ÿWPCí 5# öUN %O 0cUU<¸w@ô44HBW AQ™ 0§ê‘ 0J™ 0Tã 0^7 0h• 0rý 0|o 0†ë 0q 1u 0dv 0@Ú D3 0DM U>‘ B)Ï DCø AM; Bˆ Æ¥ 0Dk 0D¯ D/ó B"U*?^iŸÇU6fv~œvÓ˜HP LaserJet 4SiHPPCL5MS,ü,,,,,ü0nLLÎ(ÈhH  Z 6Times New Roman RegularX(;1˜$¡¡Ò°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XcXXXÔ-šBu Z‹$Arrus BT Roman FGEHIUJUKîLÓ€MÓ€Y^§aö"\W3|x^C:\WPWIN60\TEMPLATE\STANDARD.WPT*+ ,-Cþÿ<< Cÿÿ(W(3RÏ$¤¤Ý ƒ1˜!ÝÒ°ÒÒ„°ÒÔ€XÔwXXXÔÝ  Ýà ` àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò))))'ÿÿdxd(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d&&&&7Border 1dd* 'Cþÿ << Gÿÿ dƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5(3¯$¢¢Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ý($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó..'÷ÿ dxdüÿP Pd< Œ 9p`(Arial TÝ ƒ!ÝÑ  ÑÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ+"ÝÝ  ÝÔ€/ÔÔ€/ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€/XÔÌÌò òJulyÏ31,Ï1997ÌÌCecilÏCrowson,ÏJr.ÌÔ€/ôÔAppellateÏCourtÏClerkó ó •Ý ƒ!ÝÑ#€d#ÑÔ€%ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ $Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ý€€The€trial€court€heard€arguments€concerning€other€petitions,€as€well€asÏWifeððs€June€26,€1995€petition.€€The€only€issues€relevant€to€this€appeal€concernÏHusbandððs€pension€and€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees.€Ì< Œ 9p`(Courier NewPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€%ÔÒ  ÒÒ „ ÒÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€LÇXXdðXXdð7ÑÑ  ÑÓ  ÓÞ ÞÌà@ àIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌà àà à€€€€______________________________________________ÌÌò òANDREA€Y.€JOHNSON,€ó óÌÌà àPlaintiff„Appellee,ÌÙ€*ÙßR€(0'A1-j|Í` à. `€€@ÿRßà àà àà àà àà àà àà àShelby€Circuit€No.€127514€R.D.ÌVs.à àà àà àà àà àà àà àC.A.€No.€02A01„9608„CH„00194ÌÌò òCLINISSON€A.€JOHNSON,€ó óÌÌà àDefendant„Appellant.Ì____________________________________________________________________________ÌÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€JOE€C.€MORRIS,€CHANCELLORÌà@ àSitting€By€DesignationÌÌÌÌÌà@ àMimi€Phillips;€Phillips,€Howard€&€Grubb€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppelleeÌÌà@ àA.€C.€Wharton,€Jr.;€Wharton€&€Wharton€&€Associates€of€MemphisÌà@ àFor€AppellantÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà@ àò òòòAFFIRMEDÌÌó óà@ àóóOpinion€filed:€€ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òà àW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,ó óÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òPRESIDING€JUDGE,€W.S.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€JUDGEÌÌDAVID€R.€FARMER,€JUDGEó óÌÌÌÓÓ›à àThis€appeal€involves€a€post„divorce€petition.€€Defendant,€Clinisson€A.ÏJohnson€(Husband),€appeals€from€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€ordering€theÏimmediate€payment€of€Husbandððs€pension€awarded€in€the€trial€courtððs€priorÏdistribution€of€the€marital€property€and€awarding€attorneyððs€fees€to€plaintiff,ÏAndrea€Y.€Johnson€(Wife).Ìà àThe€parties€were€divorced€by€final€decree€entered€April€17,€1990,€endingÏa€marriage€of€sixteen€years.€€The€divorce€was€granted€to€both€parties€on€theÏgrounds€of€irreconcilable€differences.€€The€parties€entered€into€a€maritalÏdissolution€agreement,€which€was€approved€and€incorporated€into€the€finalÏdecree€by€the€trial€œcourt.Ìà àDuring€the€marriage,€the€parties€owned€a€residence€valued€at€$75,000.00,Ïhousehold€furnishings€worth€approximately€$2,000.00,€and€two€cars€with€anÏundisclosed€value.€€Pursuant€to€the€martial€dissolution€agreement,€Wife€wasÏentitled€to€purchase€Husbandððs€equity€in€the€residence,€and€after€consummationÏof€the€sale,€Wife€was€to€become€the€sole€owner€of€the€residence.€€She€was€alsoÏresponsible€for€both€mortgages.€€Wife€was€awarded€one€of€the€automobiles€andÏthe€household€furnishings€in€the€residence.€€Husband€was€awarded€his€personalÏproperty€in€his€separate€residence€and€the€other€automobile.€Ìà àHusband€is€employed€by€the€Shelby€County€Government.€€It€appearsÏfrom€the€record€that€Husbandððs€monthly€take€home€salary€is€$4,795.35.€€WifeððsÏnet€monthly€income€is€$1,520.00.€€Wife€has€custody€of€the€partiesðð€three€minorÏchildren.›Ìà àThe€parties€each€filed€multiple€petitions€for€contempt€against€the€otherÏat€various€stages€of€the€divorce€proceedings.€€The€parties€appeared€before€theÏtrial€court€numerous€times,€both€before€and€after€the€entry€of€the€final€decreeÏof€divorce.€€Finally,€on€June€26,€1995,€Wife€filed€a€petition€titled€ð ðPetition€toÏReduce€Claim€to€Final€Judgment€for€Breach€of€Contract.ðð€€In€the€petition,€WifeÏalleges€that€œHusband€failed›€to€pay€her€the€one„half€of€his€pension€that€she€wasÏawarded€pursuant€to€the€marital€dissolution€agreement.€€She€claims€that€she€isÍentitled€to€$4,424.06€from€Husbandððs€pension€and€that€she€is€owed€interest€onÏthat€amount€at€the€rate€of€$1.21€per€day.Ìà àThe€marital€dissolution€agreement€states€in€pertinent€part:Ìà8 àà8 àThe€Second€Party€(Husband)€is€the€owner€of€aÏpension€vested€by€way€of€his€employment€with€theÏCity€of€Memphis€and€Shelby€County€Government.€€ItÏis€agreed€that€the€party€of€the€first€party€œ[sic]€(Wife)›Ïis€entitled€to€ðð€the€value€of€this€pension€as€of€AprilÏ11,€1990€and€that€said€entitlement€shall€be€basedÏupon€the€period€of€marriage€of€the€parties€May€5,Ï1973€to€April€10,€1990,€with€said€benefits€being€basedÏonly€on€those€that€accrued€during€the€term€of€theÏmarriage.€€First€Party€waives€and€relinquishes€anyÏclaim€or€rights€of€any€type€to€the€other€ðð€of€theÏSecond€Partyððs€interest€in€his€pension.ÌÌà àAfter€a€hearing€on€January€26,€1996œ,× ƒ1 ××  ×›€the€trial€court€entered€an€order€inÍfavor€of€Wife.€€In€its€order,€the€trial€court€found,€òòinter€aliaóó,€that€Wife€wasÏentitled€to€$4,424.06€of€Husbandððs€Shelby€County€Government€Pension€œthat›Ïwas€awarded€originally€in€the€marital€dissolution€agreement.€€The€trial€courtÏalso€awarded€interest€in€the€amount€of€$1.21€per€day.€€In€the€order,€the€trialÏcourt€stated€in€pertinent€part:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à[T]he€Court€specifically€finds€that€the€PlaintiffÏbecame€entitled€to€receive€the€portion€of€DefendantððsÏpension€awarded€to€her€at€the€time€the€Final€DecreeÏof€Divorce€was€entered,€and,€accordingly,€that€she€isÏalso€entitled€to€interest€on€the€principal€amount€fromÏand€after€April€17,€1990,€the€date€on€which€the€FinalÏDecree€of€Divorce€was€entered,€as€is€more€specificallyÏset.€€The€Court€specifically€finds€that€simple€interestÏon€the€principal€amount€has€accrued€at€the€rate€ofÏ$1.21€a€day,€and€that€as€of€January€26,€1996€judgmentÏhas€accrued€in€the€amount€of€$2,493.12,€for€a€totalÏjudgment€of€principal€and€interest€of€$6,917.18.ÌÌÓÓThe€trial€court€also€awarded€attorneyððs€œfees,›€incurred€from€February€1994€untilÏthe€date€of€the€hearing€in€the€amount€of€œ$7,010.29,›€to€Wife€that€she€paid€ð ðtoÏsecure€the€Defendantððs€compliance€with€Orders€of€this€Court.ððÌà àHusband€appeals€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€and€presents€two€issuesÏfor€œÌÌÌreview:›€€1)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€by€ordering€the€immediate€payment€ofÍHusbandððs€pension€benefits€to€Wife,€and€2)€whether€the€trial€court€erred€inÏawarding€attorneyððs€fees€to€Wife.à àÌà àSince€this€case€was€tried€by€the€court€sitting€without€a€jury,€we€reviewÏthe€case€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record€with€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€theÏfindings€of€fact€by€the€trial€court.€€Unless€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€findings,€we€must€affirm,€absent€error€of€law.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).Ìà àIn€his€first€issue,€Husband€does€not€dispute€that€Wife€is€entitled€œto€one„half›€of€his€pension€pursuant€to€the€marital€dissolution€agreement,€and€œhe›Ïconcedes€that€pension€benefits€are€marital€property.€€ò òòòSeeóóó ó€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€(1996);€€òòò òCohen€v.€Cohenóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d€823,€830€(Tenn.€1996).€ÏHowever,€Husband€argues€that€Wife€is€not€entitled€to€an€immediateÏdistribution€of€one„half€of€his€pension€benefits.€€First,€Husband€argues€thatÏTennessee€courts€recognize€two€methods€of€valuing€and€distributing€pensionsÏand€that€the€trial€court€in€this€case€used€the€wrong€method.€€In€ò òòòCohenóóó ó,€theÏTennessee€Supreme€Court€discussed€the€valuation€and€distribution€of€pensionÏbenefits:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 à€€€€The€difficulty€in€dividing€future€benefits€is€aided€byÏthe€use€of€elastic,€equitable€approaches.€€Most€courtsÏuse€one€of€two€techniques.€€The€first€approach,€knownÏas€the€present€cash€value€method,€requires€the€trialÏcourt€to€place€a€present€value€on€the€retirementÏbenefit€as€of€the€date€of€the€final€decree.€€ToÍdetermine€the€present€cash€value,€the€anticipatedÏnumber€of€months€the€employee€spouse€will€collectÏthe€benefits€(based€on€life€expectancy)€is€multiplied€byÏthe€current€retirement€benefit€payable€under€the€plan.€ÏThis€gross€benefit€figure€is€then€discounted€to€presentÏvalue€allowing€for€various€factors€such€as€mortality,Ïinterest,€inflation,€and€any€applicable€taxes.€€Once€theÏpresent€cash€value€is€calculated,€the€court€may€awardÏthe€retirement€benefits€to€the€employee„spouse€andÏoffset€that€award€by€distributing€to€the€other€spouseÏsome€portion€of€the€marital€estate€that€is€equivalentÏto€the€spouseððs€share€of€the€retirement€interest.€€TheÏpresent€cash€value€method€is€preferable€if€theÏemployee„spouseððs€retirement€benefits€can€beÏaccurately€valued,€if€retirement€is€likely€to€occur€inÏthe€near€future,€and€if€the€marital€estate€includesÏsufficient€assets€to€offset€the€award.Ìà8 àà8 à€€€€In€other€circumstances€in€which€the€vesting€orÏmaturation€is€uncertain€or€in€which€the€retirementÏbenefit€is€the€partiesðð€greatest€or€only€economic€asset,Ïcourts€have€used€the€ð ðdeferred€distributionðð€orÏð ðretained€jurisdictionðð€method€to€distribute€unvestedÏretirement€benefits.€€This€method€has€distinctÏadvantages€when€the€risk€of€forfeiture€is€great.€€UnderÏsuch€an€approach,€it€is€unnecessary€to€determine€theÏpresent€value€of€the€retirement€benefit.€€Rather,€theÏcourt€may€determine€the€formula€for€dividing€theÏmonthly€benefit€at€the€time€of€the€decree,€but€delayÏthe€actual€distribution€until€the€benefits€becomeÏpayable.€€The€marital€property€interest€is€oftenÏexpressed€as€a€fraction€or€a€percentage€of€theÏemployee€spouseððs€monthly€benefit.€€The€percentageÏmay€be€derived€by€dividing€the€number€of€months€ofÏthe€marriage€during€which€the€benefits€accrued€by€theÏtotal€number€of€months€during€which€the€retirementÏbenefits€accumulate€before€being€paid.€Ìà8 àà8 à€€€€One€advantage€to€the€deferred€distribution€methodÏis€that€it€allows€an€equitable€division€withoutÍrequiring€present€payment€for€a€benefit€not€yetÏrealized€and€potentially€never€obtained.€€AnotherÏadvantage€to€the€approach€is€that€it€equallyÏapportions€any€risk€of€forfeiture.€€While€aÏdisadvantage€may€be€that€the€approach€requires€a€trialÏcourt€to€retain€jurisdiction€to€oversee€the€payment,Ïthe€entry€of€an€order€awarding€a€certain€percentage€ofÏthe€benefits€at€the€time€of€payment€should€lessen€theÏadministrative€burden€of€the€court.€€Courts€routinelyÏretain€jurisdiction€to€supervise€payments€of€alimonyÏand€child€support€and€have,€in€the€past,€successfullyÏdivided€vested€pension€rights€by€awarding€each€spouseÏa€share.€€An€administrative€burden€should€not€excuseÏan€inequitable€distribution€of€marital€property.ÌÌÓÓœò òòòCohenóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d›€at€831€(citations€omitted).Ìà àHusband€argues€that€the€marital€estate€has€been€overextended€and€thatÏthere€are€insufficient€funds€from€which€to€offset€an€immediate€judgment€of€one„half€of€his€pension.€€He€asserts€that€the€distribution€of€the€pension€benefitsÏshould€be€in€accordance€with€the€ð ðdelayed€distributionðð€or€ð ðretainedÏjurisdictionðð€method.Ìœà àThe›€choice€of€valuation€method€remains€within€the€sound€discretion€ofÏthe€trial€court€to€determine€after€consideration€of€all€relevant€factors€andÏcircumstances.€€€ò òòòCohenóóó ó,€937€S.W.2d€at€831.€€We€believe€that€the€trial€courtÏproperly€exercised€its€discretion€in€choosing€the€ð ðpresent€cash€valueðð€method.€ÏFirst,€vesting€or€maturation€of€Husbandððs€pension€is€œcertain,›€and€the€partiesÏeasily€determined€the€present€value€of€the€pension€benefits€at€the€time€of€theÍdivorce.€€The€pension€benefits€were€accurately€valued€at€$8,848.12,€with€WifeððsÏœone„half€share›€as€$4,424.06.€€In€addition,€the€pension€benefits€are€not€theÏpartiesðð€only€or€greatest€asset.€€We€believe€that,€in€light€of€Husbandððs€monthlyÏnet€income,€there€are€sufficient€funds€from€which€to€offset€an€immediateÏjudgment€of€the€pension.€€€Ìà àHusband€next€argues€that€state€pension€benefits€are€protected€fromÏexecution,€attachment,€or€garnishment€by€statute.€€T.C.A.€ðð€26„2„104€(a)Ïprovides€as€follows:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àAll€moneys€received€by€a€resident€of€the€state,€asÏpension€from€the€state€of€Tennessee,€or€anyÏsubdivision€or€municipality€thereof,€before€receipt,€orÏwhile€in€his€hands€or€upon€deposit€in€the€bank,€shallÏbe€exempt€from€execution,€attachment€orÏgarnishment€other€than€an€order€for€assignment€ofÏsupport€issued€under€ðð€36„5„501,€whether€suchÏpensioner€is€the€head€of€a€family€or€not.ÌÌÓÓT.C.A.€ðð€26„2„104€(a)€(Supp.€1996).€€Husband€argues€that€the€trial€courtÏsubjected€his€pension€funds€to€ð ðexecution,€attachment€or€garnishmentðð€becauseÏhe€has€no€other€funds€from€which€to€satisfy€the€judgment.€€He€asserts€that€theÏtrial€court€did€not€order€him€to€ð ðcash€out€or€borrow€againstðð€his€pension,€œand›Ïtherefore,€he€is€protected€by€statute.Ìà àIn€ò òòòBoyd€v.€Boydóóó ó,€No.€02A01„9210„CH„00294,€1993€WL€8379€œ(Tenn.›ÏApp.€Jan.€20,€1993),€this€Court€considered€the€effect€of€T.C.A.€ðð€26„2„104(a)€onÍthe€distribution€of€pension€benefits€in€a€divorce€action:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àThe€statute€clearly€renders€exempt€from€execution,Ïattachment€or€garnishment€all€money€received€by€aÏresident€of€the€state€as€a€pension€from€the€State€ofÏTennessee.€€ò òòòCoke€v.€Cokeóóó ó,€560€S.W.2d€631€(Tenn.€App.Ï1977).€€However,€we€do€not€construe€the€statute€toÏmean€that€the€court€in€a€divorce€action€is€prohibitedÏfrom€making€an€award€to€the€other€spouse.€€T.C.A.€ððÏ36„4„121(b)(1)(B)€does€not€exclude€a€state€employeeððsÏpension€from€the€definition€of€marital€property.ÌÌÓÓò òòòBoydóóó ó,€1993€WL€œ8379,›€at€*2.€€The€Court€found€that€the€evidence€did€notÏpreponderate€against€the€trial€courtððs€findings€and€allowed€the€distribution.€€òòò òId.ó óóó€ÏHowever,€the€distribution€was€not€to€be€made€until€the€husbandððs€retirement.€Ïòòò òId.Ìó óóóà àIn€ò òòòMalik€v.€Malikóóó ó,€No.€02A01„9604„CH„00070,€1996€WL€560257€œ(Tenn.›ÏApp.€Oct.€3,€1996),€this€Court€again€considered€T.C.A.€ðð€26„2„104(a).€€TheÏò òòòMalikóóó ó€Court€followed€the€holding€in€ò òòòBoydóóó ó€and€stated:ÌÓÓà8 àà8 àWe€agree€with€both€the€analysis€and€the€conclusion€ofÏthe€ò òòòBoydóóó ó€decision.€€Tennessee€Code€Annotated€ðð€26„2„104(a)€prohibits€the€ð ðexecution,€attachment,€orÏgarnishmentðð€of€state€pension€funds.€€In€this€case,Ïhowever,€the€trial€court€ordered€husband€to€cash€outÏand/or€borrow€against€such€funds.€€Thus,€the€fundsÏwere€not€subject€to€ð ðexecution,€attachment,€orÏgarnishment,ðð€or€any€other€judicial€process.Ìœ›ÌÓÓò òòòMalikóóó ó,€1996€WL€œ560257,›€at€*3.€€This€Court€affirmed€the€trial€courtððs€order€forÏthe€husband€to€cash€out€or€borrow€against€his€pension€fund€to€pay€the€wife€herÍshare€of€the€pension€fund€from€the€division€of€the€marital€assets.€€òòò òId.ó óóóÌà àIn€this€case,€Husband€argues€that€ò òòòMalikóóó ó€is€distinguishable€because€theÏtrial€court€did€not€order€him€to€ð ðcash€outðð€or€ð ðborrow€againstðð€his€pensionÏfund,€but€instead€œsubjected›€the€pension€benefits€to€ð ðexecution,€attachment€orÏgarnishment.ðð€€We€do€not€believe€that€ò òòòMalikóóó ó€requires€the€trial€court€to€useÏsuch€magic€language€to€overcome€T.C.A.€ðð€26„2„104(a).€€In€that€case,€the€wifeÏdid€not€have€to€wait€until€the€husbandððs€retirement€to€receive€her€share€of€hisÏpension.€€òòò òMalikóóó ó,€1996€WL€œ560257,›€at€*2.€€In€this€case,€the€trial€court€stated,Ïð ð[T]he€Court€specifically€finds€that€the€Plaintiff€became€entitled€to€receive€theÏportion€of€Defendantððs€pension€awarded€to€her€at€the€time€the€Final€Decree€ofÏDivorce€was€entered.ððÌà àWe€do€not€believe€that€the€trial€court€subjected€Husbandððs€pensionÏbenefits€to€ð ðexecution,€attachment€or€garnishment.ðð€€The€trial€courtððs€orderÏclearly€states€that€Wife€was€entitled€to€receive€her€share€of€the€pension€at€theÏtime€the€final€decree€was€entered.€€We€interpret€the€trial€courtððs€order€to€meanÏthat€Husband€must€pay€that€amount,€$4,424.06,€to€Wife€and€should€have€doneÏit€at€the€time€the€divorce€became€final.€€Husband€may€have€to€cash€out€orÏborrow€against€the€pension€fund,€but€the€pension€is€not€subject€to€ð ðexecution,Ïattachment€or€garnishment.ððÌà àHusband€next€argues€that€the€trial€court€provided€no€factual€basis€for€theÏorder€of€immediate€payment€of€the€pension€benefits.€€Husband€argues€that€it€isÏinequitable€for€the€Wife€to€enforce€and€add€to€the€marital€dissolutionÏagreement€six€years€after€its€entry.€€Husband€also€argues€that€the€trial€courtÏmade€the€order€without€taking€into€consideration€the€relevant€factors€in€T.C.A.Ïðð€36„4„121(c).Ìà àWe€believe€that€the€trial€court€was€called€upon€to€interpret€the€maritalÏdissolution€agreement€that€was€part€of€the€final€decree€of€divorce.€€The€trialÏcourt€did€not€need€a€factual€basis€to€determine€whether,€as€a€matter€of€law,ÏWife€was€entitled€to€the€pension€benefits€immediately€or€upon€HusbandððsÏretirement.€€For€the€same€reasons,€the€trial€court€did€not€have€to€consider€theÏfactors€in€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„121(c).€€Those€are€the€factors€that€the€trial€courtÏconsidered€in€making€the€equitable€division€in€the€first€place.€€They€have€noÏbearing€on€when€the€equitable€division€is€payable.€€à àWe€œdisagree€with€HusbandÏthat›€it€is€œinequitable›€to€enforce€a€six„year„old€marital€dissolution€agreement.€ÏThe€trial€court€found€that€Husband€should€have€paid€Wifeððs€share€of€theÏpension€benefits€six€years€ago,€and€œbecause›€Husband€owes€Wife€$4,424.06,Ïthere€is€nothing€inequitable€in€enforcing€the€agreed€upon€division€of€the€maritalÏproperty.Ìà àIn€conclusion,€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€by€applying€theÏð ðpresent€cash€valueðð€method,€and€the€evidence€does€not€preponderate€againstÏthe€trial€courtððs€findings.€€Wife€is€entitled€to€$4,424.06€of€Husbandððs€pensionÏbenefits,€plus€interest€as€awarded€by€the€trial€court.Ìà àIn€his€second€issue,€Husband€œcontends€that€the€trial€court€erred€inÏawarding€Wife€$7,010.29€in€attorneyððs€fees.€€He€argues›€that€he€is€in€no€betterÏfinancial€position€œthan›€Wife€to€pay€œher€attorneyððs›€fees.€€œInstead,€he›€œasserts›€that,Ïin€the€interest€of€equity,€each€party€should€be€held€responsible€for€his€or€herÏown€attorneyððs€fees.€Ìà àThe€law€in€Tennessee€is€clear€that€the€trial€court€has€wide€discretion€inÏawarding€attorneyððs€fees,€œand›€unless€the€evidence€preponderates€œotherwise,›€theÏœaward›€will€not€be€disturbed€on€appeal.€€òòò òKincaid€v.€Kincaidóóó ó,€912€S.W.2d€140,Ï144€(Tenn.€App.€1995).€€An€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€is€œappropriate€only›€whenÏthe€spouse€seeking€them€lacks€sufficient€funds€to€pay€his€or€her€own€legalÏexpenses€or€would€be€required€to€deplete€his€or€her€resources€in€order€to€payÏthese€expenses.€€òòò òBrown€v.€Brownóóó ó,€913€S.W.2d€163,€170€(Tenn.€App.€1994).Ìà àœAs€stated€previously,€the›€record€shows€that€Husbandððs€net€monthlyÏincome€is€$4,795.35,€and€Wifeððs€net€monthly€income€is€$1,520.00.€€In€the€caseÏat€bar,€œwe€believe€that€Husband€has€the€ability€to€pay€the€award,€and€we›€cannotÍsay€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€award€of€attorneyððs€fees€toÏœWife›œ›œ.›Ìà àAccordingly,€the€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed€in€all€respects.€ÏCosts€of€this€appeal€are€assessed€against€the€appellant.€à àÌÌÌà àÌÌÌÌ€œÔ€2ÔÔ€2Ô