WPCR! # VUNa % 0( 0l 0DI w@ 4  0J 0T: 0^ 0h 0rT  0| 0J 0 1u` U, 0dU,eU> D3 BU 6 0@UB)DC AMU*N x Jv~\v AO 0D D/! B5!HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPT0 (hH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX($((3$ !      0  (#$  0   [DDӀ)} B3|x)2 0Indent123  2" 0Indent20 23  2, 0Indent30 0 23  26 0Indent40 0 0 23  2@ 0Indent50 0 0 0 23  2J 0Indent60 0 0 0 0 23  2T 0Indent70 0 0 0 0 0 23  2^ 0Indent80 0 0 0 0 0 0 23   ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)<  9p`(ModernP 8Mac DefaultMac Default ` X<  9p`(Monaco<  9p`(&Times New Roman++++'dxd d<  9p`(Courier New("$    % Line 7 d....7Border 1dd-/C << G<  9p`(Arial  !#d# )  11   YYY FILED1X May24,1996CecilCrowson,Jr.1AppellateCourtClerk   !#d# )  $       ,,Theappellantarguesthatwecannotconsidertheappelleesissuesbecausehedidnotfileanoticeofappeal.Theappellantspositionisincorrect.Onceacaseisproperlyappealedbyoneparty,theotherpartyorpartiesareatlibertytoraiseissues.SeeRule13(a),T.R.A.P. !#d# )  $       ,,HusbandfiledfordivorceonDecember6,1993.  !#d# )  $       ,,Someoftheassetsarepartiallyseparatepropertyandpartiallymaritalproperty.Thetrialcourtontheremandshouldseparatetheseinterestsoutbeforeequitablydividingthemaritalassetcomponent.  !#d# )  $       ,,TotheextentHusbandcontributedtheproceedsfromtheliquidationoftheseassetstothemarriage,hisinterestatthetimeofthemarriagecanbeconsideredasa contributionbyhimwhenthecourtmakesanequitabledivisionofthenowexistingmaritalestate.SeeT.C.A.364121(c)(5).PtPtHH(FG(HH(d'@Styl{WP}01  HH  2$HH  Geneva  <Px443!#4$*$$*$ KK  Geneva  Geneva .,6 Monaco   BA Op Monaco  BA Op Monaco -C<< CLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$   1  ' dxdP Pd ! .  &((Xd&#((Xd#)  P ,75XXdd7\RA'\  ћ@ INTHECOURTOFAPPEALSOFTENNESSEEٜL02/;+'h|Wi`  `LߛRICHARDPALLMERJAHN,JR., )C/ANO.03A019511CH00388      )HAMILTONCOUNTYCHANCERYCOURT  PlaintiffAppellee, )      )      )      )HONORABLEDOUGLASA.MEYER,v.      )JUDGE,ByInterchange      )      )      )      )̜SHERYLJUNEJAHN,   )AFFIRMEDINPART,ASMODIFIED      )VACATEDINPART  DefendantAppellant.)REMANDEDWITHINSTRUCTIONSWILLIAMC.KILLIAN,Jasper,forAppellantJ.W.DIETZENofDIETZEN&ATCHLEY,Chattanooga,forAppellee@ OPINION           Susano,J.  Thisisadivorcecase.ThetrialcourtawardedRichardϜPallmerJahn,Jr.(Husband),adivorce;grantedhimcustodyofthepartiestwominorchildren,MadisonAnneJahn(DOB:March12,1986)andHaydenErichJahn(DOB:July22,1987);establishedthevisitationrightsofSherylJuneJahn(Wife);orderedWifetopayHusbandchildsupportintheamountof$1,892permonth;appointedthepartiescotrusteesofthechildrenspreexistingeducationalfund;anddividedthepartiesproperty.Wifeappeals,arguingthattheevidencepreponderatesagainstthetrialcourtscustodyandvisitationdecreesandthatthecourterredinfailingtotreatHusbandsinterestintheassetsofhislawpartnershipasamaritalasset.Husbandalsoraisesissues. 3   כHecontendsthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveimposedachildsupportobligationonWifefortheperiodfromthepartiesseparationtothedateofthefinalhearing;thatthetrialcourterredinrequiringHusbandtodepositaportionofhischildsupportintothechildrenseducationalfund;thatthecourterredinappointingthepartiescotrusteesofthefund;andthatthecourterredinfailingtoequitablydividethemaritalassets.  Inthisnonjurycase,ourreviewisdenovo;however,therecordcomestousaccompaniedbyapresumptionofcorrectnessofthetrialcourtsfactuallydrivendeterminations.Wemustaffirmthosedeterminationsunlesstheevidencepreponderatesagainstthem.Rule13(d),T.R.A.P.Nosuchpresumptionattachestothetrialcourtsconclusionsoflaw. UnionCarbideCorp.v.Huddleston ,854S.W.2d87,91(Tenn.1993).@ I.CustodyandVisitationIssues  Ourdenovoreviewofthetrialcourtscustodyandvisitationdecreesistemperedbythewellestablishedprinciplethatatrialcourthaswidediscretioninmattersofcustodyandvisitation. Suttlesv.Suttles ,748S.W.2d427,429(Tenn.1988); Marminov.Marmino ,238S.W.2d105,107(Tenn.App.1950); Grantv.Grant ,286S.W.2d349,350(Tenn.App.1954).Thevariousgeneralprinciplesregardingatrialcourtsprerogativesinthesemattersandourreviewofsameiswellstatedin Suttles : 8 Althoughwerecognizethatthegeneralruleisthat thedetailsofcustodyandvisitationwithchildrenarepeculiarlywithinthebroaddiscretionofthetrialjudge, Edwardsv.Edwards ,501S.W.2d283,291(Tenn.App.1973),andthatthetrialcourtsdecisionwillnotordinarilybereversedabsentsomeabuseofthatdiscretion, inreviewingchildcustodyandvisitationcases,wemustrememberthatthewelfareofthechildhasalwaysbeentheparamountconsiderationforthecourts. Lukev.Luke ,651S.W.2d219,221(Tenn.1983).Inaddition,therightofthenoncustodialparenttoreasonablevisitationisclearlyfavored.E.g., Weaverv.Weaver ,37Tenn.App.195,202203,261S.W.2d145,148(1953).748S.W.2dat429.  Thetrialjudgefoundthat bothparents[were]suitabletohavecustodyof[their]children;however,heconcludedthat [j]ointcustodywouldnotbeinthebestinterestofthechildren,citingourdecisionin Doddv.Dodd ,737S.W.2d286,28990(Tenn.App.1987).HeawardedsolecustodytoHusbandbaseduponananalysisofthepartiescomparativefitnesstobecustodiansoftheirminorchildren.HedeterminedthattheevidencetendedtofavorHusbandbecauseofagreateravailabilityofthirdpartysupport;morepositive associationsandinfluencestowhichthechildrenare...likelytobeexposed...with...Husband;andMr.Jahnsconsistencyandstability.Ourdenovoreviewoftherecorddoesnotpersuadeusthattheevidencepreponderatesagainstthesefindings.ThereissubstantialevidencethatHusbandhasbeenandwilllikelycontinuetobeafitandpropercustodianofthesetwochildren.Onbalance,theprooffavorsHusbandoverWifeonthisissue.  Thetrialcourtfound,andweagree,thatthefactsϜmilitateagainstajointcustodyarrangement.Thefeelingsbetweenthepartiesweresuchastodemonstrateanabsenceofthecooperativespiritthatissoessentialtoaworkablejointcustodyarrangement. Dodd ,737S.W.2dat290.Evenatthat,thecourtdiddecreethatWifeshouldcontinuetobeactivelyinvolvedinthechildrenslives: 8 Husbandmustconsultwithwife,beforemakinganymajordecisionsregardingthechildrenseducation,medicaltreatment,religioustraining,andextracurricularactivities. 8 Wifeshallhaveequalaccesstothechildrensgradesandschoolteachersandshallbekeptgenerallyadvisedbythehusbandofmaterialmattersrelatingtothechildrenshealth,education,religioustraining,sportsandextracurricularactivities.Theevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstanyofthecourtsdecreeswithrespecttotheissueofcustody.  Inthealternative,Wifearguesthatthecourtshouldhaveawardedhermorevisitationtimewithherchildren.ShearguesthatshehadmoretimewiththemunderherinformalunderstandingwithHusbandfollowingthepartiesseparation.  Theissueofvisitationaddressedthesounddiscretionofthetrialjudge. Suttles ,748S.W.2dat429.HerespondedbyawardingWifesubstantialtimewithherchildren:everyotherweekend;Wednesdayafternoons;twoweeksinthesummer;everyotherEaster,MemorialDay,July4th,LaborDay,andThanksgiving;halfoftheschoolsystemsChristmasvacation;everyotherspringvacation;MothersDay;Wifesbirthdayandapartofeachchildsbirthday;alternateHalloweens;andeveryotherschoolfallbreak.Whilenotinthecourtsdecree,thetrialcourtexpresseditsintentthatWifehavesubstantialvisitationwiththechildren: Iwanther,anytimeshesfree,tobewithherchildren.Theevidencedoesnotpreponderateagainstthetrialcourtsdecreewithrespecttovisitation.Wefindnoabuseofthetrialcourtsdiscretion.@ II.ChildSupportandRelatedIssues  ThetrialcourtorderedWifetopayHusbandchildsupportof$1,892permonth.ThisawardwasbaseduponthecourtsfindingthatWifewascapableofearningagrossmonthlyincomeof$8,500.HusbandarguesthatthesepaymentsshouldhavebeenmaderetroactivetoJanuary,1994. 4   ׀ThecourtbelowoptedtomakethesepaymentsandWifesobligationtopayhalfofthechildrensmedicalinsuranceprospectiveonlyfromMay1,1995.  Wedonotfindanyerrorinthetrialcourtsdecision.HusbandfiledamotionfortemporarychildsupportonMay10,1994.AnagreedorderwasenteredonMay27,1994,directingWifetopayHusbandchildsupportpendenteliteof$1,000permonth.Thatorderwasinplaceuntilthefinaljudgmentwasentered.Thepartiesagreedthat$1,000wastheappropriateamountofchildsupportpendentelite.Thetrialcourtapprovedthisagreementandtheorderprovidedthatthesepaymentswould continu[e]untilfurtherorderof[the]court.Underthecircumstancesofthiscase,itwasnotinappropriatetomakeWifeschildsupportobligationsinthefinaljudgmentprospectiveinnatureonly.  Husbandnextarguesthatthecourterredwhenitorderedhimtopay$600of [wifes]support[paymentof$1,892]...intotheeducationaltrustfundforthechildren.WebelievetheanswertothisissuecanbefoundintheChildSupportGuidelines(Guidelines)promulgatedbytheTennesseeDepartmentofHumanServicespursuanttotheprovisionsofT.C.A.365101(e)(2).TheseGuidelineshavetheforceoflaw. Nashv.Mulle ,846S.W.2d803,804(Tenn.1993).AtrialcourthastheauthoritytodeviatefromtheGuidelinesbutonlyifanappropriatereasonfordoingsoisexpresslystatedontherecord.T.C.A.365101(e)(1).  Tenn.Comp.R.&Regs.,ch.124024.04(3)providesasfollows: 8 Thecourtmustorderchildsupportbasedupontheappropriatepercentageofallnetincomeoftheobligorasdefinedaccordingto124024.03ofthisrulebutalternativepaymentarrangementsmaybemadefortheawardfromthatportionofnetincomewhichexceeds$6,250.Whenthenetincomeoftheobligorexceeds$6,250permonth,thecourtmayestablisheducationalorothertrustfundsforthebenefitofthechild(ren)ormakeotherprovisionsinthechild(ren)sbestinterest;however,allofthesupportawardamountbasedonnetincomeupthrough$6,250mustbepaidtothecustodialparent.(Emphasisadded).ThetrialcourtdeterminedthatWifewascapableofearningamonthlygrossincomeof$8,500whichtranslatesintoa forcednetincomeof$5,911.05.ItcorrectlysetherchildsupportobligationpursuanttotheGuidelinesat$1,892permonth.Husband,asthecustodianofthechildren,isentitledtothefullamountofthemandatedsupport.SincetherewasnoexpressfindingbythetrialcourtstatingthatitwasdeviatingfromtheGuidelines,andwhy,itwasnotappropriateforthecourttoorderHusbandtosetasideaportionofthemonthlychildsupportforthechildrenseducationalfund.Acourts setasideauthoritybeginsatanetincomeof$6,250.Accordingly,thetrialcourtsjudgmentismodifiedtodeletethefollowingprovision: 8 Sixhundreddollars($600.00)permonthofthissupportshallbepaidbythehusbandintotheeducationaltrustfundforthechildren.  Priortotheirseparation,thepartiesestablishedtheeducationalfundforthechildren.Atthetimeofthedivorce,thefundcontainedinexcessof$25,000foreachchild.Thetrialcourtaddressedthisfundasfollows: 8 Bothpartiesshallserveastrusteesofthechildrenseducationalfundandbothsignaturesarerequiredtodisbursethesefunds.TheincometaxasaresultofearningsofthefundswillbepaidbytheHusband,withtheWifetoreimbursehimforhalfofsuchtax.Totheextentthatanytaxdeductionexistsforcontributionstothefund,thepartymakingthedonationtothefundshallreceivethecorrespondingtaxadvantage.Ifanytaxdeductionexistsforthefundspresentlyintheaccounts,thetaxdeductionwillbedividedbytheparties. 8 Theeducationfundmaybeusedforcollegeorhighschooltuition(9thgradeandup).However,ifitisdecidedtoplacethechildreninaprivateorparochialschoolotherthanLutheranSchoolafter6thgrade,thefundmaybeusedforthesetuitioncosts.Thepartiesmayalsoenterintoamoredetailedagreementalongthelinesof Acostav.Acosta ,19TAM359(Tenn.App.1994)astocontributions,use,anddispositionofthetrustfundsifanyremainafterthechildrenseducationiscompleted.Husbandcomplainsthatheshouldhavebeenthesoletrusteeofthesefunds.Wedisagree.  WifemadesubstantialcontributionstothefundoutofherearningsasaCertifiedRegisteredNurseAnesthetist.Insomeyears,herincomeexceededthatofHusbands.Infact,mostofthemoneyinthefundhadbeencontributedbyWife.Wefindnoerrorinestablishingthepartiesascotrusteesofthefund.Husbandsissueonthispointisfoundtobewithoutmerit.@ III.DivisionofPropertyIssues  HusbandarguesthatWifereceivedadisproportionateshareofthemaritalassets.WifecontendsthatthetrialcourtshouldhaveconsideredHusbandsinterestintheassetsofhislawfirmasamaritalasset.Wewillconsiderthesetwoissuestogether.  Aresolutionofthesepropertyissuesishamperedbythefailureofthetrialcourttomakespecificfindingsastotheidentityandvalueofthemaritalassetsandobligations.Forexample,itisnotclearfromtherecordwhetherthecourtfoundthathusbandsinterestinthelawfirmassetswasaseparatepropertyinterestoramaritalasset.WhatisclearisthatheawardedthatinterestentirelytoHusband.  Husbandsinterestintheassetsofhislawpracticeisamaritalasset.TheseassetsaccountsreceivableandotherassetswerecreatedoracquiredafterthepartiesmarriageonMarch29,1985.Thereisnoproofintherecordthattheseparticularaccountsreceivablewereinexistencein1985.Thereisnoreasontobelievetheywere;iftheywerethatold,Husbandwouldnothaveclaimedthattheyarenowcollectible.Sincetheseaccountsandtheotherassetswerecreatedoracquiredduringthemarriage,theyaremaritalassets.SeeT.C.A.364121(b)(1)(A).  Accordingtothetestimony,Husbandsinterestintheassetsofthelawfirmisproperlyvaluedat$180,065.IfthisassetisassignedtotallytoHusbandasitwasbythetrialcourtaninequitabledivisionofmaritalpropertyresults.ThisistruebecauseofthesubstantialcontributionsmadebyWifeaswageearner,wife,andmother.  Wecannotascertainthetruevalueofmanyofthemaritalassetsfromtherecordbeforeus.Thus,wefinditappropriatetoremandthiscasetothetrialcourtforthepurposeof(a)identifyingthemaritalassetsoftheparties;(b)establishingthevalueofthoseassets 5   ;and(c)equitablydividingsamebetweentheparties.Inmakingthisdetermination,thetrialcourtisdirectedtoconsiderthefullvalueofthelawfirminterest$180,065asamaritalasset.  WehaveconsideredHusbandsargumentthatweshouldconsiderthevalueofhisinterestinthelawfirmassetsatthetimeofthemarriageandallowhimtooffsetthatagainstthevalueatthetimeofthedivorce.Wedeclinetodoso.Thelawfirmassetsinexistenceatthetimeofmarriage 6   כarenolongerownedbyHusbandsfirm.Theaccountsreceivablehavebeencollectedorarenolongercollectible.Thefixedassetshaveapparentlylongsincebeendiscarded.The bottomlineisthattheassetsnowinexistencewereacquiredduringthemarriage.Theyaremaritalassets.  Theappellantsmotiontoconsiderpostjudgmentfactsisdenied.ThefactsthatweareaskedtoconsiderdonotfallwithinthetypeoffactscontemplatedbyRule14,T.R.A.P.  Thejudgmentofthetrialcourtismodifiedtodeletetherequirementthatappelleeputaportionofthechildsupportreceivedfromappellantinthechildrenseducationalfund.Theportionofthejudgmentaddressingthedivisionofthepartiespropertyisvacatedandthatmatterisremandedwithinstructionsassetforthinthisopinion.Theremainderofthejudgmentisaffirmed.Costsonappealaretaxedhalftoeachparty.       _____________________________       CharlesD.Susano,Jr.,J.CONCUR:_____________________________̜HoustonM.Goddard,P.J.̛̜_____________________________DonT.McMurray,J.