WPC  # VU:a % 0w@ 4    0? 0DL 0J 0T 0^. 0h 0r 0|f 0 0h 1u 0dmU*B)DC$ AMg BWytv~| D3v- 0@ AO@ 0DU D/ B HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,,,,,,0nL,cAZ"Arial RegularX(~$  HTR[A' LegalLh (Avery 4167 Post CardA' Legalh (Avery 4167 Post CardTXmXXX73XXdXXd7 DDU@eӀ'R"3|x)H((3$ ~!  HTR[A' Legal3'A' Legal3'TXXXX7XXdd7   `   0  (#$  0  2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X<  9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd-#C << G  !  #d#!    H \RA'\#d#  !   YYY FILED!X June5,1997CecilCrowson,Jr.!AppellateCourtClerk  d o !#d#!    H \RA'\#d#   $       Theplaintiffshowedthestatementtootherbankemployees.  !#d#!    H \RA'\#d#   $       Dicta,becausenotpleadedorargued,butmentionedlestitbeassumedotherwise.PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'h&&&&'dxdStyl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Geneva   h HD: Geneva  h HD: Geneva ("$    -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! . !    H \RA'\#Xd##Xd#  ݛ   R$%#A1-j|` . `@Rߛ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEEEASTERNSECTIONATKNOXVILLE   DEBORAHHENDRIX,   ) UNICOICIRCUIT      )       Plaintiff/Appellant   ) NO.03A019701CV00032      ) v.      ) HON.G.RICHARDJOHNSON,      ) JUDGEFIRSTTENNESSEENATIONAL  )  CORPORATIONd/b/aFIRST  )TENNESSEEBANK,   )      )      ) Defendant/Appellee  ) AFFIRMEDJamesS.Pate,Erwin,forAppellant.StevenC.Rose,West&Rose,Kingsport,forAppellee.   OPINION           INMAN,SeniorJudge Thisactionfordamagesfordefamationandoutrageousconductwasdismissedonmotionforsummaryjudgment.Theplaintiffpresentstheproprietyofthedismissalforappellatereview,whichisdenovoontherecordwithnopresumptionofcorrectness.Johnsonv.EMPE,Inc.,837S.W.2d62,68(Tenn.App.1992). Theplaintiffallegedthatthedefendantbankheldapurchasemoneymortgageonhisresidencewhichrequiredaconcomitantescrowaccount,thefundsfromwhich,interalia,wereusedtopayinsurancepremiums.Hereffortstodiscovertheidentityoftheinsurancecarrierwereunfruitfulforseveralweeks,butshewasadvisedinFebruary1994ofthenameofthecompany.InMay1994theinsurancecompanynotifiedherthatitspolicywascanceledfornonpaymentofpremiums.Whereupon,theplaintiffrequestedanaccountingofherescrowedfunds.Shewasgivenacomputergenerateddocumentonwhichappeared, Thiswomaniscrazy.Pleaserefertosupervisorifshecalls. Theplaintiffallegedthatthisstatementwasdefamatoryandconstitutedoutrageousconduct. Thedefendantfileditsansweradmittingthattheplaintiffhadreceivedanoticeofcancellationofthepolicy,butthatthenoticewasinadvertentbecausedirectedtothewrongpolicy.Itadmittedthecriticizednotationbutdeniedtherequisitepublication,allegingthatthecommunicationwasprivilegedandlimitedtoitsemployees. Thedefendantthenmovedforsummaryjudgment,allegingthat thecommunicationofwhichtheplaintiffcomplainedwasaninternalandprivilegedcommunicationand ifadisseminationoftheprivilegedcommunicationwasmade,itwasmadeonlybytheplaintiffherself. Thetrialjudge,ingrantingthemotion,foundtherewasnopublicationoftheallegeddefamatorywords. ThenotationwasmadebyLisaVanderwerf,asupervisoratthebank.Itwasmotivatedbytheadmittedlypersistent,screamingdemandsoftheplaintiffrelatingtotheinsurancepolicy;whenemotionscooled,thenotation thiswomaniscrazywasremoved. OtherthanMs.Vanderwerf,theonlypersonswhohadaccesstothecomputerrecordweretheservicingpersonnelinthemortgagedivisionofthedefendant.TherecordrevealsthatonlyMs.VanderwerfandBeckyBarrett,whowasmanageroftheInsuranceandTaxDepartment,sawthestatement. '    Anessentialelementofanydefamationclaimisthattheallegedlydefamatorystatementbe published.SeeApplewhitev.MemphisStateUniversity,495S.W.2d190(Tenn.1973).Inthedefamationcontext,publicationisthe communicationoflibelousmattertoathirdperson.Applewhite,495S.W.2dat19293;QualityAutoParts,Inc.v.BluffCityBuick,876S.W.2d818,821(Tenn.1994). Intracorporatecommunicationamongemployeesofthecorporationdoesnotconstitute publicationtothirdpersonsfordefamationpurposes.InFreemanv.DaytonScaleCompany,19S.W.2d255(Tenn.1929),anagentofthedefendantcorporationincludedanallegedlydefamatorystatementinalettertotheplaintiffsattorneywhichhadbeendictatedtoastenographer.Plaintiffallegedthatthecommunicationtothestenographerconstituteda publicationofthedefamatorystatement.Thecourtdisagreed: Themoreliberalrule,andtheonewhichseeminglyhasthesupportoftheweightofmodernauthority,isthat,wherethecommunicationismadetoaservantorbusinessassociateintheordinaryandnaturalcourseofbusiness,thereisnoactionablelibel.Freeman,19S.W.2dat257(citationomitted). ThisprinciplewasreaffirmedinWoodsv.Helmi,758S.W.2d219(Tenn.App.1988).Inthatcase,acertifiedregisterednurseanesthetistsuedtheemployerhospitalforlibelinconnectionwithcertaininternalmemorandawrittenbyhospitaladministratorsasaresultofanapparentlyproblematicoperationwhichtookplaceatthehospital.Thememorandaconcernedplaintiffsjobperformanceandwascirculatedonlyamongtheadministrationofficials,someofwhomwereresponsiblefortheanesthesiologydepartmentandotherswereadministratorsofthehospitalsemployeerelationsdepartment.RelyingontheFreemandecision,thetrialcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentinfavorofthedefendant.Woods,758S.W.2dat22122. ThisCourtaffirmed.Weheld: WeinterpretFreemananditsprogenytomeanthatcommunicationamongagentsofthesamecorporationmadewithinthescopeandcourseoftheiremploymentrelativetodutiesperformedforthatcorporationarenottobeconsideredasstatementscommunicatedorpublicizedtothirdpersons.Id.at223. TheundisputedrecordinthiscasebringsthecircumstancessurroundingtheallegedlydefamatorystatementwithintheFreemanWoodsprincipleregardingintracorporatecommunications.Thestatementwasnot publishedtoanythirdpersonoutsideappelleesbusiness.Theonlypersonswhohadaccesstothenotationorcouldconceivablyhavereaditwereservicingpersonnelinthebanksmortgagedepartment. Appellantarguesthattheintracorporatecommunicationsprivilegeappliesonlywheretheemployeestowhomanallegedlydefamatorystatementismadeareina needtoknowposition.ThisargumentisgeneratedbydictainWoods:0 Whilemanyofthecasesdenyingtheexistenceofapublicationspeakintermsofcorporationscommunicatingtoorwithitself,itseemstothisCourtthatmoreessentialtotheissueistheconceptof needtoknowwiththecommunicationflowingthroughtheproperchainofcommand,particularlyinemployeeperformancereviewsordisciplinaryaction.Itcouldreadilybearguedthattheconceptofintracorporatecommunicationswouldnotapplyif,inthecaseofareviewbycorporatesuperiorsoftheallegedmisconductofabranchmanager,thecircumstancessurroundingthemisconductwerecommunicatedalsotothecorporationstruckdriverorjanitor,whoobviouslywouldnotbeinthe needtoknowpipeline.Woods,758S.W.2dat223. Whilewethinkthe needtoknowargumenthasmeritandisanexceptiontotheintracorporaterule,thereisnoevidencethatthestatementwasdisseminatedtoorreadbyanycorporateemployeewhohadno needtoknow.Atamaximum,itwasseenbyonlyfouremployees,noneofwhom,asfarastherecordreveals,lackedaneedtoknow. Inlightofourholdingwithrespecttothenonpublicationoftheallegedlydefamatorystatement,theissueofwhetherthebankwasguiltyofoutrageousconductisessentiallymoot.Thepointneednotbelabored,becausethestatementauthoredbyMs.Vanderwerfwhensheventedthefrustrationoccasionedbytheplaintiffsscreaming,persistentdemandsdoesnotrisetothelevelofoutrageousconduct.Asidefromthefactthatthestatementisnot,primafacie,defamatory, (   ׀itobviouslycannottocharacterizedas nottoleratedincivilizedsociety.SeeDunnv.MotoPhoto,Inc.,828S.W.2d747,753(Tenn.App.1991). Thejudgmentisaffirmedatthecostsoftheappellant.      __________________________________      WilliamH.Inman,SeniorJudgeCONCUR:_______________________________DonT.McMurray,Judge_______________________________CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,%  Judge