ÿWPC¿ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 0J@ 0TŠ 0^Þ 0l< 0D¨ 0hì 0rT 0|Æ 0†B 0È 1uX U,Í 0dù U,]U>‰B)ÇDCð AM3U*€ýª’§v~9vÓ· D3Š B½ 0@Ú AOÆi 0D/ D/s B¢˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀäÌÀÀÌÀä0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ×Uؠ٠ڠ۠ܣÝÞßÓ€ëíb¸ ìd3|xë2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd€-!Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial óÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òMay€31,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ˆÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝT.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105(1)€provides€in€pertinent€part:€ÌÌà8 àThe€following€actions€shall€be€commenced€within€three€(3)€years€from€the€accruingÏof€the€cause€of€action:Ìà àà à(1)€Actions€for€injuries€to€personal€or€real€property;ÌÌà àÌÌÌ€ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò++++'ÿÿdxd d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÓ` Ü` p”XÓÑ\R AØ'\Ñà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€WESTERN€SECTIONÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà@ à_______________________________________________________ÌÌó óà à)ò òÌFAIRWAY€VILLAGEó óà à)à àShelby€County€Circuit€CourtÌò òCONDOMINIUM€ASSOCIATION,€ó óà à)à àNo.€03779€T.D.Ìò òINC.,€A€Non„Profit€Corporation;ó óà à)ÌÙ€€Ùò òßL€"$!;+'h|nýP` Å `€€LßCARROLL€B.€CLARK€and€wife,ó óà à)Ìò òJEAN€CLARK;€RONALD€L.€HANSEN;ó óà à)Ìò òGENE€J.€THARPE€and€wife,€BETTYó óà à)Ìò òH.€THARPE;€EDWARD€J.€RICE€andó óà à)Ìò òwife,€SHEILA€O.€RICE;€KENNETHó óà à)Ìò òD.€WINGERT€and€wife,€MARGARETó óà à)Ìò òD.€WINGERT;€For€Themselvesó óà à)Ìò òIndividually€And€As€Representativesó óà à)Ìò òof€a€Classó ó,à à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Plaintiffs/Appellants.à à)Ìà à)ÌVS.à à)à àC.€A.€No.€02A01„9411„CV„00255Ìà à)Ìò òCONNECTICUT€MUTUAL€LIFEó óà à)Ìò òINSURANCE€COMPANY;€BOYLEó óà à)Ìò òINVESTMENT€COMPANYó ó;à à)Ìò òS.B.€CONDO€CORPó ó.,à à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Defendants/Appellees.à à)Ìà à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Shelby€County€at€Memphis.Ìò òHonorable€Janice€M.€Holder,€Judge€€ó óÌÌÌò òDavid€F.€Leakeó ó,Ìò òWilliam€King€Selfó ó,ÌBENHAM€LEAKE,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌò òMartin€B.€Danieló ó,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorneys€for€Plaintiffs/Appellants.ÌÌÌò òErnest€G.€Kelly,€Jr.ó ó,ÌEVANS€&€PETREE,€Memphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Defendants/Appellees.ÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌHIGHERS,€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)Ìò òLILLARD,€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓÓ` Ü` ˜XÓÓÓà àIn€this€class€action€lawsuit,€Plaintiffs„Appellants,€Fairway€Village€CondominiumÏAssociation,€Inc.,€Carroll€B.€and€Jean€Clark,€Gene€J.€and€Betty€Tharpe,€Edward€J.€and€Sheila€O.ÏRice,€Kenneth€and€Margaret€D.€Wingert€and€Ronald€L.€Hansen€appeal€the€trial€courtððs€grant€ofÏsummary€judgment€in€favor€of€Defendants„Appellees,€Connecticut€Mutual€Life€InsuranceÏCompany€(CMLI),€Boyle€Investment€Company€(BIC)€and€S.B.€Condo€Corporation€(SBCC).€ÏPlaintiffs€are€comprised€of€individual€condominium€owners€of€Fairway€Village€Condominiums€andÏtheir€homeowners€association.€€€Defendants€are€separate€corporations€which,€according€to€theÏallegations€of€Plaintiffsðð€complaint,€have€participated€in€the€construction,€marketing€andÏmanagement€of€Fairway€Village€Condominiums.€ÌÌà àThe€relevant€facts€in€this€case€are€largely€undisputed.€€In€June,€1972,€CMLIÏacquired€the€parcel€of€land€upon€which€the€Fairway€Village€Condominium€project€is€located€for€theÏpurpose€of€developing€a€98€unit€condominium€project.€€CMLI€entered€into€an€agreement€withÏFletcher€Properties€of€Tennessee,€Inc.€(Fletcher),€which€required€Fletcher€to€act€as€an€agent€forÏCMLI€and€to€oversee€the€construction€and€marketing€of€the€project.€€Additionally,€CMLI€enteredÏinto€an€agreement€with€South€Central€Development€Company€(South€Central)€to€act€as€generalÏcontractor€for€construction€of€the€project.€€Union€Planters€National€Bank€(ð ðUnion€Plantersðð)€actedÏas€construction€lender€for€the€project.€€ÌÌà àConstruction€of€the€project€was€commenced€in€May€of€1974.€€In€1975,€SouthÏCentral€was€dismissed€from€the€project€because€of€unsatisfactory€performance€under€its€contractÏwith€CMLI.€€CMLI€called€upon€South€Centralððs€bonding€company,€United€States€Fidelity€&ÏGuaranty€(USF&G)€to€secure€payment€for€the€delays€and€deviations€necessary€to€complete€theÏconstruction€project.€€BIC€took€over€as€general€manager€of€the€project€and€SBCC€was€formed€toÍhold€title€to€the€land€upon€which€the€condominium€was€located.€€Larry€Carter€ConstructionÏCompany€(Larry€Carter)€was€retained€to€correct€any€defective€construction€of€South€Central€and€toÏcomplete€the€project.€€Larry€Carter€completed€work€on€the€project€in€1977.ÌÌà àOn€September€14,€1976,€SBCC€sold€its€first€condominium€unit€to€a€member€of€theÏplaintiff€class.€€Sale€of€the€units€continued€until€1979.€€Sometime€around€1978,€certain€plaintiffsÏbegan€to€experience€problems€with€water€leaks€in€their€condominium€units.€€Consequently,ÏPlaintiffs€hired€Raymond€Scott,€an€architect,€to€investigate€the€cause€of€the€water€problems.€€OnÏJanuary€24,€1979,€Plaintiffs€received€Scottððs€report,€which€revealedò ò€òòinter€aliaó óóó€defects€in€theÏshingling,€flashing€and€siding€on€Plaintiffsðð€units.€€In€this€report,€Plaintiffsðð€architect€opined€thatÏrepair€work€would€have€to€be€done€in€order€to€stop€the€leaks.€€ÌÌà àOn€February€13,€1979,€a€meeting€was€held€between€representatives€of€DefendantsÏand€representatives€of€the€Plaintiffs.€€At€that€meeting,€Plaintiffs€voiced€their€concerns€about€theÏwater€leakage€problem€and€the€substantial€cost€of€repairs.€€Plaintiffs€allege€that€during€that€meetingÏDefendants€assured€them€that€they€would€make€all€necessary€repairs€and€would€provide€PlaintiffsÏwith€a€ð ðleak€freeðð€unit.€€Defendants€attempted€to€make€repairs€from€1979€to€1980.€€On€June€6,Ï1980,€Plaintiffs,€dissatisfied€with€the€progress€of€repairs,€ordered€Defendantsðð€workmen€off€of€theÏpremises.€€Ìà àOn€April€20,€1983,€Plaintiffs€filed€suit€against€Defendants€specifically€allegingÏbreach€of€express€and€oral€warranties,€breach€of€implied€warranties€of€habitability,€quality,Ïmerchantability€and€fitness,€negligence,€strict€liability,€negligent€misrepresentation,€and€breach€ofÏfiduciary€duty.€€Defendants€answered€and€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€the€basis€the€suit€wasÏnot€timely€filed.× ƒ% ××  ×€€Ìà àIn€1987,€after€extensive€discovery,€Plaintiffsðð€motion€to€amend€their€originalÏcomplaint€was€granted.€€In€the€Amended€Complaint,€Plaintiffs€deleted€their€claim€for€breach€ofÏimplied€warranties€of€habitability,€quality,€and€merchantability,€and€added€a€specific€count€allegingÏactual€fraud.€ÌÌà àDefendants€then€renewed€their€motion€for€summary€judgment,€once€again€relyingÏupon€the€three„year€statute€of€limitations€set€forth€in€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105.€€In€response€toÏDefendantsðð€motions€for€summary€judgment,€Plaintiffs€moved€to€amend€their€amended€complaintÏto€allege€fraudulent€concealment€of€their€cause€of€action.€€ÌÌà àAt€a€hearing€on€Defendantsðð€first€motion€for€summary€judgment,€Defendants€arguedÏthat€Plaintiffs€received€notice€of€the€defects€in€the€units,€at€the€very€latest,€when€they€received€theÏreport€of€their€architect€on€January€24,€1979.€€Therefore,€Defendants€argued€that€the€Plaintiffs€wereÏrequired€by€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105(1)€to€bring€their€claim€prior€to€January€24,€1982.€€ÌÌà àPlaintiffs,€on€the€other€hand,€alleged€that€Defendants€were€estopped€from€raisingÏthe€statute€of€limitations€as€a€defense€because€Defendants€had€lulled€Plaintiffs€into€inactivity€withÏtheir€representations€and€actions€between€February€of€1979€to€June€of€1980.€€Specifically,€theÏPlaintiffs€argued€that€the€Defendantsðð€representations€on€February€13,€1979,€that€they€wouldÏprovide€Plaintiffs€with€leak€free€units€in€conjunction€with€Defendantsðð€subsequent€attempts€toÏremedy€the€defects€in€the€Plaintiffsðð€units€caused€the€Plaintiffs€to€believe€that€a€lawsuit€wasÏunnecessary.€€Plaintiffs€argued,€therefore,€that€they€were€entitled€to€a€tolling€of€the€statute€ofÏlimitations€between€February€13,€1979,€the€time€of€the€Plaintiffsðð€first€meeting€with€Defendants,Ïand€June€6,€1980,€the€time€that€Defendantsðð€workmen€were€ordered€off€the€property€by€Plaintiffs.€€ÌÌà àMoreover,€Plaintiffs€argued€that€this€478€day€period€should€be€tacked€onto€theÏthree„year€statute€limitations€and€that€Plaintiffs€should€receive€a€day„for„day€credit€for€the€time€theyÏwere€induced€into€inaction.€€Therefore,€they€argued€that€the€statute€of€limitations€period€wasÏextended€to€May€19,€1983.€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€court€granted€the€Defendantsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment€on€all€counts,Ïexcluding€fraud,€finding€that,€even€if€the€Plaintiffs€had€been€lulled€into€inactivity€by€theÏDefendantsðð€misrepresentations€and€acts,€the€Plaintiffs€still€had€a€reasonable€time€of€one€and€a€halfÏyears€to€bring€their€suit€after€the€lulling€activity€of€the€Defendantsðð€had€ceased.€€Consequently,€theÏtrial€court€found€that€the€Plaintiffsðð€suit€was€time€barred€by€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105(1),€and€grantedÏDefendantsðð€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€At€a€later€hearing€on€Defendantsðð€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€as€to€the€count€of€fraud,€the€trial€court€held€that€the€Defendantsðð€cause€of€actionÏfor€fraud€was€also€barred€by€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105(1).€€ÌÌà àPlaintiffs€have€appealed€the€trial€courtððs€decision,€presenting€the€following€issuesÏfor€our€review:ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àI.€€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€holding€that€[Plaintiffs€were]€notÏentitled€to€a€day„for„day€extension€of€the€original€statute€ofÏlimitations€period€equal€to€the€number€of€days€in€the€tolling€period?ÌÌà8 àà àII.€€Even€assuming,€alternatively,€that€Plaintiffs€are€onlyÏentitled€to€a€reasonable€period€of€time€to€file€suit€after€DefendantsððÏtolling€activity€ceased,€did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€holding€as€a€matterÏof€law€that€a€year€and€one„half€is€a€reasonable€time€to€file€suit?ÌÌà8 àà àIII.€€Did€the€Trial€Court€err€in€holding€that€fraud€andÏnegligent€misrepresentation€were€the€same€cause€of€action,€and,€asÏsuch,€have€the€same€commencement€date€for€the€running€of€theÏstatute€of€limitations?ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àWe€begin€our€analysis€by€noting€that€a€trial€court€should€grant€a€motion€forÍsummary€judgment€only€if€the€movant€demonstrates€that€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€factÏand€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.€€ò òTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€56.03ó ó;Ïòòò òByrd€v.€Halló óóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€210€(Tenn.€1993);€òòò òDunn€v.€Hackettó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€78,€80Ï(Tenn.€App.€1992).€€When€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€made,€the€court€must€consider€theÏmotion€in€the€same€manner€as€a€motion€for€directed€verdict€made€at€the€close€of€the€plaintiff'sÏproof;€that€is,€"the€court€must€take€the€strongest€legitimate€view€of€the€evidence€in€favor€of€theÏnonmoving€party,€allow€all€reasonable€inferences€in€favor€of€that€party,€and€discard€allÏcountervailing€evidence."€ò òòòIdóóó ó.€at€210„11.€€In€òòò òByrdó óóó,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€stated:ÌÌÓÓà8 àOnce€it€is€shown€by€the€moving€party€that€there€is€no€genuine€issueÏof€material€fact,€the€nonmoving€party€must€then€demonstrate,€byÏaffidavits€or€discovery€materials,€that€there€is€a€genuine,€material€factÏdispute€to€warrant€a€trial.€€In€this€regard,€Rule€56.05€provides€thatÏthe€nonmoving€party€cannot€simply€rely€upon€his€pleadings€but€mustÏset€forth€òòò òspecific€factsó óóó€showing€that€there€is€a€genuine€issue€ofÏmaterial€fact€for€trial.ÌÌÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€at€211€(citations€omitted).€€ÌÌÓ  Óà àThe€summary€judgment€process€should€only€be€used€as€a€means€of€concluding€aÏcase€when€there€are€no€genuine€issues€of€material€fact,€and€the€case€can€be€resolved€on€the€legalÏissues€alone.€€ò òòòId.óóó ó€at€210€(citingòòò ò€Bellamy€v.€Federal€Express€Corp.ó óóó,€749€S.W.2d€31,€33Ï(Tenn.€1988)).ÌÌÓ  Óà àAs€their€first€argument,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€determining€thatÏT.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105(1)€barred€Plaintiffsðð€causes€of€action€against€Defendants.€€Plaintiffs€argue€thatÏDefendants€are€estopped€from€relying€upon€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Although€they€concede€thatÏthe€original€statute€of€limitations€would€have€run€on€January€23,€1982,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€theÏstatute€of€limitations€should€be€tolled€for€the€478€day€period€in€which€they€were€lulled€intoÏinactivity€by€the€Defendantsðð€representations€that€they€would€remedy€the€unitsðð€defects.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€well„settled€in€Tennessee€law€that€a€party,€by€its€conduct,€may€be€estopped€toÏrely€on€the€statute€of€limitations.€òòò ò€Sparks€v.€Metropolitan€Government€of€Nashville€andÏDavidson€Countyó óóó,€771€S.W.2d€430,€433€(Tenn.€App.€1989).€€ÌÌÓÓà8 à[Whereby]€promises€or€appearances€one€party€is€induced€to€believeÏthat€the€other€party€is€going€to€pay€a€claim€or€otherwise€satisfy€theÏclaims€of€the€first€party,€and€in€reliance€on€that€representation€theÏfirst€party€delays€filing€suit€with€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations,Ïthe€party€making€the€representations€may€be€estopped€to€raise€theÏstatute€of€limitations€as€a€defense.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓò òòòId.óóó ó€€Plaintiffs€have€pled€facts€in€their€complaint€which€arguably€support€a€finding€of€estoppel.€€ForÏpurposes€of€determining€whether€summary€judgment€was€proper,€we€are€obliged€pursuant€toÏòòò òByrdó óóó€to€do€as€the€trial€court€did€and€treat€Plaintiffsðð€allegations€as€true€and€assume€for€the€momentÏthat€Plaintiffs€were€lulled€into€activity€by€the€Defendantsðð€representations€and€acts€betweenÏFebruary€13,€1979,€and€June€8,€1980.€€ÌÌà àTaking€such€allegations€as€true,€we€must€then€determine€how€long€the€Plaintiffs€hadÏto€file€their€claim€after€the€period€of€estoppel€ended.€€There€is€no€clear€answer€under€TennesseeÏlaw.€Under€some€authorities,€a€party€is€allowed€a€reasonable€time€in€which€to€file€claim€after€theÏestoppel€ends,€and€under€other€authority,€the€estoppel€continues,€following€the€expiration€of€theÏstatutory€period,€until€the€party€is€allowed€a€period€equal€to€the€statutory€period€for€theÏcommencement€of€an€action.€€òòò òDuncan€v.€Gaffney€Mfg.€Co.,ó óóó€53€S.E.2d€396,€399€(S.C.Ï1949);€51€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòò òLimitation€of€Actionsó óóó€ðð€437€(1970).€€ÌÌà àPlaintiffs€urge€us€to€adopt€a€rule€whereby€a€party€lulled€into€inaction€is€entitled€to€aÏday„for„day€tolling€of€the€statute€of€limitations.€€Thus,€under€Plaintiffsðð€suggested€rule,€a€party,Ïwhose€cause€of€action€has€accrued€and€who€is€lulled€into€inaction€by€the€representations€of€anotherÏparty€for€45€days,€would€be€entitled€to€an€additional€45€days€to€bring€suit€at€the€end€of€the€originalÍstatutory€period.€€Plaintiffs€argue€that€such€a€rule€would€be€fairer€and€would€be€more€exact€than€aÏrule€which€required€a€court€to€determine€whether€a€party€had€a€reasonable€time€to€bring€suit.ÌÌà àNotwithstanding€Plaintiffsðð€arguments,€we€believe€that€the€better„reasoned€rule€isÏthe€one€followed€by€a€majority€of€jurisdictions,€which€hold€that€the€effect€of€such€an€estoppel€is€notÏto€stop€the€running€of€the€statute€or€to€create€a€new€date€for€its€commencement.€€Instead,€under€theÏmajority€rule,€if€a€reasonable€time€to€file€suit€within€the€statutory€period€exists€after€theÏcircumstances€inducing€delay€have€ceased,€a€party€should€not€be€estopped€from€pleading€the€bar€ofÏthe€statute.òòò ò€€Glennan€v.€Lincoln€Inv.€Corp.,€ó óóó110€F.2d€130€(D.C.€Cir.€1940);€òòò òPropertyÏ10„F,€Inc,€v.€Pack€&€Process,€Inc.ó óóó,€265€A.2d€290€(D.C.€1970);òòò ò€Lobrovich€v.ÏGeorgisonó óóó,€301€P.2d€460€(Cal.€App.€1956);€51€Am.€Jur.€2d€òòò òLimitation€of€Actionsó óóó€ðð€437Ï(1970).€€ÌÌà àWe€believe€this€to€be€the€better„reasoned€rule.€€The€main€purpose€of€T.C.A.€ðð€28„3„105€is€to€bar€stale€claims.€€Any€equitable€estoppel€imposed€by€a€court,€which€prevents€a€party€fromÏraising€the€statute€as€a€bar,€is€necessarily€in€derogation€of€the€statute.€€We€believe€that€the€purposeÏof€the€statute€is€better€served€by€requiring€a€plaintiff€to€bring€suit€within€the€original€statutoryÏperiod€if€reasonable€time€remains€in€which€to€bring€suit€after€any€lulling€activity€has€ceased.€ÌÌà àWe€believe€that€this€rule€is€particularly€appropriate€in€the€present€case€where€a€yearÏand€a€half€remained€for€Plaintiffs€to€bring€suit€under€the€original€statute€of€limitations€after€theÏlulling€activity€ceased€on€June€8,€1980.€€Given€the€undisputed€material€facts€of€this€particular€case,Ïwe€do€not€believe€that€reasonable€minds€could€differ€as€to€whether€a€year€and€a€half€was€aÏreasonable€time€for€Plaintiffs€to€bring€suit€against€Defendants.€€€Therefore,€we€hold€that€the€trialÏcourt€properly€granted€Defendantsðð€motions€for€summary€judgment.€€Consequently,€Plaintiffs€firstÏand€second€issues€are€without€merit.€€ÌÌà àAs€their€final€issue,€Plaintiffs€argue€that€they€were€entitled€to€bring€a€new€cause€ofÏaction€for€fraud,€accruing€in€1985,€against€the€Defendants.€€They€allege€that€Defendants€hadÏknowledge€of€the€defects€in€units€when€they€represented€them€to€be€of€good€quality€during€theirÏsale€from€1976€to€1979,€and€they€further€allege€that€Defendants€fraudulently€concealed€thisÏintentional€misrepresentation€from€Plaintiffs€until€1985.€€Plaintiffs€argue,€consequently,€that€theÏstatute€of€limitations€should€have€begun€to€accrue€in€1985€for€their€cause€of€action€for€fraud.ÌÌà àPlaintiffsðð€argument€is€based€solely€on€their€claim€that,€during€discovery€in€1985,Ïthey€found€evidence€that€the€Defendants€acted€intentionally€in€misrepresenting€the€quality€of€theÏcondominium€units€to€Plaintiffs.€€Specifically,€Plaintiffs€discovered€a€1977€newspaper€articleÏwhich€represented€the€units€to€be€of€ð ðgood€quality,€beautiful€and€of€increasing€value,ðð€and€theyÏdiscovered€a€1975€lawsuit€brought€by€South€Central€against€CMLI€and€Union€Planters€for€breachÏof€contract€(the€South€Central€lawsuit).€€Plaintiffs€allege€that€during€the€course€of€the€South€CentralÏlawsuit€CMLI€and€UPNB€both€admitted€the€existence€of€certain€defects€in€the€units.€€ÌÌà àPlaintiffs€argue€that€this€information€found€during€discovery€supports€their€claimÏthat€Defendants€committed€fraud€and€intentionally€misrepresented€the€quality€of€the€units€duringÏsale€of€the€apartments.€€Furthermore,€they€argue€that€the€Defendants€fraudulently€concealed€theirÏfraud€from€Plaintiffs€until€1985.€€Consequently,€they€argue€that€the€statute€of€limitations€of€theirÏcause€of€action€for€fraud€should€have€been€tolled€until€the€time€that€they€discovered€the€fraud€inÏ1985.ÌÌà àWe€are€not€persuaded€by€Plaintiffsðð€argument.€€While€Plaintiff€did€not€specificallyÏallege€ð ðfraudðð€or€ð ðintentional€misrepresentationðð€in€their€original€complaint,€the€complaint€containedÏgeneral€allegations€of€intentional€and€knowing€misrepresentation€on€the€part€of€Defendants,Ïconcerning€the€quality€of€the€units.€€Our€cases€point€to€the€fact€that€fraud€can€be€an€intentionalÏmisrepresentation€of€a€known,€material€fact€or€can€be€the€concealment€or€nondisclosure€of€a€knownÍfact€when€there€is€a€duty€to€disclose.òòò ò€€Hill€v.€John€Banks€Buick,€Inc.ó óóó,€875€S.W.2d€667Ï(Tenn.€App.€1993);òòò ò€Oak€Ridge€Precision€Indus.,€Inc.€v.€First€Tennessee€Bank€NatððlÏAssððnó óóó,€835€S.W.2d€25€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòò òStacks€v.€Saundersó óóó,€812€S.W.2d€587€(Tenn.ÏApp.€1990).€€As€such,€intentional€misrepresentation€is€an€element€of€fraud,€although€the€two€areÏoften€used€interchangeably€in€common€parlance.€€òòò òSee€Ritter€v.€Custom€Chemicides,€Inc.ó óóó,Ï912€S.W.2d€128€(Tenn.€1995).€€ÌÌà àIn€their€original€complaint,€Plaintiffs€alleged€that€ð ðthe€Defendantsðð€actions€ofÏintentionally€or€negligently€concealing€the€defects€described€herein€as€well€as€the€deceitful€andÏnegligent€misrepresentations€made€by€the€Defendants€and/or€their€agents€to€the€Plaintiffs€and€theirÏpredecessors€in€interest€in€the€marketing€of€this€Development€were€made€in€such€a€willful,€gross,Ïreckless€and€negligent€manner€that€the€Plaintiffs€are€entitled€to€punitive€damages.ðð€€In€our€opinion,Ïthese€allegations€smack€of€fraud.€€Consequently,€we€do€not€believe€that€Plaintiffs€can€reasonablyÏallege€to€have€been€first€put€on€notice€of€Defendantsðð€fraud€in€1985€when€they€alleged€conduct€onÏthe€part€of€Defendants€amounting€to€fraud€in€their€1982€complaint.€€We€do€not€think€that€theÏdiscovery€of€evidence,€which€merely€supports€Plaintiffsðð€initial€allegations,€are€enough€to€warrant€aÏnew€cause€of€action€for€fraud.€€To€make€such€a€finding€would€effectively€allow€these€Plaintiffs€toÏsidestep€the€applicable€statute€of€limitations€without€reasonable€justification.€€As€such,€we€find€thatÏthe€Plaintiffsðð€cause€of€action€for€fraud€is€barred.€€€€ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€and€this€cause€is€remanded€for€anyÏfurther€necessary€proceedings.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€Appellants,€for€which€execution€mayÏissue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓ` Ü` È“XÓÓÓà à________________________________Ìà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌ______________________________ÌHIGHERS,€J.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌ______________________________ÌLILLARD,€J.€(Concurs)