ÿWPCŸ …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 @ U:H B‚ Ä 0JÌ 0T 0^j 0hÈ 0r0 0|¢ 0† 0¤ 1u4 0d© U> U*KB)u BžDC» AMþëKv~6 D3´vÓç 0@º AOúÆI 0D D/S B‚˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ lgmnUoUp Uq DrUsÓ€€Dz!3|x€`"Arial RegularC:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d d$$$$7Border 1dd€-&Cþÿ << Gÿÿ áÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌò òOctober€3,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€#ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@%%%%'ÿÿdxdStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Geneva ÒÒ  BA Op Geneva Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€"ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÔ€#ÔÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€  ¦ XXdædÈ7Ñ›à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSON€ÌÌÌPAMELA€œLEMOINE›€FORD,à àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àò ò)€€Dyer€Chancery€No.€92„5Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9507„CH„00153Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMICHAEL€BURKE€FORD,à àà àœ)›Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendant/Appellee.à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DYER€COUNTYÌÙ€€ÙœßL€'(&;+'h|%` Å `€€Lß›à@ àAT€DYERSBURG,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JOE€œG.€›RILEY,€JUDGEÌÌÌœÌÌÌÌÌÌ›ÌÌò òMARTIN€B.€DANIELÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òMARK€D.€JOHNSTONÌó óDyersburg,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleeÌÌÌœÌÌ›ÌÌò òREVERSED€IN€PART,€AFFIRMED€IN€PART€&€REMANDEDÌÌÌœÌÌ›ÌÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌÓÓó óœà àIn›€this€post„divorce€proceeding,€Pamela€Ford€(ð ðwifeðð)€filed€a€petition€to€modifyÏchild€Ñ7€  ¦ XXdæ XXdæ7Ñsupport€and€alimony.€€Although€the€trial€court€declined€to€increase€alimony,€€theÏcourt€increased€the€amount€of€child€support€that€Michael€Ford€(ð ðhusbandðð)€wasÏobligated€to€pay€based€upon€his€increased€income.€€Wife€has€appealed€and€arguesÏthat€the€trial€court€erred€in€several€respects.€€First,€she€asserts€that€the€trial€court€erredÏin€holding€that€the€husbandððs€receipt€of€principal€from€an€irrevocable€trust€is€not€ð ðgrossÏincomeðð€as€that€term€is€defined€within€the€child€support€guidelines.€€Next,€she€contendsÏthat€the€trial€court€improperly€failed€to€consider€the€value€of€the€trust€in€increasing€childÏsupport.€€Furthermore,€wife€argues€that€the€trial€court€should€have€imputed€income€toÏhusband€based€upon€his€voluntary€unemployment.€€Finally,€wife€argues€that€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€denying€her€request€for€an€increase€in€alimony.€€For€the€reasons€statedÏbelow,€the€judgment€below€is€affirmed€in€part,€reversed€in€part,€and€remanded€forÏfurther€proceedings.ÌÌà àThe€parties€to€this€action€married€in€1986,€and€divorced€six€years€later.€€TheÏparties€had€two€minor€children.€€In€connection€with€the€divorce€proceedings,€husbandÍand€wife€entered€into€a€marital€dissolution€agreement.€€The€agreement€provided€asÏherein€pertinent€that€wife€was€to€have€sole€custody€of€the€children€and€that€husbandÏwas€to€pay€child€support€in€the€amount€of€$173.87€per€week,€plus€32%€of€his€annualÏbonus.€€The€agreement€obligated€husband€to€maintain€health€insurance€for€wife€for€aÏperiod€of€three€years,€and€to€maintain€car€insurance€for€wife€for€as€long€as€she€ownedÏthe€car.€The€agreement€did€not€make€any€other€provision€for€rehabilitative€or€periodicÏalimony.€€ÌÌà àAt€the€time€of€the€divorce,€husband€served€as€vice„president€of€Ford€ContractingÏCompany,€one€of€several€companies€(ð ðthe€Ford€companiesðð)€in€which€husband€heldÏan€ownership€interest.€€After€the€divorce€in€1993,€husband€sold€his€ownership€interestÏin€the€Ford€companies€to€his€brother€and€sister€for€$900,000.00.€€In€addition,€husbandÏsold€his€interest€in€another€of€the€Ford€companies€for€$404,539.00.€€Husband€placedÏthe€proceeds€from€the€two€sales€into€an€irrevocable€living€trust€at€First€TennesseeÏBank.€€Husband€also€placed€various€stocks€into€a€custodial€account€at€First€TennesseeÏBank.ÌÌà àThe€terms€of€the€trust€provide€that€husband€is€to€receive€all€income€from€the€trust€Ïand€is€allowed€to€withdraw€up€to€3%€of€the€trust€principal€each€year.€€During€1994,€theÏtrust€produced€income€in€the€amount€of€$58,775.05,€and€husband€withdrewÏ$26,973.05€from€the€trust€principal.€€Husband€received€approximately€$7,500.00€inÏincome€from€the€custodial€account.€Husband€has€not€been€employed€since€he€sold€hisÏinterest€in€the€Ford€companies€in€1993.€ÌÌà àWife€filed€a€petition€to€modify€child€support€based€upon€the€increase€inÏhusbandððs€income€that€resulted€from€the€sale€of€his€interest€in€the€Ford€companies.€ÏShe€also€filed€a€petition€to€modify€the€final€divorce€decree,€requesting€an€increase€inÏalimony.€ÌÌà àFollowing€a€trial€on€the€matter,€the€trial€court€denied€wifeððs€request€for€alimonyÏmodification.€In€addition,€the€court€below€held,€without€explanation,€that€husbandððsÏwithdrawal€of€$26,973.05€of€trust€principal€did€not€constitute€ð ðgross€incomeðð€€under€theÏchild€support€guidelines.€€In€order€to€assess€child€support,€the€court€calculatedÏhusbandððs€income€by€adding€the€amount€of€income€that€husband€received€from€theÏcustodial€account€to€the€amount€that€husband€received€from€the€trust€account.€€Then,Ïthe€court€deducted€administrative€expenses€from€that€figure€to€yield€an€annual€incomeÏof€$62,079.00.€€The€trial€court€ultimately€held€that,€pursuant€to€the€guidelines,€€husbandÏshould€pay€child€support€in€the€amount€of€$1,146.00€per€month,€or€$326.77€per€week,Ïadjusted€upward€by€$400.00€per€month€for€ten€months€for€extraordinary€educationalÏexpenses.€The€trial€court€declined€to€impute€income€to€husband€based€upon€hisÏpotential€income€because,€according€to€the€court,€husband€had€not€willfully€renderedÏhimself€unemployed€in€order€to€avoid€paying€child€support.€€ÌÌà àWe€review€child€support€decisions€in€accordance€with€T.R.A.P.€13(d),€affordingÏthe€trial€courtððs€factual€findings€a€presumption€of€correctness.€€However,€noÏpresumption€of€correctness€applies€to€the€trial€courtððs€interpretation€of€the€child€supportÍguidelines.ÌÌà àWifeððs€first€contention€on€appeal€is€that€the€husbandððs€withdrawal€of€$26,973.05Ïof€trust€principal€constitutes€ð ðgross€incomeðð€within€the€meaning€of€the€child€supportÏguidelines.€Neither€party€has€directed€us€to,€nor€can€we€find,€any€Tennessee€authorityÏspecifically€addressing€this€issue.ÌÌà àThe€child€support€guidelines€define€ð ðgross€incomeðð€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[A]ll€income€from€any€source€(before€taxes€and€otherÏdeductions),€whether€earned€or€unearned,€and€includes€butÏis€not€limited€to,€the€following:€wages,€salaries,Ïcommissions,€bonuses,€overtime€payments,€dividends,Ïseverance€pay,€pensions,€interest,€trust€income,€annuities,Ïcapital€gains,€benefits€received€from€the€Social€SecurityÏAdministration...workers€compensation€benefits€whetherÏtemporary€or€permanent,€judgments€recovered€for€personalÏinjuries,€unemployment€insurance€benefits,€gifts,€prizes,Ïlottery€winnings,€alimony€or€maintenance,€and€income€fromÏself„employment....ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.,€ch.€1240„2„4„.03(3)(a)€(1994).ÌÌà à€In€our€opinion,€husbandððs€withdrawal€of€trust€principal€constitutes€ð ðgrossÏincomeðð€within€the€meaning€of€the€guidelines.€€Our€interpretation€is€consistent€withÏboth€the€broad€definition€of€ð ðgross€income,ðð€which€includes€all€income€from€any€source,Ïand€with€one€of€the€primary€goals€expressed€in€the€guidelines,€which€is€ð ð[t]o€ensureÏthat€when€parents€live€separately,€the€economic€impact€on€the€child€is€minimized€andÏto€the€extent€that€either€parent€enjoys€a€higher€standard€of€living,€the€child€share€in€thatÏhigher€standard.ðð€€Tenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.,€ch.€1240„2„4„.02(2)(e)€(1994).ÌÌà àAccordingly,€if€and€when€any€distributions€of€the€trust€corpus€are€made€toÏhusband,€husband€shall€pay€32%€of€that€amount€to€wife€as€child€support.€€SinceÏhusband€has€already€exercised€his€option€to€withdraw€principal€from€the€trust€in€1994,Ïhe€thereby€became€subject€to€his€obligations€under€the€guidelines€for€that€calendarÏyear.Ìà@ àÌà àWife€next€urges€this€court€to€hold€that€the€trust€principal€should€be€considered€asÏa€valuable€resource€of€the€husband€meriting€an€upward€deviation€from€the€guidelines.€ÏThe€provision€upon€which€she€relies€states:€ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à(f)€Valuable€assets€and€resources€(expensive€home€orÏautomobile€which€seems€inappropriate€for€the€incomeÏclaimed€by€the€obligor)€of€the€obligor€should€be€consideredÏfor€the€purpose€of€imputing€income€and€increasing€theÏsupport€award€in€any€case€if€the€court€finds€that€equityÏrequires€it.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.,€ch.€1240„2„4„.04€(1)(f)€(1994).ÌÌà àIn€our€opinion,€equity€does€not€require€the€imputation€of€income€to€husbandÏbased€on€the€trust€account€under€the€facts€of€this€case.€€ÌÌà àWe€agree€with€wife,€however,€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€failing€to€impute€incomeÏto€husband€based€upon€his€voluntary€unemployment.€€The€relevant€provision€states:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[I]f€an€obligor€is€willfully€and€voluntarily€unemployed€orÏunderemployed,€child€support€shall€be€calculated€based€onÏa€determination€of€potential€income,€as€evidenced€byÏeducational€level€and/or€previous€work€experience.ÌÌÓÓTenn.€Comp.€R.€&€Regs.,€ch.€1240„2„4„.03(3)(d)€(1994).€€ÌÌà àThe€trial€judge€stated€in€his€Memorandum€Opinion,€ð ðIt€does€not€appear€that€theÏfather€is€avoiding€employment€simply€to€lessen€his€child€support.€€This€is€not€anÏappropriate€case€to€increase€support€due€to€willful€unemployment.ðð€The€trial€judgeððsÏstatements€in€this€regard€suggest€that€he€misconstrued€ð ðwillfully€and€voluntarilyÏunemployedðð€to€mean€that€income€may€be€imputed€to€an€obligor€only€when€he€or€sheÏbecomes€unemployed€with€the€intent€to€avoid€child€support€obligations.€€Although€weÏdo€not€deem€the€trial€judgeððs€interpretation€to€be€unreasonable€in€light€of€theÏguidelinesðð€use€of€the€word€ð ðwillfully,ðð€we€respectfully€disagree€that€there€must€be€suchÏan€intent€in€order€to€impute€income€to€an€obligor€spouse.ÌÌà àOn€the€contrary,€there€are€several€cases€in€which€courts€of€this€state€haveÏimputed€income€based€on€earning€capacity€to€an€unemployed€or€underemployedÏobligor€without€any€showing€of€an€intent€to€avoid€child€support€obligations.€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,ÏòòLuna€v.€Lunaóó,€718€S.W.2d€673€(Tenn.€App.€1986);€òòHarwell€v.€Harwellóó,€612€S.W.2d€182Ï(Tenn.€App.€1980);€òòRiley€v.€Rileyóó,€No.€03A01„9408„CH„000268,€1995€WL€311331Ï(Tenn.€App.€May€22,€1995);€òòKeck€v.€Keckóó,€No.€03A01„9102„CH„00069,€1991€WLÏ94395€(Tenn.€App.€June€6,€1991);€òòGutknecht€v.€Gutknechtóó,€No.€01A01„9101„CH„00015,€1991€WL€79560€(Tenn.€App.€May€17,€1991).ÌÌà àExamining€the€language€of€the€subject€provision€in€light€of€the€policiesÍunderlying€the€guidelines€and€applicable€case€law,€we€hold€that€there€is€noÏrequirement€that€there€exist€evidence€of€an€obligorððs€intent€to€avoid€support€obligationsÏin€order€to€impute€income€to€the€obligor€based€upon€his€or€her€potential€income.€€ÌÌà àThe€record€reveals€that€husband€was€35€years€old€at€the€time€of€trial.€€HeÏgraduated€from€high€school€and€attended€college€for€approximately€three€years.ÏHusband€testified€that€he€worked€as€a€superintendent€on€construction€jobs,€and€servedÏas€vice„president€of€Ford€Contracting€Corporation€for€a€period€of€time.€At€trial,€husbandÏtestified€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àQ.€€Are€you€currently€employed,€Mr.€Ford?Ìà8 àà8 àA.€€No,€sir.Ìà8 àà8 àQ.€€Why€not?Ìà8 àà8 àA.€€I€donððt„„I€donððt€see€why€I€have€to€be.€€Is€there€a€law€thatÏsays€I€have€to€be€employed?Ìà àà àà à*à à*à à*à à*Ìà8 àà8 àQ.€€Are€there€any€physical€disabilities€that€would€preventÏyou€from€getting€a€job?Ìà8 àà8 àA.€€No.€ÌÌÌÌÓÓà àPrior€to€his€decision€to€discontinue€working€in€1993,€husbandððs€salary€wasÏ$650.00€a€week.€€It€is€thus€apparent€that€although€husband€is€disinclined€to€work,€heÏpossesses€the€ability€to€earn€a€substantial€income.€€On€remand,€the€trial€court€shallÏconsider€husbandððs€previous€work€experience€and€educational€background€inÏdetermining€his€potential€income€and€calculate€child€support€accordingly.ÌÌà àFinally,€wife€seeks€an€increase€in€alimony€based€upon€her€alleged€increasedÏneeds€and€husbandððs€increased€income.€€Wife€argues€that€the€provisions€of€theÍoriginal€decree€failed€to€provide€her€with€enough€money€to€enable€her€to€maintain€theÏsame€standard€of€living€that€she€enjoyed€when€she€was€married€or€to€rehabilitateÏherself€by€going€back€to€school.€€ÌÌà àInitially,€we€note€that€contrary€to€husbandððs€assertion,€his€obligation€to€contributeÏthe€monthly€payments€for€wifeððs€health€and€auto€insurance€is€alimony€òòin€futuro,óó€and€isÏthus€subject€to€modification€upon€a€showing€of€a€change€in€circumstances€pursuant€toÏT.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101.€€òòCarter€v.€Carteróó,€No.€01„A„01„9005„CV„0088,€1990€WL€166596Ï(Tenn.€App.€Nov.€2,€1990).ÌÌà àThe€party€seeking€modification€of€an€alimony€award€bears€the€burden€of€provingÏthat,€since€the€time€of€the€original€award,€there€has€been€a€substantial€and€materialÏchange€of€relevant€circumstances€that€was€not€foreseeable€at€the€time€of€the€entry€ofÏthe€final€decree.€òòMcCarty€v.€McCartyóó,€863€S.W.2d€716€(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòElliot€v.€Elliotóó,Ï825€S.W.2d€87€(Tenn.€App.€1991).€€€The€factors€delineated€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„5„101€thatÏapply€to€the€determination€of€the€initial€alimony€award€also€apply€in€determiningÏwhether€there€has€been€a€change€of€circumstances€justifying€a€modification€of€theÏaward.€€òòBrewer€v.€Breweróó,€869€S.W.2d€928,€935€(Tenn.€App.€1993).€The€two€mostÏimportant€factors€in€awarding€alimony€are€need€and€ability€to€pay.€€òòElliotóó,€825€S.W.2dÏ87.ÌÌà àOur€review€of€the€record€reveals€insufficient€proof€of€a€substantial€and€materialÏchange€of€circumstances€occurring€since€the€entry€of€the€final€decree.€€AlthoughÍhusbandððs€income€has€increased,€wife€has€not€demonstrated€to€this€courtððs€satisfactionÏthat€she€has€experienced€any€material€change€in€circumstances€that€wasÏunforeseeable€at€the€time€of€the€original€decree.€€We€therefore€affirm€the€judgmentÏbelow€with€respect€to€alimony.Ìà àÌà àThe€wife€also€asks€this€court€to€award€her€attorneyððs€fees€incurred€in€connectionÏwith€her€appeal.€€We€deem€this€to€be€an€appropriate€case€for€husband€to€pay€one„halfÏof€wifeððs€legal€expenses€for€this€appeal.€€Therefore,€on€remand,€the€trial€court€shallÏdetermine€the€amount€of€attorneyððs€fees€reasonably€incurred€in€this€appeal€and€enterÏjudgment€against€husband€for€one„half€of€the€amount€so€ascertained.ÌÌà àœÌÌà àIn›€accordance€with€the€foregoing€opinion,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€isÏreversed€in€part,€affirmed€in€part,€and€remanded€for€further€and€necessary€proceedingsÏconsistent€with€this€opinion.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€husband.ÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.