ÿWPC´ …# VUNa %¯ 0GµU:üw@6 4v Š 0¶™ 0DO B“ Õ Ý 0Jå 0T/ 0^ƒ 0há 0rI 0|» 0†7 0½ 1uM 0dÂU>&U*d BŽB)«DCÔ D3 AMJà— 0@w|·‹3v~¾vÓ< AOÆ^ 0D$ D/h B—˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÈÚØÚÚØÈÚ0nLLÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX('\$¡¡Ô€XåÙXXMXÔ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular DgE îFGgHUIJ{KLÓ€VDÒ 3|xV(f(2oo$¤¤Ý ƒ'\!ÝÔ€XÍÈXXXÔÝ  ÝÔ€ô¢¼ôXXÍÈÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  ÚóóC:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial d% Line 7 d((((7Border 1dd'''''ÿÿdxd€-)Cþÿ << Gÿÿ ÖÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€%ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌAugust€1,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò rÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€&ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝIn€accordance€with€an€agreement€made€by€the€parties,€Franklin€American€Corporation€wasÏsubstituted€as€a€defendant€in€the€place€of€Franklin€American€Life€Insurance€Company.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€&ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝRestatement€(Second)€of€Torts€ðð€580A€(1977)€deals€with€the€defamation€of€a€public€official€orÏpublic€figure.€€In€this€case,€there€is€no€dispute€that€the€plaintiff€is€a€private€figure.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÔ€&ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ÍÈXXdædÈ7Ñ›Þ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌROBERT€E.€EVANS,à àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellee,à àà àò ò)€€Davidson€Circuit€No.€œ94C›„257Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌœVS›.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€01A01„9608„CV„00386̜ـ€ÙßR€+,)A1-j|ð‘` ç `€€@ÿRß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌœAMCASH›€MORTGAGE€COMPANY,à à)ÌINC.,à àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellant.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€W.€BROTHERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òPHILIP€D.€IRWINÌPAMELA€KINGÌNEAL€&€œHARWELL›Ìó óNashville,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òROBERT€E.€EVANS,€pro€œse›Ìó óNashville,€TennesseeÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òREVERSEDÌÌÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€J.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌœÌÑ7€ÍÈXXdæXXdæ7Ñó óÓÓà àIn€this€defamation€action,€Robert€Evans€(ð ðPlaintiffðð)€filed€suit€against€AmcashÏMortgage€Company,€Inc.€(ð ðDefendantðð)€and€Franklin€American€Life€InsuranceÏCompany× ƒ. ××  ×€for€an€alleged€defamatory€statement€made€by€Defendantððs€attorney€to€oneÏof€Defendantððs€employees.€€In€granting€the€Defendantððs€motion€for€partial€summaryÏjudgment,€the€trial€court€dismissed€Franklin€American€Corporation€from€the€suit,Ïdismissed€Plaintiffððs€claims€against€Defendant€under€a€theory€of€ð ðslander€by€action,ððÏand€held€that€a€genuine€issue€of€material€fact€existed€as€to€whether€the€statementÏmade€by€Defendantððs€attorney€to€one€of€Defendantððs€employees€regarding€the€reasonÏfor€Plaintiffððs€employment€termination€is€subject€to€a€qualified€privilege.€€DefendantÏappeals€the€judgment€of€the€court€below€arguing€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denyingÏDefendantððs€motion€for€summary€judgment€regarding€the€statement€made€byÏDefendantððs€attorney€to€one€of€Defendantððs€employees€concerning€the€reason€forÏPlaintiffððs€employment€termination€because€the€statement€is€subject€to€a€qualifiedÍprivilege€and€is€not€defamatory€in€nature.€€For€the€reasons€stated€hereafter,€we€reverseÏthe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€hold€that€the€statement€made€by€DefendantððsÏattorney€to€one€of€Defendantððs€employees€regarding€the€reason€for€PlaintiffððsÏemployment€termination€is€subject€to€a€qualified€privilege€and€is€not€defamatory.ÌÌà@ àò òFACTSó óÌÌà àOn€March€1,€1993,€Plaintiff€began€his€employment€with€the€Defendant€as€theÏmanager€of€Defendantððs€Nashville€office.€ÌÌà àOn€August€16,€1993€at€approximately€9:00€p.m.,€an€employee€of€the€Defendant,ÏTina€Reynolds€(ð ðReynoldsðð),€telephoned€Defendantððs€chief€executive€officer,€JohnÏHackney€(ð ðHackneyðð),›€at€his€home€and€alleged€that€Plaintiff€had€fondled€and€sexuallyÏbattered€her.€€€œHackney›€immediately€called€one€of€Defendantððs€attorneys,€John€JordanÏ(ð ðJordanðð),€and€told€Jordan€of€Reynoldððs€allegations€against€the€Plaintiff.€€œJordan›€thenÏcalled€Reynolds€and€arranged€to€meet€her€at€his€office€the€following€morning.€ÌÌà àOn€August€17,€1993€at€approximately€8:00€a.m.,€Reynolds€arrived€at€the€office€ofÏAnderson€&€Jordan,€attorneys€for€the€Defendant.€€œJordan›€greeted€Reynolds€at€the€doorÏand€arranged€for€his€law€partner,€Charles€Anderson€œ(ð ðAndersonðð),›€to€œinterviewÏReynolds€regarding›€her€sexual€battery€allegations€against€the€œPlaintiff.›ÌÌà àFollowing€Andersonððs€interview€with€Reynolds,€Hackney,€Jordan,€Taylor€MooreÍ(ð ðMooreðð),€one€of€Defendantððs€officers,€and€Gary€Atnip,€Defendantððs€chief€financialÏofficer,€decided€that€Plaintiffððs€employment€with€the€Defendant€should€be€terminated.€ÏœHackney›€then€instructed€Jordan€and€Moore€to€inform€Plaintiff€that€he€was€fired.€ÌÌà àAround€10:00€a.m.€on€August€17,€1993,€Jordan€and€Moore€went€to€PlaintiffððsÏoffice€to€inform€him€that€his€employment€with€the€Defendant€had€terminated.€€œTwo›€ofÏDefendantððs€employees,€Steve€Carr€(ð ðCarrðð)€and€Parker€Judd€(ð ðJuddðð),€were€in€theÏoffice€at€the€time€Jordan€and€Moore€came€to€tell€Plaintiff€that€he€was€fired.€€œJordan›Ïasked€Carr€and€Judd€to€step€outside.€€œAfter›€Carr€and€Judd€left€the€office,€Jordan€andÏMoore€told€Plaintiff€that€he€was€fired€and€that€he€should€pack€his€belongings€and€leaveÏimmediately.€€œPlaintiff›€then€packed€his€belongings,€and€Jordan€and€Moore€escortedÏPlaintiff€to€his€car.€€€œJordan›€and€Moore€did€not€tell€Plaintiff€the€reason€his€employmentÏwas€terminated.€€€ÌÌà àPrior€to€Plaintiffððs€employment€termination,€Andersonððs€interview€with€ReynoldsÏwas€the€only€investigation€that€Defendant€undertook€in€evaluating€the€truthfulness€ofÏReynoldððs€allegations€against€the€Plaintiff.€€œDefendant›€never€discussed€with€PlaintiffÏthe€allegations€that€Reynolds€had€made€against€him.€€œÌ›Ìà àAfter€Plaintiff€was€fired,€Jordan€acted€as€the€temporary€manager€œof›€DefendantððsÏNashville€office.€€œThe›€following€week€after€œPlaintiffððs›€œtermination›€while€Jordan,€Carr,Ïand€Judd€were€working€in€Defendantððs€office€sorting€through€files,€Carr€stepped€backÏto€pick€up€the€file€cabinets,€and€Judd€asked€Jordan€the€reason€Plaintiff€was€fired.€ÍœJordan›€responded€that€Plaintiff€was€fired€because€he€had€inappropriately€touchedÏReynoldððs€blouse.€€ÌÌà àIn€an€affidavit,€Carr€stated€that€he€was€never€told€by€the€Defendant€or€any€agentÏacting€on€behalf€of€the€Defendant€that€the€reason€Plaintiff€was€fired€was€because€of€hisÏsexual€harassment€of€another€employee.€€œCarr›€further€stated€that€the€specific€reasonsÏfor€Plaintiffððs€termination€were€never€discussed€with€him.€ÌÌà@ àò òLAWó óÌÌà àThe€sole€issue€before€this€Court€is€as€follows:Ìœà àWhether›€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€Defendantððs€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment€regarding€the€statement€Defendantððs€attorney€made€to€one€of€DefendantððsÏemployees€concerning€the€reason€Plaintiff€was€fired.ÌÌà àThe€standards€governing€our€review€of€a€trial€courtððs€action€on€a€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€are€well€settled.€€Since€our€inquiry€involves€purely€a€question€ofÏlaw,€no€presumption€of€correctness€attaches€to€the€trial€courtððs€judgment,€and€our€taskÏis€confined€to€reviewing€the€record€to€determine€whether€the€requirements€of€Rule€56Ïof€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure€have€been€met.€€òòCarvell€v.€Bottomsóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€23,€26€(Tenn.€1995);€òòCowden€v.€Sovran€Bank/Central€Southóó,€816€S.W.2d€741,Ï744€(Tenn.€1991);€òò€Foley€v.€St.€Thomas€Hosp.óó,€906€S.W.2d€448,€452€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ï1995);€òòBrenner€v.€Textron€Aerostructures,€A€Division€of€Textron,€Inc.óó,€874€S.W.2d€579,Í582€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1993).€€Tennessee€Rule€of€Civil€Procedure€56.03€provides€thatÏsummary€judgment€is€only€appropriate€where:€(1)€there€is€no€genuine€issue€of€materialÏfact€relevant€to€the€claim€or€defense€contained€in€the€motion,€and€(2)€the€moving€partyÏis€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€on€the€undisputed€facts.€€òòCarvellóó,€900ÏS.W.2d€at€26;€òòByrd€v.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòAnderson€v.€StandardÏRegister€Co.óó,€857€S.W.2d€555,€559€(Tenn.€1993).€€The€moving€party€has€the€burden€ofÏproving€that€the€motion€satisfies€these€requirements.€€òòDownen€v.€Allstate€Ins.€Co.óó,€811ÏS.W.2d€523,€524€(Tenn.€1991).ÌÌà àWhile€the€summary€judgment€procedure€is€not€a€substitute€for€trial,€it€goes€to€theÏmerits€of€the€complaint€and€should€not€be€taken€lightly.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210;ÏòòJones€v.€Home€Indem.€Ins.€Co.óó,€651€S.W.2d€213,€214€(Tenn.€1983);€òòFowler€v.€HappyÏGoodman€Familyóó,€575€S.W.2d€496,€498€(Tenn.€1978);€òòFoleyóó,€906€S.W.2d€at€452.€€It€hasÏbeen€repeatedly€stated€by€the€appellate€courts€of€this€state€that€the€purpose€of€aÏsummary€judgment€proceeding€is€not€the€finding€of€facts,€the€resolution€of€disputedÏfactual€issues€or€the€determination€of€conflicting€inferences€reasonably€to€be€drawnÏfrom€the€facts.€€òòBellamy€v.€Federal€Express€Corp.óó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33€(Tenn.€1988).€€ÏRather,€the€purpose€of€summary€judgment€is€to€resolve€controlling€issues€of€law.€€òòIdóó.€€ÌÌà àIn€evaluating€the€propriety€of€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€we€view€theÏevidence€in€the€light€most€favorable€to€the€nonmoving€party€and€draw€all€reasonableÏinferences€in€the€nonmoving€partyððs€favor.€€òòByrdóó,€847€S.W.2d€at€210„11.€€A€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€should€only€be€granted€when€both€the€facts€and€the€conclusionsÍdrawn€from€the€facts€permit€a€reasonable€person€to€reach€only€one€conclusion.€€òòIdóó.€ÌÌà àIn€order€to€prevail€in€a€defamation€action,€a€plaintiff€must€demonstrate€someÏlevel€of€fault€on€the€part€of€the€defendant.€€€€òòMemphis€Pub.€Co.€v.€Nicholsóó,€569€S.W.2dÏ412,€418€(Tenn.€1978).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€in€òòNicholsóó€decided€thatÏnegligence€is€the€requisite€level€of€fault€that€must€be€established€by€a€private€figureÏplaintiff€who€is€bringing€a€defamation€action.€€òòIdóó.€€€The€supreme€court€in€òòNicholsóó€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àIn›€determining€the€issue€of€liability,€the€conduct€of€theÏdefendant€is€to€be€measured€against€what€a€reasonablyÏprudent€person€would,€or€would€not,€have€done€under€theÏsame€or€similar€circumstances.€€This€is€the€ordinaryÏnegligence€test€that€we€adopt,€not€a€ð ðjournalisticÏmalpracticeðð€test€whereby€liability€is€based€upon€aÏdeparture€from€supposed€standards€of€care€set€byÏpublishers€themselves.Ìà0 àà àà8 àœà8 àIn›€our€opinion,€the€appropriate€question€to€be€determined€from€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence€is€whether€the€defendantÏexercised€reasonable€care€and€caution€in€checking€on€the€truth€orÏfalsity€and€the€defamatory€character€of€the€communication€beforeÏpublishing€it.€€€ÌÌÓÓòòNicholsóó,€569€S.W.2d€at€418€(citations€omitted).ÌÌà àIn€òòPress,€Inc.€v.€Verranóó,€569€S.W.2d€435,€442€(Tenn.€1978),€our€Supreme€CourtÏadopted€the€Restatement€(Second)€of€Torts€(1977)€standards€for€liability€in€aÏdefamation€suit.€€The€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àWe€are€impressed€with€Standards€580Aœ× ƒ/ ××  ×›€and€580B,€RestatementÏ(Second)€of€Torts€(1977).€€They€read€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà8 à€€€€€€€€€€€€€*€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€*€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€*ÌÌà8 àà8 àðð€580B.€€òòDefamation€of€a€Private€Person.óóÌà8 àà8 àOne€who€publishes€a€false€and€defamatory€communicationÏconcerning€a€private€person,€or€concerning€a€public€officialÏor€public€figure€in€relation€to€a€purely€private€matter€notÏaffecting€his€conduct,€fitness€or€role€in€his€public€capacity,€isÏsubject€to€liability,€if,€but€only€if,€heÌà8 àà8 à(a)€knows€that€the€statement€is€false€and€that€it€defames€theÏother,Ìà8 àà8 à(b)€acts€in€reckless€disregard€of€these€matters,€orÌà8 àà8 à(c)€acts€negligently€in€failing€to€ascertain€them.ÌÌà8 àà8 àWe€believe€that€these€standards€meet€the€criteria€of€ourÏfederal€and€state€constitutions€and€we€adopt€them€as€theÏlaw€of€this€jurisdiction.ÌÌÓÓòòPress,€Inc.óó,€569€S.W.2d€at€442.€€Thus,€liability€is€only€imposed€if€the€defendant€actsÏnegligently€in€failing€to€ascertain€the€truth€or€falsity€of€the€alleged€defamatoryÏstatement.€€òòIdóó.ÌÌà àœIn€the€present€case,€Plaintiff›€claims€that€the€Defendant€acted€negligently€inÏfailing€to€ascertain€whether€Reynoldsðð€allegations€of€sexual€harassment€were€true€orÏfalse.€€Plaintiff€argues€that€because€Andersonððs€interview€with€Reynolds€was€the€onlyÏinvestigation€that€Defendant€undertook€in€evaluating€the€truthfulness€of€ReynoldððsÏallegations€against€Plaintiff€prior€to€Plaintiffððs€employment€termination,€Defendant€wasÏnegligent€in€investigating€Reynoldððs€claims€of€sexual€harassment€against€Plaintiff.ÌÌà àWe€believe€Defendant€exercised€reasonable€care€and€caution€in€investigatingÏthe€veracity€of€Reynoldððs€allegations€of€sexual€harassment€against€Plaintiff€beforeÏPlaintiff€was€terminated.€€Reynolds€called€Hackney€at€home€one€evening€andÍcomplained€that€Plaintiff€had€fondled€and€had€sexually€battered€her.€€€Hackney€thenÏcalled€Jordan€and€apprised€Jordan€of€Reynoldððs€allegations€against€Plaintiff.€€JordanÏarranged€to€meet€Reynolds€the€following€morning€in€his€law€office.€€Reynolds€wasÏinterviewed€by€one€of€Defendantððs€attorneys,€Anderson,€the€morning€after€ReynoldsÏcomplained€to€Hackney€of€Plaintiffððs€conduct.€€After€interviewing€Reynolds€regardingÏher€allegations€against€Plaintiff,€Defendant€formed€the€belief€that€Reynoldððs€allegationsÏwere€well„grounded€in€fact€and€that€Plaintiff€should€be€terminated.€€Because€we€findÏthat€the€Defendant€exercised€reasonable€care€and€caution€in€investigating€the€truth€orÏfalsity€of€Reynoldððs€allegations,€an€essential€element€of€Plaintiffððs€defamation€claimÏfails.€€A€reasonable€and€prudent€person€would€rely€upon€their€œattorneysðð€observations›Ïand€insights€into€a€situation.€€Defendant,€therefore,€acted€reasonably€in€relying€upon€itsÏattorneysðð€judgment€that€Reynoldððs€allegations€were€sincere€and€true€and€in€relyingÏupon€its€attorneysðð€advice€to€fire€Plaintiff.€€ÌÌà àNonetheless,€it€is€an€elementary€rule€in€this€state€that€publication€is€an€essentialÏelement€of€a€defamation€action€without€which€a€complaint€must€be€dismissed.€ÏòòApplewhite€v.€Memphis€Stateóó€òòUniversityóó,€495€S.W.2d€190,€192„93€(Tenn.€1973);ÏòòFreeman€v.€Dayton€Scale€Co.óó,€19€S.W.2d€255,€256€(Tenn.€1929);€òòWoods€v.€Helmióó,€758ÏS.W.2d€219,€222„23€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988).€€òòFreemanóó€and€its€progeny€stand€for€theÏproposition€that€inasmuch€as€the€gravamen€of€the€act€of€defamation€is€pecuniaryÏdamage€to€the€character€or€credit€of€the€party€defamed,€an€action€for€defamationÏcannot€arise€without€publication.€€òòWoodsóó,€758€S.W.2d€at€223.€€€We,€therefore,€do€notÏreach€the€matter€of€privilege,€malice€or€any€other€question€until€there€is€a€publication.€ÍòòIdóó.€ÌÌà àIn€òòFreemanóó,€the€supreme€court€held€that€œthe›€communication€of€a€defamatoryÏmatter€between€the€agents€and€officers€of€a€corporation€in€the€ordinary€course€ofÏbusiness€was€not€a€publication.€€òòFreemanóó,€19€S.W.2d€at€258.€€The€Freeman€courtÏquoted€the€following€annotation€from€18€ALR€772,€778€which€states:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àThe›€more€liberal€rule,€and€the€one€which€seemingly€has€theÏsupport€of€the€weight€of€modern€authority,€is€that,€where€theÏcommunication€is€made€to€a€servant€or€business€associateÏin€the€ordinary€and€natural€course€of€business,€there€is€noÏactionable€libel.ÌÌÓÓFreeman,€19€S.W.2d€at€257.ÌÌà àIn€òòWoods€v.€Helmióó,€758€S.W.2d€219€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988),€a€nurse€filed€aÏdefamation€and€intentional€interference€with€employment€suit€against€certain€doctorsÏand€her€immediate€supervisor€following€her€employment€termination.€€The€nurseððsÏdefamation€action€was€based€upon€a€memorandum€written€by€her€supervisor€andÏcirculated€to€her€superiors€regarding€her€operating€room€behavior.€€This€memorandumÏled€to€the€nurseððs€termination.€€In€holding€that€the€supervisorððs€memorandum€was€notÏpublished€for€defamation€purposes€and€that€the€contents€of€the€memorandum,€even€ifÏpublished,€did€not€sustain€a€cause€of€action€for€defamation€because€of€the€supervisorððsÏlack€of€malice€in€preparing€the€memorandum,€this€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àWe›€interpret€òòFreemanóó€and€its€progeny€to€mean€thatÏcommunication€among€agents€of€the€same€corporationÏmade€within€the€scope€and€course€of€their€employmentÏrelative€to€duties€performed€for€that€corporation€are€not€to€beÏconsidered€as€statements€communicated€or€publicized€toÍthird€persons.ÌÌòòÓÓWoodsóó,€758€S.W.2d€at€223.Ìà àÌà àThe€communications€in€the€present€case,€like€those€in€òòWoods€v.€Helmióó,€wereÏmade€ð ðamong€agents€of€the€same€corporation€.€.€.€within€the€scope€and€course€of€theirÏemployment€relative€to€duties€performed€for€that€corporation,ðð€or€were€made€to€thoseÏð ðin€the€ððneed€to€knowðð€channel.ðð€€òòSeeóó€òòWoodsóó,€758€S.W.2d€at€224.€€€Under€the€rationaleÏof€òòWoodsóó,€we€are€compelled€to€find€that€the€communications€ð ðare€not€to€be€consideredÏas€statements€communicated€or€publicized€to€third€persons.ðð€€òòIdóó.€at€223.€€€BecauseÏthere€was€no€publication,€the€action€of€the€trial€court€must€be€œreversed.›ÌÌà àFurthermore,€even€if€the€statements€made€by€Defendantððs€attorney€regardingÏthe€reason€for€Plaintiffððs€employment€termination€are€defamatory,€we€believe€that€theÏDefendant€is€entitled€to€summary€judgment€because€this€statement€is€conditionallyÏprivileged€under€a€common€interest€privilege.€€ÌÌà àA€conditional€privilege€is€recognized€where€the€interest€which€the€defendant€isÏseeking€to€vindicate€or€further€is€regarded€as€sufficiently€important€to€justify€someÏlatitude€for€making€mistakes.€€W.€Page€Keeton€et€al.,€òòProsser€and€Keeton€on€the€Law€ofÏTortsóó,€ðð€115,€at€825€(5th€ed.€1988).€€The€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€authorizedÏconditional€privileges€in€òòSouthern€Ice€Co.€v.€Blackóó,€189€S.W.€861,€863€(Tenn.€1916),Ïand€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àQualified›€privilege€extends€to€all€communications€made€inÍgood€faith€upon€any€subject„matter€in€which€the€partyÏcommunicating€has€an€interest,€or€in€reference€to€which€heÏhas€a€duty€to€a€person€having€a€corresponding€interest€orÏduty;€and€the€privilege€embraces€cases€where€the€duty€isÏnot€a€legal€one,€but€where€it€is€of€a€moral€or€social€characterÏof€imperfect€obligation.€.€.€.€The€rule€announced€isÏnecessary€in€order€that€full€and€unrestricted€communicationÏconcerning€a€matter€in€which€the€parties€have€an€interest€orÏa€duty€may€be€had.€€It€is€grounded€in€public€policy€as€well€asÏreason.ÌÌòòÓÓSee€alsoóó€òòPrice€v.€Saleóó,€8€Tenn.€App.€382,€392„93€(1918).ÌÌà àConditional€privileges€may€cover€many€different€types€of€interests€including€aÏcommon€interest€and€a€public€interest.€€Keeton€et€al.,€òòsupraóó,€at€826„31.€€The€commonÏinterest€privilege€has€been€recognized€in€Tennessee€to€cover€communicationsÏbetween€employees€or€agents€of€the€same€business€or€corporation.€€òòSeeóó€òòWoods€v.ÏHelmióó,€758€S.W.2d€219€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988);€òòSouthern€Ice€Co.óó,€189€S.W.€at€863;ÏòòDickson€v.€Nissan€Motor€Mfg.€Corp.óó,€No.€87„289„ll,€1988€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€80€(Feb.Ï10,€1988).ÌÌà àIn€òòSouthern€Ice€Co.€v.€Blackóó,€189€S.W.€861€(Tenn.€1916),€an€employee,€Black,Ïfiled€a€defamation€action€for€an€alleged€slanderous€statement€made€by€œa€foreman›€ofÏthe€Defendant€corporation€where€Black€worked.€€€The€foreman€stated€that€Black€hadÏstolen€some€tickets€and€that€Black€was€a€thief.€€In€holding€that€the€statements€made€byÏthe€foreman€were€protected€by€qualified€privilege€and€were€not€actionable€unlessÏmalice€was€shown,€the€court€stated€that€the€foreman€was€well€warranted€in€believingÏthat€Black€had€stolen€œa›€coupon€book€and€that€all€of€the€parties€to€whom€the€publicationÍwas€made€were€interested€in€the€transaction.€€€òòIdóó.€at€863.€€Because€Black€was€unableÏto€prove€malice,€the€alleged€slanderous€statements€were€not€actionable€based€uponÏqualified€œprivilege.€€òòIdóó.€at€864.›ÌÌà àIn€òòFreeman€v.€Dayton€Scale€Co.óó,€19€S.W.2d€255€(Tenn.€1929),€the€plaintiff,€aÏformer€employee€of€the€defendant€company,€filed€suit€based€upon€an€alleged€libelousÏcommunication€which€passed€from€an€agent€of€the€defendant€corporation€œto›€theÏattorney€for€the€plaintiff.€€Plaintiff€sued,€in€part,€based€œupon›€the€dictation€of€an€allegedlyÏlibelous€letter€œby€an€agent€of€the€defendant€to›€a€stenographer€of€the€defendantÏcorporation.€€In€holding€that€the€dictation€of€a€letter€containing€libelous€matter€to€aÏstenographer€does€not€constitute€publication€in€the€sense€of€the€law€of€libel,€ourÏsupreme€court€œstated:›€œð ð[W]here›€the€communication€is€made€to€a€servant€or€businessÏassociate€in€the€ordinary€and€natural€course€of€business,€there€is€no€actionable€œlibel.ðð›€ÏòòIdóó.€at€257.ÌÌà àIn€òòDickson€v.€Nissan€Motor€Mfg.€Corp.óó,€No.€87„289„ll,€1988€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€80Ïœ(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€Feb.›€10,€1988),€an€employee,€Dickson,€filed€suit€against€his€employerÏfor€alleged€slanderous€statements€made€œto€his›€superiors.€€Dickson€was€fired€from€theÏDefendant€corporation€for€insubordination€and€for€speaking€to€his€superior€in€anÏobscene€and€threatening€manner.€€In€holding€that€the€Defendantsðð€statements€wereÏprotected€under€a€qualified€privilege,€this€Court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àOne›€is€entitled€to€learn€from€his€associates€what€is€beingÏdone€in€a€matter€in€which€he€has€an€interest€in€common€withÏthem.€€This€interest€in€their€common€affairs€entitles€him€toÍinformation€as€to€how€they€are€conducted,€or€to€informationÏthat€affects€their€common€interest,€even€though€he€is€notÏpersonally€concerned€with€the€information.€€Restatement€ofÏTorts€2d.€1977€„€596,€comment€c.Ìà à€€€€€€€€€€*€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€*€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€*Ìà8 àThis€Court€agrees€with€the€argument€of€defendants€that,€where€a€plantÏemployee€is€discharged,€the€employer€has€a€privileged€right€to€state€andÏthe€other€employees€have€a€privileged€right€to€hear€that€the€dischargeÏhas€taken€place€and€the€grounds€therefor,€stated€in€general€terms.€€ÌÌòòIdóó.€at€*8„9.€€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àSimilarly,€in€òòPerry€v.€Foxóó,€No.€01A01„9407„CV„00337,€1994€Tenn.€App.€LEXISÏ763€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€December€21,€1994),€plaintiff€was€fired€from€his€job€at€SouthÏCentral€Bell€Telephone€Company€(ð ðSCBðð)€after€being€accused€of€work€relatedÏmisconduct€including€malicious€destruction€of€property,€impersonation€of€another€SCBÏemployee,€incorrectly€documenting€time,€and€making€unauthorized€representations€toÏa€SCB€customer.€€€Plaintiff€filed€a€defamation€suit€against€Fox,€an€employee€of€SCB,Ïand€SCB€based€upon€a€memorandum€Fox€prepared€and€distributed€which€stated€thatÏplaintiff€had€been€terminated€for€malicious€destruction€of€property€and€that€in€the€futureÏplaintiff€would€not€be€welcome€on€company€property.€€Plaintiff€further€alleged€that€SCBÏfailed€to€make€a€reasonable€investigation€into€the€allegations€against€him€beforeÏterminating€his€employment.€€In€upholding€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€summary€judgmentÏin€favor€of€the€defendantsðð,€this€court€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àœà8 àIt›€is€an€elementary€rule€in€this€state€that€publication€is€anÏessential€element€of€a€libel€action€without€which€a€complaintÏmust€be€dismissed.€€òòApplewhiteóó€òòv.€Memphis€StateÏUniversityóó,€495€S.W.2d€190€(Tenn.€1973);€òòWoods€v.€Helmióó,Ï758€S.W.2d€219€(Tenn.€App.€1988).€€Taken€in€the€light€mostÏfavorable€to€the€plaintiff,€the€memorandum€wasÍdisseminated€to€certain€fellow€employees€of€the€plaintiff.€ÏThis€action€falls€short€of€publication€œwithin›€the€ambit€of€theÏrule.€€As€stated€in€òòFreeman€v.€Dayton€Scale€Co.óó,€159€Tenn.Ï413,€19€S.W.2d€255€(Tenn.€1929),€ð ðwhere€communication€isÏmade€to€a€servant€or€business€associate€in€the€ordinary€orÏnatural€course€of€business€there€is€no€actionable€libel.ðð€ÏòòSee€alsoóó,€òòWoodsóó,€òòsupraóó.ÌÌòòPerryóó,€1994€Tenn.€App.€LEXIS€763,€at€œ*3.Ì›ÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€privilege€can€be€lost,€however,€if€the€defendant€does€not€act€with€good€faithÏor€acts€with€actual€malice.€€When€a€communication€is€conditionally€privileged,€it€is€notÏactionable€unless€actual€or€express€malice€is€shown€by€the€plaintiff.€€òòWoods€v.€Helmióó,Ï758€S.W.2d€219,€224€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1988);€òòSouthern€Ice€Co.óó,€189€S.W.€at€863„64.€ÏOnce€privileged,€the€statement€is€presumed€to€have€been€made€without€malice,€andÏthe€burden€is€on€the€plaintiff€to€prove€express€malice.€€òòLangford€v.€VanderbiltÏUniversityóó,€318€S.W.2d€568,€576€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1958).€€To€prove€actual€malice,€thereÏmust€be€sufficient€evidence€to€permit€the€conclusion€that€the€defendant€in€factÏentertained€serious€doubts€as€to€the€truth€of€his€publication,€and€that€publishing,€withÏsuch€doubt,€shows€reckless€disregard€for€truth€or€falsity€and€demonstrates€actualÏmalice.€€òòMoore€v.€Baileyóó,€628€S.W.2d€431,€433„34€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.€1981).€€ÌÌà àThe€record€does€not€reveal€that€the€Defendant€entertained€serious€doubts€as€toÏthe€veracity€of€Reynoldððs€allegation€of€sexual€battery€against€the€Plaintiff€or€that€theÏDefendant€acted€with€actual€malice.€€As€stated€above,€the€record€does€not€indicate€thatÏthe€Defendant€acted€negligently€in€investigating€Reynoldððs€allegations.€€We€hold€thatÏthe€statement€by€Defendantððs€attorney€to€one€of€Defendantððs€employees€regarding€theÍreason€œfor€Plaintiffððs›€œ€employment›€œtermination›€is€conditionally€privileged€under€aÏcommon€interest€privilege€and,€therefore,€is€not€actionable.ÌÌà àThe€action€of€the€trial€court€denying€summary€judgment€to€Defendant€regardingÏthe€statement€Defendantððs€attorney€made€to€one€of€Defendantððs€employeesÏconcerning€the€reason€for€Plaintiffððs€employment€termination€is€hereby€reversed.€ÏCosts€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€Plaintiff€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€œnecessary.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòòà à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.›ÌÌÌà à