ÿWPCF  ÜLþÍÛÒ…Œy~{×ÿŸ°¡h¦?(uë`ÊKš{8'ŒO=8·’c•,0ÂÅC øí‡—›ëɈXµa™óÎø¿ƒÿþpæ½%¸à]ÚGô&ÃÊtŠ*QäÌ .[(zÀD»§7ý«4t¢ü(áÚlõ/ñÌ-ä:ö»^ãüÄh­² @„áÁ†ÅD‹áÚ‘$ á°Nè¬oˆ MêWJ6x`LT—:œ_±ß$í$è`ŠgÝlSû¹÷nÖMUƒÕàb¹¥^5®ªâS‡¦«žáx°»Tvû¾ï|ºœ ^ld´ '—Šð{Ù¢§Ã±$$m”²we(Ðh`ʫϔѹšÇ^¤ZíÞý€ÏZß<í0MCC_õ{«Ü[Ýî%k«™¬­uH…ÀÇíϰ†=‹?É1ÅŽúÌ ¨º³ ¥‡ŸV¾Ê,ý9Ô‡¿w†W™°œ£ÙQü‚¥–HV§ŸšÙÑ·¿áÞÝ‘Œ›¾¬­«ìvƒ$<„sܤo%VSkæjéBi&Õ-G1åÿC?|$¨sYÿe• E&­‚‡ Ï«¶–Qéîöô çd)ƒµ½|7š?ÿыٳÄ4»ÁHŒ) Õš£–ÿn­ÙƒÑyÌÔŠ‚LbxÚ=øÚ?çÙÁ*4L` 0(o—w@ŸßUNõCU:EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEUB %ÁÁÁÁÁÁ AQÇÆ 0DÞ 0D" 0Dff D/ª BÙ Bö D3 ©yË&ÔøÔô3|xÀ($¡¡ ®D¯°D±²D³´1eµ¶·Ó€ Ñ Ü Ñ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman Regular øÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€ X~VXXXÔÔ€ QuX X~VÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€ X~VX QuÔÐ  ÐÌJuly€16,€1999ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular<þ6X9`(*Courier 12pt10cpiX!"#$&Cþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxd düÿP Pd'''''ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýñ´ñ›ñ´ññ´ñ›ñ´ñѰÑÒܰÒÑ ý ÑÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÑ7€ŠuXXdÈXXdð7ÑÔ€XP"XXXÔñ´ñÔ€Š°ŠXX ºÔÔ€X ºXŠŠ°Ôñ´ñÑ€ßfÑñ·ñœßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@EÈ ` 8ttxPð  rß›ñ·ñH.J.L.,€L.P.,à Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ð  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)Ìà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Appeal€No.Ìà 4 àPlaintiff„Appellant,à < àà ” àà ì à)€€01A01„9811„CH„00589Ð Ì Ä Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ìv.à 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ð ¤ œ Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€Davidson€ChanceryÌNASHVILLE€&€EASTERN€RAILROADà ì à)Ð | t ÐCORPORATION€AND€NASHVILLE€AND€)ÌEASTERN€RAILROAD€AUTHORITY,à ì à)Ð TL  Ðà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à)€€Ìà 4 àDefendants„Appellees,à ” àà ì à)€€Ð ,$  ÐÌÌÌà@ì ì ‚àCOURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEˆÌà@dd‚àMIDDLE€SECTION€AT€NASHVILLEˆÌÌÌÌAPPEALED€FROM€THE€CHANCERY€COURT€OF€DAVIDSON€COUNTYÌAT€NASHVILLE,€TENNESSEEÌÌTHE€HONORABLE€ELLEN€HOBBS€LYLE,€CHANCELLORÌÌÌDAVID€B.€HERBERTÌORTALE,€KELLEY,€HERBERT€&€CRAWFORDÌThird€floor,€Noel€PlaceÌ200€fourth€Avenue€NorthÌP.O.€Box€198985ÌNashville,€Tennessee€€37219„8985Ìà 4 àAttorney€for€Plaintiff„AppellantÌÌDAVID€W.€LAWRENCE€and€R.€DAVID€ALLENÌ108€North€Greenwood€StreetÌLebanon,€Tennessee€37087Ìà 4 àAttorneys€for€Defendant„Appellee€Nashville€&€Eastern€Railroad€CorporationÌÌWILLIAM€E.€FARMERÌ104€W.€Main€Street,€P.O.€Box€2429ÌLebanon,€Tennessee€37088„2429Ìà 4 àAttorney€for€Defendant„Appellee€Nashville€and€Eastern€Railroad€AuthorityÌÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àÌà@Ê Ê ‚àAFFIRMED€IN€PART,€REVERSED€IN€PART,€AND€REMANDEDˆÌÌÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àà D àHERSCHEL€P.€FRANKS,€JUDGEÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌGODDARD,€P.J.ÌSUSANO,€J.Ìñ·ñÑßfÑÑܰÑÑ  ÑÑßfÑÑ Ü ÑÑ  Ññ·ñÌÐ ”;Œ49ý ÐÑßfÑÑܰÑÑ  Ññ·ñÑßfÑÑ Ü ÑÑ  Ññ·ñÌÌÌà@VV%‚àòòO€P€I€N€I€O€NóóˆÐ Ì Ä ÐÌÌÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àIn€this€action,€plaintiff€sought€the€continuing€use€of€a€railroad€underpass.€€TheÏChancellor€granted€defendants€summary€judgment,€and€plaintiff€has€appealed.Ìà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€H.J.L.,€L.P.,€is€a€limited€partnership€created€by€the€Eakes€family.€€The€ÏEakes€own€a€farm€used€for€breeding€walking€horses.€€In€1980,€the€Eakes€purchasedÏapproximately€eighteen€acres€from€Donald€OððGuinn.€€They€purchased€an€adjoining€fourteenÏacres€from€Mark€Parrish€in€1982.€€These€tracts€were€deeded€to€H.J.L.€in€1993.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€property€is€bordered€on€one€side€by€the€Cumberland€River,€and€on€theÏother€by€railroad€tracks.€€Defendant€Nashville€and€Eastern€Railroad€Authority€(ð ðAuthorityðð),Ïa€governmental€entity,€owns€the€railroad€right„of„way.€€The€Authority€leases€the€property€toÏdefendant€Nashville€&€Eastern€Railroad€Corporation€(ð ðCorporationðð).€€Under€the€lease,€theÏCorporation€has€full€authority€to€use,€manage€and€maintain€the€property.Ìà 4 àà Œ àAt€issue€in€this€case€is€a€trestle€located€near€the€end€of€Guaranty€Drive€inÏDavidson€County.€€Guaranty€Drive€ends€several€feet€before€the€trestle.€€The€area€underneathÏthe€trestle€is€not€a€public€road.€€The€Eakes€used€the€area€underneath€the€trestle€to€reach€theÏproperty€they€purchased€from€OððGuinn€and€Parrish,€although€the€frequency€of€their€use€isÏdisputed.€€The€Eakes€also€have€access€to€the€property€from€Barker€Road,€approximately€3,200Ïfeet€to€the€north.€€This€access€is€not€as€direct€and€requires€ñ´ñœñ´ñtheirñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€ñ´ñœñ´ñcrossing€ofñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€other€propertyÏowned€by€them€to€reach€these€tracts.Ìà 4 àà Œ àIn€November€1991,€the€Corporation€notified€the€Eakes€that€the€trestle€was€inÏneed€of€repair.€€The€Corporation€informed€the€Eakes€that€it€intended€to€fill€the€areaÏunderneath€the€trestle€unless€the€Eakes€paid€for€certain€construction€costs€to€keep€theÏunderpass€open.€€The€Eakes€refused€and€the€Corporation€filled€in€the€trestle.Ìà 4 àà Œ àH.J.L.€filed€suit€on€December€16,€1993,€and€the€defendants€counter„claimed,Ïalleging€that€one€of€the€Eakesðð€fences€encroached€upon€the€right„of„way.€€The€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñÐ ä7Ü05 Ðdenied€H.J.L.ððs€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment€on€its€claims€of€equitable€estoppel€andÏinverse€condemnation,€and€granted€defendants€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment.€€TheÏñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€also€denied€defendantsðð€Motion€for€Summary€Judgment€on€the€issue€ofÏencroachment,€and€granted€summary€judgment€to€plaintiff€on€that€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àWhen€evaluating€a€motion€for€summary€judgment,€the€Trial€Court€shouldÏconsider€ð ð(1)€whether€a€factual€dispute€exists;€(2)€whether€the€disputed€fact€is€material€to€theÏoutcome€of€the€case;€and€(3)€whether€the€disputed€fact€creates€a€genuine€issue€for€trial.ðð€€òòByrdÐ (  Ðv.€Hallóó,€847€S.W.2d€208,€214€(Tenn.€1993).€€ñ´ñœñ´ñOn€appeal,€noñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€presumption€of€correctnessÐ  Ðattaches€ñ´ñœñ´ñto€añ´ñ›ñ´ñ€ñ´ñœñ´ñsummaryñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€judgment€involving€only€a€question€of€law.€€òòHembree€v.€Stateóó,€925Ð èà ÐS.W.2d€513€(Tenn.€1996).€€T.R.A.P.€Rule€13(d).€€We€are€required€to€view€the€evidence€in€theÏlight€most€favorable€to€the€opponent€of€the€motion€and€all€legitimate€conclusions€of€factsÏmust€be€drawn€in€favor€of€the€opponent.€€òòGray€v.€Amos,€óó869€S.W.2d€925€(Tenn.€App.€1993).Ð ˆ€ Ðà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€argues€that€it€is€entitled€to€an€equitable€easement€under€the€trestle.€ÏThere€is€no€recorded€document€granting€plaintiff€access.€€The€plaintiff€contends,€however,Ïthat€defendants€are€estopped€from€denying€the€existence€of€an€easement.€€The€elements€ofÏequitable€estoppel€are€set€forth€in€òòConsumer€Credit€Union€v.€Hite,€óó801€S.W.2d€822,€825Ð %  Ð(Tenn.€App.€1990):ÌÓÓà0 4 àà0Œ 4(#4(#àThe€essential€elements€of€an€equitable€estoppel€as€related€to€the€party€estoppedÏare€said€to€be€(1)€Conduct€which€amounts€to€a€false€representation€orÏconcealment€of€material€facts,€or,€at€least,€which€is€calculated€to€convey€theÏimpression€that€the€facts€are€otherwise€than,€and€inconsistent€with,€thoseÏwhich€the€party€subsequently€attempts€to€assert;€(2)€Intention,€or€at€leastÏexpectation€that€such€conduct€shall€be€acted€upon€by€the€other€party;€(3)ÏKnowledge,€actual€or€constructive€of€the€real€facts.€€As€related€to€the€partyÏclaiming€the€estoppel€they€are€(1)€Lack€of€knowledge€and€of€the€means€ofÏknowledge€of€the€truth€as€to€the€facts€in€question;€(2)€Reliance€upon€theÏconduct€of€the€party€estopped;€and€(3)€Action€based€thereon€of€such€aÏcharacter€as€to€change€his€position€prejudicially,€19€Am.Jur.Estoppel€Sec.€42,Ïpp.€642„643.Ð Œ (#Œ (# ÐÌ(òòciting€Callahan€v.€Town€of€Middletonóó,€792€S.W.2d€501€(Tenn.€App.€1954)).Ð ø4ð-1 ÐÌÓÓà 4 àà Œ àThe€ñ´ñœñ´ñAuthority€whichñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€owns€the€land€is€a€government€ñ´ñœñ´ñentity,€and€theñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€doctrine€ofÏequitable€estoppel€generally€does€not€apply€to€the€acts€of€public€officials€or€public€agencies.€Ð ¸8°15 ÐòòBledsoe€County€v.€McReynoldsóó,€703€S.W.2d€123€(Tenn.€1985).€€ð ðPublic€agencies€are€notÐ  Ðsubject€to€equitable€estoppel€or€estoppel€in€pais€to€the€same€extent€as€private€parties€and€veryÏexceptional€circumstances€are€required€to€invoke€the€doctrine€against€the€State€and€itsÏgovernmental€subdivisions.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€124.€€In€the€cases€where€equitable€estoppel€has€beenÐ ¨   Ðapplied€against€a€public€body,€ð ðthe€public€body€took€affirmative€action€that€clearly€induced€aÏprivate€party€to€act€to€his€or€her€detriment,€as€distinguished€from€silence,€non„action€orÏacquiescence.ðð€€òòId.óó€at€125.€€ñ´ñœñ´ñÐ H@  Ðà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiffñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€concedes€ñ´ñœñ´ñitñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€did€not€discuss€the€issue€of€access€through€the€trestle€withÏanyone€before€purchasing€the€property.€€It€argues,€however,€that€defendants€engaged€inÏsufficient€affirmative€conduct€to€invoke€the€doctrine.€€First,€plaintiff€cites€the€fact€that€theÏtrestle€was€continuously€maintained.€€It€appears€from€the€record€that€this€maintenance€wasÏundertaken€primarily€to€preserve€the€structural€integrity€of€the€trestle,€which€was€necessary,Ïregardless€of€whether€private€citizens€used€the€underpass.€€The€plaintiff€also€cites€the€1977Ïð ðAgreementðð€between€the€defendantððs€predecessor€and€landowners€concerning€sharing€theÏcost€of€maintaining€the€trestle.€€This€agreement€was€never€consummated,€because€one€of€theÏparties€withdrew.€€The€proposal€ñ´ñœñ´ñwasñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€not€sufficient€affirmative€conduct€to€invoke€the€doctrine.€ÏThus,€plaintiff€had,€at€most,€a€license€to€use€the€trestle.Ìà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€argues€that€if€it€only€had€a€license,€the€license€was€irrevocable.€€AÏlicense€is€generally€revocable€at€the€will€of€the€licensor.€€25€Am.Jur.2d€òòEasements€andÐ È(À!$ ÐLicenses€óóðð143€(1996).€€A€party€may,€however,€be€estopped€from€revoking€a€license,€when€aÐ ¨* #& Ðlicensee€has€made€valuable€improvements€or€incurred€expenses€in€reliance€upon€the€license.€ÏòòSee€Daughterty€v.€Toomeyóó,€222€S.W.2d€195€(Tenn.€App.€1949).€€The€Oregon€Supreme€CourtÐ h.`'* Ðhas€held€that€this€exception€ð ðdoes€not€apply€where€the€landowner€has€not€given€expressÏpermission,€but€has€merely€silently€acquiesced€or€failed€to€object€to€the€improvements.ðð€ÏòòBrusco€Towboat€Co.€v.€State,€óó589€P.2d€712€(Or.€1978).€€Moreover,€holding€the€licenseÐ 4-0 Ðirrevocable€would€require€applying€the€doctrine€of€estoppel€which,€as€we€have€noted,€is€notÏapplicable€in€this€case.Ð È7À04 Ðà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€also€cites€an€older€version€of€the€Tennessee€Code€to€support€itsÏposition.€€This€statute€states€that€ð ð[w]hen€land€on€both€sides€of€the€track€is€owned€by€the€sameÏproprietor,€convenient€crossing€shall€be€made€and€kept€up€at€the€expense€of€the€corporationÏfor€the€use€of€said€proprietor,€and€all€necessary€cowgaps€œmade.ñ¶ñððñ¶ñ›€€òòShannonððs€Code€of€1896óó,Ð ¨   Ððð2419€(1918).€€Although€not€cited€by€either€party,€the€current€version€of€this€statute€is€T.C.A.Ïðð65„18„106.€€This€particular€chapter€addresses€incline€railroad€companies.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€statute€does€not€entitle€plaintiff€to€relief.€€The€record€is€not€entirely€clearÏconcerning€who€owned€the€property€at€issue€when€the€trestle€was€constructed.€€DollyÏWilliams€stated€that€her€father€purchased€the€property€in€1923,€and€Williams€also€testifiedÏabout€a€trestle€on€the€property,€although€it€is€not€entirely€clear€if€she€was€referring€to€theÏtrestle€at€issue€in€this€case.€€The€record€also€indicates€that€the€trestle€may€have€been€inÏexistence€as€early€as€1918.€€Assuming,€òòarguendo,óó€that€the€trestle€was€constructed€when€theÐ ¨  Ðproperty€on€both€sides€of€the€track€was€owned€by€one€person,€the€property€was€subdivided€inÏthe€1950's.€€Thus,€the€land€on€both€sides€of€the€track€was€no€longer€owned€by€the€ð ðsameÏproprietorðð.€€The€plaintiff€did€not€own€the€land€on€both€sides€of€the€track€when€he€purchasedÏthe€property,€and€the€plaintiff€has€access€to€its€property€through€an€underpass€located€atÏBarker€Drive.€€ñ´ñœñ´ñFor€the€foregoing€reasons,€weñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€affirm€the€judgment€of€the€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€on€thisÏissue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€Trial€Court€granted€summary€judgment€to€defendants€on€the€issue€ofÏinverse€condemnation.€€The€Authority€argues€the€Chancery€Court€lacked€jurisdiction€toÏdecide€this€issues.€€Jurisdiction€for€condemnation€and€inverse€condemnation€suits€is€conferredÏupon€the€Circuit€Courts€and€not€upon€the€Chancery€Courts.€€òòMcLain€v.€Stateóó,€442€S.W.2d€637Ð h.`'* Ð(Tenn.€App.€1968).€€In€òòMcLainóó,€the€court€held€the€Chancery€Court€had€jurisdiction€over€a€suitÐ H0@), Ðfor€both€the€reformation€of€a€deed€œanñµñdñµñ›€inverse€condemnation.€€In€òòEvans€v.€Wheeleróó,€348Ð (2 +. ÐS.W.2d€500,€502€(Tenn.€1961),€the€court€ñ´ñœñ´ñdeterminedñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€that€since€the€plaintiff€had€sought€anÏinjunction,€the€Chancery€Court€retained€jurisdiction€ð ðinsofar€as€the€case€turned€into€eminentÏdomain€proceedings.ðð€€In€this€case,€plaintiff€sought€to€enjoin€defendants€from€preventing€itsÐ È7À04 Ðuse€of€the€trestle,€and€sought€an€equitable€easement€in€addition€to€the€inverse€condemnationÏclaim.€€These€claims€were€disposed€of€in€a€single€judgment€by€the€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellor.ñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€€Accordingly,Ïthe€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€has€jurisdiction€over€all€claims.Ìà 4 àà Œ àPlaintiff€argues€that€the€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€erred€in€granting€summary€judgment€onÏthe€inverse€condemnation€claim.€€ð ðInverse€condemnation€is€the€popular€description€of€a€causeÏof€action€against€a€governmental€defendant€to€recover€the€value€of€the€property€which€hasÏbeen€taken€in€fact€by€a€governmental€defendant€even€though€no€final€exercise€of€the€power€ofÏeminent€domain€has€been€attempted€by€the€government.ðð€€òòJohnson€v.€City€of€Greenevilleóó,€435Ð (  ÐS.W.2d€476,€478€(Tenn.€1968).€€T.C.A.€ðð29„16„123€governs€such€actions.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€ñ´ñœñ´ñChancellorñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€properly€granted€summary€judgment.€€Plaintiff€has€no€legalÏtitle€to€the€path€under€the€trestle.€€Additionally,€the€path€is€not€a€public€road.€€As€noted,€theÏplaintiff€enjoyed€at€most€a€license€to€use€the€path.€€Other€ñ´ñœñ´ñjurisdictionñ­ñsñ­ññ´ñ›ñ´ñ€ñ´ñœñ´ññ®ñsñ®ñhaveñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€held€that€theÏholder€of€a€license€is€generally€not€entitled€to€compensation€for€its€appropriation.€€òòSee€ActonÐ ˆ€ Ðv.€United€Statesóó,€401€F.2d€896€(9th€Cir.€1968),€òòcert.€denied,€óó393€U.S.€1121€(1969)€and€395Ð h` ÐU.S.€945€(1969);€òòTidwell€v.€State€ex€rel.€Hermanóó,€514€P.2d€1260€(Ariz.€App.€1973);€òòLahti€v.Ð H!@ ÐStateóó,€414€N.Y.S.2d€607€(N.Y.Ct.Cl.€1979);€òòLee€v.€North€Dakota€Park€Serv.óó,€262€N.W.2dÐ (#  Ð467€(N.D.€1978);€òòCity€of€Norwood€v.€Forest€Converting€Co.óó,€476€N.E.2d€695€(Ohio€App.Ð %  Ð1984);€òòSee€generally€óó26€Am.Jur.2d,€òòEminent€Domain€óóðð282€(1996).€€Ð è&à" Ðà 4 àà Œ àT.C.A.€ðð65„6„119€authorizes€defendants€to€fill€in€their€trestles€as€ñ´ñœñ´ñnecessaryñ¯ñ,Ïand€ñ¯ññ°ñ.›€›€Wñ°ññ±ñwñ±ñeñ´ñ›ñ´ñ€affirm€the€ñ´ñœñ´ññ²ñTrial›€Judge›€ofñ²ññ³ñChancellor€onñ³ññ´ñ›ñ´ñ€this€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àDefendants€filed€a€counter„claim€against€plaintiff€for€encroachment.€€TheÏdefendants€alleged€that€a€fence€constructed€by€plaintiff€encroaches€upon€the€railroad€right„of„¼way,€and€moved€for€summary€judgment€on€the€encroachment€issue.€€Summary€judgment€wasÏgranted€to€plaintiff€on€this€issue,€but€we€vacate€and€remand.Ìà 4 àà Œ àRoger€Fuqua,€a€licensed€surveyor,€prepared€a€survey€that€shows€a€fenceÏencroaching€upon€the€right„of„way.€€The€plaintiff€argues€that€it€did€not€construct€this€fence.€ÏHoyt€Eakes€stated,€however,€that€he€built€a€fence€running€to€the€left€and€right€of€the€trestle.€Ð È7À04 ÐAlthough€it€is€not€entirely€clear€from€his€testimony€if€the€fence€he€built€is€the€same€oneÏencroaching€on€the€property,€the€testimony€creates€an€issue€of€material€fact€which€is€notÏsuitably€resolved€by€a€summary€judgment.€€Accordingly,€we€remand€to€the€Trial€Court€toÏresolve€this€issue.Ìà 4 àà Œ àThe€judgment€of€the€Trial€Court€is€affirmed€in€part€and€reversed€in€part,€andÏthe€cause€remanded,€with€cost€of€the€appeal€assessed€to€the€appellant.ÌÓÓÌÌÌÌÌà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì à________________________Ìà 4 àà Œ àà ä àà < àà ” àà ì àHerschel€P.€Franks,€J.ÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌÔ‡Šà]ŠXXÛÙÔHouston€M.€Goddard,€P.J.Ð H!@ ÐÔ#†XÛÙXŠŠà]ƒA#ÔÌÌÌÌÌÌ___________________________ÌÔ‡Šà]ŠXXÛÙÔCharles€D.€Susano,€Jr.,€J.Ð Ü(Ô!$ ÐÔ#†XÛÙXŠŠà]B#ÔÌÌ