ÿWPC{  €f0NÌþd!S5¯èƃ &xU[½÷]ùT^:C›‹&©ñE7Ç–6°k›%˜Ñ6=!±A>åìD¢¨X¦¦ R4`z,mÛwr¼‹þëÔ ý7x¸%@8{ó.~‹ñ?Šà»W‹áÑ;PqšÉ#½€÷/ˆ‘Å]hù«ãQYXäÅ1@+K§)×ÿ÷Þ8%_#ìŒÞnC©°É؈ÓBš7SóðÐQã§ÿcù.¦¶J5 kÿÚ³Öyån+ëw”—ñb á°Â0|FÔˆBÔ:±æö<‰Nºâ³¥î)Žn2 o¬Z%ï3{L“\:…ƒM§“ÎÊŒIJ —59â¦_3,z¸LÇ›&ËL‡¤œ3Ys—ÿ÷5¼6QhàoÎ8Þ1SgÕ™‹·6€AKC8XçÿËàÔΜTA*õ>:Ó”Ày›–µÇ®¿îmz.~½T¢úûBi~Úþ£ST´yEBÍZÁ ’mvYC»‚Ë¿öob')i›•] »ñŸ›g޻✭mMnÕ&z/Ć£±!íWߨñD;‰æ˜”!¯5tñ9Å'ÄÏÀ}Ã'(¦¦Fü“•ƒàm/‹ß£ú¨ýñ_ê1ôÁ0M*# LUNW %¥ 0(«w@Ó4'6>B-WU:„¾U: AQüÆM 0D 0DW 0D› › D/ß B B+ D3H ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLhÎ(ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ DDDDÓ€%&©yË&w3|x' úÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ X{wXXXÔÔ€ ´X X{wÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X{wX ´ÔÐ  ÐÌAugust€18,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó Ñ  Ñ #Ñ#€Xÿÿd#Ñ,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular úÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€X{wXXXÔÔ€´XX{wÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€X{wX´ÔÐ  ÐÌAugust€12,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÒ€°ÒÒ„°ÒÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ€ @¨ÑÔ€¼œh¼XXÔÑ  ÑÑ€ úÑÓ*°ØX†XV“X°œX*Óñ%ñññßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eô±` 8ttxP,°ð  rßñññ%ññ%ññ%ñRANDY€GENE€HAUSKINS€and€wife,à & à)Ð ° ÐCAMMY€HAUSKINS,à à àà 8 àà & à)Ð À Ðñ&ññ%ñßt€ )>.*jx%ö` `€€@EÆ` 8ttxPQþ[ È tßñ%ññ&ññ&ñßt€ )>.*jx%ö` `€€@EÆ` 8ttxPQþ[ È tßñ&ñà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà & à)à è àà @ àAppeal€No.€Ð Ð  Ðà Ø àPlaintiffs/Appellants,à 8 àà & à)à è àà @ à01A01„9806„CV„00284Ð à0 Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà & à)Ìv.à Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà & à)à è àà @ àSumner€CircuitÐ  P Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà & à)à è àà @ àNo.€16594„CÐ  ` ÐTRI€COUNTY€ELECTRIC€à 8 àà & à)Ð  p ÐMEMBERSHIP€CORPORATION,à & à)Ð 0 € Ðà Ø àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àà & à)Ìà Ø àDefendantññsññ/Appelleeññsññ.à 8 àà & à)à è àòòÐ P   ÐÌÌÌóóÔ‡»k»¼¼œhÔÓ  ÓCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÐ à ÐÌÌAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€FOR€SUMNER€COUNTYÌÌAT€GALLATIN,€TENNESSEEÌÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€THOMAS€GOODALL,€JUDGEÌÓ6°,X‚Xì“X°ØX†XV“X6ÓÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓ  ÓC.€TRACEY€PARKSÌHarsh,€Parks€&€HarshÌ123€Public€SquareÌGallatin,€Tennessee€€37066Ìà Ø àATTORNEY€FOR€PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTSÌÌÌÔ#†¼œh¼»»k«#ÔTHOMAS€M.€DONNELL,€JR.Ð ,P'% ÐJENNIFER€A.€LAWRENCEÌStewart,€Estes€&€DonnellÌSuite€1401€SunTrust€CenterÌ424€Church€StreetÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219Ìà Ø àATTORNEYS€FOR€DEFENDANT/APPELLEE€ÌÌÓ  ÓÌÌAFFIRMED€AND€REMANDEDÌÌÌññÑ úÑÑ7€vtXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑÑ úÑÑ#€Xÿÿd#ÑÑ  ÑññÌññÑ úÑÑ7€vtXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑññÓ  Óà @ àà @ì àWILLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEòòÐ à:063d ÐÑ úÑÑ7€vtXXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑññÑ úÑÑ7€–:XXdìXXdì7ÑÑ  ÑññÓ  ÓÔ€„»Î„¼¼œhÔO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóó›Ð ° ÐÓ  ÓÌÓ6°ØX°4` ˜X°,X‚Xì“X6ÓÓ€Óà  àÔ€¼œh¼„„»ÎÔPlaintiffs,€Randy€Gene€Hauskins€and€Cammy€Hauskins,€are€husband€andÐ pÀ Ðwife.€€At€the€time€of€the€accident€resulting€in€his€very€serious€injuries,€Mr.ÏHauskins€was€a€framing€carpenter€working€for€Terry€Gregory,€subcontractor€ofÏCoates€Construction€œCompany,›€in€the€construction€of€a€new€home€in€SumnerÏCounty,€Tennessee.€€The€defendant,€Tri€County€Electric€Membership€Corporation,Ïdistributes€electric€power€through€distribution€lines€owned€and€maintained€by€TriÏCounty.ÌÌà  àAt€all€times€material€in€this€case,€the€following€sections€of€TennesseeÏCode€Annotated€were€in€full€force€and€effect:ÌÓ€Óà8  àà 0 à68„103„102.€€ò òGuarding€against€accidental€contact€byÐ `° Ðemployee.€ó ó€No€person,€firm,€or€corporation,€or€agent€of€same,Ð tÄ Ðshall€require€or€permit€any€employee€to€perform€any€functionÏin€proximity€to€high„voltage€lines;€to€enter€upon€any€land,Ïbuilding,€or€other€premises€and€there€to€engage€in€anyÏexcavation,€demolition,€construction,€repair€or€otherÏoperation;€or€to€erect,€install,€operate,€or€store€in€or€upon€suchÏpremises€any€tools,€machinery,€equipment,€materials,€orÏstructures,€including€house€moving,€well€drilling,€pile€drivingÏor€hoisting€equipment,€unless€and€until€danger€from€accidentalÏcontact€with€such€high„voltage€lines€has€been€effectivelyÏguarded€against€in€the€manner€hereinafter€prescribed.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌà8  àà 0 à68„103„103.€€ò òClearance€or€safeguard€required.ó ó€€(a)€€TheÐ 8%ˆ # Ðoperation,€erection€or€transportation€of€any€tools,€machinery,Ïor€equipment,€or€any€part€thereof€capable€of€vertical,€lateral€orÏswinging€motion,€the€handling,€transportation€or€storage€ofÏany€supplies,€materials€or€apparatus,€or€the€moving€of€anyÏhouse€or€other€building,€or€any€part€thereof,€under,€over,€by€orÏnear€high„voltage€lines,€is€hereby€expressly€prohibited,€if€atÏany€time€during€such€operation,€transportation€or€otherÏmanipulation€it€is€possible€to€bring€such€equipment,€tools,Ïmaterials,€building,€or€any€part€thereof,€within€six€feet€(6')€ofÏsuch€high„voltage€lines,€except€where€such€high„voltage€linesÏhave€been€effectively€guarded€against€danger€from€accidentalÏcontact,€by€either:Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà 0 à(1)à ˆ àThe€erection€of€mechanical€barriers€to€preventÐ  3\.0 Ðphysical€contact€with€high„voltage€conductors;€orÐ  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà 0 à(2)à ˆ àDe„energizing€the€high„voltage€conductors€andÐ ,5|02 Ðgrounding€where€necessary.Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà 0 à(b)à ˆ àOnly€in€the€case€of€either€such€exception€may€theÐ L7œ24 Ðsix„foot€(6')€clearance€required€be€reduced.€€The€required€six„¼foot€(6')€clearance€shall€not€be€provided€by€movement€of€theÐ l9¼46 Ðconductors€through€strains€impressed,€by€attachments€orÏotherwise,€upon€the€structures€supporting€the€high„voltageÏline€nor€upon€any€equipment,€fixtures€or€attachments€thereon.Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà 0 à(c)à ˆ àIf€temporary€relocation€of€the€high„voltageÐ à0 Ðconductors€is€necessary,€appropriate€arrangements€shall€beÏmade€with€the€owner€or€operator€of€the€overhead€line€for€suchÏtemporary€relocation.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌà8  àà 0 à68„103„105.€€ò òNotification€to€power€company€andÐ 0 € Ðresponsibility€for€safeguards.€€ó óWhen€any€operations€are€toÐ D”  Ðbe€performed,€tools€or€materials€are€to€be€handled,€orÏequipment€is€to€be€moved€or€operated,€within€six€feet€(6')€ofÏany€high„voltage€line,€the€person€or€persons€responsible€forÏthe€work€to€be€done€shall€promptly€notify€the€operator€of€theÏhigh„voltage€line€of€the€work€to€be€performed,€and€suchÏperson€shall€be€responsible€for€the€completion€of€the€safetyÏmeasures,€which€are€required€by€ðððð€68„103„102€and€68„103„¼103,€before€proceeding€with€any€work€which€would€impairÏthe€aforementioned€clearance.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÓ€ÓÌà  àThe€contractor,€Craig€Coates,€had€contracted€with€Mr.€and€Mrs.€ReeceÏto€build€their€new€home€on€Blacky€Bandy€Road€in€Bethpage,€Tennessee.€€CoatesÏsubcontracted€the€framing€work€to€Terry€Gregory€who€then€employed€HauskinsÏand€others€to€do€the€framing.€€Prior€to€the€initiation€of€this€new€construction€on€theÏproperty,€the€location€of€the€electrical€lines€exceeded€all€vertical€clearanceÏrequirements€as€set€forth€by€the€National€Electrical€Safety€Code.€€The€house€wasÏto€be€built€œin€part€under›€existing€power€lines,€including€an€œuninsulated›€7200€voltÏline.ÌÌà  àCoates€contacted€Tri€County€Staking€Technician€Keith€Taylor€to€requestÏthat€the€lines€be€moved.€€At€the€time€Coates€and€Taylor€met€at€the€site€to€discussÏmoving€the€power€lines,€some€of€the€block€work€for€the€basement€had€beenÏcompleted€but€framing€work€had€not€yet€begun.€€Coates€knew€that€work€on€theÏroof€near€the€power€lines€would€not€be€safe€and€so€did€subcontractor€TerryÏGregory.ÌÌà  àWithout€notifying€Tri€County,€framing€and€roofing€work€wasÏundertaken,€bringing€subcontractor€employees,€including€plaintiff€Hauskins,€intoÏclose€proximity€of€the€7200€volt€line.€€Hauskins€was€an€experienced€framingÏcarpenter,€having€worked€in€the€construction€business€for€over€twenty€years€andÐ È84; Ðwas€aware€that€the€lines€were€dangerous.€€At€the€time€of€the€accident,€he€wasÏworking€in€very€close€proximity€to€the€7200€volt€line.€€He€œaccidently›€came€intoÏcontact€with€the€line,€received€severe€electrical€shock€and€was€thrown€from€theÏroof€in€such€a€manner€as€to€fracture€his€thoracic€spine€resulting€in€paraplegia.€€TheÏaccident€occurred€May€14,€1995.Ì̛̜à  àThe€trial€in€March€of€1998€resulted€in€a€finding€by€the€jury€that€plaintiffÏHauskins€was€100%€at€fault€and€that€Tri€County€had€no€fault.ÌÌœà  àPlaintiffs€appeal,€raising€three€issues:Ìà8  àà 0 à1.€€Whether€the€trial€court€erred€in€allowing€Tri€County€toÏintroduce€evidence€of€Coates€Constructionððs€acts€or€omissionsÏwhen€Coates€could€not€be€made€a€party€due€to€the€exclusiveÏremedy€provision€of€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„¼108(a);Ð  Ð  Ð  Ѐà8  àà 0 à2.€€Whether€such€evidence€and€the€resulting€argument€toÐ 0€  Ðthe€jury€was€in€derogation€of€the€rule€set€forth€in€the€case€ofÐ È" ÐòòRidings€v.€Ralph€M.€Parsons€Co.óó,€914€S.W.2d€79€(Tenn.Ð `!°$ Ð1996);Ð  Ð  Ð  Ðà8  àà 0 à3.€€Whether€the€trial€erred€in€its€charge€to€the€juryÏregarding€causation€and€liability.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌà  àAfter€the€accident€Hauskins€had€settled€with€Lumberman's€MutualÏCasualty€Company,€workers'€compensation€carrier€for€Coates€ConstructionÏCompany.€€Lumberman's€had€intervened€to€assert€its€subrogation€rights€against€TriÏCounty€but€did€not€join€in€the€appeal€of€the€adverse€judgment€below.ÌTennessee€Code€Annotated€section€50„6„108(a)€provides:ÌÓ€Óà8  à(a)€The€rights€and€remedies€herein€granted€to€an€employeeÏsubject€to€the€Workers'€Compensation€Law€on€account€ofÏpersonal€injury€or€death€by€accident,€including€a€minorÏwhether€lawfully€or€unlawfully€employed,€shall€exclude€allÏother€rights€and€remedies€of€such€employee,€such€employee'sÏpersonal€representative,€dependents€or€next€of€kin,€at€commonÏlaw€or€otherwise,€on€account€of€such€injury€or€death.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌÐ Ð9 5@ ÐÓ€’%Óà  àAppellant€is€correct€in€his€assertion€that€a€plaintiff's€"right€to€recover€onÏallegations€of€negligence€...€is€determined€without€reference€to€the€employer'sÏconduct."€€òòRidings€v.€Ralph€M.€Parsons€Co.óó,€914€S.W.2d€79,€84€(Tenn.€1996).€€InÐ à0 Ðanswering€the€question€of€whose€conduct€is€the€òòproximate€cause€óóof€an€accident,Ð x È Ðthe€actions€of€a€plaintiff's€employer€may€not€be€considered.€€However,€it€is€alsoÏtrue€that€evidence€of€an€employer's€actions€may€be€used€to€show€that€a€plaintiffÏhas€not€made€out€its€cause€of€actionññ,€i.e.,€ññññ€as€in€ñña€failure€to€prove€that€a€defendant'sÏactions€were€òòcause€in€fact€óóof€plaintiff's€injury.€€òòSnyder€v.€LTG€LufttechnischeÐ Ø(  ÐGmbHóó,€955€S.W.2d€252,€256€(Tenn.€1997).Ð pÀ  ÐÌà  àThe€law€of€this€jurisdiction€distinguishes€between€òòproximate€causeóó€andÐ  ð Ðòòcause€in€factóó.€€One's€actions€may€be€the€òòcause€in€factóó€of€an€injury€while€not€beingÐ 8ˆ Ðthe€injury's€òòproximate€causeóó.€€On€the€other€hand,€one's€actions€cannot€be€aÐ Ð  Ðòòproximate€causeóó€of€an€accident€without€being€a€òòcause€in€factóó.€€In€the€words€of€ourÐ h¸ Ðsupreme€court:ÌÓ€Óà8  àà 0 àCausation€and€proximate€cause€are€distinct€elements€ofÏnegligence,€and€both€must€be€proven€by€the€plaintiff€by€aÏpreponderance€of€the€evidence.€€Bradshaw,€854€S.W.2d€atÏ869;€€McClenahan€v.€Cooley,€806€S.W.2d€767,€774Ï(Tenn.1991);€Smith€v.€Gore,€728€S.W.2d€738,€749Ï(Tenn.1987).€€"Causation€(or€cause€in€fact)€is€a€very€differentÏconcept€from€that€of€proximate€cause.€€€Causation€refers€to€theÏcause€and€effect€relationship€between€the€tortious€conduct€andÏthe€injury.€€€The€doctrine€of€proximate€cause€encompasses€theÏwhole€panoply€of€rules€that€may€deny€liability€for€otherwiseÏactionable€causes€of€harm."€€€King,€Causation,€Valuation,€andÏChance€in€Personal€Injury€Torts€Involving€Preexisting€InjuriesÏand€Future€Consequences,€90€Yale€L.J.€1353,€1355€n.€7Ï(1981).€€€Thus,€proximate€cause,€or€legal€cause,€concerns€aÏdetermination€of€whether€legal€liability€should€be€imposedÏwhere€cause€in€fact€has€been€established.€€McKellips€v.€SaintÏFrancis€Hosp.,€741€P.2d€467€(Okl.€1987).€€"Cause€in€fact,€onÏthe€other€hand,€deals€with€the€'but€for'€consequences€of€an€act.€Ï'The€defendant's€conduct€is€a€cause€of€the€event€if€the€eventÏwould€not€have€occurred€but€for€that€conduct.'€"€€Id.€at€470Ï(quoting€Prosser€and€Keeton,€The€Law€of€Torts€266€(5th€ed.Ï1984)).Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÓ€‰,ÓòòÓ€ÓÌÓ€ÓKilpatrick€v.€Bryant,€óó868€S.W.2d€594€(Tenn.€1993).Ð 5X05 Л̜à  àThe›€elements€of€a€negligence€action€are:€€œ(1)›€a€legal€duty,€œ(2)›€breach€ofÏthat€duty€which,€œ(3)›€in€fact€causes,€and€œ(4)›€proximately€causes€œ(5)›€damages€orÐ Ð9 5; ÐÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑññÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  ÑÑ @¨ÑÑ  ÑÑ  Ñññinjury€to€the€plaintiff.€€No€negligence€claim€can€succeed€in€the€absence€of€any€ofÏthese€elements.€€òòSee€Perez€v.€McConkey,€óó872€S.W.2d€897,€905€(Tenn.€1994);€òòSeeÐ H˜ Ðalso€Bradshaw€v.€Daniel,óó€854€S.W.2d€865,€869€(Tenn.1993);€òòMcClenahan€v.Ð à0 ÐCooley,óó€806€S.W.2d€767,€774€(Tenn.1991).€€€€A€defendant€in€response€to€the€proofÐ x È Ðof€those€elements€may€œallege,›€as€Tri€County€did,€the€possible€intervening€andÏsuperseding€activity€of€an€employer€such€as€Coates€Construction,€which,€thoughÏit€cannot€be€a€òòproximate€causeóó€of€the€injury,€may€so€overbear€the€actions€of€theÐ @  Ðdefendant€as€to€negate€òòcause€in€factóó.€€This€is€the€very€situation€addressed€in€òòSnyderÐ Ø(  Ðv.€LTG€Lufttechnische€GmbHóó,€955€S.W.2d€252€(Tenn.€1997):Ð pÀ  ÐÓ€Óà8  àà 0 àThere€is€no€question€that€the€Court€in€òòRidingsóó€consideredÐ X Ðthe€"fairness"€arguments€advanced€here€by€the€defendants€andÏmade€a€policy€decision€to€leave€immune€employers€out€of€theÏassessment€of€fault.€€We€thus€decline€the€defendants'Ïinvitation€to€reverse€òòRidingsóó€or€otherwise€depart€from€the€ruleÐ H˜ Ðadopted€in€that€decision.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌà8  àà 0 àHowever,€before€leaving€òòRidingsóó,€we€are€inclined€to€addÐ xÈ Ðthat€our€decision€in€that€case€can€best€be€understood€whenÏconsidered€in€the€analytical€context€in€which€the€case€came€toÏthe€Court.€€The€defendants€in€òòRidingsóó,€like€the€defendantsÐ ¨ø Ðhere,€wanted€the€jury€to€assess€fault€against€the€employer€byÏarguing€that€the€employer's€actions€were€the€proximate,€orÏlegal,€cause€of€the€plaintiff's€injuries.€€Of€course,€the€employerÏcannot€be€found€to€be€the€proximate,€or€legal,€cause€of€theÏplaintiff's€injuries€because€the€employer€is€immune€from€tortÏliability€under€Tenn.Code€Ann.€ðð€50-6-108(a).€€By€enactingÏTenn.Code€Ann.€ðð€50-6-108(a),€the€legislature€has€alreadyÏdetermined€that€for€policy€reasons€the€employer€may€not€beÏthe€legal€cause€of€the€plaintiff's€injuries.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌà8  àà 0 àThis€is€not€to€say,€however,€that€the€employer€cannot€beÏfound€by€the€trier€of€fact€to€have€been€a€cause€in€fact€of€theÏplaintiff's€injuries.€€If€the€rule€were€otherwise,€the€defendantsÏwould€effectively€be€precluded€from€presenting€a€defense.€€AÏdefense€that€the€product€was€not€defective€or€unreasonablyÏdangerous€when€it€left€the€defendants'€control€would€not€beÏcredible€unless€the€defendants€were€permitted€to€introduceÏevidence€as€to€what€actually€happened€to€the€product€leadingÏup€to€the€incident€that€injured€the€plaintiff.€€Excising€theÏemployer€from€that€discussion€would€be€tantamount€toÏdrawing€a€line€which€would€make€discussion€of€the€case€to€beÏtried€difficult,€if€not€impossible.€€The€end€result€would€be€thatÏthe€jury€would€not€hear€evidence€of€the€true€facts€surroundingÏthe€product€that€caused€the€plaintiff's€injuries€but,€nonetheless,Ïbe€asked€to€determine€fault€and€hence€liability€for€damages.€ÏProhibiting€the€introduction€of€such€evidence€could€result€inÐ H9˜46 Ða€defendant,€who€was€not€a€cause€in€fact€of€the€plaintiff'sÏinjuries,€being€required€to€pay€for€the€harm€anyway.Ð  Ð  Ð  МòòÌSnyderóó,›€955€S.W.2d€at€256.Ð à0 ÐÓ€Ó€Ìà  àIn€òòSnyderóó€a€manufacturer€attempted€to€raise€in€its€defense€in€œfederal›Ð ˆ Ø Мcourt›€the€action€of€an€immune€employer€to€prove,€òòinter€alia,€óóthat€the€product€itÐ  p Ðmanufactured€was€not€unreasonably€dangerous€and€only€became€so€uponÏsubsequent€alteration.€òòSnyderóó,€955€S.W.2d€at€255.€€On€certification€from€theÐ P   Мfederal›€œDistrict€Court,›€the€Tennessee€Supreme€Court€held€that€the€actions€of€thatÏemployer€worked€not€to€implicate€the€employer€under€comparative€fault,€but€toÏshow€a€break€in€the€causal€chain€from€manufacture€to€dangerous€condition€toÏinjury.€€òòSee€generallyóó€Tenn.€Code€Ann.€ðð€29„28„108.Ð ° ÐÌà  àIn€the€case€at€bar,€the€defendant€was€alleged€to€have€violated€statutes€andÏthe€provisions€of€the€National€Electric€Safety€Code€with€regard€to€the€operationÏand€maintenance€of€power€lines€at€safe€distances.ÌÌà  àAttendant€to€those€allegations€supporting€the€legal€duty€of€Tri€CountyÏand€its€concomitant€liability€for€breach€of€that€duty€was€the€major€question€ofÏwhether€any€actions€or€omissions€on€the€part€of€Tri€County€òòactually€causedóó€Mr.Ð p"À$ ÐHauskins€injury.€€This€question€of€òòcause€in€factóó€must€be€separated€from€theÐ $X& Ðquestion€of€òòproximate€causeóó.€€The€charge€to€the€jury€must€articulate€the€difference.€Ð  %ð ( ÐWe€find€that€the€trial€court€properly€disposed€of€any€possible€confusion.€€The€trialÏcourt€charged€the€jury:ÌÓ€Óà8  àà 0 àThe€point€that€I€want€to€state€to€you,€that€I€think€isÏimportant,€is€that€you,€as€a€jury,€may€consider€only€theÏevidence€that's€relevant€to€the€events€leading€up€to€the€incidentÏthat€injured€Mr.€Hauskins.€€Tri€County€may€not€ask€the€jury€toÏassign€fault€to€the€employer€of€Mr.€Hauskins.€€Tri€County€mayÏnot€take€the€legal€position€that€Mr.€Hauskins's€employer'sÏactions€were€the€legal€cause€of€Mr.€Hauskins's€injuries.€€YouÏmay€consider€the€actions€of€the€employer€only€in€assessingÏwhether€Mr.€Hauskins€has€met€his€burden€of€establishing€theÏelements€necessary€to€recover€against€Tri€County.€€You€shallÏnot€assess€„„€I'm€sorry.€€You€shall€not€„„€I'm€going€to€say€itÏanyway€„„€assess€fault€against€Mr.€Hauskins's€employer.€€TheÏemployer's€legal€responsibility,€if€any,€will€be€determinedÏunder€the€Workman's€Compensation€Act.€€Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÓ€ÓÐ H9˜4< Ðà  àThe€statutory€duties€under€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€section€68„103„¼102,€103€and€105€rested€upon€Mr.€Hauskins'€employer.€€Under€the€proof€the€juryÏcould€find€that€the€accident€would€not€have€happened€"but€for"€the€failure€of€theÏemployer€to€notify€Tri€County€that€framing€construction€on€the€house€had€started,Ïthereby€triggering€the€duty€of€Tri€County€to€move€the€lines€or€cut€off€the€power.€ÏThis€goes€to€the€jury€as€negating€"cause€in€fact"€of€the€alleged€negligence€of€theÏdefendant,€an€issue€on€which€plaintiffs€bear€the€burden€of€proof.€€€ÌÓ€Óà8  àÓ€ÓÐ  Ð  Ð  Ðà  àConcerning€Appellant€Hauskinsðð€third€issue,€this€Court€will€not€viewÏindividual€charges€in€a€vacuum.€€We€consider€the€jury€charge€in€its€entirety,€andÏuphold€it€as€long€as€it€fairly€defines€the€issues€and€does€not€mislead€the€jury.€œòò€See›Ð  ð Ðe.g.€Memphis€St.€Rwy.€v.€Wilsonóó,€108€Tenn.€618,€620,€69€S.W.€265,€265€(1901);Ð 8ˆ ÐòòAbbot€v.€American€Honda€Motor€Co.,óó€682€S.W.2d€206€206,€209€(Tenn.€Ct.€App.Ð Ð  Ð1984).€€See€also€òòSmith€v.€Parker,óó€213€Tenn.€147,€156,€373€S.W.2d€205,€209Ð h¸ Ð(1963).€ÌÌà  àWe€find€in€viewing€the€jury€charge€as€a€whole€that€the€issues€wereÏproperly€placed€before€the€fact€finders,€and€that€the€jurors€were€not€misled.€€TheÏevidence€was€properly€limited€and€the€jury€properly€instructed.€€The€verdictÏreturned€found€Mr.€Hauskins€100%€at€fault.€€ÌÌÓ€Óà8  àà 0 àIt€is€the€time€honored€rule€in€this€State€that€in€reviewing€aÏjudgment€based€upon€a€jury€verdict€the€appellate€courts€areÏnot€at€liberty€to€weigh€the€evidence€or€to€decide€where€theÏpreponderance€lies,€but€are€limited€to€determining€whetherÏthere€is€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict;€and€inÏdetermining€whether€there€is€material€evidence€to€support€theÏverdict,€the€appellate€court€is€required€to€take€the€strongestÏlegitimate€view€of€all€the€evidence€in€favor€of€the€verdict,€toÏassume€the€truth€of€all€that€tends€to€support€it,€allowing€allÏreasonable€inferences€to€sustain€the€verdict,€and€to€discard€allÏto€the€contrary.€€Having€thus€examined€the€record,€if€there€beÏany€material€evidence€to€support€the€verdict,€it€must€beÏaffirmed;€if€it€were€otherwise,€the€parties€would€be€deprivedÏof€their€constitutional€right€to€trial€by€jury.Ð  Ð  Ð  ÐÌòòCrabtree€Masonry€Co.€v.€C€&€R€Const.,€Inc.,€óó575€S.W.2d€4,€5€(Tenn.€1978).Ð 6h19 ÐÓ€ÓÌà  àAs€a€result,€for€the€reasons€and€under€the€authorities€œcited€herein,€theÐ À84< Ðjudgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed,€and€the€case€is€remanded€for€furtherÏproceedings€as€needed.€€Costs€on€appeal€are€taxed€against€appellant.Ô‡X–:X¼¼¼EÔÐ H˜ ÐÌÌÔ#†¼¼E¼XX–: V#ÔÌÓ€Óà  àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 à______________________________________Ìà  àà 0 àà ˆ àà à àà 8 àññññwññññññWILññññññIññññññLIAM€B.€CAIN,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌWILLIAM€C.€KOCH,€JR.,€JUDGEÌÌÌ_________________________________ÌPATRICIA€J.€COTññññññAññññññTññññRELL,€JUDGEññ