ÿWPCÃ+ 9#†. %´ 0 (ºUFâ4(< 0lK 0D·û 0Jû 0TE 0^™w÷ 0h  0Du 0r¹Æ+ 0|ñ 0†m AOó 0DB 0† 1u U,‹ 0d· 0@ D3[ U,Ž D/º Bé B U6# B)Y DC‚ AMÅ U* e<  = /]¯Œ ;÷H3 ?v~r$vÓð%˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0®ØP 7 ú‡FðX($¡¡<4šÛ 9Z ‹.Courier New Regular1# šÛ |xÄ ((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  ÔƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 52J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô$(Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd< Œ 9p`(Monaco**'÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Courier New% Line 7 d,,,,7Border 1dd$-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial Ý ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ"ÝÝ  Ýò òÔ€+ÔÓ  ÓÔ€/ÔÔ eee ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔó óÌò òÔ€/¼ÔÔ"USú ú, úÔÔ ƒ0 ÔÔ!  Ôó óÔ€/XÔÌÌò òCecil€Crowson,€Jr.Ô€+Ôó óÔ  ÔÌÔ€+ÂÔÔ€/ÔÔ eee Ôò òAppellate€Court€Clerkó óÔ  ÔÔ€+ÔÔ€+XÔ %Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€+ôÔ€€The€area€at€issue€is€a€AR2a€zone€district,€an€agriculture€andÏresidential€area€with€a€two€acre€minimum.Ì ¥Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€+ôÔ€€The€private€individuals€included€Edward€Knight,€Beverly€Knight,€JamesÏPhillip€Carter,€Maridee€Carter,€Marie€Carter,€William€Carter,€and€Mary€JaneÏCarter.€€Hereinafter,€this€opinion€will€refer€to€these€individuals€as€"theÏCitizens."Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€Ô€+ôÔThe€"general€requirements"€referred€to€throughout€this€opinion€areÏfound€at€section€17.124.040€of€the€Zoning€Regulations.€€This€section€states€asÏfollows:ÌÌà8 àà àA€conditional€use€permit€shall€be€granted€provided€the€boardÏfinds€that€it:Ìà8 àà àA.€€Is€so€designed,€located,€and€proposed€to€be€operatedÏthat€the€public€health,€safety€and€welfare€will€be€protected;Ìà8 àà àB.€€Will€not€adversely€affect€other€property€in€the€area€inÏwhich€it€is€located;Ìà8 àà àC.€€Is€within€the€provision€of€"conditional€uses"€as€set€outÏin€this€title;€andÌà8 àà àD.€€Conforms€to€all€applicable€provisions€of€this€title€forÏthe€district€in€which€it€is€to€be€located€and€necessary€for€publicÏconvenience€in€that€location.€(Prior€code€Appx.€A€ðð€103.21)ÌÌZoning€Regulation€ðð€17.124.040.Ì íÝ ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€+ôÔ€€The€"specific€requirements"€at€issue€in€this€case€are€found€inÏsection€17.124.330€and€include€the€following:ÌÌà8 àà àA.€€The€location€of€such€an€activity€shall€be€in€an€areaÏsparsely€developed€and€likely€to€remain€sparsely€developed€duringÏthe€length€of€time€the€sawmill,€mining€or€quarrying€activity€isÏanticipated€and€no€new€location€shall€be€considered€within€a€one„mile€radius€of€an€existing€quarry.Ìà8 àà àB.à àAny€permit€issued€under€this€chapter€shall€be€based€onÏa€site€plan€or€other€documents€submitted€with€an€application€whichÏshall€provide€for€the€following:Ìà8 àà à.€.€.€.Ìà8 àà à8.€€Finished€contours€of€the€site€after€the€quarryingÏoperation€has€been€terminated.€€The€site€shall€be€graded€and/orÏfilled€so€as€to€be€in€substantial€conformity€with€the€topographyÏof€the€surrounding€lands.€€All€fill€material€shall€be€nontoxic,Ïnonflammable,€and€noncombustible€solids.€€All€areas€that€areÏbackfilled€shall€be€left€so€that€adequate€drainage€is€provided.ÌÌZoning€Regulation€ðð€17.124.330€(A),(B)(8).€Ì ) Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€ÔÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÔ€+ôÔ€€Prior€to€the€polling€of€the€board€members,€board€member€Price€madeÏthe€following€statement:ÌÌà8 àMy€„„€I€guess€my€sympathies€lie€with€the€residents€in€this€area.€ÏI€think€the€way€the€law€is€structured,€however,€at€the€presentÏtime€that€the€application€by€Hoover,€Incorporated€will€probably€beÏwell€taken.€€I€think€it's€obvious€by€people's€position€that€atÏthis€stage€of€the€game,€that€it's€not€going€to€pass.€€But€I€thinkÏunder€the€law€in€terms€of€requirements,€that€they€have€met€theÏrequirements.€€Unfortunately,€the€way€the€law,€as€I€read€it€andÏunderstand€it€at€this€point,€that€would€say€to€them€that€once€theyÏhave€met€those€general€„„€those€specific€requirements,€that€theyÏwould€be€entitled€to€a€conditional€use€permit.Ìà8 àà àI€believe€that€something€needs€to€be€in€the€law€thatÏspecifically€sets€out€what€we€can€consider€beyond€that€in€relationÏto€the€general€requirements,€because€I€think€they€are€onlyÏentitled€to€a€presumption€from€meeting€the€specific€requirements.Ìà8 àà à.€.€.€.€You€know,€my€sympathies€lie€with€you,€but€I€believeÏthat€the€state€of€the€law€as€it€is€right€now,€and€looking€at€theÏcases,€they're€probably€entitled€to€it.ÌÌAt€the€conclusion€of€the€hearing,€board€member€Spann€stated€as€follows:ÌÌà8 àà àLadies€and€gentlemen,€I€feel€like€with€the€conditions€thatÏcould€be€placed€on€this,€that€Hoover€would€meet€the€legalÏrequirements€necessary€to€be€granted€a€permit.Ìà8 àà àI€want€to€also€state€that€that's€based€on€my€analysis€of€theÏlegal€interpretation.€.€.€.Ìà8 àà à.€.€.€I€want€you€to€know,€though,€that€while€I€feel€theyÏmight€legally€qualify,€I€would€be€very€uncomfortable€having€toÏvote€for€this€because€from€a€moral€standpoint,€I€think€it€would€beÏa€mistake€to€put€a€rock€quarry€at€this€location.€€A€rock€quarry€isÏunquestionably€an€industrial€operation.Ìà8 àà àIt€is€the€Metro€zoning€regulation,€not€Hoover,€that's€atÏfault€for€this.€€But€the€regulations€are€wrong.ÌÌAfter€board€member€Spann€finished€giving€his€statement,€board€member€KarrÏstated€that€he€concurred€in€the€thoughts€expressed€by€board€member€Spann.€€ÌÌÓÓPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÒ  BA: T Monaco ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€''X„d&ÓÑ#€''Xd#ÑÔ€+ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€ÆgXXdÖdÈ7ÑÑ  ÑHOOVER,€INC.,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àPetitioner/Appellantà àà à)à àAppeal€No.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)à à01A01„9506„CH„00277à àÌv.à àà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMETRO€BOARD€OF€ZONING€APPEALS,à à)à àDavidson€Chancery€€Ìet€al.,à àà àà àà àà àà à)à àCounty€No.€92„1993„IIIÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌÙ€ÙßL€.1-;+'h|øšâ `€€Lßà àRespondent/Appelleeà àà àà à)ÌÌÌÌÔ€+¼Ôà@ àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT,€PART€THREEÌÌà@ àAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€ROBERT€S.€BRANDT,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌÔ€+ôÔTHOMAS€V.€WHITEà àà àà àà àROGER€A.€HORNERÌTune,€Entrekin€&€Whiteà àà àà àP.O.€Box€788ÌTwenty„First€Floor€à àà àà àBrentwood,€Tennessee€37024„0788ÌFirst€American€Centerà àà àà à€€ATTORNEY€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEEà àÌ315€Deaderick€Streetà àà àà à€€CITY€OF€BRENTWOODÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ì€€ATTORNEY€FOR€PETITIONER/APPELLANTÌà àà àà àà àà àà àJAMES€D.€PATERSONÌGEORGE€A.€DEAN€à àà àà àà à306€Court€SquareÌParker,€Lawrence,€Cantrell€&€Deanà àFranklin,€Tennessee€37064Ì200€Fourth€Avenue,€Northà àà à€€ATTORNEY€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEEÌ5th€Floor,€Noel€Placeà àà àà à€€WILLIAMSON€COUNTYÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ì€€ATTORNEY€FOR€PETITIONER/APPELLANTÌà àà àà àà àà àà àHerbert€R.€RichÌJAMES€L.€MURPHY€IIIà àà àà à213€Third€Avenue,€NorthÌSTEPHEN€NUNN€à àà àà àà àNashville,€Tennessee€37201„1680Ì204€Metropolitan€Courthouseà àà à€€ATTORNEY€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEEÌNashville,€Tennessee€37201à àà à€€PAUL€JOHNSONÌ€€ATTORNEYS€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEEÌ€€METROPOLITAN€BOARD€OF€ZONING€APPEALSÌ€€METROPOLITAN€GOVERNMENT€OF€NASHVILLEÌ€€AND€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌÌROBERT€H.€JENNINGS,€JR.ÌJAMES€R.€TOMKINSÌJennings€and€TomkinsÌSuite€2240„L&C€TowerÌNashville,€Tennessee€37219Ì€€ATTORNEYS€FOR€RESPONDENT/APPELLEEÌ€€EDWARD€KNIGHT,€BEVERLY€KNIGHT,€JAMESÌ€€PHILLIP€CARTER,€MARIDEE€CARTER,€MARIEÌ€€CARTER,€WILLIAM€CARTER,€MARY€JANEÌ€€CARTER€AND€STOP€THE€QUARRYÌÌÌÌÌÌÔ€+¼Ôà@ àREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,JUDGEÇà@ àÔ€+„ÔòòOPINIONÔ€+¼ÔóóÌÌÌÓÓà àThis€is€an€appeal€by€petitioner/appellant,€Hoover€Inc.Ï("Hoover"),€from€an€order€of€the€chancery€court€affirmingÏthe€Metropolitan€Board€of€Zoning€Appeal's€decision€to€denyÏHoover's€application€for€a€conditional€use€permit.ÌÌà àThe€pertinent€facts€are€as€follows.€€On€23€April€1992,ÏHoover€filed€an€application€for€a€conditional€use€permitÏwith€the€Metropolitan€Board€of€Zoning€Appeals€("theÏBoard").€€Hoover€wanted€the€permit€in€order€to€build€aÏstone€processing€plant€and€related€plants€at€6682ÏNolensville€Road.× ƒ2 ××  ×€€To€aid€it€in€its€decision,€the€BoardÏasked€for€comments€from€various€public€offices€and€held€aÏpublic€hearing€on€28€May€1992.€€At€the€hearing,€HooverÏpresented€evidence€to€prove€that€its€project€complied€withÏthe€Zoning€Regulations€of€the€Metropolitan€Government€ofÏNashville€and€Davidson€County.€€Opponents€to€Hoover'sÏapplication€also€presented€evidence€showing€that€HooverÏhad€not€fulfilled€the€necessary€requirements.€€Needless€toÍsay,€Hoover's€application€generated€a€great€deal€of€publicÏconcern€and€action.ÌÌà àAt€the€conclusion€of€the€hearing,€the€board€membersÏvoted€as€follows:€2€against,€0€in€favor,€3€abstentions,Ïand€1€absent.€€Hoover€needed€four€concurring€votes€inÏorder€to€prevail.€€Typically,€there€are€seven€persons€onÏthe€Board.€€Prior€to€the€public€hearing,€however,€oneÏmember€resigned€leaving€a€vacancy.€€Of€the€six€remainingÏmembers,€board€member€Hoover,€president€of€appellant,€didÏnot€attend€the€hearing€because€of€the€obvious€conflict€ofÏinterest€and€board€members€Spann€and€Karr€abstainedÏbecause€they€felt€it€was€inappropriate€for€them€to€vote€onÏthe€matter€unless€board€member€Hoover€resigned€from€theÏBoard.ÌÌà àFour€months€before€the€hearing€board€members€Spann€andÏKarr€sent€a€letter€to€board€member€Hoover€explaining€theirÏposition.€€Subsequently,€they€met€with€board€member€HooverÏand€again€explained€their€decision€to€abstain.€€DespiteÏtheir€predisposition,€both€board€members€attended€theÍmeeting€"to€allow€a€quorum€to€be€present€so€that€theÏmatter€could€be€heard€[on€that€night]€rather€thanÏlingering€on€for€several€months."€€ÌÌà àAfter€the€hearing,€the€Board€entered€an€order€denyingÏthe€application€pursuant€to€section€17.16.060€of€theÏZoning€Regulations€of€the€Metropolitan€Government€ofÏNashville€and€Davidson€County€Tennessee.€€The€applicableÏportion€of€that€regulation€provides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà àThe€presence€of€four€members€shall€constituteÏa€quorum€and€the€concurring€vote€of€at€least€fourÏmembers€of€the€board€shall€be€necessary€to€denyÏor€grant€any€application€before€the€board.€€InÏthe€event€that€five€or€more€members€are€present,Ïfailure€to€receive€four€concurring€votes€withinÏthirty€days€of€the€public€hearing€shall€be€deemedÏa€denial.ÌÌÓÓZoning€Regulations€of€the€Metropolitan€Government€ofÏNashville€and€Davidson€County€Tennessee€ððÏ17.16.060(A)(hereinafter€Zoning€Regulations).€€BoardÏmembers€Karr€and€Spann€knew€of€this€rule.€Thus,€they€knewÏthat€Hoover€could€not€get€the€permit€if€they€abstainedÏbecause,€after€taking€into€account€the€vacancy€and€boardÏmember€Hoover's€conflict,€there€were€only€three€votesÏleft.ÌÌà àHoover€appealed€the€Board's€decision€to€the€DavidsonÏCounty€Chancery€Court€under€a€common€law€writ€ofÏcertiorari.€€Later,€the€chancery€court€entered€an€orderÏallowing€several€private€parties× ƒ3 ××  ×,€Stop€the€Quarry,€PaulÏJohnson,€the€City€of€Brentwood,€and€Williamson€County€toÏjoin€as€respondents.€€In€his€Memorandum€Opinion,€dated€26ÏFebruary€1993,€the€chancellor€concluded€that€the€BoardÏfailed€to€follow€procedure€when€it€allowed€board€membersÏKarr€and€Spann€to€vote€despite€certain€disqualifications.€ÏFurther,€the€chancellor€concluded€that€the€Board's€failureÏto€make€findings€of€fact€precluded€judicial€review.€€BasedÏon€these€conclusions,€the€chancellor€remanded€the€case€toÏthe€Board€for€a€new€hearing.ÌÌà àAll€of€the€respondents€appealed€the€chancellor'sÏdecision€to€the€Court€of€Appeals€for€the€Middle€Section.€ÏAt€the€time€of€oral€argument,€the€Western€Section€wasÏsitting€in€Nashville.€€The€Western€Section€stated€that€theÍissue€was€"whether€the€Board€failed€to€make€a€legallyÏeffective€decision€regarding€Hoover's€application."€Ïòòò òHoover,€Inc.€v.€Metropolitan€Bd.€of€Zoning€Appeals,Ïet.€alóóó ó,€No.€01A01„9307„CH„00312,€1994€WL€260693,€at€*2Ï(Tenn.€App.€15€July€1994).€€In€resolving€this€issue,€theÏcourt€only€addressed€those€conclusions€made€by€theÏchancellor.€€The€Western€Section€reversed€the€chanceryÏcourt€and€held€that€the€Board€properly€allowed€both€KarrÏand€Spann€to€participate€in€the€decision.€€òòò òId.óóó ó€€InÏaddition,€the€Western€Section€found€that€it€was€notÏnecessary€for€the€Board€to€make€any€findings€of€factÏbecause€"the€Board€failed€to€obtain€a€concurring€voteÏ(either€affirmatively€or€negatively)."€€òòò òId.óóó ó€at€*3.€€InÏsupport€of€this€conclusion,€the€court€cited,€withÏapproval,€òòò òMayor€and€City€Council€of€Baltimore€v.ÏBiermanóóó ó,€50€A.2d€804€(Md.€1947)€and€òòò òSokolis€v.€ZoningÏBoard€of€Appeals€of€Springfieldóóó ó,€157€N.E.2d€427€(Ill.ÏApp.€Ct.€1959).€€The€Western€Section€found€that€theÏBoard's€decision€was€legally€effective€and€remanded€theÏcase€to€the€chancery€court€"to€review€the€Board's€decisionÏon€its€merits."€€òòò òHooveróóó ó,€1994€WL€at€*3.à8 àÌÌà à€On€22€February€1995,€the€chancellor€filed€aÏMemorandum€Opinion€holding€that€Hoover€did€not€establishÏthat€the€plan€satisfied€the€general€requirements.× ƒ4 ××  ×€€InÏaddition,€the€chancery€court€found€that€Hoover'sÏreclamation€plan€was€inappropriate€and€that€Hoover€did€notÏestablish€that€the€area€was€"sparsely€developed."× ƒ5 ××  ×€€As€aÍresult,€the€chancery€court€entered€final€judgmentÏaffirming€the€Board's€decision.€€ÌÌà àHoover€filed€its€notice€of€appeal€on€22€March€1995.€ÏThe€Citizens€and€Stop€the€Quarry€filed€a€brief€together,Ïand€the€Board€and€the€Metropolitan€Government€of€NashvilleÏand€Davidson€County€also€filed€a€brief.€€All€of€the€otherÏparties€filed€notices€of€intent€to€join€in€the€brief€ofÏthe€Citizens€and€Stop€the€Quarry.€€ÌÌà àThe€parties€presented€a€variety€of€issues.€ÏNevertheless,€the€only€issue€raised€by€a€writ€of€commonÏlaw€certiorari€is€whether€the€Board€exceeded€itsÏjurisdiction€or€acted€illegally,€arbitrarily,€orÏfraudulently.òòò ò€€Hoover€Motor€Exp.€Co.€v.€Railroad€&ÏPub.€Utils.€Comm'n,€et.€alóóó ó,€261€S.W.2d€233,€238,€195ÏTenn.€593,€604„5€(1953);€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð27„8„101€(1980).€ÏMoreover,€upon€a€common€law€writ€of€certiorari,€a€court€isÏnot€to€weigh€the€evidence.€€òòò òWatts€v.€Civil€Serv.€Bd.Ífor€Columbiaóóó ó,€606€S.W.2d€274,€277€(Tenn.€1980),€òòò òcert.Ïdeniedóóó ó,€450€U.S.€983€(1981).€€ÌÌà àDuring€oral€argument,€there€seemed€to€be€someÏconfusion€as€to€whether€the€chancery€court€or€the€WesternÏSection€had€addressed€this€issue.€€It€is€the€opinion€ofÏthis€court€that€neither€court€considered€the€issue.€€TheÏchancery€court€simply€decided€that€it€could€not€review€theÏBoard's€decision€because€it€was€not€legally€effectiveÏwithout€findings€of€fact.€€The€Western€Section€thenÏreversed€the€chancery€court€and€held€that€the€Board'sÏdecision€was€legally€effective€and€subject€to€judicialÏreview.€€Up€to€this€point,€neither€court€had€addressed€theÏissue€of€whether€the€Board's€decision€was€illegal,Ïarbitrary,€or€fraudulent.ÌÌà àThe€decision€of€the€chancery€court,€entered€on€22ÏFebruary€1995,€addressed€the€issue€presented€by€a€commonÏlaw€writ€of€certiorari,€but€was€without€affect.€€ToÏexplain,€the€chancellor€applied€the€correct€law€to€theÏwrong€facts.€€In€his€opinion,€the€chancellor€correctlyÍstated€that€the€standard€of€review€was€whether€there€wasÏany€material€evidence€to€support€the€Board's€decision.€€InÏother€words,€if€a€reviewing€court€finds€that€there€was€noÏmaterial€evidence€to€support€an€administrative€body'sÏdecision,€the€reviewing€court€must€conclude€that€theÏadministrative€body€acted€illegally.€€òòò òWattsóóó ó,€606€S.W.2dÏat€276„77;€òòò òHoover€Motor€Exp.€Co.óóó ó,€261€S.W.2d€at€238„39.ÌÌà àIn€this€case,€the€chancery€court€affirmed€the€decisionÏof€the€Board€because€it€found€that€there€was€materialÏevidence€to€support€the€Board's€conclusions€that€Hoover'sÏplan€did€not€meet€the€general€requirements,€that€it€didÏnot€establish€that€the€area€was€sparsely€developed,€andÏthat€it€did€not€include€an€appropriate€reclamation€plan.€ÏThe€problem€with€the€chancery€court's€decision€is€thatÏthese€conclusions€were€not€the€reasons€given€by€the€BoardÏfor€denying€the€permit.€€The€denial€was€by€operation€ofÏlaw.€€It€had€nothing€to€do€with€whether€Hoover€had€met€theÏspecific€or€the€general€requirements.€€ÌÌà àIt€is€the€position€of€this€court€that€a€reviewingÍcourt€can€not€determine€whether€the€decision€of€anÏadministrative€body€is€supported€by€material€evidenceÏunless€the€administrative€body€makes€findings€of€factsÏsetting€forth€the€reasons€for€its€decision.€€We€do€notÏexpress€an€opinion€as€to€whether€the€Western€Section€wasÏcorrect€in€concluding€that€it€was€not€necessary€for€theÏBoard€to€set€out€findings€of€facts€absent€four€concurringÏvotes.€€Instead,€it€is€our€opinion€that€a€reviewing€courtÏcan€not€determine€if€there€was€material€evidence€toÏsupport€a€decision€if€the€reviewing€court€is€unaware€ofÏthe€basis€for€the€decision.€€Thus,€although€the€chancellorÏstated€the€law€correctly,€the€law€was€not€applicable€toÏthe€facts€of€this€case.€€€ÌÌà àThe€issue€of€whether€an€administrative€body€has€actedÏillegally,€arbitrarily,€or€fraudulently€is€not€limited€toÏa€determination€of€whether€material€evidence€supported€theÏadministrative€body's€decision.€€An€illegal,€arbitrary,€orÏfraudulent€action€could€be€any€number€of€things.€€ExamplesÏinclude€the€following:€€1)€the€failure€"to€follow€minimumÏstandards€of€due€process";€2)€"the€misrepresentation€orÍmisapplication€of€a€legal€standard";€3)€the€making€of€aÏdecision€for€"ulterior€motives";€or€4)€the€violation€of€aÏconstitutional€standard.€€Ben€H.€Cantrell,€òòReview€ofÏAdministrative€Decisions€by€Writ€of€Certiorari€inÏTennesseeóó,€4€Mem.€St.€U.€L.€Rev.€19,€28„29€(1973).€ÏMoreover,€"[w]here€a€petitioner€for€a€zoning€permit€hasÏmet€all€of€the€requirements€of€the€applicable€zoningÏresolution,€and€where€the€zoning€authority€denies€theÏpermit€based€on€reasons€other€than€the€petitioner'sÏcompliance€with€the€resolution,€the€[zoning€authority's]Ïaction€in€denying€the€permit€is€arbitrary€andÏunreasonable."€€òòò òRoger's€Group,€Inc.€v.€County€ofÏFranklinóóó ó,€No.€01A01„9110„CH„00378,€1992€WL€8505,€at€*5Ï(Tenn.€App.€1992);€òòò òsee€Father€Ryan€High€School,€Inc.Ïv.€City€of€Oak€Hillóóó ó,€774€S.W.2d€184,€191€(Tenn.€App.Ï1988);ò òòò€Merritt€v.€Wilson€County€Bd.€of€ZoningÏAppealsóóó ó,€656€S.W.2d€846,€854„55€(Tenn.€App.€1983).ò òòò€€óóó óInÏother€words,€a€board€member€can€not€vote€to€deny€anÏapplication€when€the€board€member€believes€the€applicantÏhas€met€the€necessary€zoning€requirements.€€Further,€whenÏan€applicant€has€complied€with€the€requirements€of€theÍordinance,€an€administrative€body€may€not€deny€the€permitÏbecause€of€the€concerns€of€neighboring€landowners.€Ïòòò òBrooks€v.€Fisheróóó ó,€705€S.W.2d€135,€138€(Tenn.€App.€1985).€ÏIn€this€case,€four€of€the€five€board€members€present€atÏthe€public€hearing€expressed€their€beliefs€that€Hoover€hadÏmet€the€legal€conditions€required€to€obtain€theÏconditional€use€permit.ÌÌà àThe€most€striking€conduct€was€that€of€board€memberÏEmamalie.€€After€board€member€Meeks€moved€to€deny€theÏmotion,€board€member€Emamalie€seconded€the€motion€andÏvoted€to€deny€the€permit.€€Immediately€preceding€theÏtaking€of€the€vote,€board€member€Emamalie€stated€asÏfollows:ÌÓÓà8 àDue€to€all€the€facts€that€have€been€placed€inÏfront€of€me€here,€I€think€Hoover,€Inc.,€and€basedÏon€the€legal€matters€put€before€me€and€all€theÏrest€of€the€testimony,€I€think€that€they€meet€allÏthe€obligations€for€us€to€grant€them€this€permit.€ÏBut€as€a€human€body€here€and€as€a€person,€I€feelÏa€moral€obligation€to€the€people€that€live€outÏthere.€€And€a€lot€of€them€are€neighbors€to€me,Ïand€I€think€I€owe€them€much€to,€as€I€said,Ïdisapprove€this€quarry.ÌÌÓÓThis€testimony€establishes€that€board€member€EmamalieÏbased€his€decision€to€deny€the€permit€on€something€otherÍthan€whether€Hoover€had€met€the€required€conditions.€€SuchÏa€decision€is€arbitrary€under€the€laws€of€Tennessee.ÌÌà àUnlike€board€member€Emamalie,€board€members€Spann,ÏKarr,€and€Price,€who€also€believed€that€Hoover€had€met€theÏZoning€Requirements,€abstained€from€the€vote.× ƒ6 ××  ×€€It€is€theÍopinion€of€this€court€that€we€should€treat€theseÏabstentions€as€if€they€were€votes€to€deny€the€application.ÌÌà àSection€17.16.060€of€the€Zoning€Regulations€providesÏthat€the€Board€shall€adopt€rules€for€its€meetings.€€ThereÏis€nothing€in€these€rules€regarding€abstention.€€There€is,Ïhowever,€a€provision€which€states:€€"When€an€issue€arisesÏwhich€is€not€specifically€covered€by€these€rules,€theÏBoard€will€be€governed€by€òòRobert's€Revised€Rules€ofÏOrder.óó"€€Metro.€Bd.€of€Zoning€App.€R.€of€P.€Rule€14€(filedÏin€the€Metro.€Council€Clerks€Office€2€March€1992).€€ThisÏbook€does€address€the€issue€of€abstention,€albeit€briefly.€ÏIt€states:€€"While€it€is€the€duty€of€every€member€who€hasÏan€opinion€on€the€question€to€express€it€by€his€vote,€yetÏhe€cannot€be€compelled€to€do€so.€€He€may€prefer€to€abstainÏfrom€voting,€though€he€knows€the€effect€is€the€same€as€ifÏhe€voted€on€the€prevailing€side."€€General€Henry€M.ÏRobert,€òòRobert's€Rules€of€Order€Revisedóó,€ðð46€p.193€(1971).€€ÌÌà àWhen€a€board€member€chooses€to€abstain€from€a€vote,€heÏcreates€a€peculiar€situation.€€One€who€abstains€knows€thatÏhe€might€as€well€have€voted€for€the€prevailing€side,€butÏfor€some€reason€chooses€to€keep€his€decision€out€of€theÏpublic€record.€€Because€board€members€realize€that€anÏabstention€is€essentially€a€vote€for€the€prevailing€side,Ïit€is€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€it€be€treated€as€suchÏfor€the€purposes€of€determining€whether€an€administrativeÏbody€acted€illegally,€arbitrarily,€or€fraudulently.ÌÌà àIn€the€instant€case,€there€was€no€prevailing€side.€ÏThere€was,€however,€a€regulation€allowing€the€Board€toÏdeny€the€application€by€operation€of€law.€€Board€membersÏKarr,€Spann,€and€Price€all€knew€of€this€regulation€andÏknew€that€if€they€abstained€the€regulation€would€operateÏto€deny€Hoover€the€permit.€€Treating€the€abstentions€as€ifÏthey€were€denials,€we€must€conclude€that€the€board€membersÏacted€illegally,€arbitrarily,€or€fraudulently€because€theyÏconstructively€denied€the€permit€despite€their€beliefsÏthat€Hoover€had€fulfilled€the€zoning€requirements.ÌÌà àThere€is€no€doubt€that€the€public€opposition€to€theÏquarry€influenced€the€board€members€who€abstained,€but€itÏalso€seems€that€they€chose€to€abstain€because€the€ZoningÏRegulations€dissatisfied€them.€€While€it€is€not€theÏposition€of€this€court€to€state€when€a€board€member€mayÏabstain€from€a€vote,€it€is€important€to€point€out€theÏproblems€with€allowing€board€members€to€abstain€for€anyÏreason€whatsoever.€€To€begin€with,€board€members€whoÏabstain€because€they€do€not€believe€the€law€is€correctÏare,€in€essence,€legislating.€€Allowing€such€action€byÏboard€members€is€an€unlawful€delegation€of€legislativeÏauthority.€€òòò òLobelville€Special€School€Dist.€v.ÏMcCanlessóóó ó,€381€S.W.2d€273,€274,€214€Tenn.€460,€464„65Ï(1964).€€To€explain,€board€members€Karr,€Spann,€and€PriceÏwere€able€to€deny€Hoover€a€permit€even€though€theyÏbelieved€Hoover€had€satisfied€the€requirements€of€the€law.€ÏThat€is,€they€were€able€to€circumvent€the€dictates€of€theÏregulations€and€essentially€amend€the€law€to€suit€theirÏdesires.€€While€such€a€situation€may€not€be€common,€theÏfacts€of€this€case€reveal€that€it€is€certainly€aÏpossibility.€€A€second€reason€for€establishing€when€anÍabstention€is€valid€is€that€board€members€can€abstainÏsimply€to€save€face€leaving€the€final€determination€to€theÏcourts.€€This€destroys€any€purpose€that€could€be€set€forthÏin€favor€of€having€such€an€administrative€body.€€ÌÌà àOur€final€point€concerns€the€coercive€manner€in€whichÏboard€members€Spann€and€Karr€treated€board€member€Hoover.€ÏBoth€the€Zoning€Regulations€and€the€Metropolitan€Board€ofÏZoning€Appeals€Rules€of€Procedure€address€the€issue€ofÏconflict€of€interest.€€The€Zoning€Regulations€states€asÏfollows:€€"Any€member€of€the€board€who€shall€have€a€directÏor€indirect€interest€in€any€property€which€is€the€subjectÏmatter€of,€or€affected€by,€a€decision€of€the€board€shallÏbe€disqualified€from€participating€in€the€discussion,Ïdecision,€or€proceedings€of€the€board€in€connectionÏtherewith."€€Zoning€Regulations€ðð€17.16.050(C).€€TheÏboard's€rules€further€state:€€"Any€Board€member€who€mayÏhave€an€interest€in€the€issues€in€a€given€case€shallÏpublicly€state€that€fact€on€the€record€so€that€eitherÏparty€or€a€member€of€the€Board€might€object€to€his„herÏfurther€participation€in€the€case."€€Metro.€Bd.€of€ZoningÍApp.€R.€of€P.€Rule€6(B).€€Nowhere€does€it€state€that€aÏboard€member€must€resign€when€facing€a€conflict€ofÏinterest€or€that€another€board€member€may€ask€anÏinterested€board€member€to€resign.€€Further,€there€is€noÏevidence€that€board€member€Hoover€did€anything€inÏcontravention€of€the€regulations€or€rules.€€Therefore,€itÏis€the€opinion€of€this€court€that€board€members€Spann€andÏKarr€acted€illegally€when€they€told€board€member€HooverÏthat€they€would€abstain€if€Hoover€did€not€resign€from€theÏBoard.ÌÌà àFor€the€above€stated€reason,€we€reverse€the€decisionÏof€the€chancery€court€and€remand€the€case€to€the€chanceryÏcourt€for€any€further€necessary€proceedings.€€Cost€onÏappeal€are€taxed€to€respondents/appellees.ÌÌÌÓÓà àà àà àà àà àà àà à____________________________Ìà àà àà àà àà àà àà àSAMUEL€L.€LEWIS,€JUDGEÌÌÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ____________________________ÌHENRY€F.€TODD,€P.J.,€M.S.ÌÌÌÌÌ____________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGE€€€€€€