ÿWPC~ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ 1mH 0dµ 0J 0Tc 0^· 0h 0r} 0|ï 0†k 0ñ 1u U,ö 0d"U,†U>²B)ðDC AM\ B©U*Æ'ðv~vÓ• D3h 0@› 0Û 0Šj 0 ô 0´” 0ÇH 0Û 0ïê AOÙÆ( 0Dî D/2 Ba˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ ïðEñòóDôDõöoe÷Ó€DÒ XXXX3|x tuvwxyz#,37=CIQYag­­1.a.i.(1)(a)(i)1)a)(<1$´´Ô2Ô6.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0  à2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€&ÔÔ€&ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€&XÔÌÌSeptember€13,€1996ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò(gfi$µµà0  àÔ2(ÆÔ6.Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú.Ú  Ú0Ú  ÚÔ3  Ôà0` (#(#à(bÕä$¶¶à0  àà0` (#(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚÚ  Ú.Ô3  Ôà0¸ ` (#` (#à(xâr$··à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0¸ (#¸ (#à(ŒU$¸¸à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0h(#(#à(Ÿ@Æ$¹¹à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àÔ2ˆAÔ(Ú  ÚÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0Àh(#h(#à(³ýt$ººà0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  Ú0Ú  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0À(#À(#à(Çñû$»»à0  àà0` (#(#àà0¸ ` (#` (#àà0¸ (#¸ (#àà0h(#(#àà0Àh(#h(#àà0À(#À(#àÔ2ˆAÔÚ  ÚaÚ  Ú)Ô3  Ôà0p(#(#à€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€  X„d&ÓÑ#€  Xd#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  Ý›Ñ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€õXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  Ñœ›à@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌò òEDNA€FORBES,ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellee,ÌÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àWilson€Chancery€No.€9325Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€01A01„9602„CH„00089̜ـ€ÙÙ€€ÙßL€$'#;+'h|h×` ç `€€Lß›Ìò òWILSON€COUNTY€EMERGENCYÌCOMMUNICATION€DISTRICT€911ÌBOARD€and€W.€J.€McCLUSKEY,ó óÌÌà àDefendants„Appellants.Ìòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€ÌÌóóà@ àCONCURRENCE€IN€PART,€DISSENT€IN€PARTÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌÓÓHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.Ìà àI€write€separately€to€concur€in€part€with€the€majorityððs€Opinion,€and€to€dissent€in€part.Ìà àI€concur€with€the€majorityððs€holding€that€the€record€supports€a€finding€that€the€OpenÏMeetings€Act€was€violated€and€that€the€remedy€under€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„44„105€is€to€declare€theÏdemotion€of€the€plaintiff€ð ðvoid€and€of€no€effect.ðð€€However,€I€dissent€from€the€majorityððs€holdingÏthat€this€precludes€the€plaintiff€from€recovering€damages€under€Tennesseeððs€handicapÏdiscrimination€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103.€€Consequently,€I€would€address€issues€raisedÏby€appellant€under€the€discrimination€statutes,€including€whether€the€facts€are€sufficient€to€supportÏa€finding€that€the€plaintiff€was€ð ðhandicappedðð€and€whether€punitive€damages€are€recoverable€underÏthe€applicable€Tennessee€statutes.Ìà àBecause€the€demotion€of€the€plaintiff€is€declared€ð ðvoid€and€of€no€effectðð€under€the€OpenÏMeeting€Act,€the€majority€concludes€that€there€was€no€demotion€and€therefore€no€act€occurred€uponÏwhich€a€claim€of€discrimination€could€be€predicated.€€This€case€presents€a€unique€situation,€and€theÏcase€law€is€sparse€on€whether€an€employment€claim€may€be€based€on€an€act€that€is€later€declaredÏvoid€under€another€statute.€€There€is€no€Tennessee€case€law€on€point,€and€little€case€law€elsewhere.€ÏIn€ò òòòMiller€v.€United€Statesó óóó,€717€F.2d€109€(3d€Cir.€1983),€a€civilian€Army€employee€was€appointedÍto€a€position,€and€it€was€later€determined€that€he€was€overqualified€for€the€position.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€110„11.€ÏHis€appointment€was€declared€void€ò òòòab€initioó óóó,€and€his€employment€was€terminated.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€111.€€HeÏsought€to€appeal€the€discharge€to€the€Merit€Systems€Protection€Board.€€ò òòòId.€€ó óóóThe€Board€ruled€that,Ïbecause€the€plaintiffððs€employment€had€been€ruled€void,€he€could€not€appeal€the€termination.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ÏOn€appeal€to€the€Third€Circuit€Court€of€Appeals,€the€Army€argued€that€because€the€plaintiffððsÏappointment€was€never€valid,€the€termination€of€his€employment€did€not€constitute€an€ð ðadverseÏaction.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€112.€€The€Court€rejected€this€argument,€noting€that€the€plaintiff€had€been€working€inÏthe€position€for€two€years€when€the€Army€told€him€he€no€longer€had€a€job.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€The€Court€stated:Ïð ðIt€is€hard€for€us€to€imagine€action€against€an€individual€that€could€be€more€ððadverse.ðð€ðð€ò òòòId.€ó óóóat€113.Ìà àTennessee€law€is€unclear€on€whether€a€void€act€may€be€the€predicate€for€a€claim.€€In€ò òòòAdamsÏv.€Tennessee€Farmers€Mutual€Insurance€Co.ó óóó,€898€S.W.2d€216€(Tenn.€App.€1994),€evenÏthough€an€insurance€policy€was€voidò òòò€ab€initioó óóó,€the€insurer€could€nevertheless€sue€the€insured€for€aÏbad€faith€claim.€€ò òòòBut€seeó óóó,€ò òòòe.g.ó óóó€ò òòòCoulter€v.€Hendricksó óóó,€918€S.W.2d€424€(Tenn.€App.€1995)€(theÏeffect€of€a€void€marriage).Ìà àIn€this€case,€the€issue€is€whether€the€demotion€later€declared€void€is€nevertheless€an€adverseÏemployment€action€under€Tennesseeððs€handicap€discrimination€statute.€€In€òòò òHowze€v.€VirginiaÏPolytechnicó óóó,€901€F.€Supp.€1091€(W.D.Va.€1995),€the€district€court€held€that€when€a€universityÏfinal€review€panel€reversed€a€prior€termination€decision€of€a€lower€review€panel,€there€was€noÏadverse€employment€action€on€which€plaintiff€could€base€a€retaliatory€discrimination€claim€underÏTitle€VII.€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€1096„97.€€The€court€reasoned€that€ð ð[o]nly€the€final€decision€is€the€ultimate€act,ððÏfinding€that€no€legal€effect€resulted€from€the€initial€actions.€€ò òòòIdó óóó€at€1097òòò ò;€see€Page€v.€Bolgeró óóó,€645ÏF.2d€227,€233€(4th€Cir.)€(holding€that€ð ðthere€are€many€interlocutory€or€mediate€decisions€havingÏno€immediate€effect€upon€employment€conditionsðð€under€Title€VII),€ò òòòcert.€deniedó óóó,€454€U.S.€892Ï(1981).€Ìà àUnlike€an€interim€employment€action€which€is€later€reconsidered€and€reversed€by€theÏemployer,€in€this€case€the€decision€to€demote€the€plaintiff€was€final€from€the€employerððsÏstandpoint.€€The€plaintiff€was€required€to€file€a€lawsuit€to€obtain€relief.€€While€the€Open€MeetingsÏAct€employs€the€legal€fiction€of€later€declaring€the€action€ð ðvoidðð€as€though€it€never€happened,€to€theÏplaintiff€it€actually€happened,€and€the€humiliation€and€embarrassment€on€which€the€jury€awardedÏdamages€was€certainly€real.€€I€would€find€that€the€demotion,€though€void€under€the€Open€MeetingsÏAct,€can€nevertheless€be€the€basis€for€a€claim€under€Tennesseeððs€handicap€discrimination€statute.€ÏHowever,€the€remedy€of€front€pay€would€not€be€available€since€the€Open€Meetings€Act€mandatesÏthat€the€action€in€question€be€declared€void,€and€the€plaintiff€must€be€returned€to€her€original€jobÏposition.€€Ìà àConsequently,€I€would€reach€the€issues€presented€by€the€parties€with€respect€to€theÏTennessee€handicap€discrimination€statutes.€€First,€the€employer€argues€that€the€plaintiffððsÏcondition,€colon€cancer,€is€not€a€ð ðhandicapðð€within€the€meaning€of€the€statute.€€Under€the€definitionÏof€ð ðhandicapðð€contained€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„102€(9)€and€under€the€comparable€federalÏstatutes,€the€Rehabilitation€Act€of€1973,€29€U.S.C.€ðððð€701„794€(West€1988),€and€the€AmericansÏwith€Disabilities€Act,€€42€U.S.C.€ðððð€12101„12213€(Supp.1996),€cancer€is€clearly€a€handicap.€€ò òòòSeeó óóóÏ28€C.F.R.€ðð€41.31€(b)(1)€(1996);€28€C.F.R.€ðððð€35.104,€36.104€(1996)€and€49€C.F.€R.€ðð€37.3Ï(1996).€€Therefore,€this€argument€is€without€merit.Ìà àThe€employer€also€asserts€that€the€juryððs€award€of€$250,000€for€humiliation€andÏembarrassment€is€excessive.€€In€this€case,€the€jury€rejected€the€plaintiffððs€contention€that€theÏdemotion€from€a€supervisory€position€was€because€of€her€cancer.€€The€jury€concluded€that€theÏdecision€to€place€the€plaintiff€in€a€part„time€position€instead€of€a€full„time€position€was€motivated€byÏher€cancer,€and€there€is€sufficient€evidence€in€the€record€to€support€this€finding.€€However,€theÏaward€of€$250,000€for€compensatory€damages€for€humiliation€and€embarrassment€seemsÏexcessive,€since€the€damages€are€ò òòòonlyó óóó€for€the€decision€to€place€the€plaintiff€in€a€part„time,€ratherÏthan€full„time,€position.Ìà àFinally,€the€employer€argues€that€punitive€damages€are€unavailable€to€the€plaintiff€under€theÏapplicable€statutes.€€The€plaintiff€cites€ò òòòHodges€v.€S.€C.€Toof€&€Co.ó óóó,€833€S.W.2d€896€(Tenn.Ï1992)€and€ò òòòWood€v.€Emerson€Electric€Co.ó óóó,€No.€01„A„01„9310„CH0067,€1994€WL€716270€(Tenn.ÏApp.€Aug.€12,€1994),€as€establishing€that€punitive€damages€may€be€awarded€in€this€case.€ÏHowever,€ò òòòHodgesó óóó€is€inapplicable€since€it€holds€that€punitive€damages€are€available€in€a€retaliatoryÏdischarge€action€because€the€plaintiff€may€recover€the€damages€for€the€common€law€tort€as€well€asÏthe€statutory€violation.€€In€this€case,€a€claim€for€handicap€discrimination€is€a€creature€of€statuteÏonly,€and€the€damages€available€must€be€determined€by€reference€to€the€applicable€statutes.€€Ìà àò òòòWood€v.€Emerson€Electric€Co.ó óóó€also€does€not€address€the€issue€presented€in€this€case.€€InÏò òòòWoodó óóó,€the€Court€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€grant€of€the€defendantððs€motion€for€judgmentÏnotwithstanding€the€verdict€on€the€issue€of€punitive€damages,€and€found€that€the€evidence€did€notÏsupport€an€award€of€punitive€damages.€€The€court€did€not€address€whether€punitive€damages€wereÏavailable€under€the€statutes.€Ìà àTennesseeððs€handicap€discrimination€statute,€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103,€expresslyÏincorporates€the€rights€and€remedies€provided€in€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðððð€4„21„302€through€311.€€ò òòòSeeó óóóÏTenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€8„50„103(b)(2).€€The€pertinent€statutes€do€not€provide€for€punitive€damages.€Ïò òòòSeeó óóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„306(7)€and€(8)€and€ðð€4„21„311.€€This€was€noted€by€this€court€in€ò òòòTaffÏv.€Media€General€Broadcast€Services,€Inc.ó óóó,€No.€32,€1986€WL€12240,€11€T.A.M.€52„1€(Tenn.ÏApp.€Nov.€03,€1986)€and€ò òòòGifford€v.€Premier€Manufacturing€Corp.ó óóó,€No.€18,€1989€WL€85752,€Ï14€T.A.M.€36„2€(Tenn.€App.€Aug.€01,€1989).€€Recent€changes€to€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„311Ïsupport€this€conclusion.€€The€statute€now€provides€specifically€that€a€plaintiff€in€a€case€involvingÏdiscriminatory€housing€practices€may€recover€punitive€damages;€however,€punitive€damages€inÏother€cases€are€still€not€mentioned.€€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€4„21„311€(Supp.€1995).€€As€stated€inÏò òòòTaffó óóó,€ð ðif€the€Legislature€intended€to€provide€for€some€form€of€punishment€the€Act€would€haveÏdone€so€specifically.ðð€€ò òòòTaffó óóó,€11€T.A.M.€52„1,€at€p.€9.€€Consequently,€I€would€reverse€the€awardÍof€punitive€damages.Ìà àIn€sum,€I€concur€with€the€majorityððs€analysis€of€the€Open€Meetings€Act€and€the€conclusionÏthat€the€employerððs€demotion€of€the€plaintiff€must€be€declared€void€under€the€Act.€€I€dissent€fromÏthe€majorityððs€conclusion€that€the€employerððs€action,€later€declared€void,€cannot€be€the€basis€for€aÏclaim€under€the€Tennessee€handicap€discrimination€statutes.€€Consequently,€I€would€reach€theÏissues€presented€under€the€handicap€discrimination€claim,€and€would€affirm€the€trial€courtððsÏholding€that€the€plaintiffððs€condition€is€a€ð ðhandicapðð€under€the€statutes,€would€reduce€the€award€ofÏcompensatory€damages€for€humiliation€and€embarrassment,€and€would€reverse€the€trial€courtððsÏdetermination€that€punitive€damages€are€available€under€the€applicable€Tennessee€discriminationÏstatutes.ÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.