ÿWPC …# V %a 0(gBw@Ñ4 % 4 0l< 0D¨ UFì 0J2 0T| 0^Ð 0h. 0r– 0| 0†„ 0 1uš U, 0d;U,ŸU 6ËB)DC* AMm Bº D3×U* 74 0@kr«v~vÓ› AOnƽ 0Dƒ D/Ç Bö˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ò($¡¡C:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT ˜™š›œDPžDŸD Ó€ªDÒ 3|xª((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó<Ú5 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd€-'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d))))'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Arial -Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔÝ  ÝÔ€+ÔÔ€+ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€+XÔÌÌJuly€12,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò hÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€€€The€choice€of€law€statute€provides€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àDuties€of€support€enforceable€under€this€law€are€those€imposed€orÏimposable€under€the€laws€of€any€state€or€jurisdiction€where€theÏalleged€obligor€was€present€during€the€period€for€which€support€isÏsought€or€where€the€obligee€was€present€when€the€failure€toÏsupport€commenced,€at€the€election€of€the€obligee.ÌÌÓÓòòMiss.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€93„11„15€(1994).ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHØ(d'`Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€$$X„d&ÓÑ#€$$Xd#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€%ôÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ë—Xòd°dÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÔ€%XÔ›STATE€OF€TENNESSEE€ex€relà à)à àAppeal€No.€ÌCAROLYN€D.€SMITH,à àà àà à)à à01„A„01„9512„CV„00564Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà à)Ìv.à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àDavidson€County€No.ÌÙ€€ÙœßL€(,';+'h|W$` ç `€€Lß›EDWARD€LEE€EARLY,à àà àà à)à àR„5549Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à à)ÌÌÌÔ€%¼ÔÌÌÌÌà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€FOURTH€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€MURIEL€ROBINSON,€JUDGEÔ€%XÔÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌJON€S.€JABLONSKIÌ2400€Crestmoor€RoadÌSuite€321ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37215Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌJAMES€H.€TUCKER,€JR.ÌAssistant€Attorney€GeneralÌ404€James€Robertson€ParkwayÌSuite€1510,€Parkway€TowersÌNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0499Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLEEÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àÔ€%¼ÔAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÔ€%XÔÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àÔ€%¼ÔSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÇà@ àòòOPINIONÔ€%XÔóóÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€is€an€appeal€brought€by€respondent/appellant,€Edward€LeeÏEarly,€from€a€judgment€of€the€trial€court€ordering€him€to€payÏfuture€and€retroactive€child€support.€€The€pertinent€facts€are€asÏfollows.ÌÌà àOn€9€June€1980,€plaintiff/appellee,€Carolyn€D.€Smith,€gaveÏbirth€to€a€child,€Tamika€LaShone€Smith.€€Nine€years€later,€sheÏfiled€a€Uniform€Support€Petition€in€the€Franklin€County€ChanceryÏCourt€of€Mississippi.€€Thereafter,€the€Mississippi€court€enteredÏan€order€transferring€the€case€to€Tennessee's€courts.ÌÌà àOn€19€June€1989,€the€Fourth€Circuit€Court€of€Davidson€CountyÏentered€an€order€requiring€defendant€to€appear€and€show€cause€whyÏthe€court€should€not€enter€an€order€requiring€defendant€to€payÏchild€support.€€Nearly€four€years€later,€the€Fourth€Circuit€CourtÏentered€an€order€requiring€defendant€to€pay€the€circuit€courtÏclerk€$315.00€every€two€weeks€pending€final€resolution€of€theÏmatter.€€On€25€July€1994,€the€court€entered€an€order€and€made€theÏfollowing€findings:€1)€defendant€is€the€father€of€the€child;€2)Ïdefendant's€gross€monthly€income€is€$3,722.00;€3)€Tennessee'sÏchild€support€guidelines€apply€to€the€case;€and€4)€defendant€isÏliable€for€the€child's€medical€insurance.€€The€court€then€orderedÏdefendant€to€pay€monthly€child€support€of€$565.00€plus€the€clerk'sÏcommission€of€$28.25€and€to€obtain€medical€insurance€for€the€childÍwithin€thirty€days.€€In€addition,€the€court€set€a€hearing€date€toÏdetermine€the€issue€of€retroactive€support.ÌÌà àOn€25€August€1994,€the€court€held€a€hearing€as€to€the€amountÏof€retroactive€support€owed€to€plaintiff.€€Thereafter,€plaintiffÏfiled€a€proposed€order€stating€that€the€parties€reached€anÏagreement€which€included€a€finding€that€defendant€owed€plaintiffÏ$38,000.00€in€retroactive€support€as€of€30€June€1994.€€On€24ÏOctober€1994,€the€court€entered€an€order€accepting€the€agreementÏof€the€parties€and€setting€monthly€payments€at€$89.25.€ÌÌà àOn€8€September€1994,€defendant€filed€a€motion€to€set€asideÏthe€order€arguing€that€there€was€a€mutual€mistake€of€law.€ÏSpecifically,€defendant€claimed€that€Mississippi€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€93„9„11€limited€plaintiff's€recovery€of€retroactiveÏsupport€to€one€year€preceding€the€commencement€of€the€action.€€OnÏ9€January€1995,€the€court€entered€an€order€setting€aside€theÏprevious€order.€€The€court€then€set€the€case€for€a€hearing€on€theÏreasonableness€of€the€amount€of€retroactive€support,€but€affirmedÏits€previous€decision€holding€that€Tennessee,€not€Mississippi,€lawÏapplied€to€the€case.€€On€14€March€1995,€the€court€entered€an€orderÏfinding€that,€based€on€defendant's€income€from€October€1989Ïthrough€June€1994,€defendant€owed€plaintiff€$30,282.00.€€BecauseÏthere€was€no€proof€of€defendant's€actual€income,€the€court€assumedÏdefendant's€yearly€income€was€$25,761.00.€€From€this,€the€courtÏcalculated€the€arrearage€for€June€1980€through€September€1989€toÍbe€$40,218.00.€€In€an€amended€order,€entered€on€4€April€1995,€theÏcourt€held€that€it€would€modify€the€order€if€defendant€providedÏproof€of€his€actual€income€within€sixty€days.ÌÌà àOn€26€April€1995,€defendant€filed€a€motion€asking€the€courtÏto€recalculate€the€arrearage€amount€based€on€his€actual€income€andÏto€apply€the€Mississippi€statute€limiting€plaintiff's€recovery€ofÏretroactive€support€to€one€year€preceding€the€commencement€of€theÏaction.€€On€16€August€1995,€the€court€entered€its€final€judgment.€ÏThe€court€held€that€Mississippi's€statute€of€limitations€andÏTennessee's€fifteen€percent€rule€did€not€apply€to€theÏdetermination€of€the€arrearage€amount.€€The€court€calculated€theÏarrearage€for€each€year€by€multiplying€the€number€of€payments€perÏyear€times€the€child€support€rate€based€on€twenty„one€percent€ofÏdefendant's€net€income.€€As€a€result,€the€court€held€thatÏdefendant€owed€plaintiff€a€total€of€$67,167.42€for€June€1980Ïthrough€September€1989.€€The€court€then€took€into€account€allÏpayments€made€on€the€arrearage€through€June€1995€and€held€that€theÏtotal€child€support€judgment€through€June€1995€was€$57,524.63.€ÌÌà àThereafter,€defendant€filed€his€notice€of€appeal.€€HeÏpresented€the€following€issues:ÌÓÓà@ àISSUE€IÌà8 àà àWhether€the€Court€erred€in€setting€retroactiveÏchild€support€from€the€date€of€birth€instead€of€limitingÏretroactive€child€support€to€the€period€from€one€yearÏprior€to€the€filing€of€the€URESA€petition€inÏMississippi.Ì€à@ àISSUE€IIÌà8 àà àWhether€the€court€erred€in€setting€retroactiveÏchild€support€without€applying€the€15%€rule€of€theÏTennessee€child€support€guidelines€while€at€the€sameÏtime€applying€the€21%€presumption€of€the€guidelines€inÏsetting€retroactive€child€support.ÌÌÓÓÌà àDefendant's€first€issue€is€a€choice€of€law€question,€i.e.,Ïdid€the€trial€court€correctly€choose€to€apply€Tennessee€law.€€ItÏis€defendant's€contention€that€the€trial€court€should€have€appliedÏMississippi€law.€€Specifically,€he€asserts€that€Mississippi€CodeÏAnnotated€section€93„9„11€limits€plaintiff's€recovery€ofÏretroactive€child€support.€€That€statute€provides€as€follows:€ð ðTheÏfather's€liabilities€for€past€education€and€necessary€support€andÏmaintenance€and€other€expenses€are€limited€to€a€period€of€one€(1)Ïyear€next€preceding€the€commencement€of€an€action.ðð€€òòMiss.€Code€Ann.óóÏðð€93„9„11€(1994).ÌÌà àIn€support€of€this€claim,€defendant€makes€two€arguments.€ÏFirst,€he€argues€that€Mississippi's€choice€of€law€statute× ƒ. ××  ×€allowsÏthe€obligee€to€choose€either€the€law€of€the€initiating€state€orÏthe€law€of€the€responding€state€and€that€plaintiff€chose€the€lawÏof€the€initiating€state,€Mississippi,€in€her€petition.€ÍDefendant's€second€argument€is€ð ðeven€if€the€Mississippi€StatuteÏdidn't€specifically€require€the€election,€which€it€does,€theÏMississippi€limitation€would€still€apply€because€the€limitation€isÏsubstantive,€not€procedural€.€.€.€.ððÌÌà àœThese›€arguments€are€without€merit.€€ð ðA€court,€subject€toÏconstitutional€restriction,€will€follow€a€statutory€directive€ofÏits€own€state€on€choice€of€law.ðð€€òòRestatement€(Second)€of€Conflict€of€LawsóóÏðð6(1)€(1971);€òòò òsee€Hataway€v.€McKinleyóóó ó,€830€S.W.2d€53,€59€&Ïnn.2„3€(Tenn.€1992)€(adopting€sections€145€and€175€of€theÏRestatement€which€incorporate€section€6).€€Thus,€when€determiningÏwhich€choice€of€law€statute€to€apply,€Tennessee's€courts€shouldÏlook€to€its€statutes€if€such€a€statute€exists.€€In€this€case,Ïthere€is€a€choice€of€law€statute€which€provides:€ÌÓÓà8 àDuties€of€support€applicable€under€this€part€are€thoseÏimposed€or€imposable€under€the€laws€of€any€state€whereÏthe€obligor€was€present€during€the€period€for€whichÏsupport€is€sought.€€The€obligor€is€presumed€to€have€beenÏpresent€in€the€responding€state€during€the€period€forÏwhich€support€is€sought€until€otherwise€shown.ÌÌÓÓòòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€36„5„207(a)€(1991).€€Mississippi's€courts€have€alsoÏadopted€section€6€of€the€Restatement€to€guide€them€when€makingÏchoice€of€law€decisions.€€òòò òSpargins€v.€Louise€Plantation,ÏInc.óóó ó,€391€So.€2d€97,€99„100€(Miss.€1980).€€Both€of€defendant'sÏarguments€assume€the€application€of€Mississippi's€choice€of€lawÏstatute.€€Because€this€assumption€is€incorrect,€defendant'sÏarguments€must€fail.ÌÌà àTennessee's€choice€of€law€statute€applies€in€this€case.€ÏPursuant€to€that€section,€Tennessee's€substantive€law€applies,€notÏthat€of€Mississippi.€€Moreover,€ð ðmatters€of€procedure€.€.€.€areÏgoverned€by€the€law€of€the€forum€.€.€.€.ðð€€16€òòAm.€Jur.€2dóó€ðð118Ï(1979).€€Therefore,€it€does€not€matter€whether€plaintiff€made€anÏelection€or€whether€the€Mississippi's€statute€is€substantive€orÏprocedural.ÌÌà àDefendant's€second€issue€is€also€without€merit.€€ÌÓÓà8 àIn€making€its€determination€concerning€the€amount€ofÏsupport€of€any€minor€child€or€children€of€the€parties,Ïthe€court€shall€apply€as€a€rebuttable€presumption€theÏchild€support€guidelines.€€If€the€court€finds€thatÏevidence€is€sufficient€to€rebut€this€presumption,€the€Ïcourt€shall€make€a€written€finding€that€the€applicationÏof€the€child€support€guidelines€would€be€unjust€orÏinappropriate€in€that€particular€case,€in€order€toÏprovide€for€the€best€interest€of€the€child(ren)€or€theÏequity€between€the€parties.ÌÌÓÓòòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€36„5„101(e)(1)€(1991).€€The€trial€court€did€notÏmake€any€findings€nor€is€there€any€evidence€in€this€case€that€theÏguidelines€would€be€unjust€or€inappropriate.€€Thus,€the€guidelinesÏapply€to€these€parties.€€ð ðThe€child€support€award€is€based€on€aÏflat€percentage€of€the€obligor's€net€income€.€.€.€depending€on€theÏnumber€of€children€for€whom€support€is€being€set€.€.€.€.ðð€€òòTennÏComp.€R.€&€Reg.óó€ch.€1240„2„4„.03(2)€(1994).€€Paragraph€five€providesÏthat€the€obligor€shall€pay€twenty„one€percent€of€his€net€incomeÏfor€one€child.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€ch.€1240„2„4„.03(5).ÌÌà àIt€is€defendant's€contention,€however,€that€the€trial€courtÍshould€have€applied€the€fifteen€percent€modification€rule€inÏconjunction€with€the€twenty„one€percent€rule.€€The€fifteen€percentÏmodification€provision€comes€from€two€sources.€€The€first,ÏTennessee€Code€Annotated,€provides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àIn€cases€involving€child€support,€upon€application€ofÏeither€party,€the€court€shall€decree€an€increase€orÏdecrease€of€such€allowance€when€there€is€found€to€be€aÏsignificant€variance,€as€defined€in€the€child€supportÏguidelines€established€by€subsection€(e),€between€theÏguidelines€and€the€amount€of€support€currently€ordered€.Ï.€.€.ÌÌÓÓòòTenn.€Code€Ann.óó€ðð€36„5„101(a)(1)€(Supp.€1995).€€The€second,€theÏregulations,€defines€the€term€significant€variance€as€ð ðat€leastÏ15%€if€the€current€support€is€one€hundred€dollars€($100.00)€orÏgreater€per€month€and€at€least€fifteen€dollars€($15.00)€if€theÏcurrent€support€is€less€than€$100.00€per€month.ðð€€Both€of€theseÏsources€assume€the€existence€of€a€current€order€of€support.€€InÏother€words,€there€must€be€an€existing€judgment€for€the€court€toÏmodify.€€In€this€case,€there€was€no€judgment€prior€to€the€instantÏaction.€€Plaintiff€did€not€ask€the€court€to€modify€an€existingÏorder;€she€asked€the€court€to€make€an€initial€order.€€Under€theseÏcircumstances,€the€fifteen€percent€modification€rule€isÏinapplicable.€€Thus,€the€trial€court€correctly€determined€theÏamount€of€the€arrearage.ÌÌà àAlthough€he€did€not€properly€brief€the€issue,€defendantÏpropounded€another€reason€for€reversing€the€trial€court.€€DuringÏoral€argument€and€in€œhis›€statement€of€the€facts,€defendantÏmentioned€that€plaintiff€failed€to€request€reimbursement€orÍarrearages€in€her€petition.€€It€is€defendant's€contention€that,Ïbecause€plaintiff€did€not€check€the€appropriate€boxes€in€theÏpetition,€she€can€not€recover€for€back€child€support.€€Defendant,Ïhowever,€never€raised€this€objection€in€the€trial€court.€€Not€onlyÏdid€he€fail€to€object€to€the€retroactive€child€support€award,€butÏhe€provided€the€court€with€evidence€of€his€actual€income€sinceÏ1980,€argued€that€the€court€should€base€the€retroactive€childÏsupport€amount€on€his€actual€income,€and€argued€that€the€courtÏshould€apply€the€Mississippi€limitation€on€œrecovery.€€Defendant›Ïwaived€any€objection€to€the€retroactive€child€support€award€on€theÏground€that€it€exceeded€the€scope€of€the€pleadings.€€òòò òIrvin€v.ÏBinkleyóóó ó,€577€S.W.2d€677,€679€(Tenn.€App.€1978).ÌÌà àFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€the€decision€of€the€trial€court€isÏaffirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€any€further€œnecessaryÏproceedings.€€Costs›€of€appeal€are€taxed€to€defendant/appellant,ÏEdward€Lee€Early.ÌÓÓœà à›à àà àà àà àà àà à___________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ___________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌBEN€H.€CANTRELL,€JUDGEÌ