ÿWPC# …#†VUNÜ %* 0(04Xl 0¶{ 0D1 U:u 0J¯ 0Tù 0^M 0h« 0r 0|… 0† 0‡ 1u U,Œ 0d¸ U,U>HU *†B)°DCÙ AMi»… B@B]»Ÿ D3Zv~vÓ  0@Þ AO!Æm! 0D3" 0Dw" D/»" Bê"˜IBM Laser Printer 4019IBM4019ÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0”Èo·1NçMÔÈŒ 2Ê×;(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡3x2Öh3|x1(f(2¸$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ XyÑXXXÔÔ€ òÞòX XyÑÔÓ  Óà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó,†r‰AZ‹"Arial Regular2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òDecember€29,€1995ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSpecifically,€Plan€A€provides:ÌÌà àà à4.04€(b)€€Non„vested€Plan€B€Member€Who€Returns€to€Employment.Ìà8 àà8 àAny€member€of€Plan€B€who€Terminates€Employment€before€or€afterÏDecember€1,€1978,€who€has€less€than€ten€years€of€creditable€service€inÏPlan€B,€but€who€returns€to€Employment€within€two€years€after€suchÏTermination€and€has€not€received€a€refund€of€contributions€under€Plan€B,Ïshall€automatically€become€a€Participant€in€Plan€A.€à àÌ d 8Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝERISA€explicitly€exempts€government€pension€plans€from€its€coverage.€€29€U.S.C.S.€ðð€1003.Ì ±Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ôÔÓ  Óà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝThe€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€has€expressly€validated€the€Shelby€County€retirement€system'sÏamendments€to€its€pension€plan.€€In€òòBlackwell€v.€Quarterly€County€Courtóó,€622€S.W.2d€535€(Tenn.€1981),Ïthe€Court€held€that€changes€can€be€properly€made€in€a€county€retirement€plan€as€long€as€the€changes€doÏnot€affect€the€rights€of€an€employee€who€has€a€vested€interest€in€the€assets€of€the€retirement€plan.€€òòId.óó€atÏ542.€€In€other€words,€òòBlackwellóó€holds€that:Ìà8 àà8 àÌà8 àà8 à[A]€public€employer€may€make€changes€in€such€a€plan€when€reasonablyÏrequired€to€do€so€for€the€fiscal€integrity€thereof,€even€though€suchÏchanges€be€detrimental€to€the€beneficiaries€€of€the€plan,€except€that,€noÏsuch€modification€can€be€permitted€to€adversely€affect€an€employee€whoÏhas€complied€with€all€conditions€necessary€to€be€eligible€for€a€retirementÏallowance.€€ÓÓÌòòFelts€v.€Tennessee€Consolidated€Retirement€Systemóó,€650€S.W.2d€371,€374€(Tenn.€1983).Ì'''''ÿÿdxdPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco Ò("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€X„d&ÓÑ#€Xd#ÑÔ€ ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÔ€!Ôò òÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€v#XXdìdÈ7Ñà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌòòà@ à€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌÌJ.€FRANK€HALL,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àà àò ò)€€Shelby€Chancery€No.€96334„3€R.D.ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àò ò)ó óÌò òVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9408„CH„00184Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌSHELBY€COUNTY€RETIREMENTà à)ÌBOARD,€ET€AL,à àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìó óà àDefendants/Appellees.à àà àò ò)ÌÌÌó óà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€SHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JOE€C.€MORRIS,€CHANCELLORÌÙ€€ÙßL€$%#;+'h|ÿ!` Å `€€LßÌÌÌÌÌÌò òJ.€FRANK€HALL,€JR.Ìó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òJ.€MINOR€TAIT,€JR.ÌASSISTANT€SHELBY€COUNTY€ATTORNEYÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppelleesÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌPAUL€G.€SUMMERS,€SP.€J.ó óà àÌÌÌÌÌÓÓà àThe€majority€of€the€facts€in€the€present€case€are€undisputed.€€Petitioner€workedÏfor€Ñ7€v#XXdìXXdì7ÑShelby€County€as€a€delinquent€tax€attorney€from€May€10,€1977,€to€February€1,Ï1987.€Petitioner€was€appointed€to€this€position€by€the€Shelby€County€Trustee€on€aÏyear„to„year€basis.€The€Shelby€County€Trustee€did€not€reappoint€Petitioner€in€JanuaryÏof€1987.€€ÌÌà àAs€a€result€of€the€Trustee's€failure€to€reappoint€him,€Petitioner's€service€with€theÏcounty€fell€approximately€three€months€short€of€ten€years,€the€period€of€time€necessaryÏfor€his€retirement€benefits€to€vest€under€the€terms€of€the€county€retirement€plan.€ÏFollowing€a€six„month€break€in€service,€Petitioner€secured€employment€as€a€GeneralÏSessions€prosecutor€from€January€1,€1988,€to€April€30,€1988,€in€an€attempt€to€completeÏthe€10„year€vesting€requirement.€€ÌÌà àSince€1945,€the€retirement€system€of€Shelby€County€has€had€a€retirement€plan,Ïknown€as€"Plan€B."€This€plan€was€in€effect€when€Petitioner€began€his€employment€withÏthe€county€in€1977.€€In€1978,€the€county€commissioners€amended€the€retirementÍsystem€by€creating€an€additional€plan,€Plan€A.€€Employees€whose€rights€hadÏpreviously€vested€under€Plan€B€were€not€affected€by€this€amendment.€€If,€however,€anÏemployee€who€was€participating€in€Plan€B€"terminated€employment"€with€the€countyÏbefore€10€years€and€later€was€€re„employed€with€the€county,€that€employee€was€placedÏinto€Plan€A.€€Ìà àÌà àThe€pertinent€provision€of€the€amendment€to€Plan€B€provides:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àAny€active€employee€who€is€a€participant€in€Plan€B€as€of€theÏeffective€date€shall€continue€to€have€future€rights€to€benefitsÏunder€Plan€B€for€the€duration€of€his€continuous€futureÏemployment€thereafter.€€If€any€such€participant€in€Plan€BÏterminates€employment€with€Shelby€County€after€theÏeffective€date€or€any€retired,€disabled€or€otherwiseÏterminated€employee€on€December€1,€1978€shall€beÏsubsequently€re„employed€by€Shelby€County,€he€shall€beÏentitled€to€all€benefits€pursuant€to€Plan€B€vested€andÏaccrued€as€of€such€date€of€termination€of€employment,€butÏupon€such€re„employment€with€Shelby€County,€shallÏbecome€a€member€of€Plan€A€and€shall€not€resumeÏparticipation€in€Plan€B€in€any€way.€€ÌÌÓÓÌà àPursuant€to€Plan€B,€an€employee's€rights€vest€when€he€or€she€has€beenÏemployed€with€the€county€for€ten€or€more€years.€€The€employee€is€entitled€to€benefitsÏupon€reaching€age€60.× ƒ& ××  ×€ÌÌà àOn€May€4,€1988,€Petitioner€filed€an€application€with€the€Board,€seeking€toÏdetermine€his€status€in€the€retirement€system.€€In€his€application€to€the€Board,ÏPetitioner€asked€the€Board€determine€that€he€had€a€vested€right€to€benefits€pursuant€toÏPlan€B.€At€their€meeting,€the€Board€declined€to€make€any€decision€on€the€matter,€Ïreasoning€that€it€could€not€render€an€advisory€opinion.€€In€response,€Petitioner€filed€aÏPetition€for€Writ€of€Certiorari€in€the€chancery€court.€€The€chancellor€remanded€the€caseÏto€the€Board€with€instructions€for€the€Board€to€determine€whether€Petitioner's€break€inÏservice€was€voluntary€or€involuntary.€€Following€remand,€the€Board€held€a€hearing€andÏdetermined€that€his€break€in€service€was€voluntary.€€ÌÌà àPetitioner€subsequently€moved€the€chancery€court€to€remand€the€question€ofÏvoluntary€or€involuntary€to€the€Board€with€instructions€to€answer€the€question€basedÏupon€evidence€and€facts,€rather€than€upon€law.€€The€chancellor€granted€said€motionÏand€remanded€the€case€to€the€Board€"to€decide€whether€the€break€in€service€ofÏPetitioner,€J.€Frank€Hall,€was€voluntary€or€involuntary€..."€€€The€chancellor€ordered€theÏBoard€to€decide€the€question€as€one€of€fact€rather€than€one€of€law.€€The€chancellorÏfurther€instructed€the€Board€to€afford€to€the€words€"voluntary"€and€"involuntary"€theirÏnatural€and€ordinary€meanings.€ÌÌà àIn€accordance€with€the€chancellor's€mandate,€the€Board€made€a€secondÏdetermination€that€Petitioner's€break€in€service€was€voluntary.€€The€final€decree€of€theÏchancery€court€upheld€the€Board's€determination.€€€The€trial€court€found€that€theÍBoard's€finding€was€supported€by€material€and€substantial€evidence€and,€therefore,Ïdismissed€Petitioner's€writ€of€certiorari.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€from€this€dismissal€that€Petitioner€appeals.€€Petitioner€has€raised€severalÏissues€on€appeal;€however,€we€perceive€the€primary€issues€to€be€€two„fold.€€First,ÏPetitioner€contests€the€Board's€finding€that€his€break€in€service€was€voluntary.€ÏSecond,€Petitioner€seeks€to€reverse€the€trial€court's€denial€of€his€motion€to€amend€theÏpleadings€so€that€he€can€supplement€his€petition€with€additional€issues.€€ÌÓ  ÓÌÓ  Óà àWe€first€address€Petitioner's€argument€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€denying€hisÏmotion€to€amend€the€petition.€ÌÌà àIn€his€original€petition€for€writ€of€certiorari,€Petitioner€proceeded€under€aÏcommon€law€writ.€€The€standard€of€review€for€a€common€law€writ€is€that€a€trial€courtÏshould€uphold€an€action€of€a€civil€service€board€unless€the€board€has€acted€in€violationÏof€a€constitutional€or€statutory€provision,€€has€acted€illegally,€fraudulently,€or€arbitrarily,Ïor€has€acted€without€any€material€evidence€to€support€its€decision.€€òòCochran€v.€BoardÏof€Administration€of€the€City€of€Memphisóó,€1987€WL€14746€(Tenn.€App.€July€28,€1987);ÏòòBrown€v.€Tennessee€Real€Estate€Commissionóó,€494€S.W.2d€506,€510€(Tenn.€App.Ï1972).€€In€his€motion€to€amend€the€petition,€filed€some€three€and€a€half€years€after€theÏoriginal€petition€was€filed,€Petitioner€sought€to€have€the€chancery€court€review€his€caseÏon€a€òòde€novoóó€standard€of€review.€€He€also€moved€the€court€to€allow€him€to€€addÏallegations€against€the€Board€for€breach€of€duty€of€loyalty€and€conflict€of€interest.€€TheÍtrial€court€denied€this€motion.€€Almost€a€year€later,€Petitioner€filed€a€second€motion€toÏamend€the€petition€to€recharacterize€the€petition€as€a€statutory€writ,€rather€than€aÏcommon€law€writ,€in€order€to€gain€òòde€novoóó€review.€€€He€further€alleged€that€T.C.A.€ðð€27„9„114,€which€governs€the€standard€of€review€on€common€law€writs,€was€violative€of€theÏEqual€Protection€Clause.€€€The€trial€court€denied€this€motion,€as€well.€€ÌÌà à€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.,€Rule€15.01€provides€that€"[a]€party€may€amend€his€pleadingsÏonce€as€a€matter€of€course€at€any€time€before€a€responsive€pleading€is€served€...Ïotherwise,€a€party€may€amend€his€pleadings€only€by€written€consent€of€the€adverseÏparty€or€by€leave€of€court..."€€In€Tennessee,€after€a€responsive€pleading€has€beenÏserved,€the€denial€of€a€motion€to€amend€the€pleadings€lies€within€the€sound€discretionÏof€the€trial€court.€€It€will€not€be€reversed€absent€a€showing€of€an€abuse€of€€thatÏdiscretion.€€òòMerriman€v.€Smithóó,€599€S.W.2d€548,€559€(Tenn.€Appò ò.ó ó€1979);€òòWelch€v.ÏThuanóó,€882€S.W.2d€792,€793€(Tenn.€App.€1994).€€€There€are€several€considerations€aÏtrial€judge€should€evaluate€in€determining€whether€to€grant€or€deny€a€motion€to€amend.€ÏAmong€these€factors€are€undue€delay€in€filing,€lack€of€notice€to€the€opposing€party,€badÏfaith€by€the€moving€party,€repeated€failure€to€cure€deficiencies€by€previousÏamendments,€undue€prejudice€to€the€opposing€party,€and€futility€of€amendment.€òòÏóóòòMerrimanóó,€599€S.W.2d€at€559.òòÌóóÌà àPetitioner€has€failed€to€persuade€this€Court€that€the€chancellor€abused€hisÏdiscretion€in€denying€his€motions€to€amend.€€€In€light€of€the€factors€delineated€above,Ïwe€find€ample€justification€for€the€actions€of€the€trial€court€in€denying€such€motions.€€€InÍthe€present€case,€Petitioner€did€not€file€his€motions€to€amend€until€approximately€threeÏand€a€half€years€after€his€original€petition€was€filed.€€The€motions€were€thus€untimely,Ïthereby€constituting€an€undue€delay€in€filing.€€Moreover,€because€Petitioner€sought€toÏadd€several€additional€claims,€a€court's€allowance€of€the€amendments€would€undulyÏprejudice€the€Board.€€Finally,€the€amendments€would€be€futile€because€granting€themÏwould€only€prolong€the€litigation€and€would€almost€certainly€not€lead€to€a€contraryÏultimate€result.ÌÌà àWe€therefore€find€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€in€denying€theÏmotion€to€amend.€€ÌÌà àBoth€of€the€parties€and€the€trial€court€expended€much€time€and€toil€grapplingÏwith€the€€issue€of€whether€Petitioner's€break€in€service€was€voluntary€or€involuntary.€ÏThe€Board's€position€is€that€it€is€immaterial€whether€Petitioner's€cessation€of€€work€wasÏvoluntary€or€involuntary€under€the€retirement€plan.€€According€to€the€Board,€allÏemployees€who€leave€county€service€and€are€later€re„employed€by€the€county€areÏplaced€into€Plan€A,€regardless€of€the€circumstances€under€which€they€left€employment.€ÏThe€Board€argues€that€the€same€result€ensues€€whether€the€employee€retires,€wasÏdischarged,€or€was€disabled.ÌÌà àIn€contrast,€Petitioner's€position€is€that€a€line€of€federal€decisions€under€ERISAÏand€the€Labor€Management€Relations€Act€€should€govern€this€case.€€These€cases€holdÏthat€the€failure€to€have€a€voluntary„involuntary€test€with€respect€to€breaks€in€service€isÍarbitrary€and€capricious.€€€òòSeeóó,€òòe.g.óó,€òòLee€v.€Nesbitóó,€453€F.2d€1309€(9th€Cir.€1972)Ï(holding€that€the€LMRA€implicitly€requires€a€voluntary„involuntary€test€in€evaluatingÏpension€benefits);€òòVan€Fossen€v.€International€Brotherhood€of€Teamsters€Union€LocalÏNo.€710€Pension€Fundóó,€649€F.2d€1243€(7th€Cir.€1981)€(holding€that€ERISA€requires€aÏvoluntary„involuntary€test€for€breaks€in€service).€€€€He€urges€this€Court€to€adopt€theÏrules€and€reasoning€of€these€decisions€and€apply€them€to€government€pension€plansÏin€Tennessee.ÌÌà àWe€find€Petitioner's€argument€to€be€flawed€in€several€respects.€€Primarily,€theÏdecisions€upon€which€he€relies€are€not€binding€on€this€Court.€€The€mostÏdistinguishable€facet€of€these€cases,€however,€is€that€each€ultimately€dealt€with€theÏconstruction,€interpretation,€and€application€of€federal€statutes€rather€than€the€simpleÏinterpretation€of€pension€plans.€€ÌÌà àThere€exists€no€Tennessee€law€indicating€that€a€voluntary„involuntary€testÏshould€be€applied€as€a€matter€of€law€to€breaks€in€service€under€government€pensionÏplans.× ƒ( ××  ×€€We€therefore€decline€to€adopt€the€federal€break€in€service€rules€with€respect€toÏgovernment€pension€plans€in€Tennessee.€€ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€must€look€to€the€language€of€the€plan€itself€to€determineÏwhether€there€exists€a€voluntary„involuntary€distinction€that€might€affect€Petitioner'sÏentitlement€to€benefits.Ìà àÌà àWe€begin€with€the€fundamental€proposition€that€an€employee's€rights€in€aÏretirement€plan€"vest€only€in€accordance€with€the€terms€of€the€plan."€€òòConlee€v.€BostÏEngineering€Co.óó,€541€S.W.2d€601,€603€(Tenn.€App.€1976).€€Ìà àÌà àThe€pertinent€portions€of€the€retirement€plan€that€we€find€determinative€includeÏsection€9(d)€of€Plan€B,€which€states,€"Any€ò òmember€terminatingó ó€with€ten€(10)€or€moreÏyears€of€creditable€service€shall€have...a€deferred€pension€commencing€at€age€sixtyÏ(60)..."€€€Plan€A€states€that€"[a]ny€ò òmemberó ó€of€Plan€B€ò òwho€Terminates€Employmentó ó"Ïwith€the€county€who€has€less€than€ten€years€of€service€and€who€returns€to€employmentÏwith€the€county€within€two€years€"shall€automatically€become€a€participant€in€Plan€A."× ƒ) ××  ×Ï(emphasis€added)ÌÌà àThe€pivotal€words€in€the€quoted€provisions€are€"terminates"€and€"terminating."ÏPetitioner€argues€that€"terminates€employment"€requires€€voluntary€action€on€the€part€ofÍthe€employee€in€order€for€the€terms€of€the€plan€to€require€that€he€be€placed€into€Plan€A.ÌÌà àPlan€A€€capitalizes€"Terminates€Employment,"€which€indicates€that€it€is€a€termÏdefined€within€the€plan.€€The€definitional€section€of€the€plan€does€not€defineÏ"Terminates€Employment."€€However,€it€defines€"Termination"€and€"Termination€ofÏEmployment"€to€mean€"termination€of€employment€as€an€employee€of€Shelby€County."Ï(ðð€3.01(r))€€This€definition€does€not€distinguish€between€an€employee€who€terminatesÏemployment€voluntarily€and€one€who€terminates€employment€as€a€result€of€beingÏdischarged.Ìà àÌà àGeneral€principles€of€contract€construction€are€instructive€in€determining€anÏemployee's€rights€under€a€pension€plan.€€òòConlee€v.€Bost€Engineering€Co.óó,€541€S.W.2dÏ601,€603€(Tenn.€App.€1976)€(quoting€42€A.L.R.2d€461€at€464).€€This€court€has€statedÏthat€"[t]he€cardinal€rule€for€interpretation€of€contracts€is€to€ascertain€the€intention€of€theÏparties€and€to€give€effect€to€that€intention."€€€òòPark€Place€Center€Enterprises,€Inc.€v.€ParkÏPlace€Mall€Assoc.óó,€836€S.W.2d€113,€116€(€Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòJaffe€v.€Boltonóó,€817ÏS.W.2d€19,€25€(Tenn.€App.€1991).ÌÌà àHad€the€drafters€of€the€plan€intended€for€these€provisions€to€apply€only€to€thoseÏemployees€who€voluntarily€left€county€employment,€the€drafters€surely€would€haveÏincluded€some€provision€addressing€an€employee's€status€in€the€retirement€systemÏwhen€the€employee€is€discharged€or€leaves€for€another€reason.ÌÌà àAlthough€the€language€is€phrased€somewhat€ineptly,€we€conclude€that€theÏdrafters€of€the€retirement€plan€intended€"terminates"€and€"terminating"€to€mean€simplyÏ"the€end€of€employment€with€the€county,"€regardless€of€the€circumstances€that€causedÏemployment€to€terminate.€€We€recognize€the€potential€merit€in€Petitioner's€argument,Ïbut€we€cannot€reasonably€construe€the€language€of€either€pension€plan€to€requireÏvoluntary€termination€by€an€employee.€€Our€interpretation€of€"terminates€employment"Ïis€that€the€employee€can€terminate€employment€by€choosing€to€do€so,€or€he€canÏterminate€employment€because€he€is€forced€to€do€so€by€actions€of€the€county.€€In€eitherÏevent,€the€result€is€the€same.€€Termination€means€simply€the€end€of€employment€withÏthe€county.€€ÌÌà àIt€was€the€trial€court's€opinion€that€a€determination€that€Petitioner's€break€inÏservice€was€voluntary€was€necessary€in€order€to€hold€that€Petitioner€was€not€entitled€toÏPlan€B€benefits.€€As€explained€above,€we€disagree€with€the€trial€court€in€part€becauseÏwe€do€not€believe€that€there€exists€any€voluntary„involuntary€distinction€in€the€pensionÏplan.€€Nevertheless,€we€feel€that€the€trial€court€reached€the€correct€result.€€That€is,Ïpursuant€to€the€explicit€terms€of€the€pension€plan,€Petitioner€is€entitled€to€receive€onlyÏPlan€A€benefits€as€his€rights€did€not€vest€under€Plan€B.ÌÌà àAccordingly,€we€affirm€the€trial€court's€judgment€on€a€different€basis.€€We€holdÏthat€there€is€no€requirement€that€an€employee€be€involuntarily€terminated€in€order€forÏsuch€employee€to€receive€benefits.€€The€plan€requires€ten€years'€service€with€theÏcounty€in€order€to€acquire€a€vested€right€to€Plan€B€benefits.€€Petitioner€simply€did€notÍfulfill€the€ten„year€requirement€and€thus,€did€not€acquire€a€vested€right€to€Plan€BÏbenefits.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€to€Petitioner.ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌSUMMERS,€SP.€J.ÌÌà àÌÌà àÌà à