ÿWPC• …# VUNa %¯ 0(µLÝb) w@1 4q … ” 0Jœ 0Tæ 0^: 0h˜ 0r 0|r 0†î 0t 1u 0dy U>Ý B)DCD AM‡U*Ôþ Bv~,vÓª D3} 0@° AOðÆ? 0D D/I Bx˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡C:\OFFICE\WPWIN\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT- ù- öD÷øUùúDûüDýþÓ€DÒ 3|x2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d 7Border 1dd€-!Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€#ÔÔ€#ÔÓ  Óò òÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€#XÔÌÌFebruary€28,€1997ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔ  Ôó ó dPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ€ÑÑ7€FXXdìdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑÓ#` Ü` ä œ ’X#Ó›Þ ÞÌSTATE€OF€TENNESSEE,à à)ÌDEPARTMENT€OF€HUMAN€SERVICES,à à)ÌASSIGNEE€OF:€JUDY€STANLEY,à à)Ìà àà à)Ìà àPlaintiff/Appellee,à à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà à)à à01„A„01„9605„CV„00231Ìv.à àà à)Ìà àà à)à àDickson€Circuit̜ـ€ÙßR€"$!A1-j|‹~` ç `€€@ÿRß›JOHN€FRANKLIN€HOOPER,à à)à àNo.à à8015Ìà àà à)Ìà àDefendant/Appellant.à à)ÌÌÌÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€DICKSON€COUNTYÌÌAT€CHARLOTTE,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€E.€BURCH,€JUDGEÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌCHARLES€W.€BURSONÌAttorney€General€&€ReporterÌÌÌKIMBERLY€M.€FRAYNÌJENNIFER€HELTON€SMALLÌ404€James€Robertson€Parkway€Suite€1501ÌNashville,€Tennessee€37243„0499Ìà àATTORNEYS€FOR€PLAINTIFF/APPELLEEÌÌÌBRIAN€K.€FRAZIERÌNeal€&€HarwellÌ2000€First€Union€TowerÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219„2498Ìà àATTORNEY€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLANTÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÓ  ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌòòÓ  ÓÔ€„ÔOPINIONóóÌÓ  ÓÌÓ€ÓÔ€¼Ôà àThis€appeal€involves€the€application€and€constitutionality€of€TennesseeððsÏlaw€creating€a€conclusive€presumption€of€paternity€when€a€DNA€test€shows€theÏstatistical€probability€of€paternity€is€ninety„nine€percent€(99%)€or€greater.€€TheÏDickson€œCounty›€Circuit€Court€held€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€is€constitutional.€€Since€there€was€no€dispute€as€to€any€material€fact,Ïthe€court€held€that€the€State€was€entitled€to€summary€judgment€establishing€theÏdefendantððs€paternity€as€a€matter€of€law.€€In€addition,€the€court€ordered€theÏdefendant€to€make€weekly€payments€for€the€care€and€maintenance€of€the€child€asÏwell€as€for€back€child€support€dating€from€the€time€of€the€childððs€birth.€€We€findÏthat€the€conclusive€presumption€of€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€violates€the€DueÏProcess€Clause€of€the€Fourteenth€Amendment€and,€therefore,€we€reverse€theÏdecision€of€the€trial€court.ÌÌà àOn€20€September€1990,€the€State€of€Tennessee,€as€assignee€for€JudyÏStanley,€filed€a€suit€to€obtain€a€judgment€of€paternity€and€support€paymentsÏagainst€œDefendant›€John€Franklin€Hooper€for€Anthony€Bryan€Stanley,€a€minorÏchild€born€out€of€wedlock€in€April€of€1990.€€The€evidence€shows€that€Ms.€StanleyÏand€Defendant€met€in€1986€and€cohabitated€intermittently€for€the€next€five€yearsÏduring€which€time€Ms.€Stanley€was€married€for€three€months€to€another€man€inÏ1987.€€In€November€of€1988,€Ms.€Stanley€and€Defendant€had€a€child€who€wasÏborn€premature€and€survived€only€six€days.€€As€stated,€Ms.€Stanley€had€anotherÍchild€in€1990,€Anthony€Bryan€Stanley.€€Ms.€Stanleyððs€deposition€testimony€wasÏthat€she€was€certain€that€Defendant€was€the€father€of€this€child.€€She€stated€thatÏshe€was€living€with€Defendant€and€in€an€exclusive€sexual€relationship€with€him€atÏthe€time€of€this€childððs€conception.€€A€DNA€paternity€test€established€a€99.71%Ïð ðprobability€of€paternity.ððÌÌà àThough€Defendant€denied€œever›€staying€overnight€with€Ms.€Stanley,€heÏdid€admit€having€sexual€relations€with€her.€€The€record€contains€certain€lettersÏwritten€to€Defendant€by€Ms.€Stanley€communicating€that€he€was€not€the€father€ofÏthis€child.€€However,€Ms.€Stanley€testified€that€she€wrote€these€under€threats€toÏher€life€from€œDefendantððs›€mother.€€Also,€as€indicated€by€a€responsive€letter€toÏMs.€Stanley€from€the€district€attorneyððs€office,€Ms.€Stanley€requested€that€theÏpaternity€suit,€once€underway,€be€dropped.€€œIn€this€letter,€the›€district€œattorney›Ïadvised€her€against€this€declaring€that€he€would€not€dismiss€the€case€until€he€hadÏan€opportunity€to€discuss€it€in€its€entirety€with€Ms.€Stanley.€€As€is€obvious,€theÏcase€was€never€dismissed.ÌÌÓ  ÓI.ÌÓ  ÓÌà àIn€his€first€issue,€Defendant€asserts€that€Tennessee€Code€AnnotatedÏsection€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€is€applicable€only€to€alleged€fathers€who€haveÏvoluntarily€acknowledged€paternity.€€Section€24„7„112,€in€which€the€specificÏstatute€at€issue€is€found,€is€entitled€as€follows:€ð ðTests€to€determine€parentage€„ÏAdmissibility€in€evidence€„€œCosts.ð𛀀It€provides,€in€pertinent€part,€that€ð ð[i]n€theÏtrial€of€any€civil€or€criminal€proceeding€in€which€the€question€of€parentageÏarises,€the€court€before€whom€the€matter€may€be€brought€.€.€.€shall€order€that€allÏnecessary€parties€submit€to€any€tests€and€comparisons€which€have€been€developedÍand€adapted€for€purposes€of€establishing€or€disproving€parentage€[including]€anyÏblood,€genetic,€or€DNA€test€utilized€by€an€accredited€laboratory.ðð€€Tenn.€CodeÏAnn.€ðð€œ24„7„112(a)(1)€(Supp.›€1996).€€Further,€ð ð[t]he€results€of€such€tests€andÏcomparisons,€including€the€statistical€likelihood€of€the€alleged€parentððs€parentage,Ïif€available,€may€be€admitted€into€evidence€as€provided€in€subsection€(b).ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ÏThe€relevant€portion€of€subsection€(b),€the€specific€statute€at€issue€in€this€case,€isÏas€follows:ÌÓÓà8 à(B)€An€individual€is€conclusively€presumed€to€be€the€father€ofÏa€child€if€blood,€genetic,€or€DNA€tests€show€that€the€statisticalÏprobability€of€paternity€is€ninety„nine€percent€(99%)€orÏgreater.€€A€rebuttable€presumption€of€the€paternity€of€anÏindividual€is€established€by€blood,€genetic,€or€DNA€testingÏshowing€a€statistical€probability€of€paternity€of€that€individualÏat€ninety„five€percent€(95%)€or€greater.ÌÌò òòòId.ó óóó€ðð€œ24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€(Supp.€1996).›ÌÌÌÌÓ€Óà àIn€support€of€œhis›€contention€that€the€conclusive€presumption€of€sectionÏ24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€requires€a€voluntary€acknowledgment,€œDefendant›€points€outÏthat€this€provision€was€passed€as€part€of€a€larger€bill,€House€Bill€No.€2527,€theÏbulk€of€which€sets€forth€the€relationship€between€voluntary€acknowledgments€ofÏpaternity,€paternity€tests,€and€rebuttable€or€conclusive€presumptions.€€House€BillÏ2527€included€provisions€amending€the€code€section€entitled€ð ð[v]oluntaryÏacknowledgment€of€paternityðð€which€provides€that€a€voluntary€acknowledgmentÏof€paternity€becomes€conclusive€after€a€DNA€paternity€test€result€of€99%€orÏgreater.€€ò òòòSee€id.ó óóó€ðð€24„7„118(d)(3).€€Thus,€it€is€Defendantððs€argument€that,€readÏin€context€of€the€entire€applicable€law,€the€conclusive€presumption€in€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€is€conditioned€upon€and€can€be€applied€only€in€cases€in€which€œaÏdefendant›€has€voluntarily€acknowledged€paternity.ÌÌà àDefendant€proffers€as€another€piece€of€textual€evidence€for€œhis›Ïinterpretation€of€the€statute€the€overlap€in€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€between€theÏð ðninety„five€percent€(95%)€or€greaterðð€and€the€ð ðninety„nine€percent€(99%)€orÏgreaterðð€figures.€€This€provision€is€worded€so€that€there€is€potentially€both€aÏconclusive€and€a€rebuttable€presumption€between€the€99%€and€œ100%.€€In›€otherÏwords,€the€language€of€the€statute€does€not€indicate€that€the€rebuttableÏpresumption€ends€at€98%.€€Thus,€according€to€Defendant,€the€more€logicalÏinterpretation€is€that,€for€test€results€between€99%€and€100%,€the€rebuttableÏpresumption€attaches€if€there€is€no€voluntary€acknowledgment€and€the€conclusiveÏpresumption€attaches€only€if€there€is€such€an€admission.€€Finally,€DefendantÏpoints€out€that€section€36„2„104(d)(dealing€with€payment€of€child€support€into€anÏescrow€account€pending€adjudication€on€the€issue€of€paternity)€contemplates€aÏjury€trial€in€cases€in€which€a€defendant€has€a€paternity€result€of€95%€or€moreÏwhich€includes€results€of€99%€or€more.€€That€statute€provides€that€ð ð[i]f€theÏdefendant€requests€a€jury€trial€on€the€issue€of€paternity€after€blood€tests€have€beenÏobtained€which€indicate€a€presumption€of€paternity€greater€than€ninety„fiveÏpercent€(95%),€the€court€may,€in€its€discretion,€in€lieu€of€an€indemnity€bond,Ïorder€a€defendant€to€pay€child€support€to€the€clerk€of€the€court€to€be€held€inÏescrow€pending€final€adjudication.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€ðð€36„2„104(d)(1996).ÌÌà àð ðOur€role€in€construing€statutes€is€to€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€theÏlegislative€intent€without€unduly€restricting€or€expanding€a€statuteððs€coverageÏbeyond€its€intended€scope.ðð€€ò òòòRoseman€v.€Rosemanó óóó,€890€S.W.2d€27,€29€(Tenn.Ï1994)(citing€ò òòòState€v.€Sligeró óóó,€846€S.W.2d€262,€263€(Tenn.€1993)).€€Where€aÏstatute€is€unambiguous,€this€court€must€ascertain€and€give€effect€to€the€intentionÏand€purpose€of€the€General€Assembly€as€expressed€in€the€four€corners€of€theÍstatute.€€ò òòòGabel€v.€Lermaó óóó,€812€S.W.2d€580,€582€(Tenn.€App.€1990)(citingÏò òòòMemphis€Pubððg€Co.€V.€Holt,ó óóó€710€S.W.2d€513€(Tenn.€1986)).€€An€earlyÏexpression€of€the€ð ðfour€cornersðð€rule,€which€is€the€most€basic€and€fundamentalÏrule€of€statutory€construction,€was€recently€quoted€by€our€Supreme€Court:€€ÌÓÓà8 àœ›œ[I]f›€œ[the›€legislative€intent]€is€expressed€in€a€manner€devoid€ofÏcontradiction€and€ambiguity,€there€is€no€room€forÏinterpretation€or€construction,€and€the€judges€are€not€atÏliberty,€on€consideration€of€policy€or€hardship,€to€depart€fromÏthe€words€of€the€statute;€that€they€have€no€right€to€makeÏexceptions€or€insert€qualifications,€however€abstract€justice€orÏthe€justice€of€a€particular€case€may€require€it.ÌÌò òòòCarson€Creek€Vacation€Resorts,€Inc.€v.€State€Depððt€of€Revenueó óóó,€865ÏS.W.2d€1,€2€(Tenn.€1993)(quoting€ò òòòAustin€v.€Memphis€œPublððg›€Co.ó óóó,€655ÏS.W.2d€146,€148€(Tenn.€1983)(quoting€ò òòòHeiskell€v.€Loweó óóó,€153€S.W.€284,€290Ï(Tenn.€1912)).ÌÌÌÌÓ€Óà àIn€œò òòòAustin€v.€Memphis€Publððg€Co.ó óóó,›€at€issue€was€the€interpretation€ofÏa€statute€which€ð ðstated€that€a€newsman,€etc.,€gathering€information€forÏpublication,€shall€not€be€required€to€disclose€to€any€Tennessee€court,€etc.,€ððanyÏinformation€or€the€source€of€any€information€procured€for€the€publication€orÏbroadcast.ðððð€ò òòòAustinó óóó,€655€S.W.2d€at€148€(quoting€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„1„208Ï(1973)).€€The€Court€of€Appeals€had€interpreted€the€statute€by€inserting€the€wordÏð ðconfidentialðð€before€ð ðinformationðð€because€it€was€ð ðevident€to€[them]€that€theÏstatute€was€passed€to€assure€confidentiality€in€order€to€facilitate€the€gathering€ofÏnews€and€information,€which€confidentiality€was€not€provided€by€[a€certainÏUnited€States€Supreme€Court]€decision.ðð€€ò òòòAustin,ó óóó€655€S.W.2d€at€147.€€ReversingÏthe€lower€courtððs€decision,€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€ð ðfourÏcornersðð€rule€ð ðprohibit[ed]€the€courts€from€resorting€to€outside€sources€toÏdetermine€legislative€intent.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€149.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€language€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€very€clearly€creates€a€conclusive€presumption€of€paternity€basedÏupon€DNA€test€results€alone.€€It€is€true,€as€Defendant€asserts,€that€elsewhere€in€theÏcode,€a€voluntary€acknowledgment€of€paternity€followed€by€a€DNA€test€resultÏshowing€a€probability€of€paternity€of€99%€or€greater€causes€the€voluntaryÏacknowledgment€to€become€conclusive.€€ò òòòSeeó óóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€24„7„118.€ÏHowever,€the€legislature€did€not€condition€the€conclusive€presumption€of€sectionÏ24„7„112€upon€a€voluntary€acknowledgment€of€paternity,€and€as€was€the€court€inÏò òòòAustinó óóó,€we€are€prohibited€from€inserting€any€such€requirement€into€the€statute.€Ïò òòòSee€Tennessee€œManufactured›€Hous.€Assððn€v.€Metropolitan€Govððt€ofÏNashvilleó óóó,€798€S.W.2d€254,€257€(Tenn.€App.€1990)(citations€omitted)(courtsÏð ðshould€presume€that€the€General€Assembly€chose€its€words€carefully.ðð)€ÌœÌÓ  ÓII.›œÌ›ÌÓ  Óà àHaving€ruled€that€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)Ïwas€properly€applied€to€this€defendant,€we€turn€to€Defendantððs€constitutionalÏchallenge.€€In€this€case,€Defendant€asserts€that€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B),€byÏimposing€a€conclusive€presumption€of€paternity€in€cases€where€the€DNA€testsÏshow€a€statistical€probability€of€99%€or€greater,€operates€to€deny€putative€fathersÏthe€due€process€of€law€violating€the€Due€Process€Clause€of€the€Fifth€andÏFourteenth€Amendments€of€the€United€States€Constitution€and€Article€I,€Section€8Ïof€the€Tennessee€Constitution.€€The€Fourteenth€Amendment€provides€in€part€thatÏð ð[n]o€State€shall€.€.€.€deprive€any€person€of€life,€liberty,€or€property,€without€dueÏprocess€of€law.ðð€€U.S.€Const.€Amend.€XIV.€€Our€supreme€court€has€consistentlyÏheld€that€Article€1,€Section€8€of€the€Tennessee€Constitution€confers€the€sameÍprotections€as€does€the€Fourteenth€Amendment.€€ò òòòBrown€v.€Campbell€CountyÏBd.€Of€Educ.ó óóó,€915€S.W.2d€407,€413€(Tenn.€1995),€òòcert.€œdeniedóó,›€116€S.€Ct.€1852Ï(1996);€ò òòòState€v.€Testeró óóó,€879€S.W.2d€823,€827€(Tenn.€1994).ÌÌà àð ð[P]ermanent€irrebuttable€presumptions€have€long€been€disfavoredÏunder€the€Due€Process€Clause.ðð€€ò òòòCleveland€Bd.€Of€Educ.€V.€LaFleuró óóó,€414ÏU.S.€632,€644€(1974)(citing€ò òòòVlandis€v.€Klineó óóó,€412€U.S.€441,€446€(1973)).€€InÏò òòòVlandisó óóó,€the€œCourt›€held€violative€of€due€process€a€Connecticut€statute€whichÏcreated€a€conclusive€presumption€of€non„residency€for€students€who€had€non„Connecticut€addresses€at€the€time€of€applying€for€admission€to€a€ConnecticutÏschool€and€who€were€later€attempting€to€qualify€as€residents€for€purposes€ofÏreduced€tuition€rates.€€The€Court€stated€that€ð ðit€is€forbidden€by€the€Due€ProcessÏClause€to€deny€an€individual€the€resident€rates€on€the€basis€of€a€permanent€andÏirrebuttable€presumption€of€nonresidence,€when€that€presumption€is€notÏnecessarily€or€universally€true€in€fact.ðð€€ò òòòVlandis,€ó óóó412òòò ò€óóó óU.S.€at€452;€ò òòòsee€alsoÏStanley€v.€Illinoisó óóó,€405€U.S.€645€(1972)(holding€that€an€Illinois€statuteÏcontaining€an€irrebuttable€presumption€that€unmarried€fathers€are€incompetent€toÏraise€their€children€violated€the€Due€Process€Clause.)ÌÌà àIn€an€early€example€of€its€dissatisfaction€with€the€use€of€conclusiveÏevidence,€the€Tennessee€legislature€amended€a€1741€statute€involving€theÏestablishment€of€paternity.€€The€statute€provided€that€ð ðthe€person€charged€by€theÏwoman€before€the€justices€was€to€be€adjudged€the€reputed€father,€and€nothingÏfurther€was€to€be€done€when€the€proceedings€were€returned€to€the€county€courtÏbut€for€the€court€to€make€the€order€for€maintenance.ðð€€ò òòòGoddard€v.€Stateó óóó,€10ÏTenn.€96,€97€(1825).€€However,€ð ð[b]y€the€act€of€1822,€ch.€29,€the€legislatureÏprovide[d]€that€the€affidavit€of€the€woman€shall€not€be€conclusive€upon€the€countyÍcourt,€and€the€reputed€father€cut€off€from€all€enquiry€in€every€possible€case;€butÏupon€filing€his€affidavit€clearly€setting€forth€that€justice€requires€an€issue€to€beÏmade€to€try€the€truth€of€the€charge,€it€shall€be€the€duty€of€the€court€where€suchÏcharge€is€pending€to€hear€proof€and€determine€the€matter€as€to€right€and€justiceÏmay€appertain.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€at€98;€1822€Tenn.€Pub.€Acts€ch.€29,€ðð€1.ÌÌà àLike€the€1741€statute,€the€irrebuttable€presumption€of€Tennessee€CodeÏAnnotated€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€effectively€denies€putative€fathers€theÏopportunity€to€be€heard.€€The€œSupreme›€Court€has€held€œð ðdue›€process€requires,€at€aÏminimum,€that€absent€a€countervailing€state€interest€of€overriding€significance,Ïpersons€forced€to€settle€their€claims€of€right€and€duty€through€the€judicial€processÏmust€be€given€a€meaningful€opportunity€to€be€heard.ðð€€ò òòòLittle€v.€Streateró óóó,€452ÏU.S.€1,€5„6€(1981)(citing€ò òòòBoddie€v.€Connecticutó óóó,€401€U.S.€371,€377€(1971)).€ÏIn€determining€what€process€is€due€in€a€particular€situation,€three€factors€must€beÏconsidered:€(1)€the€private€interest€affected€by€the€official€action;€(2)€the€risk€ofÏerroneous€deprivation€of€the€interest€through€the€procedures€used€and€theÏprobable€value,€if€any,€of€additional€or€substitute€procedural€safeguards;€andÏfinally,€(3)€the€governmentððs€interest,€including€the€function€involved€and€theÏfiscal€and€administrative€burdens€that€the€additional€or€substitute€proceduralÏrequirement€would€entail.€€ò òòòMathews€v.€Eldridgeó óóó,€424€U.S.€319,€335€(1976);Ïò òòòState€v.€Barnett,€ó óóó909€S.W.2d€423,€426€(Tenn.€1995).ÌÌà àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€private€interests€are€substantial.€€ò òòòLittleó óóó,€452€U.S.Ïat€13.€€In€ò òòòLittleó óóó,€the€œCourt›€held€that€due€process€was€violated€when€a€œstatute,›Ïwhich€provided€œthat›€œthe›€cost€of€blood€tests€œin€paternity€actions€was›€to€be€borne€byÏthe€party€requesting€the€œtests,›€operated€to€deny€such€tests€to€an€indigent€defendant.€ÏAs€in€our€situation,€the€ò òòòLittleó óóó€Court€noted€the€pecuniary€interest€of€the€putativeÍfather€in€avoiding€a€substantial€support€obligation€and€the€liberty€interestÏthreatened€by€potential€sanctions€for€failure€to€comply€with€child€supportÏobligations.€€ò òòòId.;€seeó óóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€œ36„5„104(1996)€(providing›€that€theÏfailure€to€comply€with€orders€to€support€minor€children€may€be€punished€byÏimprisonment€in€the€county€workhouse€or€county€jail€for€up€to€six€(6)€months.)€ÏIn€addition,€the€Court€in€ò òòòLittleó óóó€stressed€the€significance€of€the€creation€of€theÏparent„child€relationship.€€ð ðJust€as€the€termination€of€such€bonds€demandsÏprocedural€fairness,€so€too€does€their€imposition.ðð€€ò òòòLittleó óóó,€452€U.S.€at€13Ï(citation€omitted).€€Further,€the€œCourt›€stated€that€ð ðboth€the€child€and€theÏdefendant€in€a€paternity€action€have€a€compelling€interest€in€the€accuracy€of€suchÏa€determination.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€An€Indiana€court€which€found€that€an€indigent€paternityÏdefendant€was€entitled€to€both€court„appointed€counsel€and€free€blood€groupingÏtests€further€expounded€upon€the€childððs€interests:€ð ðThe€childððs€rights€of€support,Ïinheritance,€and€custody€are€directly€affected€by€the€proceedings.€€The€childððsÏhealth€interests€are€affected€as€an€accurate€family€medical€history€can€be€criticalÏin€the€diagnosis€and€treatment€of€a€childððs€injuries€and€illnesses.€€The€adjudicatedÏfather€may€assert€rights€to€custody€and€must€give€consent€before€a€child€can€beÏadopted.ðð€€ò òòòKennedy€v.€Woodó óóó,€439€N.E.2d€1367,€1370„71€(Ind.€App.€1982).ÌÌà àArrayed€against€these€substantial€private€interests€are€the€StateððsÏinterests.€€The€thrust€of€the€Stateððs€interest,€as€articulated€in€its€brief,€is€the€ð ðhugeÏand€unwarranted€fiscal€and€administrative€burden€on€the€State€and€on€mothers€ofÏchildren€born€out€of€lawful€wedlockðð€which€would€result€if€the€statute€is€heldÏunconstitutional.€€Indeed,€if€the€conclusive€presumption€is€held€unconstitutional,Ïthe€rebuttable€presumption€for€test€results€showing€a€95%€or€greater€probabilityÏof€paternity€will€still€stand,€and€defendants,€including€those€whose€test€are€aboveÏ99%,€will€be€given€the€opportunity€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€their€paternity€ifÍthey€so€desire.€€There€is€no€way€to€empirically€determine€how€many€moreÏhearings€on€the€issue€of€paternity€there€will€be€in€the€absence€of€the€conclusiveÏpresumption.€€However,€the€Supreme€Court€has€said€that€ð ð[t]he€Stateððs€interest€inÏadministrative€ease€and€certainty€cannot,€in€and€of€itself,€save€the€conclusiveÏpresumption€from€invalidity€under€the€Due€Process€Clause€where€there€are€otherÏreasonable€and€practicable€means€of€establishing€the€pertinent€facts€on€which€theÏStateððs€objective€is€premised.ðð€€ò òòòVlandisó óóó,€412€U.S.€at€451.€€Here,€œanotherÏreasonable€means€is€to€give€the€putative€father€the€chance€to€rebut€theÏpresumption€of€paternity€just€as€he€would€have€had€if€his€DNA€test€results€hadÏshown€a€98.9%€probability€of€paternity.ÌÌà àWe€agree€that€invalidating€the€conclusive€presumption€of€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€will€be€more€costly€for€the€State€of€Tennessee.€€ð ðProcedure€byÏpresumption€is€always€cheaper€and€easier€than€individualized€determination.ðð€Ïò òòòStanleyó óóó,€405€U.S.€at€656„57.€€Still,€in€ò òòòLittleó óóó,€while€the€Court€acknowledged€theÏStateððs€legitimate€interest€in€children€born€out€of€wedlock€and€in€the€accurate€andÏjust€determination€of€their€paternity,€it€concluded€that€ð ðthe€Stateððs€monetaryÏinterest€ððis€hardly€significant€enough€to€overcome€private€interests€as€important€asÏthose€here.ðððð€€ò òòòLittleóóó ó,€452€U.S.€at€16€(citing€ò òòòLassiter€v.€Depððt€of€Soc.€Servs.ó óóó,Ï452€U.S.€18,€28€(1981)).ÌÌà àThe€final€consideration€under€ò òòòMathews€v.€Eldridgeó óóó€involves€the€riskÏof€inaccurately€adjudicating€someone€a€father€because€the€conclusive€presumptionÏhas€foreclosed€his€ability€to€demonstrate€that€he€is€not€the€father€of€a€particularÏchild.€€To€understand€this€risk,€it€is€essential€to€understand€what€the€probability€ofÏpaternity€percentage€actually€means.€€With€a€9.98%€probability€of€paternity,Ïwhich€is€significantly€higher€than€Defendantððs€in€this€case,€ð ðin€a€city€with€a€same„race€male€population€of€500,000,€or€even€500,001,€one€hundred€other€men€mightÏtheoretically€be€the€father.€€Taking€this€to€a€global€scale,€if€there€are€500€millionÏmen€of€the€same„race€on€the€planet,€100,000€men€might€theoretically€qualify€asÏputative€fathers.ðð€€E.€Donald€Shapiro€et€al,€òòThe€DNA€Paternity€Test:€LegislatingÏthe€Future€Paternity€Actionóó,€7€J.L.€&€Health,€1,€44€(1992„93)(While€this€article€isÏhighly€supportive€of€the€use€of€DNA€to€determine€paternity,€it€advocates€aÏuniform€paternity€law€where€there€is€a€conclusive€presumption€of€paternity€onlyÏin€cases€in€which€the€probability€of€paternity€is€99.9999%€or€above).€€AlthoughÏwe€acknowledge€that€it€is€extremely€likely€that€the€man€named€in€a€paternityÏaction€with€a€99%€or€greater€probability€of€paternity€is€the€true€father,€ð ðthe€factÏremains€that€paternity€indexes€are€not€mathematically€solid.ðð€€ò òòòId.ó óóó€€In€addition,Ïthere€is€the€problem€of€human€error€in€the€scientific€analyses€of€the€DNA.€€ò òòòSeeó óóóÏEdward€J.€Imwinkelried,€òòThe€Debate€in€the€DNA€Cases€over€the€Foundation€forÏthe€Admission€of€Scientific€Evidence:€The€Importance€of€Human€Error€as€aÏCause€of€Forensic€Misanalysisóó,€69€Wash€U.L.Q.€19,€22€(1991)(indicating€thatÏthere€ð ðis€mounting€evidence€of€a€significant€margin€of€error€in€scientific€analysisÏ.€.€.€[and]€that€fifteen€percent€of€all€medical€laboratory€tests€are€in€error.ðð)€It€isÏindisputable€that€an€opportunity€to€be€heard€would€be€of€value€in€guarding€againstÏan€erroneous€adjudication€or€paternity€based€upon€a€misleading€or€an€inaccurateÏDNA€test€result.ÌÌà àAssessment€of€the€factors€found€in€ò òòòMathews€v.€Eldridgeó óóó€indicatesÏthat€the€conclusive€presumption€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€24„7„112(b)(2)(B)€fails€to€provide€men€in€paternity€proceedings€with€the€process€thatÏis€constitutionally€due.€€The€Stateððs€interests€pale€when€compared€to€the€importantÏprivate€interests€at€stake€in€an€adjudication€of€paternity.€€Furthermore,€while€theÏrisk€of€an€erroneous€deprivation€of€these€private€interests€is€small,€there€is€greatÍvalue€in€providing€an€opportunity€to€rebut€the€evidence€of€paternity€to€aÏdefendant€who€might€not€be€the€true€father.€€We€therefore€find€that,€in€order€toÏhave€the€ð ðmeaningful€opportunity€to€be€heardðð€guaranteed€by€the€Due€ProcessÏClause,€the€conclusive€presumption€can€not€stand.€€We€reverse€the€decision€of€theÏtrial€court€and€remand€the€case€to€the€trial€court€so€that€this€defendant€may€haveÏan€opportunity€to€rebut€the€presumption€of€paternity€attached€to€a€99.71%Ïprobability€of€paternity.€€Costs€shall€be€taxed€against€the€State€of€Tennessee.Ì€ÌÌÓÓÔ€XÔà àà à____________________________________Ìà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌ_____________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€J.Ìà àÌÌÌ