ÿWPC` žÆ©Ã bzñ×á¨ÄŸó2¥0ãÁ]OÀô¹&ª…ñXX@2Ég!òÔÔîröç'Ê©´5µG³$ ]©Àþ­0™‘=Ÿ.4ºuºÌ’]Ûk‹a Q‹­Ø_Z¼AM¡3¥K­Ü¤£äñÜY®×·rý®Ïú¬> ô¤†“P’¸Õs¾à¢õe"~–h¨B0ÓùJ¬êÁEf&‘#Ä ûˆ|פnø„ÎÚ>xD1/4ÿ·ÀYÿ³‰X¸ŸIÈ–—Xìxœ.ꔢʿˆ ©EÈ“È |køB›4eN×aV îYgÞ¿]XcP?¾ƒb,„ßlN,Mž·mÎ5_fƈéª)¤gߢæi-cÜßk—úz5PйÇi5 »cdø¹ŽãV+Âv¿”§Ö˼Ч …òÀ·Xí3v<$–ñ×4D’]£¼Ëb‡º§y6…5­@f§yš.Ö!²|ùùbË[ùÖ"W@Oý…àÅ£ º–~Þ]÷™Þ@°™™¼\È%¦DdOt!Kn¸ ÊÈ´orìêïSÝÊ{·•9ÖC1nL-Gã*ÙèP®zµ-e“ê]ÔŸBZ…¶@³j°õÛ«­@˜Òª½°LT’ê†DíQUgFTHld#!xUN™ %ç 0(íw 4 - U<< UNx Æ NÎ 0lÐ 0D< € • m— 7® U:å ^                B+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 0DH D5Œ Œ Œ Œ Œ AQÁ Æ 0DØ 0D˜HP LaserJet 8000 DN PSØÚØÚÚØØÚ0(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡{Z='3|x-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó Ñ  Ñ ÿU‹ÿÀÀÀ -Ý ƒb¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÔ€X8êXXXÔÔ€ˆkXX8êÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X8êXˆkÔÐ  ÐÌSeptember€29,€1999ÌÌCecil€Ô_ÔCrowsonÔ_Ô,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAxÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular‡“='L  d(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý"""")ÿÿ!dxdxabZc[Cþÿ<<CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó óÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ_ÔÑTR[° AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€P¸ÑÓ  Óò òÔ‡ XÇSXXXÔÑ8€ÇSXXdìdÈ8ÑÔ_Ôà@ ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEó óˆÐ ° Ðò òßx€`[B2.jz–Ë`  `€€@ÿEžg` 8ttxPÖŸ( È xßà@úú$ìàAT€NASHVILLEˆÐ œì Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð ˆØ ÐÌóóÌJOHN€DAVIS,€€€€€€€à ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ð L œ Ðó óà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àò ò)ó óÐ 8 ˆ Ðà  àPlaintiff/Appellant,ò òà  àà h àà À à)à  àó óDavidson€Circuit€No.€97C„1823Ð $ t Ðò òà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)ó óà  àà p àÐ  d Ðò òv.à  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  à€Ð  P  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)à  àÐ ì <  ÐCOMPUTER€MAINTENANCE€€€€€€à À à)à  àó óAppeal€No.€01A01„9809„CV„00459Ð Ø(  Ðò òSERVICE,€INC.,à ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ð È  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À à)Ìà  àó óDefendant/Appellee.à  àò òà h àà À à)à  àÐ  ð  ЀÌÌà@ìàó óAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTY€€€€€€€€€ˆÐ h¸ Ðà@ìàAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEE€€ˆÌÌÌà@« « ìàTHE€HONORABLE€WALTER€C.€KURTZ,€JUDGEˆÌòòÌÌÌFor€the€Plaintiff/Appellantóó:òòà  àà h àà À àFor€the€Defendant/Appelleeóó:Ô#†XÇSXX XÇSŸ#ÔÔ‡ XÇSXXXÇSÔòòÐ È ÐóóÌB.€Keith€Williams€€€€€€à  à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€James€D.€Kay,€Jr.Ð  ð ÐBrody€N.€Kaneà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àJohn€B.€EnkemaÐ ŒÜ ÐLebanon,€Tennessee€€€à  àà h à€€€€€€€€€€€€Nashville,€Tennessee€€€€€€Ð xÈ Ѐ€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌÌò òÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àAFFIRMEDÌÌÌà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àà À àó óHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ð Ø&("% ÐÌÌÌCONCURS:ÌòòÌóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.Ð `,°'+ ÐÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÔ#†XÇSXX XÇS #ÔÓÓÐ  $/t*. ÐÔ_ÔØØÑ8€Ÿ¢XXdðXXdð8ÑÑ  Ñà0  àà ° àò òà0(#(#àà ° àà@55'ì(#(#àOPINIONó óˆÐ ° Ðà  àThis€is€an€employment€disability€discrimination€case.€€The€plaintiff€employee€filed€suitÐ à Ðagainst€the€defendant€employer,€alleging€that€he€was€wrongfully€terminated€shortly€after€he€wasÐ pÀ Ðhired€because€of€his€diabetes,€in€violation€the€Tennessee€Handicap€Act.€€The€trial€court€grantedÐ P   Ðsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€the€defendant€employer,€finding€that€the€plaintiff€profferedÐ 0 € Ðinsufficient€evidence€that€his€termination€was€wrongfully€based€on€his€handicap.€€€€We€affirm,Ð `  Ðfinding€that€the€plaintiffððs€condition€does€not€constitute€a€ð ðhandicapðð€under€the€Tennessee€Act,€basedÐ ð@  Ðon€ò òòòSutton€v.€United€Airlines,€Inc.ó óóó,€527€U.S.€_____,€119€S.€Ct.€2139€(1999),€decided€after€the€trialÐ Ð  Ðcourtððs€decision€in€this€case.ò òòòÐ ° Ðà  àó óóóPlaintiff/Appellant,€John€Davis€(ð ðDavisðð),€was€hired€as€a€purchasing€agent€byÐ à ÐDefendant/Appellee,€Computer€Maintenance€Service,€Inc.€(ð ðCMSðð),€on€June€24,€1996.€€The€job€forÐ pÀ Ðwhich€Davis€was€hired€required€him€to€order€and€price€parts€over€the€phone,€return€defectiveÐ P  Ðmerchandise€to€manufacturers,€receive€incoming€parts,€issue€parts,€and€lift€heavy€equipment€suchÐ 0€ Ðas€computer€monitors.€€Davis€is€an€insulin€dependent€diabetic€and€must€take€multiple€daily€insulinÐ ` Ðinjections.€€He€also€takes€an€oral€medication€to€aid€in€digestion.€€A€side€effect€of€the€oral€medicationÐ ð@ Ðis€a€frequent€dry€cough.€€At€the€June€24€interview,€Davis€told€CMS€about€his€medical€condition.€€Ð Ð  Ðà  àDavis€began€work€on€July€1,€1996.€€He€stored€his€insulin€in€the€refrigerator€located€in€theÐ °"  ÐCMS€break€room.€€On€July€3,€1996,€after€a€meeting€with€a€CMS€supervisor,€CMS€fired€Davis.€€DavisÐ $à" Ðcontends€that€CMS€terminated€him€because€of€his€diabetes,€based€on€comments€made€to€him€aboutÐ p&À!$ Ðhis€medical€condition€by€the€CMS€supervisor€at€the€meeting€at€which€he€was€terminated.Ð P( #& Ðà  àDavis€filed€a€lawsuit€on€June€9,€1997€naming€CMS€as€the€sole€defendant.€€The€complaintÐ 0*€%( Ðalleged€that€at€the€meeting€at€which€Davis€was€terminated,€the€CMS€supervisor€who€terminatedÐ ,`'* ÐDavis,€David€Bender€(ð ðBenderðð),€voiced€concerns€about€Davisðð€diabetes.€€Bender€also€allegedly€hadÐ ð-@), Ðconcerns€about€other€employees€sharing€the€same€work€area€with€Davis€and€did€not€believe€thatÐ Ð/ +. ÐDavis€could€perform€the€tasks€required€for€his€position.€€Davis€maintained€that€CMS€violated€theÐ °1-0 ÐTennessee€Handicap€Act€(ð ðTHAðð),€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€8„50„103.€€Davis€alsoÐ 3à.2 Ðasserted€claims€for€negligent€hiring€or€supervision,€intentional€and€negligent€infliction€of€emotionalÐ p5À04 Ðdistress,€retaliatory€discharge,€and€outrageous€conduct.€€In€the€complaint,€Davis€sought€$500,000€inÐ P7 26 Ðcompensation€for€impairment€of€his€earning€capacity,€loss€of€future€income,€loss€of€back€pay,€lossÐ 09€48 Ðof€medical€insurance€benefits,€loss€of€life€insurance€coverage,€loss€of€opportunity€for€advancementÐ ;`6: Ðand€ð ðserious€humiliation€and€embarrassment€causing€severe€mental€anguish.ðð€€The€complaint€€soughtÐ ° Ð$1,000,000€in€punitive€damages€for€the€alleged€intentional,€willful,€and€malicious€actions€of€CMS,€Ð à Ðas€well€as€attorneyððs€fees.€€€€€€€Ð pÀ Ðà  àThe€answer€filed€by€CMS€admitted€that€any€statements€made€by€a€CMS€supervisor€wouldÐ P   Ðbe€imputed€to€CMS€through€the€doctrine€of€respondeat€superior,€but€denied€that€Bender€made€anyÐ 0 € Ðdiscriminatory€remarks€to€Davis.€€CMS€denied€all€other€claims€asserted€in€Davisðð€complaint.€€InÐ `  Ðaddition,€CMS€raised€several€defenses,€including€failure€to€state€a€claim€upon€which€relief€may€beÐ ð@  Ðgranted,€and€asserted€that€Davis€was€unable€to€adequately€perform€the€duties€of€the€job€for€whichÐ Ð  Ðhe€was€hired.Ð ° Ðà  àAfter€discovery€was€conducted,€CMS€filed€a€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€summaryÐ à Ðjudgment€motion€asserted€that€Davis€was€fired€because€he€ð ðhad€problems€lifting€and€moving€theÐ pÀ Ðcomputer€inventory€and€was€insubordinate€and€arrogant.ðð€€CMS€denied€that€it€terminated€DavisÐ P  Ðsolely€because€of€his€diabetes.€€In€the€alternative,€CMS€claimed€that€it€was€entitled€to€summaryÐ 0€ Ðjudgment€because€Davis€was€not€ð ðhandicappedðð€and€because€CMS€did€not€regard€Davis€as€havingÐ ` Ðan€impairment€that€substantially€limited€a€major€life€activity.€€CMS€asserted€that€there€were€no€factsÐ ð@ Ðto€support€Davisðð€claims€for€negligent€hiring€and€supervision,€retaliatory€discharge,€intentional€andÐ Ð  Ðnegligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€or€punitive€damages.€€In€support€of€its€motion,€CMS€filedÐ °"  Ðthe€depositions€of€Davis,€Bender€and€several€CMS€employees.€€Ð $à" Ðà  àIn€CMSðð€memorandum€of€law€filed€in€support€of€its€motion€for€summary€judgment,€CMSÐ p&À!$ Ðargued€that,€under€the€Tennessee€handicap€discrimination€statute,€a€plaintiff€has€to€prove€he€or€sheÐ P( #& Ðwas€firedòò€solely€óóbecause€of€a€handicap.€€CMS€maintained€that€the€proof€showed€that€it€fired€DavisÐ 0*€%( Ðbecause€of€lifting€problems€and€insubordination,€and€therefore€did€not€violate€the€Tennessee€statute.€Ð ,`'* ÐSecond,€CMS€asserted€that€Davis€could€not€be€considered€ð ðhandicappedðð€under€the€TennesseeÐ ð-@), Ðstatute€because€he€had€submitted€no€proof€that€his€condition€substantially€limits€a€major€life€activity,Ð Ð/ +. Ðnor€had€he€submitted€evidence€that€CMS€regarded€him€as€having€an€impairment€that€substantiallyÐ °1-0 Ðlimits€a€major€life€activity.€€€Ð 3à.2 Ðà  àIn€response€to€CMSðð€summary€judgment€motion,€Davis€€asserted€that€CMSðð€profferedÐ p5À04 Ðreasons€for€his€termination€were€not€legitimate€since€he€was€not€told€these€reasons€at€the€time€ofÐ P7 26 Ðtermination.€€Davis€also€asserted€that€he€adequately€performed€the€required€job€duties,€including€Ð 09€48 ЇÌlifting,€and€was€not€arrogant€or€disrespectful.€€Accordingly,€Davis€argued€that€there€was€a€genuineÐ à Ðissue€of€material€fact€regarding€whether€he€was€terminated€solely€because€of€his€diabetes.€Ð pÀ Ðà  àDavis€asserted€that€he€is€ð ðhandicappedðð€under€the€Tennessee€statute€because€he€mustÐ P   Ðadminister€daily€insulin€shots€and€must€comply€with€a€proper€diet€and€exercise€program.€€He€alsoÐ 0 € Ðasserted€that€the€alleged€statements€made€by€Bender€at€the€meeting€at€which€he€was€firedÐ `  Ðdemonstrated€that€CMS€regarded€him€as€impaired.€€Ð ð@  Ðà  àIn€opposition€to€CMSðð€motion€for€summary€judgment,€Davis€filed€his€affidavit,€in€which€heÐ Ð  Ðstated€that€his€diabetes€did€not€interfere€with€the€performance€of€his€job€duties.€€He€denied€beingÐ ° Ðdisrespectful€or€having€trouble€taking€direction€from€CMS€supervisors.€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð à Ðà  àIn€Davisðð€deposition,€he€testified€about€his€initial€interview€with€CMS€employee€Janet€BaxterÐ pÀ Ð(ð ðBaxterðð).€€Davis€testified€that€he€told€Baxter€about€his€diabetes,€and€that,€because€of€the€diabetes,Ð P  Ðhe€would€need€insurance€coverage.€€Davis€said€that€Baxter€assured€him€that,€if€he€currently€hadÐ 0€ Ðinsurance,€there€would€be€no€problem€with€CMS€insuring€him.€€Davis€understood€from€Baxter€thatÐ ` Ðhe€would€be€eligible€for€health€insurance€immediately,€and€was€not€told€of€any€waiting€period.€€HeÐ ð@ Ðalso€understood€that€CMS€had€a€120€day€probation€period€in€which€he€could€be€fired€for€performanceÐ Ð  Ðreasons.€€Davis€testified€that,€at€the€time€he€was€hired,€he€did€not€feel€that€his€diabetes€was€aÐ °"  Ðhandicap€or€that€his€condition€prohibited€him€from€performing€any€of€the€job€duties.€€Ð $à" Ðà  àIn€his€deposition,€Davis€testified€that€after€working€two€and€one„half€days,€Bender€calledÐ p&À!$ ÐDavis€into€the€conference€room€to€talk.€€Davis€and€Bender€were€the€only€persons€present.€€Davis€saidÐ P( #& Ðthat€Bender€commented€on€Davisðð€insulin€in€the€refrigerator€and€asked€him€if€he€was€a€diabetic.€Ð 0*€%( ÐBender€also€questioned€Davis€about€his€cough.€€Davis€testified€that€when€he€told€Bender€about€theÐ ,`'* Ðcough,€Bender€told€him€that€it€was€not€acceptable€and€that€he€was€going€to€terminate€Davis.€€DavisÐ ð-@), Ðsaid€that€Bender€felt€that€he€could€not€perform€the€functions€of€his€position,€expressed€concern€aboutÐ Ð/ +. Ðthe€well€being€of€other€employees,€and€said€it€was€necessary€to€terminate€Davis.€€Davis€then€left€theÐ °1-0 Ðmeeting€and€went€home.€€Davis€claimed€that€he€was€never€told€of€any€dissatisfaction€about€his€jobÐ 3à.2 Ðperformance,€nor€was€he€told€that€his€diabetes€interfered€with€his€job€performance.€€€Davis€denied€Ð  p5À04 Ðthat€he€almost€dropped€a€monitor.€€When€asked€why€he€thought€he€was€discriminated€against,€DavisÐ ° Ðstated,Ð à ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓà ` àThe€reason€I€think€I€was€discriminated€against€was€because€the€folks€in€thisÐ pÀ Ðcompany€when€they€contacted€their€insurance€company€found€out€how€much€it€wasÐ ` ° Ðgoing€to€cost€to€insure€an€insulin„dependent€diabetic€and€they€decided€they€werenððtÐ P   Ðgoing€to€invest€that€kind€of€money€in€a€new€employee.Ð @  ÐÌÒ°6ÒÒ°ú5ÒÓ6ÓWhen€asked€about€proof€to€support€this€assertion,€Davis€replied,€ð ðThatððs€what€I€feel,€because€I€gaveÐ  p  Ðthem€no€reason€to€fire€me.ððÐ P  Ðà  àDavis€testified€in€his€deposition€that,€after€he€was€terminated€by€CMS,€he€had€no€healthÐ à0  Ðinsurance€until€the€summer€of€1997€when€he€obtained€insurance€through€TennCare.€€During€the€timeÐ À Ðin€which€he€was€uninsured,€Davis€calculated€that€he€incurred€approximately€$12,000€in€medical€bills.€Ð  ð Ðà  àIn€support€of€its€motion€for€summary€judgment,€CMS€relied€on€the€depositions€of€CMSÐ €Ð Ðemployees€allegedly€showing€that€it€had€legitimate€non„discriminatory€reasons€for€firing€Davis.€Ð `° ÐBender,€the€shop€manager€and€CMS€supervisor€who€terminated€Davis,€testified€that€he€knew€thatÐ @ ÐDavis€was€a€diabetic€at€the€meeting€at€which€Davis€was€terminated€because€Davis€told€him€whenÐ  p ÐBender€questioned€Davis€about€his€cough.€€Bender€said€that,€on€Davisðð€second€day€of€work,€someoneÐ P Ðmentioned€to€him€Davisðð€frequent€cough€and€he€became€concerned.€€Bender€denied€asking€DavisÐ à0 Ðabout€insulin€in€the€refrigerator.€€He€stated€that€he€saw€Davis€falter€on€two€separate€occasions€while€Ð À! Ðlifting€monitors.€€He€conceded€that€Davis€succeeded€in€placing€the€monitors€in€boxes€as€wasÐ  #ð! Ðrequired,€but€felt€that€Davis€looked€unsteady.€€Bender€said€it€was€immediately€obvious€to€him€thatÐ €%Ð # Ðð ðlifting€was€going€to€be€a€very€serious€limitation€there.ðð€€Bender€stated,€however,€€that€ð ð[t]o€the€bestÐ `'°"% Ðof€my€knowledge,€.€.€.€he€was€performing€the€tasks€that€we€hired€him€to€do.ðð€Ð @)$' Ðà  àBender€testified€that€when€he€asked€Davis€to€meet€with€him,€he€originally€intended€only€toÐ  +p&) Ðask€Davis€about€the€cough,€but€when€Davis€became€defensive,€agitated,€and€disrespectful,€he€firedÐ -P(+ Ðhim.€€Bender€said€that€the€meeting:€Ð à.0*- ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓended€very€abruptly.€€[Davis]€said,€well,€what,€you€going€to€release€me?€€You€know,Ð À0,/ Ðand€at€this€point€„„€and€he€„„€and€Iððm€already€mad.€€I€donððt€need€these€„„€you€know,Ð °1-0 ÐIððm,€Iððm€your€boss,€I€donððt€need€you€talking€to€me€this€way,€yes,€Iððm€going€to€releaseÐ  2ð-1 Ðyou,€you€know.€€He€got€up,€left.Ð 3à.2 ÐÌÒ°û@ÒÒ°í@ÒÓ AÓBender€stated€that€it€was€his€decision€to€fire€Davis€and€that€no€one€at€CMS€directed€him€to€fireÐ p5À04 ÐDavis.€Ð P7 26 ÐÐ  09€48 Ðà  àStephen€Vire,€the€President€of€CMS,€said€that€he€also€saw€Davis€almost€drop€a€monitor.€€HeÐ ° Ðalso€noticed€that€Davisðð€cough€ð ðimpeded€him€being€able€to€carry€on€phone€conversations,€which€isÐ à Ða€lot€of€that€job.ðð€€When€Bender€asked€Mr.€Vire€his€opinion€of€€Davis,€€Mr.€Vire€told€Bender€aboutÐ pÀ Ðboth€of€these€concerns.€€Mr.€Vire€also€testified€€that€Davis€had€trouble€taking€direction€from€hisÐ P   Ðdirect€supervisor,€Pom€Norris.€€However,€Mr.€Vire€did€not€believe€that€Davis€failed€to€do€any€jobÐ 0 € Ðduties€that€he€was€asked€to€do.€€Mr.€Vire€maintained€that€he€did€not€know€Davis€was€a€diabetic€untilÐ `  Ðhe€was€interviewed€by€the€EEOC.€€Ð ð@  Ðà  àDianne€Vire,€the€CEO€of€CMS€and€Stephen€Vireððs€spouse,€testified€that€Pom€Norris,€theÐ Ð  Ðemployee€who€trained€Davis,€told€her€that€Davis€ð ðwas€very€argumentative,€opinionated,€and€did€notÐ ° Ðwant€to€do€things€by€the€company€policy.ðð€€Mrs.€Vire€was€told€by€both€Pom€Norris€and€Bender€thatÐ à ÐDavis€was€having€trouble€lifting€equipment.€€Mrs.€Vire€stated€that€neither€she€nor€any€other€CMSÐ pÀ Ðemployee€checked€on€insurance€premiums€for€Davis.€€Mrs.€Vire€filled€out€Davisðð€separation€notice.€Ð P  ÐOn€the€separation€notice,€she€listed€the€reasons€for€termination€as:€ð ðArgumentative€with€trainer,€heÐ 0€ Ðknew€it€all,€caught€CMS€on€fire,€smoking€and€throwing€cigarettes€in€mulch,€CMS€is€a€nonsmokingÐ ` Ðenvironment,€not€capable€of€job€duties€as€led€to€believe€during€the€interview€process.ðð€€€€€€Ð ð@ Ðà  àManaswee€(Pom)€Norris€(ð ðNorrisðð),€was€an€accountant€for€CMS€who€sometimes€performedÐ Ð  Ðpurchasing€duties.€€Norris€trained€Davis.€€Norris€testified€in€her€deposition€that€Davis€coughed€often.€Ð °"  ÐOn€a€loudness€scale€of€one€to€ten,€Norris€rated€the€cough€at€an€eight.€€She€testified€that€€Davis€failedÐ $à" Ðto€properly€tag€incoming€parts,€and€that,€on€Davisðð€second€day€of€work,€he€did€not€receive€theÐ p&À!$ Ðincoming€parts€in€a€timely€manner€as€the€job€required.€€She€thought€Davis€seemed€like€a€ð ðknow„it„Ð P( #& Ðallðð€because€he€did€not€take€notes€when€she€was€training€him.€€She€did€not€think€he€was€capable€ofÐ 0*€%( Ðdoing€the€job€at€CMS€because€he€spent€all€his€time€ordering€parts€instead€of€receiving€them.€€SheÐ ,`'* Ðalso€noted€that€Davis€ð ðfussedðð€a€lot€about€noise€levels€and€about€people€failing€to€put€parts€back.€Ð ð-@), ÐShe€testified€that€Davis€was€a€slow€worker€and€did€not€follow€the€CMS€procedures€for€the€job.€€AsÐ Ð/ +. Ða€result,€Norris€said€that€she€had€to€receive€parts,€which€was€not€her€job.€€She€did€not€remember€anyÐ °1-0 Ðoccasions€on€which€Davis€had€trouble€talking€on€the€phone€or€had€to€stop€in€mid„sentence€to€coughÐ 3à.2 Ðwhile€talking€on€the€phone.€€Norris€did€not€see€Davis€struggle€and€almost€drop€a€monitor.€€NorrisÐ p5À04 Ðtestified€that€she€did€not€call€CMSðð€insurance€agent€to€determine€the€cost€of€health€insurance€forÐ P7 26 ÐDavis.€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð 09€48 Ѐà  àBased€on€this€record,€the€trial€court€considered€CMSðð€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€TheÐ ° Ðtrial€court€found€that€the€record€contained€no€evidence€to€support€Davisðð€claims€for€retaliatoryÐ à Ðdischarge,€outrageous€conduct,€intentional€or€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress,€negligentÐ pÀ Ðhiring€or€supervision,€or€punitive€damages.€€Therefore,€the€trial€court€granted€CMSðð€motion€forÐ P   Ðsummary€judgment€on€these€claims.€€Ð 0 € Ðà  àOn€Davisðð€handicap€discrimination€claim,€the€trial€court€found€that€Davis€was€handicappedÐ `  Ðas€defined€by€Tennessee€Code€Annotated,€but€that€Davis€proffered€insufficient€evidence€that€CMSÐ ð@  Ðfired€him€because€of€his€handicap.€€The€trial€court€reasoned€that,€under€òòò òSt.€Maryððs€Honor€Center€v.€Ð Ð  ÐHicksóóó ó,€509€U.S.€508,€113€S.€€Ct.€€2742€(1993),ò òòò€ó óóóDavis€was€required€to€ð ðshow€evidence€sufficient€forÐ ° Ðthe€fact€finder€reasonably€to€conclude€that€the€employerððs€decision€to€discharge€him€or€her€wasÐ à Ðwrongfully€based€on€the€handicap€€.€.€.€the€plaintiff€cannot€avert€summary€judgment€if€the€record€isÐ pÀ Ðdevoid€of€adequate€direct€or€circumstantial€evidence€of€discriminatory€animus€on€the€part€of€theÐ P  Ðemployer.ðð€€Citing€òòò òPruett€v.€Wal„Mart€Stores,€Inc.ó óóó,€No.€02A01„9610„CH„00266,€1997€WL€729260Ð 0€ Ð(Tenn.€App.€No.€25,€1997),€the€trial€court€found€that€Davis€could€not€survive€summary€judgment€byÐ ` Ðasserting€that€he€must€have€been€fired€due€to€his€handicap€simply€because€the€reasons€given€for€hisÐ ð@ Ðtermination€were€untrue.€€Consequently,€the€trial€court€granted€CMSðð€motion€for€summary€judgmentÐ Ð  Ðon€the€handicap€discrimination€claim€as€well.òòò òÐ °"  Ðà  àó óóóOn€appeal,€Davis€argues€that€summary€judgment€was€inappropriate€because€there€is€aÐ $à" Ðgenuine€issue€of€material€fact€as€to€whether€he€is€handicapped€and€whether€he€has€sufficient€evidenceÐ p&À!$ Ðto€support€his€cause€of€action€under€the€Tennessee€Handicap€Act.€€He€also€asserts€on€appeal€that€heÐ P( #& Ðsubmitted€sufficient€proof€to€survive€summary€judgment€on€his€claims€for€€retaliatory€discharge,Ð 0*€%( Ðoutrageous€conduct,€intentional€or€negligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress,€negligent€hiring€orÐ ,`'* Ðsupervision€of€employees,€and€punitive€damages.òòò òÐ ð-@), Ðóóó óÔ‡ X¸XXXŸ¢Ôà  àA€motion€for€summary€judgment€should€be€granted€when€the€movant€demonstrates€that€thereÐ Ð/ +. Ðare€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact€and€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matterÐ ¨1ø,0 Ðof€law.€€òòò òSee€ó óóóTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.04.€€The€party€moving€for€summary€judgment€bears€the€burden€ofÐ €3Ð.2 Ðdemonstrating€that€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€exists.€€òòò òSee€Bain€v.€Wellsó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622Ð X5¨04 Ð(Tenn.€1997).€€On€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€viewÐ 07€26 Ðof€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€nonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€thatÐ 9X48 ÐÑP¸Ñâ âÑ  Ñâ âÑ  Ñparty,€and€discard€all€countervailing€evidence.€€òòò òSee€id.ó óóó€€In€ò òòòByrd€v.€Hallóóó ó,€847€S.W.2d€208€(Tenn.Ð ° Ð1993),€our€Supreme€Court€stated:Ð ˆØ ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€material€fact,Ð `° Ðthe€nonmoving€party€must€then€demonstrate,€by€affidavits€or€discovery€materials,€thatÐ L œ Ðthere€is€a€genuine,€material€fact€dispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05Ð 8 ˆ Ð[now€Rule€56.06]€provides€that€the€nonmoving€party€cannot€simply€rely€upon€hisÐ $ t Ðpleadings€but€must€set€forth€specific€facts€showing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€ofÐ  ` Ðmaterial€fact€for€trial.à8  àÐü L ÈÈ ÐÒ°aÒÒ°(aÒÌÓÓòòò òId.ó óóó€at€211€(citations€omitted).Ð Ô$  Ðà  àSummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€when€the€facts€and€the€legal€conclusions€drawn€fromÐ ¬ü  Ðthe€facts€reasonably€permit€only€one€conclusion.òòò ò€€See€Carvell€v.€Bottomsó óóó,€900€S.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.Ð „Ô  Ð1995).€€Since€only€questions€of€law€are€involved,€there€is€no€presumption€of€correctness€regardingÐ \¬ Ða€trial€court's€grant€of€summary€judgment.€€òòò òSee€Bainó óóó,€936€S.W.2d€at€622.€€Therefore,€our€review€ofÐ 4„ Ðthe€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgment€is€òòde€novoóó€on€the€record€before€this€Court.òòò ò€€See€WarrenÐ  \ Ðv.€Estate€of€Kirkó óóó,€954€S.W.2d€722,€723€(Tenn.€1997).Ô#†XŸ¢XX X¸]#ÔÔ‡X¡è XXXŸ¢Ôòòò òÐ ä4 ÐóóÔ#†XŸ¢X XX¡èêf#Ôó óà  àIn€this€case,€the€trial€court€found€that€Davis€was€handicapped€within€the€meaning€of€theÐ ¼  ÐTennessee€Handicap€Act€(ð ðTHAðð),€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€8„50„103€(1993).€€€However,€sinceÐ œì Ðthe€trial€court€rendered€its€decision€in€this€case,€the€United€States€Supreme€Court€issued€a€decisionÐ |Ì Ðclarifying€the€definition€of€ð ðdisabilityðð€under€the€comparable€federal€disability€discriminationÐ \!¬ Ðstatutes.€€ò òòòSee€Sutton€v.€United€Air€Lines,€Inc.ó óóó,€527€U.S.€_____,€119€S.Ct.€2139€(1999).€Ð <#Œ! ÐConsequently,€in€light€of€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€we€must€examine€whether€Davis€would€be€consideredÐ %l # Ðð ðhandicappedðð€under€the€Tennessee€statute.Ð ü&L"% Ðà  àThe€pertinent€provision€of€the€THA€provides:Ð Ü(,$' ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓà ` àThere€shall€be€no€discrimination€in€the€hiring,€firing€and€other€terms€andÐ ¼* &) Ðconditions€of€employment€of€the€state€of€Tennessee€or€any€department,€agency,Ð ¬+ü&* Ðinstitution€or€political€subdivision€of€the€state,€or€of€any€private€employer,€againstÐ œ,ì'+ Ðany€applicant€for€employment€based€solely€upon€any€physical,€mental€or€visualÐ Œ-Ü(, Ðhandicap€of€the€applicant,€unless€such€handicap€to€some€degree€prevents€theÐ |.Ì)- Ðapplicant€from€performing€the€duties€required€by€the€employment€sought€or€impairsÐ l/¼*. Ðthe€performance€of€the€work€involved.Ð \0¬+/ ÐÌÒ° kÒÒ°kÒÓ(kÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(a)€(1993).€€The€THA€does€not€define€ð ðhandicap.ðð€€Therefore,Ð <2Œ-1 ÐTennessee€courts€look€to€three€sources€for€interpretation€of€this€term:€€(1)€the€Tennessee€HumanÐ 4l/3 ÐRights€Act€definition€of€handicap,€codified€at€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€4„21„102(9);€(2)€theÐ ü5L15 Ðcomparable€federal€statutes,€the€American€with€Disabilities€Act,€42€U.S.C.A.€ðð€12102(2),€and€theÐ Ü7,37 ÐRehabilitation€Act,€29€U.S.C.A.€ðð€706(8);€and€(3)€federal€and€state€case€law€interpreting€theseÐ ¼9 59 Ðstatutes.€€òòò òSee€Barnes€v.€€Goodyear€Tire€&€Rubber€Co.óóó ó,€No.€€02A01„9707„CH„00157,€1998€WLÐ ° Ð345449€(June€30,€1998)€(òòperm€to€app€granted€Jan.€€11,€1999óó).€€€€€€Ð à Ðà  àDavis€argues€that€his€diabetes€constitutes€a€ð ðhandicapðð€under€the€definition€of€ð ðhandicapððÐ pÀ Ðin€the€Tennessee€Human€Rights€Act€(ð ðTHRAðð),€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€4„21„102(9).€€UnderÐ P   Ðthis€definition,€"handicap"€means:€Ð 0 € ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓ(i)€A€physical€or€mental€impairment€which€substantially€limits€one€(1)€or€more€ofÐ `  Ðsuch€person's€major€life€activities;€Ð P  Ð(ii)€A€record€of€having€such€an€impairment;€or€Ð ð@  Ð(iii)€Being€regarded€as€having€such€an€impairment;€€€€€Ð à0  ÐÌÒ°¹rÒÒ°«rÒÓÇrÓTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102(9)€(1998).€€ð ðMajor€life€activitiesðð€are€defined€as€ð ð[F]unctions€such€asÐ À Ðcaring€for€oneððs€self,€performing€manual€tasks,€walking,€seeing,€hearing,€speaking,€breathing,Ð  ð Ðlearning,€and€working.ðð€€òòò òCecil€v.€€Gibsonóóó ó,€820€S.W.2d€361,€364€(Tenn.€€App.€€1991)€(quoting€29Ð €Ð ÐC.F.R.€ðð€1613,€702€(c)€(1990)).€€The€definition€of€handicap€in€the€THRA€is€virtually€identical€to€theÐ `° Ðfederal€definitions€of€disability€found€in€the€ADA€and€the€Rehabilitation€Act.€€Thus,€casesÐ @ Ðinterpreting€the€federal€statutes€are€€particularly€helpful€to€Tennessee€courts€interpreting€the€stateððsÐ  p Ðdefinition€of€handicap.€€òòò òId.€ó óóó€€€€€€€€€Ð P Ðà  àDavis€asserts€that€he€satisfies€all€three€prongs€of€the€handicap€definition.€Davis€argues€thatÐ à0 Ðthe€first€prong€is€satisfied€because€his€diabetes€is€ð ða€physical€condition€which€substantially€limitsÐ À! Ðmajor€life€activities,ðð€noting€that€he€must€administer€insulin€shots,€take€oral€medication,€monitor€hisÐ  #ð! Ðcondition,€and€comply€with€a€strict€diet€and€exercise€program.€€Davis€does€not€name€the€ð ðmajor€lifeÐ €%Ð # Ðactivityðð€which€is€substantially€limited€by€his€diabetes,€and€asserts€that€his€diabetes€did€not€preventÐ `'°"% Ðhim€from€performing€his€job€duties.€€Davis€maintains€that€the€second€prong€is€satisfied€because€heÐ @)$' Ðhas€been€diabetic€for€twenty€years€and€thus€has€ð ða€recordðð€of€having€an€impairment€that€substantiallyÐ  +p&) Ðlimits€a€major€life€activity.Ð -P(+ Ðà  àDavis€also€argues€that€the€evidence€shows€that€he€satisfies€the€third€prong€of€the€definition,Ð à.0*- Ðbecause€CMS€ð ðregardedðð€him€as€having€an€impairment€that€substantially€limits€a€major€life€activity.€Ð À0,/ ÐDavis€maintains€that€Benderððs€comments€about€his€diabetes€showed€that€he€ð ðperceived€that€hisÐ  2ð-1 Ðdiabetic€condition€may€have€limited€his€work€performance.ððÐ €4Ð/3 Ðà  àIn€response,€CMS€asserts€that€Davis€has€presented€no€proof€that€he€is€substantially€limitedÐ `6°15 Ðâ âin€a€major€life€activity,€but€simply€requests€the€Court€to€take€judicial€notice€that€diabetesÐ @837 Ðsubstantially€limits€a€major€life€activity.€€Thus,€CMS€argues€that€Davis€does€not€satisfy€the€definitionÐ ° Ðof€ð ðhandicap.ðð€€We€will€consider€this€issue€in€light€of€ò òòòSutton€v.€United€Airlines,€Inc.óóó óÐ à Ðâ âà  àIn€òòò òSuttonóóó ó,€two€visually€impaired€twins€with€identical€uncorrected€vision€of€20/200€or€worseÐ pÀ Ðfiled€suit€against€a€commercial€airline€under€the€American€with€Disabilities€Act€(ð ðADAðð).€€TheÐ P   Ðairline€had€rejected€the€twins€for€employment€as€pilots€because€they€did€not€meet€the€airlineððsÐ 0 € Ðminimum€vision€requirements,€which€required€uncorrected€visual€acuity€of€20/100€or€better.€€BothÐ `  Ðthe€district€court€and€the€Tenth€Circuit€dismissed€the€plaintiffsðð€complaint,€finding€that€the€plaintiffsÐ ð@  Ðcould€not€prove€that€they€had€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€because€they€failed€to€show€that€they€were€substantiallyÐ Ð  Ðlimited€in€a€major€life€activity€such€as€working.€€The€plaintiffs€appealed€to€the€United€StatesÐ ° ÐSupreme€Court.€€à ¸ àÐ à Ðà  àOn€appeal,€the€pivotal€issue€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó€was€ð ðwhether€disability€is€to€be€determined€with€orÐ pÀ Ðwithout€reference€to€corrective€measuresðð€such€as€glasses€or€contact€lenses.€€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€119€S.€Ct.€atÐ P  Ð2146.€€The€plaintiffs€argued€that€the€issue€of€whether€a€litigantððs€impairment€substantially€limits€aÐ 0€ Ðmajor€life€activity€should€be€determined€without€regard€to€corrective€measures.€€They€notedÐ ` Ðregulations€and€interpretive€guidelines€promulgated€by€the€Equal€Employment€OpportunityÐ ð@ ÐCommission€(ð ðEEOCðð)€which€stated€that€disability€should€be€determined€ð ðwithout€regard€toÐ Ð  Ðmitigating€measures€such€as€medicines,€or€assistive€or€prosthetic€devices.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€2145€(quoting€29Ð °"  ÐC.F.R.€pt.€1630,€App.€€ðð€1630.2(j)€(1998)).Ð $à" Ðà  àThe€Supreme€Court€rejected€the€approach€in€the€EEOC€Guidelines.€€ò òòòId.€ó óóó€at€2146.€€It€notedÐ p&À!$ Ðthat€the€Act€requires€a€present,€not€a€hypothetical,€limitation€on€a€major€life€activity,€and€found€thatÐ P( #& Ða€person€whose€impairment€is€corrected€by€medication€is€not€presently€limited.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€It€also€observedÐ 0*€%( Ðthat€the€determination€of€whether€a€person€has€a€disability€is€an€individualized€inquiry.€€It€found€thatÐ ,`'* Ðadopting€the€approach€in€the€EEOC€Guidelines€ran€counter€to€the€required€individualized€inquiry,Ð ð-@), Ðand€utilized€diabetes€as€an€example:Ð Ð/ +. ÐÓÓà8  àFor€instance,€under€this€view,€courts€would€almost€certainly€find€all€diabetics€to€beÐ °1-0 Ðdisabled,€because€if€they€failed€to€monitor€their€blood€sugar€levels€and€administerÐ  2ð-1 Ðinsulin,€they€would€almost€certainly€be€substantially€limited€in€one€or€more€major€lifeÐ 3à.2 Ðactivities.€€A€diabetic€whose€illness€does€not€impair€his€or€her€daily€activities€wouldÐ €4Ð/3 Ðtherefore€be€considered€disabled€simply€because€he€or€she€has€diabetes.€€Thus,€theÐ p5À04 Ðguidelines€approach€would€create€a€system€in€which€persons€often€must€be€treated€Ð `6°15Ð Ð  Ðà8  àas€members€of€a€group€of€people€with€similar€impairments,€rather€than€as€individuals.€Ð ° ÐThis€is€contrary€to€both€the€letter€and€spirit€of€the€ADA.РðÐ Ð  ÐÌÓÓò òòòId.ó óóó€at€2147.€€The€Supreme€Court€also€noted€that€the€approach€in€the€EEOC€Guidelines€would€meanÐ €Ð Ðthat€employers€could€not€take€into€account€negative€side€effects€from€the€mitigating€measures,€suchÐ ` ° Ðas€seizures€from€antipsychotic€drugs.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Court€also€found€this€ð ðinconsistent€with€theÐ @  Ðindividualized€approach€of€the€ADA.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€Ð  p  Ðà  àThe€Court€then€described€the€appropriate€inquiry€to€determine€whether€a€person€who€usesÐ P  Ðcorrective€measures€has€a€ð ðdisabilityðð€under€the€first€prong€of€the€test,€that€is,€a€physical€impairmentÐ à0  Ðthat€substantially€limits€a€major€life€activity.€€The€Court€stated€that€ð ðone€has€a€disability€underÐ À Ðsubsection€A€[the€first€prong]€if,€notwithstanding€the€use€of€a€corrective€device,€that€individual€isÐ  ð Ðsubstantially€limited€in€a€major€life€activity.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€2149.€€Based€on€this€analysis,€the€CourtÐ €Ð Ðconcluded€that€the€plaintiffs€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó€were€not€disabled€under€the€first€prong€of€the€definition€ofÐ `° Ðð ðdisability.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€Ð @ Ðà  àThe€Court€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó€then€discussed€the€third€prong€of€the€definition€of€disability,€underÐ  p Ðwhich€a€person€may€be€found€disabled€if€he€is€ð ðregarded€as€havingðð€an€impairment€that€substantiallyÐ P Ðlimits€a€major€life€activity.€€The€Court€observed€that€a€disability€may€be€found€if€an€employerÐ à0 Ðð ðmistakenly€believes€that€an€actual,€nonlimiting€impairment€substantially€limits€one€or€more€majorÐ À! Ðlife€activities.ðð€€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€2150.€€òòóóIn€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€the€plaintiffs€argued€that€the€defendant€airline€mistakenlyÐ  #ð! Ðbelieved€that€their€visual€impairment,€remedied€with€corrective€measures,€substantially€limited€themÐ €%Ð # Ðin€the€major€life€activity€of€working,€specifically,€working€as€a€global€airline€pilot.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€Ð `'°"% Ðà  àThe€Court€inò òòòSuttonó óóó€observed€that€ð ðthere€may€be€some€conceptual€difficulty€in€definingÐ @)$' Ðððmajor€life€activitiesðð€to€include€workðð€because€it€leads€to€circular€reasoning€that€if€a€person€isÐ  +p&) Ðexcluded€because€of€an€impairment€from€working€with€others,€ð ð€ððthen€that€exclusion€constitutes€an€Ð -P(+ Ðimpairment.€.€.€.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€2151€(quoting€Tr.€of€Oral€Arg.€inò òòò€School€Board€of€Nassau€Co.€v.€Arlineó óóó,Ð à.0*- ÐO.€T.€1986€No.€85„1277,€p.€15€(argument€of€Solicitor€General)).€€The€Court€assumed,€withoutÐ À0,/ Ðdeciding,€that€working€is€a€major€life€activity,€but€found€nevertheless€that€the€plaintiffs€did€not€meetÐ  2ð-1 Ðthe€ð ðregarded€asðð€prong€of€the€definition€of€disability.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€It€noted€that€even€if€ð ðworkingðð€isÐ €4Ð/3 Ðconsidered€one€of€the€major€life€activities,€ð ð[t]o€be€substantially€limited€in€the€major€life€activity€ofÐ `6°15 Ðworking,€.€.€.€one€must€be€precluded€from€more€than€one€type€of€job,€a€specialized€job,€or€a€particularÐ @837 Ðjob€of€choice.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Court€found€that€the€ò òòòSuttonó óóó€plaintiffs€had€alleged€only€that€the€airlineÐ  :p59 Ðregarded€their€poor€vision€as€precluding€them€from€a€position€as€ð ðglobal€airline€pilot.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€TheÐ ° ÐCourt€stated:€ð ðBecause€the€position€of€global€airline€pilot€is€a€single€job,€this€allegation€does€notÐ à Ðsupport€the€claim€that€respondent€regards€petitioners€as€having€a€substantially€limiting€impairment.ðð€Ð pÀ Ðò òòòId.ó óóó€€Therefore,€the€Court€affirmed€the€dismissal€of€the€plaintiffsðð€claims.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€2152.Ð P   Ðà  àAs€noted€above,€Tennessee€courts€have€found€that€federal€case€law€construing€the€federalÐ 0 € Ðdiscrimination€statutes€is€ð ðan€important€source€of€guidance.ðð€€òòò òCecil€v.€€Gibsonóóó ó,€820€S.W.2d€361,€364Ð `  Ð(Tenn.€€App.€€1991).€€Indeed,€Tennessee€courts€ð ðutilize[]€federal€decisions€construing€parallelÐ ð@  Ðemployment€law.€.€.€.ðð€€ò òòòPruettó óóó,€1997€WL€729260€at€*12€(Tenn.€App.€Nov.€25,€1997).€€The€reasoningÐ Ð  Ðin€òòò òSuttonóóó ó€is€in€line€with€the€Tennessee€Handicap€Act€and€it€is€therefore€appropriate€to€adopt€itsÐ ° Ðanalysis€of€the€federal€definition€of€disability€in€construing€the€THA.€Ð à Ðà  àUtilizing€the€reasoning€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€Davis€would€clearly€not€meet€the€first€prong€of€theÐ pÀ Ðdefinition€of€ð ðhandicapðð€set€forth€in€the€THRA.€€Davis€notes€that€he€must€utilize€corrective€measures,Ð P  Ðsuch€as€insulin€shots€and€oral€medication,€but€identifies€no€major€life€activity€which€is€substantiallyÐ 0€ Ðlimited€by€his€diabetes.€€As€noted€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€a€ð ðdiabetic€whose€illness€does€not€impair€his€.€.€.€dailyÐ ` Ðactivitiesðð€should€not€be€considered€disabled€ð ðsimply€because€he€.€.€.€has€diabetes.ðð€€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€119Ð ð@ ÐS.Ct.€at€2147.€€Under€this€analysis,€Davis€meets€neither€the€first€nor€the€second€(ð ðrecord€of€anÐ Ð  Ðimpairmentðð)€prong€of€the€definition€of€ð ðhandicap.ððÐ °"  Ðà  àDavis€argues€that€he€meets€the€third€prong€of€the€definition€of€ð ðhandicap,ðð€because€CMSÐ $à" Ðð ðregardedðð€him€as€handicapped,€that€is,€CMS€regarded€him€as€having€an€impairment€thatÐ p&À!$ Ðsubstantially€limited€the€major€life€activity€of€working.€€ò òòòSee€Ceciló óóó,€820€S.W.2d€at€366;€ò òòòBarnes€v.Ð P( #& ÐGoodyear€Tire€and€Rubber€Co.ó óóó,€No.€02A01„9707„CH„00157,€1998€WL€345449€(Tenn€App.€JuneÐ 0*€%( Ð20,€1998).Ð ,`'* Ðà  àAs€did€the€Court€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€we€acknowledge€some€conceptual€difficulty€in€recognizingÐ ð-@), Ðð ðworkingðð€as€a€major€life€activity€under€the€definition€of€ð ðhandicap,ðð€in€that€it€tends€to€lead€toÐ Ð/ +. Ðcircular€reasoning.€€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€119€S.€Ct.€at€2151.€€However,€even€assuming€that€ð ðworkingðð€is€a€majorÐ °1-0 Ðlife€activity€under€Tennesseeððs€definition€of€ð ðhandicap,ðð€Davis€identifies€no€broad€class€of€job€thatÐ 3à.2 Ðhe€is€ð ðregarded€asðð€being€unable€to€perform.€€ð ðWhen€the€major€life€activity€under€consideration€isÐ p5À04 Ðthat€of€working,€the€statutory€phrase€ððsubstantially€limitsðð€requires,€at€a€minimum,€that€plaintiffsÐ P7 26 Ðallege€that€they€are€unable€to€work€in€a€broad€class€of€jobs.ðð€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€The€Equal€EmploymentÐ 09€48 ÐCommission€has€explained€that€ð ðsubstantially€limitsðð€in€reference€to€the€major€life€activity€ofÐ ° Ðworking€means:Ð à ÐÒ°ÒÒ°ÒÓÓ.€.€.€significantly€restricted€in€the€ability€to€perform€either€a€class€of€jobs€or€a€broadÐ pÀ Ðrange€of€jobs€in€various€classes€as€compared€to€the€average€person€havingÐ ` ° Ðcomparable€training,€skills,€and€abilities.€€The€inability€to€perform€a€single,€particularÐ P   Ðjob€does€not€constitute€a€substantial€limitation€in€the€major€life€activity€of€working.Ð @  ÐÌÒ°ê«ÒÒ°Ü«ÒÓø«Óòòò òId.€óóó ó(quoting€C.F.R.€ðð€1630.2(j)(3)(i)).€€Accordingly,€Davis€must€show€that€CMS€regarded€hisÐ  p  Ðdiabetes€as€an€impairment€that€substantially€limits€him€in€ð ðmore€than€one€type€of€job,€a€specializedÐ P  Ðjob,€or€a€particular€job€choice.ðð€€òòò òId.ó óóó€€Davis€must€show€that€(1)€CMS€perceived€Davis€as€having€anÐ à0  Ðimpairment,€and€that€(2)€CMS€perceived€the€impairment€as€substantially€limiting€a€major€lifeÐ À Ðactivity.€€€Ð  ð Ðà  àSince€this€is€an€appeal€from€a€grant€of€summary€judgment,€we€must€Ô‡ X¸XXXŸ¢Ôtake€the€strongestÐ €Ð Ðlegitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€Davis.€€Ô#†XŸ¢XX X¸»°#Ôòòò òSee€Bain€v.€Wellsóóó ó,€936€S.W.2d€618,€622€(Tenn.Ð €Ð Ð1993).€€Davis€disputes€CMSðð€assertion€that€he€had€trouble€lifting€computer€monitors,€that€he€hadÐ €Ð Ðtrouble€taking€directions,€that€he€was€argumentative,€opinionated,€ð ðknow„it„all,ðð€defensive€orÐ `° Ðdisrespectful,€or€that€he€ð ðdid€not€want€to€do€things€by€company€policy.ðð€€Viewing€the€evidence€inÐ @ Ðthe€light€most€favorable€to€Davis,€he€asserts€that€Bender€asked€him€about€the€persistent€cough€thatÐ  p Ðresulted€from€the€oral€medication€Davis€takes€to€aid€his€digestion.€€Davis€acknowledges€that€BenderÐ "P Ðtold€him€that€he€did€not€feel€that€Davis€could€perform€the€requirements€of€the€job€for€which€he€wasÐ à#0! Ðhired.€€Davis€asserts,€without€factual€foundation,€his€belief€that€CMS€fired€him€because€it€wasÐ À%!# Ðconcerned€about€the€cost€of€insurance€for€a€diabetic€employee.Ð  'ð"% Ðà  àUnder€the€analysis€in€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€CMS€could€legitimately€consider€negative€side€effects€resultingÐ €)Ð$' Ðfrom€the€use€of€corrective€measures,€such€as€the€side€effects€from€medication.€€ò òòòSuttonó óóó,€119€S.€Ct.Ð `+°&) Ðat€2147.€€Davis€acknowledges€that€his€medication€resulted€in€his€having€a€persistent€dry€cough.€€ItÐ @-(+ Ðis€undisputed€that€talking€on€the€telephone€was€a€substantial€part€of€the€job€duties€of€the€position€forÐ  /p*- Ðwhich€Davis€was€hired.€Ð 1P,/ Ðà  àMoreover,€while€Davis€asserts€that€the€evidence€demonstrates€that€CMS€regarded€his€diabetesÐ à20.1 Ðas€substantially€limiting€him€in€the€major€life€activity€of€working,€he€identifies€no€broad€class€of€jobsÐ À403 Ðin€which€he€was€regarded€as€unable€to€work.€€Viewing€the€evidence€as€a€whole,€in€the€light€mostÐ  6ð15 Ðfavorable€to€Davis,€the€fact„finder€could€not€reasonably€infer€that€CMS€ð ðmistakenly€believe[d]€thatÐ €8Ð37 Ðan€actual,€nonlimiting€impairment€substantially€limit[ed]ðð€Davis,€rendering€him€ð ðunable€to€work€inÐ ° Ða€broad€class€of€jobs.ðð€€ò òòòId.€€óóó óat€2150„51òòóó.Ð à Ðà  àThus,€Davis€fails€to€meet€any€of€the€three€prongs€of€the€definition€of€ð ðhandicapðð€applicableÐ pÀ Ðto€claims€under€the€Tennessee€Handicap€Act.€€On€this€basis,€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summaryÐ P   Ðjudgment€to€CMS€on€Davisðð€claim€of€handicap€discrimination€was€appropriate.€€This€holdingÐ 0 € Ðpretermits€the€issue€of€whether€Davis€was€fired€solely€because€of€his€diabetes.€€Ð `  Ðà  àDavis€also€contends€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€CMSÐ ð@  Ðon€his€claims€for€negligent€hiring€or€supervision€of€employees,€retaliatory€discharge,€intentional€andÐ Ð  Ðnegligent€infliction€of€emotional€distress€and€outrageous€conduct.€€The€trial€court€found€that€DavisÐ ° Ðpresented€no€evidence€to€support€a€cause€of€action€for€these€claims.€€Other€than€conclusoryÐ à Ðallegations€that€CMSðð€conduct€provides€sufficient€basis€for€these€causes€of€action,€Davis€presentsÐ pÀ Ðno€facts€that€would€support€a€cause€of€action€on€any€of€these€claims.€€The€trial€court€is€affirmed€onÐ P  Ðthis€issue.Ð 0€ Ðà  àThe€decision€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€Appellant,€for€which€executionÐ ` Ðmay€issue€if€necessary.€òòò òÐ ð@ ÐÌÓÓóóó óÔ‡ X¸XXXŸ¢Ôà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð °"  Ðà  àà ` àà ¸ àà  àà h àò òóóHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ð œ#ì! Ðó óà  àò òÌCONCUR:Ð t%Ä # ÐÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð 8(ˆ#& ÐóóW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.€J.,€W.S.Ð $)t$' ÐÌÌó óòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ð è+8'* Ðóóò òDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.Ô#†XŸ¢XX X¸'À#ÔòòÐ Ô,$(+ ÐÌó óóó