ÿWPCt £\®Îê£òy'¼½17º¥Î {Œb͈ðñM²§AfPR‰;tqÿTºRüÎ0ƒtÑJèꇳEmä¦^4v5§Ðù’F[e;1Eä!›S°ûɱH ÚMóCw‹°ÈgéÎn“‚Œ ÿÃ"ÎŒOü)Ô6~8§Q¯lÏÞ4®ñ ŽU «f_g([<ú½êL[ôëÎaíðDìvá2wòr,òÊå×”à1§é½@Ø`¯äW’¬påÑDwˆÿÓ—|ƒÝ'n°9|N‚“‡sŽV»Ä 2ÇÐÚãQZÙ-±¾¯‡òžŸVc˜NÜ¢X¨s§4,8~x¦œ(ÍåÂ|¡öƒOCŸ†Eì$†Õ‡GÃ0/v„¿ê€RÇåk”¸CëM”d¡y•eé@NÒ2H 5@AE†G4öOí€ðœáhçüýæ¢Ü‘; í¾Ágmk´+°Ä$­x5Ôßv:ñ„õç@é¹Ök¥G“à4F Lw&»¬,á÷¥|ݯâÑm}K[ŽîC›o¢j0ߎŸÆÎY¬øƒ"V$p}ÿ© ƒ˜˜ÄF»£W±<ÆšqìóOÇêb¯›éi¯ÖPŠcd¾Yk/ié=¦þØÃ=ŽJýŠu¨*# LUNW %¥ 0(«w@Ó4'UN6 0l„ 0Dðx4 AQ¬  ý  U: BF Æc 0D) 0Dm 0D±± D/õõ B$ D3A˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLlÎ(ÈhH  Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ vUw x y z {£|}~Ó€ˆsF(&žÏ`3|xˆ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman Regular((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó nÝ ƒ üÝÿÝà  àòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝWe€note€that€this€procedure€is€highly€unusual€and€have€doubt€regarding€whether€theÐ ° Ðallowance€of€live€testimony€at€a€hearing€on€a€motion€for€summary€judgment€is€even€permissible.€ÏUnder€Rule€56€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€a€motion€for€summary€judgmentÏshould€be€granted€ð ðif€the€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€interrogatories,€and€admissions€onÏfile,€together€with€the€affidavits,€if€any,€show€that€there€is€no€genuine€issue€as€to€any€material€factÏand€that€the€moving€party€is€entitled€to€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law.ðð€€T.R.C.P.€56.04.€€ThisÏrule€does€not€authorize€and€we€are€aware€of€no€other€rule€permitting€the€trial€court€to€consider€theÏtestimony€of€live€witnesses€in€addition€to€pleadings,€depositions,€answers€to€interrogatories,Ïadmissions,€and€affidavits.!"#$&Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ Ý ƒ üÝ$Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú2Ú  ÚóóÝ  ÝOur€ruling€should€not€be€read,€however,€to€preclude€IDB€from€asserting€its€claim€as€aÐ ° Ðseparate€action€or€as€a€counterclaim€to€Holzingerððs€inverse€condemnation€action.€€ ùÝ ƒ"¯"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€Xh>XXXÔÔ€7JXXh>ÔÓ  Óò òÔ Ad ÔFILEDÔ€Xh>X7JÔÐ  ÐÌJanuary€11,€1999ÌÌCecil€W.€CrowsonÌAppellate€Court€ClerkÔdAhÔó ó,c½¬AZ‹"Arial Regular dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý(3¯$££Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó(('÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd 'ÿÿdxdÝ ƒ!ÝÝ  ÝÑTR[¤ AØ'ÿ Legal3Ø' AØ'ÿ Legalÿ3Ø'TÑÓ'°,X°À”X°œX'Óò òñˆññ~ñßr€ )<,(j 8` `€€@Eȱ` 8ttxP°ð  rßñ~ññˆññˆñßt€ )>.*jxhÿÚ` `€€@E0Š` 8ttxPhÂð È tßñˆñà@h h ìàIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,ˆÌà@úú$ìàAT€NASHVILLEó óˆÐ œì ÐÌà@. . ìà_______________________________________________________ˆÌÌà À à)Ìò òNORMAN€HOLZINGERó ó,à À à)à  àMontgomery€County€Circuit€CourtÐ 8 ˆ Ðà À à)à  àNo.€C11„568Ð ( x Ѐ€€€€Plaintiff/Appellant.à À à)Ð  d Ðà À à)ÌVS.à À à)à  àC.A.€No.€01A01„9711„CV„00685Ð ì <  Ðà À à)Ìò òINDUSTRIAL€DEVLOPMENT€BOARDó ó,€)Ð Ä  Ðò òOF€THE€COUNTY€OF€ó óà À à)Ð ´  Ðò òMONTGOMERY,€CITY€COUNCIL€OFó óà À à)Ð ¤ô  Ðò òCLARKSVILL,€TENNESSEE€andó óà À à)Ð ”ä  Ðò òCITY€OF€CLARKSVILLE,ó óà À à)Ð „Ô Ðò òTENNESSEEó ó.à À à)Ð tÄ Ðà À à)Ì€€€€€Defendants/Appellees.à À à)Ð P  Ðà À à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÌFrom€the€Circuit€Court€of€Montgomery€County€at€Clarksville.Ìò òHonorable€James€E.€Walton,€Judge€ó óÐ ì< ÐÌÌÌò òRobert€Clive€Marksó ó,€MARKS€&€MARKS,€Clarksville,TennesseeÐ œì ÐAttorney€for€Plaintiff/Appellant.ÌÌÌò òF.€Evans€Harvilló ó,€Clarksville,€TennesseÐ P"   ÐAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellee€Industrial€Development€Board€of€the€County€of€Montgomery.Ìò òDavid€Hainesó ó,€Clarksville,€TennesseeÐ ,$|" ÐAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellee€City€of€ClarksvilleÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òREVERSED€AND€REMANDEDó óÐ ¤*ô%) ÐÌÌà À àò òFARMER,€J.ó óÐ h-¸(, ÐÌò òHIGHERS,€J.ó ó:€(Concurs)Ð @/*. Ðò òTOMLIN,€Sp.€J.ó ó:€(Concurs)ñvñÐ 00€+/ ÐÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÐ D;”6; ÐñvññxññwñÓ3°,X°` À”X°,X°À”X3ÓñwññxññyññxñÓ6°,X°` ¸ À”X°,X°À”X6ÓñxññyññzññyñÓ6°,X°` ‚XÀ”X°,X°À”X6ÓñyññzññzñÓ0°,X°` ˜X°,X°À”X0Óñzññ{ñÓ  Óñ{ññ|ñÓÓñ|ññ}ñÔ‡XfXXXÔPlaintiff€Norman€Holzinger€appeals€an€order€of€the€trial€court€granting€a€motion€for€summaryÐ ° Ðjudgment€filed€by€Defendant€Industrial€Development€Board€of€Montgomery€County€(IDB).€€BecauseÏwe€find€that€the€trial€court€should€have€dismissed€IDBððs€counterclaim,€we€reverse€the€ruling€of€theÏtrial€court.ÌÌà ` àOn€May€10,€1995,€Holzinger,€a€real€estate€developer,€entered€into€a€contract€with€IDBÏunder€which€Holzinger€was€granted€a€nine€month€option€to€purchase€an€eighty„seven€acre€tract€ofÏreal€property.€€The€parties€later€extended€this€option€by€four€months€so€that€it€did€not€expire€untilÏJune€10,€1996.€€On€June€7,€1996,€Holzinger€notified€IDB€that€he€was€exercising€his€option€toÏpurchase€the€real€property€and€requested€that€IDB€prepare€the€necessary€paper€work€as€soon€asÏpossible€so€that€the€parties€could€close€the€deal.€€On€July€12,€1996,€IDB€mailed€this€paper€work€toÏHolzinger€for€his€approval€and€requested€that€Holzinger€advise€IDB€concerning€a€possible€closingÏdate.€€After€receiving€no€response€from€this€correspondence,€counsel€for€IDB€sent€a€letter€toÏHolzingerððs€attorney€suggesting€that€the€parties€proceed€with€the€closing.€€When,€after€seven€days,Ïcounsel€for€IDB€still€had€not€received€a€response,€he€sent€a€second€letter€to€Holzingerððs€attorneyÏstating€that€IDB€was€ready,€willing,€and€able€to€close.€€On€August€28,€1996,€counsel€for€HolzingerÏfaxed€a€letter€to€IDBððs€attorney€explaining€that€his€client€had€been€ill€but€would€be€available€toÏconsummate€the€option€within€ð ðthe€next€couple€of€weeks.ðð€€Finally,€on€September€11,€1996,€counselÏfor€IDB€mailed€a€letter€to€Holzingerððs€attorney€demanding€that€they€schedule€a€closing.€€ÌÌà ` àBefore€exercising€the€option,€Holzinger€sought€to€have€the€real€property€rezoned€forÏmultiple€family€residential€use€so€that€it€could€be€used€in€the€development€of€an€apartment€complex.€ÏThe€Clarksville€City€Council€denied€Holzingerððs€zoning€request.€€On€May€24,€1996,€Holzinger€filedÏa€complaint€in€circuit€court€against€the€Clarksville€City€Council,€the€City€of€Clarksville,€and€IDB,Ïseeking€review€of€the€City€Councilððs€decision€(Holzingerððs€zoning€appeal).€€No€relief€was€soughtÏagainst€IDB;€rather,€IDB€was€named€as€a€defendant€by€virtue€of€its€ownership€of€the€property.€€IDBÏfiled€an€answer€and€counterclaim,€requesting€a€declaration€that,€as€a€result€of€Holzingerððs€refusal€toÏclose,€the€option€had€expired.€€Holzinger€filed€a€reply€to€IDBððs€counterclaim,€seeking€dismissal€ofÏIDBððs€claim€on€the€grounds€of€improper€joinder.€€On€March€25,€1997,€Holzinger€filed€a€separateÏcomplaint€against€the€Clarksville€City€Council,€the€City€of€Clarksville,€and€IDB,€€seeking€damagesÐ ;`6: Ðfor€injuries€sustained€as€a€result€of€the€City€Councilððs€denial€of€his€zoning€request€(HolzingerððsÏinverse€condemnation€action).€€Again,€IDB€was€named€as€a€defendant€to€this€second€action€becauseÏof€its€ownership€of€the€property€but€no€relief€was€sought€against€IDB.€€On€May€27,€1997,€IDB€filedÏa€motion€for€summary€judgment€seeking€a€judgment€as€a€matter€of€law€with€respect€to€itsÏcounterclaim€filed€in€Holzingerððs€zoning€appeal.€€On€June€19,€1997,€the€City€of€Clarksville€filed€aÏsecond€motion€for€summary€judgment,€arguing€that€if€the€trial€court€finds€that€Holzinger€has€noÏrights€under€the€option€contract€as€alleged€in€IDBððs€counterclaim,€then€Holzinger€lacks€standing€toÏmaintain€his€zoning€appeal.€€Holzinger€filed€a€memorandum€in€opposition€to€IDBððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€on€July€17,€1997,€again€stating€that€IDBððs€counterclaim€was€improperly€joined.€ÏThe€matter€came€to€be€heard€on€August€22,€1997.€€During€this€proceeding,€the€trial€court€allowedÏthe€parties€to€present€live€testimony€in€addition€to€oral€argument€by€counsel.׃ ×Ý ƒ #ÃÝòòÚ  Ú1Ú  ÚóóÝ  Ý×  ×€€At€the€conclusion€ofÐ pÀ Ðthe€partiesðð€proof,€the€trial€court€granted€IDBððs€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€The€trial€court€thenÏentered€orders€dismissing€both€Holzingerððs€zoning€appeal€and€his€inverse€condemnation€action€forÏlack€of€standing.€€This€appeal€followed.€€ÌÌòòò òà ` àóóó óOn€appeal,€the€questions€presented€for€review,€as€we€perceive€them,€are€as€follows:Ð Ð  Ð(1)€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€failing€to€dismiss€IDBððs€counterclaim€on€the€grounds€of€improperÏjoinder,€(2)€Did€the€trial€court€err€in€granting€summary€judgment€in€favor€of€IDB,€and€(3)€Was€theÏevidentiary€hearing€conducted€on€August€22,€1997€a€full€trial€on€the€merits?ÌÌòòò òà ` àó óóóAfter€being€named€as€a€defendant€to€Holzingerððs€zoning€appeal,€IDB€filed€aÐ 0*€%( Ðcounterclaim€asking€the€trial€court€to€declare€that€Holzinger€no€longer€had€a€right€to€purchase€the€realÏproperty€under€the€option€contract.€€Holzinger€replied€to€IDBððs€counterclaim€as€follows:ÌÌÓÓà8 ` àò ò11.€€Improper€joinder.€€ó óPlaintiffsðð€action€is€an€appeal€by€writ€ofÐ °1-0 Ðcertiorari€with€a€special€standard€of€review.€€The€counterclaim€ofÏdefendant,€Industrial€Development€Board,€is€a€normal€action€differentÏin€nature€from€an€appeal€by€writ€of€certiorari.€€These€two€claimsÏcannot€be€heard€together.€€They€are€improperly€joined.€€TheÏcounterclaim€should€be€dismissed€without€prejudice€to€bringing€it€asÏa€separate€action.Ð ` x` x ÐÌÌÌÓÅÓHolzinger€reiterated€this€argument€in€his€memorandum€in€opposition€to€IDBððs€motion€for€summaryÏjudgment.€€Holzinger€did€not€file€a€motion€to€dismiss€IDBððs€counterclaim€on€the€grounds€ofÏimproper€joinder.€€Nor€did€the€trial€court€address€Holzingerððs€objection€to€the€joinder€of€IDBððsÏcounterclaim€when€granting€IDBððs€motion€for€summary€judgment.€€As€a€general€rule,€a€defense€notÏraised€at€the€trial€court€level€is€waived€for€purposes€of€appeal.€€òòò òSee,€e.g.,€Teague€Bros.,€Inc.€v.Ð  ð ÐMartin€&€Bayley,€Inc.ó óóó,€750€S.W.2d€152,€156€(Tenn.€App.€1987)(citing€ò òòòCitizensðð€Bank€&€Trust€Co.Ð €Ð Ðv.€Scott€&€Sandersó óóó,€72€S.W.2d€1064€(Tenn.€App.€1933);€T.R.C.P.€12.08).€€Under€the€pleadingÐ `° Ðstandards€of€the€Tennessee€Rules€of€Civil€Procedure,€however,€we€must€construe€Holzingerððs€replyÏto€IDBððs€counterclaim€liberally€so€as€to€do€substantial€justice.€€ò òòòSee€Ezell€v.€Gravesóóó ó,€807€S.W.2d€700,Ð  p Ð704€(Tenn.€App.€1990)(citing€T.R.C.P.€8.06).€€Thus,€we€find€that€the€objection€noted€in€HolzingerððsÏreply€to€IDBððs€counterclaim€and€Holzingerððs€memorandum€in€opposition€to€IDBððs€motion€forÏsummary€judgment€was€sufficient€to€preserve€Holzingerððs€right€to€raise€the€issue€of€improper€joinderÏon€appeal.ÌÌà ` àAs€a€general€rule,€a€party€must€assert€as€a€counterclaim€any€claim€that€he€or€she€hasÏagainst€an€opposing€party€if€the€claim€arises€out€of€the€same€transaction€or€occurrence€that€is€theÏsubject€matter€of€the€opposing€partyððs€claim.€€ò òòòSee€óóó óT.R.C.P.€13.01.€€Additionally,€a€party€may,€butÐ  +p&) Ðis€not€required€to,€assert€as€a€counterclaim€any€claim€that€he€or€she€has€against€an€opposing€party€thatÏdoes€not€arise€out€of€the€same€transaction€or€occurrence€that€is€the€subject€matter€of€the€opposingÏpartyððs€claim.€€ò òòòSee€ó óóóT.R.C.P.€13.02.€€As€an€exception€to€this€rule,€however,€a€party€may€not€assert€aÐ À0,/ Ðcounterclaim€when€the€claim€of€the€opposing€party€is€an€appeal€to€the€trial€court€from€a€decisionÏrendered€during€an€administrative€proceeding.€€In€òòò òGoodwin€v.€Metropolitan€Bd.€of€Healthóóó ó,€656Ð €4Ð/3 ÐS.W.2d€383€(Tenn.€App.€1983),€Goodwin€was€employed€by€the€Metropolitan€Board€of€HealthÏ(Board)€as€a€home€health€aid.€€òòò òSee€id.€ó óóóat€386.€€After€an€administrative€hearing,€the€Board€terminatedÐ @837 Ðher€employment.€€òòò òSee€id.€€óóó óBy€writ€of€certiorari,€Goodwin€appealed€the€decision€of€the€Board€to€theÐ  :p59 Ðchancery€court.€€ò òòòSee€id.€€óóó óIn€addition€to€seeking€review€of€the€Boardððs€termination€decision,Ð