensation.Ð ¨ ø  Ðà  à3.à ä àEmployer's€discharge€of€or€discrimination€against€Plaintiff.Ð @  Ðà  à4.à ä àAn€exclusive€causal€relationship€between€Plaintiff's€actions€and€œÐ Ø(  Ðà  àà ä àDefendant's›€actions.€ÌÌà  àIn€the€context€of€a€retaliatory€discharge€for€workers€compensationÏrelated€activities,€this€court€questioned€the€correctness€of€the€fourth€factor€set€forthÏin€òòJohnsonóó€and€the€Supreme€Court€granted€an€appeal€to€reconcile€the€factorsÐ Ð  Ðneeded€for€a€prima€facie€case€of€retaliatory€discharge€in€a€œworkers'›€compensationÏcontext.€€The€Supreme€Court€held:ÌÓ€Óà8  àà ä àBased€on€the€principles€stated€in€òòClanton€v.€Cain„SloanÐ ˜è ÐCo.,€Chism€v.€Mid„South€Milling€Co.,€Inc.€óóand€òòJohnson€v.Ð ¨ø ÐSaint€Francis€Hosp.,€Inc.,€óóthe€following€elements€are€found€toÐ ¸  Ðestablish€a€cause€of€action€for€discharge€in€retaliation€forÏasserting€a€workers'€compensation€claim:€€(1)€The€plaintiffÏwas€an€employee€of€the€defendant€at€the€time€of€the€injury;€(2)Ïthe€plaintiff€made€a€claim€against€the€defendant€for€workers'Ïcompensation€benefits;€(3)€the€defendant€terminated€theÏœplaintiff's€employment;€and€(4)€the€claim€for€workers'›Ïcompensation€benefits€was€a€substantial€factor€in€theÏemployer's€motivation€to€terminate€the€employee'sÏemployment.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌÓ€ÓòòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€558€(Tenn.€1993).Ð h*¸%+ ÐÌà  àòòJohnson€v.€St.€Francis€Hosp.,€Inc.óó,€759€S.W.2d€925€(Tenn.€App.€1988)Ð ˜-è(/ Ðdealt€with€œworkers'›€œcompensation›€retaliatory€discharge€and€was€decided€two€yearsÏbefore€the€enactment€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304.€€The€firstÏcase€dealing€specifically€with€this€"whistle€blower"€statute€was€òòMerryman€v.Ð `2°-5 ÐCentral€Parking€System,€Inc.,€et€alóó,€No.€œ01A01„9203„CH„00076,›€1992€WLÐ ø3H/7 Ð330404,€(Tenn.€App.€Nov.€13,€1992).€€It€was€decided€after€the€decision€of€thisÏcourt€in€òòAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.,€œóó1992€WL›€œ63421€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð (7x2; Ðñµ ññ´ ñAprilñ´ ññµ ññµ ñAprilñµ ñ€ñ¶ ñ1,€1992)ñ¶ ñ,›€but€before€the€Supreme€Court€issued€its€opinion€on€appeal.€Ð À84= Ðœòòñ· ñAngela›Ð À84= Ðñ· ñAnderson€v.€Standard€Register€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555€(Tenn.€June€28,€1993).€Ð ° ÐòòMerrymanóó€adopted€the€four€factors€of€òòJohnson€v.€St.€Francis€Hosp.,€Inc.óó,Ð H˜ Ðincluding€the€"exclusive€causal€relationship"€factor€without€making€clear€that€thisÏ"exclusive€causal€relationship"€factor€is€mandated€by€the€particular€language€ofÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304,€rather€than€by€òòJohnson€v.€St.Ð  ` ÐFrancis€Hosp.,€Inc.óó€€This€fourth€factor€of€òòJohnsonóó€did€not€survive€òòAnderson€v.Ð ¨ ø  ÐStandard€Register€Co.óó,€but€was€rather€converted€therein€to€a€"substantial€factor"Ð @  Ðtest€in€worker€compensation€related€retaliatory€discharge.›ÌÌà  àIt€results€that€the€four€factor€test€set€forth€in€òòJohnson€v.€St.€FrancisÐ X ÐHosp.,€Inc.,óó€759€S.W.2d€925,€928€(Tenn.€App.€1988)€is€the€correct€test€onlyÐ  ð Ðbecause€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304(a)€provides€that€"noÏemployee€shall€be€discharged€or€terminated€òòsolelyóóòò€€óófor€refusing€to€participate€in,Ð Ð  Ðor€for€refusing€to€remain€silent,€about€illegal€activities."€€(emphasis€added)ÌÌà  àThus€considering€this€case€in€the€limited€context€of€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€50„1„304€and€not€in€the€context€of€retaliatory€discharge€inÏgeneral,€the€four€factor€òòJohnsonóó€test€is€valid.Ð È" ÐÌà  àThe€limited€number€of€cases€actually€addressing€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€50„1„304€indicate€that€the€plaintiff€has€indeed€a€formidableÏburden€in€establishing€elements€number€two€and€four€of€the€cause€of€action.€ÏòòGriggs€v.€Coca„Colaóó€òòEmployees'€Credit€Unionóó,€909€F.Supp.€1059,€1063;Ð À'#, ÐòòMerróóyòòman€v.€Central€Parkingóó€òòSystem,€Inc.óó,€No.€01A01„9203„CH„00076€1992€WLÐ X)¨$. Ð330404€and€òòLeeman€v.€Edwardsóó,€No.€01A01„9401„CV„00050€1994€WL€560889Ð ð*@&0 Ð(Tenn.€App.€Oct.€14,€1994)€(both€overruled€on€œother›€grounds).ÌÌIII.à  àSUMMARY€JUDGMENTÐ ¸/+6 Ðà  àThe€often€repeated€rules€governing€summary€judgment€are€outlined€inÐ P1 ,8 ÐòòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€evidence€must€be€taken€by€theÐ è28.: Ðtrial€court€and€by€this€court€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€plaintiff€as€theÏnonmoving€party€and€all€reasonable€inferences€from€the€facts€of€the€case€must€beÏconstrued€in€favor€of€Darnall.ÌÐ H9˜4B Ðà  àThe€four€elements€of€a€cause€of€action€under€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€50„1„304€are:ÌÓ<€ü(€A ä è“X€ü(€ ä è“X<ÓÌà A à(1)à ä àThe€plaintiff's€status€as€an€employee€of€the€Defendant;Ð x È Ðà A à(2)à ä àThe€plaintiff's€refusal€to€participate€in,€or€to€remain€silent€about,Ð  ` Ðillegal€activities;€Ìà A à(3)à ä àThe€employer's€discharge€of€the€employee;€andÐ @  Ðà A à(4)à ä àAn€exclusive€causal€relationship€between€the€plaintiff's€refusal€toÐ Ø(  Ðparticipate€in€or€remain€silent€about€illegal€activities€and€the€employer'sÏtermination€of€the€employee.€€òòGriggs€v.€Coca„Cola€Employees'€Credit€Unionóó,€909Ð X ÐF.Supp.€1059,€1063€(E.D.€Tenn.€1995).ÌÌà A àElements€(1)€and€(3)€are€clearly€met€in€this€case.€€There€is€enoughÏevidence€in€the€record€as€held€by€the€trial€judge€to€preclude€summary€judgment€asÏto€element€number€(2).ÌÌà A àIt€is€the€inability€of€the€plaintiff€to€establish€the€"exclusive€causalÏrelationship"€between€his€alleged€"whistle€blower"€activities€and€his€terminationÏby€A+€that€dooms€his€case.€€The€persistent€inquiries€by€Darnall€into€activitiesÏpredating€his€employment€with€A+€and€his€conference€with€the€outside€auditorsÏthe€day€before€his€termination€may€have€been€the€main€reason€for€his€dischargeÏand€probably€were€at€least€a€substantial€part€of€the€reason€for€his€discharge.€ÏHowever,€this€substantial€factor€rationale€will€not€avoid€summary€judgment.ÌÌà A àIn€analyzing€the€causation€element€necessary€to€sustain€an€action€underÏTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304,€the€United€States€District€Court€forÏthe€Eastern€District€of€Tennessee€held:ÌÓ€Óà8 A àà ä àThe€fourth€element€requires€Griggs€to€demonstrate€"anÏexclusive€causal€relationship€between€the€plaintiff's€refusal€toÏparticipate€in€or€to€remain€silent€about€illegal€activities€and€theÏemployer's€termination€of€the€employee."€€òòMerrymanóó,€1992€WLÐ è28.9 Ð330404,€at€p.€*6;€òòLeemanóó,€1994€WL€560889,€at€p.€*2.€€TheÐ ø3H/: Ðpertinent€language€of€òòTenn.Code€Ann.óó€ðð€50„1„304(a)€(emphasisÐ 5X0; Ðadded)€reads:€€"No€employee€shall€be€discharged€or€terminatedÏòòsolelyóó€for€refusing€to€participate€in,€or€for€refusing€to€remain€silentÐ (7x2= Ðabout,€illegal€activities."€€Griggs€invites€the€Court€to€read€theÏstatute€and€the€language€from€òòMerrymanóó€as€intending€theÐ H9˜4? Ðemployer's€unlawful€behavior€to€only€have€been€a€"substantial"Ïfactor€in€the€discharge€(Court€File€No.€11,€pp.€10„14).€€The€Court€òòÐ À Ðóódeclines€to€do€so.ÐÐ A “!A “! Ðà8 A àà ä àThe€rule€of€statutory€construction€requires€the€Court€toÏyield€to€the€legislature's€intention.€€òòBusiness€Brokerage€Centre€v.Ð ð@ ÐDixonóó,€874€S.W.2d€1,€5€(Tenn.1994);€òòCityóó€òòof€Blaine€v.€JohnÐ  P ÐColeman€Hayes,€óó818€S.W.2d€33,€37òò€óó(Tenn.App.1991)€(citationsÐ  ` Ðomitted);òò€Lockhart€v.€Jackson„Madison€Cty.€Gnl.€Hosp.óó,€793Ð  p ÐS.W.2d€943,€945€(Tenn.App.1990)€(citations€omitted);€òòsee€alsoÐ 0 € ÐFirst€Am.€Nat.€Bank„Eastern€v.€F.D.I.C.,€óó782€F.2d€633,€636„37Ð @  Ð(6th€Cir.1986).€€In€order€to€give€effect€to€the€legislature's€intent,Ïcourts€look€primarily€to€"the€natural€and€ordinary€meaning€of€theÏlanguage€used,€when€read€in€the€context€of€the€entire€statute,€andÏwithout€any€forced€or€subtle€construction€to€limit€or€extend€theÏimport€of€the€language."€€òòCity€of€Blaineóó,€818€S.W.2d€at€37Ð à Ð(citations€omitted).Ð A “!A “! Ðà8 A àà ä àHere,€the€language€is€clear.€€An€employer€may€notÏdischarge€an€employee€"solely€for€refusing€to€participate€in,€or€forÏrefusing€to€remain€silent€about,€illegal€activities."€€òòTenn.€CodeÐ Ð  ÐAnn.€óóðð€50„1„304(a).€€Nothing€in€the€remainder€of€the€sectionÐ à0 Ðindicates€the€Court€should€read€the€statute€differently.€€Nothing€inÐ ð@ ÐòòMerrymanóó€and€òòLeemanóó,€the€only€two€cases€directly€addressing€theÐ P Ðstatute,€indicate€the€Court€should€read€the€statute€differently.€€Ð A “!A “! ÐÌòòÓ€ÓGriggs€v.€Coca„Cola€Employees'€Credit€Unionóó,€909€F.Supp.€1059,€1065€(E.D.Ð 0€ ÐTenn.€1995).ÌÌà A àThis€court,€in€discussing€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„1„304,€hasÏstated:ÌÓ€Óà8 A àà ä àPrior€to€the€passage€of€T.C.A.€ðð€50„1„304,€the€appellateÏcourts€had€not€clearly€settled€on€whether€a€plaintiff€was€requiredÏto€show€that€protected€activity€was€either€a€substantial€factor€or€theÏsole€cause€of€termination.€€But€the€statute€supplied€the€answer;€itÏclearly€requires€the€employee€to€show€that€the€òòsoleóó€cause€of€hisÐ h*¸%& Ðtermination€was€his€refusal€to€remain€silent€about€illegal€activitiesÏin€the€workplace.Ð A “!A “! ÐÌòòÓ€ÓHubrig€v.€Lockheed€Martin€Energy€Systems,€Inc.óó,€No.€03A01„9711„CV„00525Ð ¨.ø)* Ð1998€WL€240128,€*€11€(Tenn.€App.€May€4,€œ1998)ñ¸ ñ.ñ¸ ññ¹ ñ€ñ¹ ññ¼ ñòòñ¼ ññ¹ ñpermñ¹ ññº ññ¹ ñiñ¹ ññº ññ» ñ.€to€app.€denied,Ð @0+, Ðconcurring€in€results€onlyñ» ññ¼ ñóóñ¼ ññ» ñ€(Tenn.€Oct.€12,€1998).ñ» ñ›Ð Ø1(-. ÐÌà A àThe€legislature€chose€the€language€used€in€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€50„¼1„304€and€provided€a€very€limited€exception€to€the€common€law€rule€governingÏ"at€will"€employment.€€There€is€substantial€evidence€in€the€record€at€bar€toÏestablish€a€causal€relationship€between€Darnall's€sexually€explicit€comments€toÐ Ð9 58 ÐMs.€Rollinson€and€his€subsequent€discharge€by€his€employer€for€alleged€sexualÏharassment.€€The€necessary€"exclusive"€causal€relationship€between€the€statutorilyÏprotected€activities€and€the€discharge€of€Darnall€cannot€be€established,€and€theÏaction€of€the€trial€court€in€sustaining€the€motion€for€summary€judgment€of€AðâðÐ x È ÐHomecare,€Inc.€is€affirmed.ÌÌà A àPlaintiff€further€asserts€that€the€president€and€sole€stockholder€of€AðâðÐ @  ÐHomecare,€Inc.,€James€D.€Smith,€is€liable€under€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€50„1„304.€€Smith€is€not€an€"employer"€under€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€50„1„304€and€cannot€be€liable€to€the€plaintiff€under€the€statute.€€òòCarr€v.Ð X ÐUnited€Parcel€Serviceóó,€955€S.W.2d€832€(Tenn.€1997)€and€òòWilliams€v.€WilliamsonÐ  ð ÐCounty€Board€of€Educationóó,€890€S.W.2d€788,€790€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€Ð 8ˆ ÐÌà A àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€and€costs€are€assessed€againstÏthe€Appellant.ÌÌÓ€ÓÓ?€ü(€A ä À@’X€ü(€A ä è“X?Óà A àà ä àà À à_______________________________________Ìà A àà ä àà À àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌœñ½ ñ_____________________________________›ñ½ ññ¾ ñCONCURRING€IN€SEPARATE€OPINIONñ¾ ñÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE