ÿWPCZ ï;Æçô³ˆNm*sý@ > > 0Dq q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q AOµ Æ 0DÊ D/ B=¢RC&ÔøÔô3|x!($¡¡   DDQÓ€ Ô€XXXXÔԀîXXÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€÷ñîÔÐ  ÐÌò òApril€13,€1999Ð ¶¶ ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ôo  ô÷ñÔAppellate€CourtÐ –– ÐClerkó ó(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular Ô€ XXXXÔÔ€ îX XÔÓ  ÓÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ ÷ñî ÔÐ  ÐÌò òApril€01,€1999Ð ¶¶ ÐÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€ ôo  ô ÷ñÔAppellate€CourtÐ –– ÐClerkó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX d%%%%'ÿÿdxd(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýññ›ññѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[  AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ÚXXdÈXXdð7ÑÔ€X@;XXXÔÔ€Š4ÊŠXX@;Ôññññßr€*<,(j 8 `€€@E  tt0"H¨Órßññññññßr€ *<,(j 8 `€€@E  tt0"H¨Órßññññ›ññ€€€€à@j j ‚àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÐ  ÐÌà@>>%‚àAT€KNOXVILLEˆÌó óÌÌÌARTHUR€J.€HITE,à ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€C/A€NO.€03A01„9808„CV„00256Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellant,à < àà ” àà ì à)€KNOX€CIRCUITÐ  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìv.à 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€HON.€WHEELER€A.€ROSENBALM,Ð   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€JUDGEÌGLAZER€STEEL€CORPORATIONà ì à)Ð   Ðand€BRADFORD€A.€GLAZER,à ” àà ì à)€AFFIRMEDÐ   Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€ANDÌà 4 àDefendants„Appellees.à ” àà ì à)€REMANDEDÐ  ÐÌÌÌÌJERROLD€L.€BECKER,€and€SAMUEL€W.€BROWN,€BECKER,€THOMFORDE,ÏBROWN€&€KNIGHT,€P.C.,€Knoxville,€for€Plaintiff„Appellant.ÌÌBERNARD€E.€BERNSTEIN,€BERNSTEIN,€STAIR€&€McADAMS,€Knoxville,€forÏDefendants„Appellees.ÌÌÌÌà@%‚àò òòòO€P€I€N€I€O€Nóóó óˆÐ # ÐÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àà œ àFranks,€J.ÌÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€Trial€Judge,€responding€to€defendantsðð€motion€to€dismiss,€dismissedÏthe€plaintiffððs€cause€of€action€alleging€unjust€enrichment,€defamation,€and€estoppelÏagainst€Glazer€Steel€and€interference€with€a€prospective€economic€advantage€againstÏBradford€Glazer,€and€plaintiff€has€appealed.Ìà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€was€Executive€Vice„President€and€General€Manager€of€GlazerÏSteel€and€the€estate€of€Jerome€S.€Glazer€owned€100%€of€the€common€stock€of€GlazerÏSteel.€€Plaintiff€wrote€to€Alfred€H.€Moses,€executor€of€the€estate,€and€offeredÏplaintiffððs€services€in€finding€a€buyer€for€Glazer€Steel.€€Moses€and€plaintiff€exchangedÏcommunications€and€plaintiff€stated€at€one€point€that€he€had€a€potential€buyer€œready€toÏbuy.›€€The€parties€never€reached€a€final€agreement€concerning€compensation€andÐ ;þ34ýÏ Ðplaintiff€informed€Moses€that€the€opportunity€had€been€lost.€€Glazer€Steel€terminatedÏplaintiff€on€April€29,€1997.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€Trial€Courtððs€order€recites€that€its€decision€upon€the€motion€toÏdismiss€was€based€upon€plaintiffððs€response€to€the€motion€and€affidavit€filed€byÏdefendants,€memoranda€presented€by€the€defendants,€exhibits€presented€with€theÏpleadings,€and€arguments€of€counsel.€€Where€a€trial€court€œñ ñconsidersñ ñ›€matters€outside€theÏpleadings€on€a€motion€to€dismiss€for€failure€to€state€a€claim,€the€motion€is€treated€as€aÏmotion€for€summary€judgment.€€òòHixson€v.€Stickleyóó,€493€S.W.2d€471€(Tenn.€1973).€€Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€contends€that€he€is€entitled€to€a€finderððs€fee€based€on€unjustÏenrichment.€€€ð ðUnjust€enrichment€is€a€quasi-contractual€theory€or€is€a€contractÏimplied-in-law€in€which€a€court€may€impose€a€contractual€obligation€where€one€doesÏnot€exist.ððòò€€Whitehaven€Community€Baptist€Church€v.€Hollowayóó,€973€S.W.2d€592,€596Ð  Ð(Tenn.€1998)€(citing€òòPaschall's€Inc.€v.€Dozier,óó407€S.W.2d€150,€154-55€(Tenn.€1966)).€Ð  ÐCourts€will€impose€a€contractual€obligation€under€an€unjust€enrichment€theory€when:€Ï(1)€there€is€no€contract€between€the€parties€or€a€contract€has€become€unenforceable€orÏinvalid;€€and€(2)€the€defendant€will€be€unjustly€enriched€absent€a€quasi-contractualÏobligation.òò€€Id.€œñ ñ€ñ ñóóñ ñIn€this€case,€Glazer€Steel€did€not€receive€any€benefit€or€otherwiseÐ ˆ'€  Ðbecome€unjustly€enriched€by€the€plaintiffððs€efforts.ñ ñ›Ð '  Ðà 4 àà Œ àThe€Complaint€does€not€allege€that€Glazer€Steel€entered€a€sales€contract,Ïor€otherwise€profited€by€plaintiffððs€efforts€to€secure€a€buyer.€€The€Complaint€merelyÏstates€that€Glazer€Steel€had€been€in€contact€with€the€potential€buyer.€€Since€GlazerÏSteel€had€yet€to€receive€any€benefit€from€the€œñ ñAppellantñ ñññplaintiffññððs›€efforts,€the€trial€court€did€notÏerr€on€this€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€plaintiff€also€contends€that€Glazer€Steel€should€be€estopped€fromÏdenying€plaintiff€severance€pay€and€a€reasonable€finderððs€fee.€€The€elements€ofÏequitable€estoppel€are€set€forth€in€òòCallahan€v.€Town€of€Middletonóó,€292€S.W.2d€501,Ð 700 Ð508€(€Tenn.App.€1954):Ð 922 ÐÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àThe€essential€elements€of€an€equitable€estoppel€as€related€to€the€partyÏestopped€are€said€to€be€(1)€Conduct€which€amounts€to€a€falseÏrepresentation€or€concealment€of€material€facts,€or,€at€least,€which€isÏcalculated€to€convey€the€impression€that€the€facts€are€otherwise€than,Ïand€inconsistent€with,€those€which€the€party€subsequently€attempts€toÏassert;€€(2)€Intention,€or€at€least€expectation€that€such€conduct€shall€beÏacted€upon€by€the€other€party;€€(3)€Knowledge,€actual€or€constructive€ofÏthe€real€facts.€€€As€related€to€the€party€claiming€the€estoppel€they€are€(1)ÏLack€of€knowledge€and€of€the€means€of€knowledge€of€the€truth€as€to€theÏfacts€in€question;€€(2)€Reliance€upon€the€conduct€of€the€party€estopped;€Ïand€(3)€Action€based€thereon€of€such€a€character€as€to€change€hisÏposition€prejudicially[.](citation€omitted).Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÓTÓÌThe€doctrine€is€ordinarily€applicable€only€to€representations€of€facts,€either€past€orÏpresent.€€òòConsumer€Credit€Union€v.€Hiteóó,€801€S.W.2d€822€(Tenn.App.€1990).€€TheÐ H@ ÐComplaint€does€not€allege€any€misrepresentations€by€Glazer€Steel.€€The€final€offerÏmade€by€Glazer€conditioned€the€payment€of€a€finderððs€fee€upon€Glazerððs€purchase€byÏthe€potential€buyer,€œññandññññbutññ›€plaintiff€informed€Alfred€Moses€that€the€potential€buyer€wasÏno€longer€interested.€€Similarly,€the€plaintiffððs€severance€pay€was€conditional€upon€hisÏremaining€with€the€Glazer€Steel€through€sale€or€liquidation€and€performing€his€dutiesÏsatisfactorily.€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àAlthough€the€Complaint€states€that€he€was€concerned€that€Glazer€SteelÏmight€inappropriately€link€his€proposed€finderððs€fee€agreement€with€the€severance€payÏagreement,€it€does€not€allege€any€false€representations€by€Glazer€Steel€regardingÏseverance€pay.€€Glazer€Steel€terminated€plaintiff€before€it€was€liquidated€or€sold.€ÏThus,€plaintiff€was€not€entitled€to€severance€pay€under€the€terms€of€the€agreement.€€¼à 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€argues€that€Glazer€Steel€defamed€him€in€a€letter€sent€to€theÏTennessee€Department€of€Employment€Security€(T.D.E.S.).€€In€this€letter,€Glazer€SteelÏstated€that€the€appellant€was€terminated€for€breach€of€fiduciary€duties€and€use€ofÏcorporate€opportunities€for€his€own€benefit.€€Plaintiff€claims€this€communicationÏdefamed€him.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€Trial€Court€did€not€err€on€this€issue€because€the€communicationÐ Ð9È22 Ðbetween€Glazer€Steel€and€T.D.E.S.€is€absolutely€privileged.€€T.C.A.€ðð€50„7„701(c)€setsÏforth€this€privilege:€ÌÓÓ€à8 4 àà Œ àà ä àAll€letters,€reports,€communications,€or€any€other€matters,€à0@  4Ð 4Ð àœññà0@  ƒàÐ   Ðà0Œ 4Ð 4Ð àññeither›€oral€or€written,€from€the€employer€or€employee€or€formerÏemployee,€to€each€other,€or€to€the€department,€or€to€or€by€any€ofÏthe€agents,€representatives€or€employees€of€any€of€them,€whichÏshall€have€been€written,€spoken,€sent,€delivered€or€made€inÏconnection€with€the€requirements€and€administration€of€thisÏchapter,€shall€be€absolutely€privileged,€and€shall€not€be€made€theÏsubject€matter€or€basis€for€any€suit€for€libel€or€slander€in€anyÏcourt.Ð Œ Ð Œ Ð  ÐÌÓ‰ÓPlaintiff€argues,€however,€that€this€court€should€apply€the€doctrine€of€compelled€self„¼publication€to€his€claim.Ìà 4 àà Œ àòòSullivan€v.€Baptist€Mem.€Hosp.óó,€1997€WL€426981€(Tenn.App.),Ð PH Ðòòpermission€to€appeal€grantedóó€April€6,€1998,€€recognized€the€doctrine€of€compelledÐ XP Ðself„publication.€€The€Western€Section€of€the€Court€of€Appeals€held€that€ð ðtheÏpublication€element€required€for€a€defamation€claim€can€be€met€if€1)€the€republicationÏof€the€defamatory€statement€is€reasonably€foreseeable€to€the€defendant,€and€2)€theÏplaintiff€is€compelled€to€republish€the€defamatory€communication.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€*7.€€€Ð x#p Ðà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€states€that€Glazer€Steel€orally€notified€him€of€the€reasons€for€hisÏdismissal,€and€attempts€to€use€this€oral€communication€to€state€a€claim€under€theÏdoctrine€of€compelled€self„publication.€€Assuming,€òòarguendoóó,€that€the€Supreme€CourtÐ )ˆ"" Ðadopts€this€doctrine,€plaintiffððs€Complaint€still€fails€to€state€a€claim€for€defamation.€ÏAlthough€Glazer€Steel€could€arguably€foresee€that€the€statement€would€be€republished,Ïthe€Complaint€does€not€allege€that€plaintiff€was€ever€ð ðcompelled€to€republish€theÏdefamatory€statement.ðð€€Thus,€the€Complaint€fails€to€state€a€œññpresent€ññclaim›€under€theÏdoctrine€of€compelled€self„publication.€Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€Complaint€originally€alleged€that€Bradford€Glazer€was€liable€forÏtortious€interference€with€prospective€economic€advantage.€€Plaintiff€now€concedesÏthat€this€claim€is€barred€by€òòNelson€v.€Martinóó,€958€S.W.2d€643€(Tenn.€1997),€butÐ Ð9È22 Ðcontends€that€he€has€stated€a€cause€of€action€for€intentional€interference€with€his€at„¼will€employment€relationship.€€Plaintiff€claims€that€he€argued€to€the€trial€court€that€hisÏComplaint€could€be€read€to€state€this€claim.€€The€record€before€us€does€not€reflect€anyÏargument€or€other€amendment,€nor€does€the€Complaint€allege€any€actionable€conductÏby€Bradford€Glazer€that€took€place€before€the€appellantððs€termination.€€€€Ìà 4 àà Œ àWe€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€and€remand€with€cost€of€theÏappeal€assessed€to€appellant.ÌÓÓÌÌà@‚‚+‚àòòˆà D àÐ H@ Ðóóà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à__________________________Ð LD Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.ÌÌÌÌÌ(Not€Participating)Ì___________________________ÌJudge€Don€T.€McMurray,€J.Ì