ÿWPC …# VU:a %› 0(¡4ÉÝìw@ì, 0J4 0T~ 0^Ò 0h0 0r˜ 0| 0†† 0 1uœ U, 0d= U,¡ U*Í B)÷ DC  AMc B°çÍv~´vÓ2 D3 0@8 AOxÆÇ 0D D/Ñ B˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 ,†r‰AZ‹"Arial RegularX($¡¡;p‚ x3|xÏ ¹D¼U½D¾E¿ÀDÁEÂUÃÓ€Ï2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)< Œ 9p`(ModernP ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(Monaco< Œ 9p`(Arial% Line 7 d""""7Border 1dd€-#Cþÿ << Gÿÿ d ÝÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òMay€9,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó óPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'@Styl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑMonacoÑÑ ÑÒ  BA Op Monaco ÒÒ  BA Op Monaco Ò%%%%'ÿÿdxd("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÓ&€  X„d&ÓÑ#€  Xd#ÑÔ€!ÔÝ  ÝÓ  ÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÑ7€çØXXdædÈ7Ñ›à@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEEÌà@ àWESTERN€SECTION€AT€JACKSONÌÌÌTERRY€T.€JOHNSON,à àà àà à)€€Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óPlaintiff/Appellant,à àà àò ò)€œ€Shelby›€Circuit€No.€39380€T.D.Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌVS.à àà àà àà àà àà à)€€Appeal€No.€02A01„9502„CV„00029ÌÙ€€ÙœßL€$&#;+'h|¾ ` Å `€€Lß›à àà àà àà àà àà à)ÌMICHAEL€H.€MCCOMMON€andà àà à)ÌMLG&W,à àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àà àà àà àà à)Ìà àà àó óDefendants/Appellees.€à àò ò)ó óÌÌÌà@ àAPPEAL€FROM€THE€CIRCUIT€COURT€OFÏSHELBY€COUNTYÌà@ àAT€MEMPHIS,€TENNESSEEÌà@ àTHE€HONORABLE€WYETH€CHANDLER,€JUDGEÌÌœÌÌÌÌ›ÌÌò òA.€WILSON€WAGESÌALICE€L.€GALLAHERÌA.€WAGES€LAW€FIRMÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€AppellantÌÌÌò òJOSEPH€G.€LITTLEÌó óMemphis,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Appellee,€MLG&WÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌò òAFFIRMEDÌœÌÌÌ›ÌÌó óà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àò òALAN€E.€HIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌW.€FRANK€CRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.ÌÌHOLLY€KIRBY€LILLARD,€J.ÌœÌÓÓó óà àThis€action€was€brought€against€Michael€McCommon€and€Memphis€Light,€Gas,Ïand€Ñ7€çØXXdæXXdæ7ÑWater€(MLG&W)€for€personal€injuries€sustained€when€McCommon,€an€employeeÏof€MLG&W,€struck€plaintiff€with€his€vehicle.€€McCommon€was€dismissed€from€the€suitÏprior€to€trial.€Following€a€bench€trial,€the€lower€court€held€that€plaintiff's€negligence€wasÏgreater€than€that€of€the€defendant€and€that€plaintiff€proximately€caused€her€ownÏinjuries.€Because€we€do€not€find€that€the€evidence€preponderates€against€the€trialÏcourt's€determination,€we€affirm€the€judgment€dismissing€plaintiff's€case.Ìà@ àÌà àOn€October€12,€1990,€€Terry€Johnson€("plaintiff")€was€driving€a€friend's€car€on€ÏInterstate€240€in€Memphis.€€The€car€stalled€in€the€center€lane€of€the€interstate€andÏplaintiff€was€unable€to€restart€the€vehicle.€€Plaintiff€proceeded€to€get€out€of€the€vehicleÏin€order€to€warn€approaching€motorists€of€the€obstruction.€€Plaintiff€testified€thatÏdefendant's€vehicle€struck€her€as€she€emerged€from€the€car€with€her€back€facingÏoncoming€traffic.€€In€contrast,€McCommon€testified€that€when€plaintiff€got€out€of€the€car,Ïshe€began€running€across€the€left€lane€toward€the€median.€McCommon€testified€thatÍhe€reduced€his€speed€as€soon€as€he€saw€plaintiff€and€that€he€swerved€into€the€medianÏto€avoid€hitting€her.€€Defendant's€testimony€was€corroborated€by€an€eye„witness,€Mr.ÏElton€Harris,€who€testified€by€deposition€that€after€plaintiff€got€out€of€the€car,€she€tookÏ"running€steps"€across€the€left€lane€of€oncoming€traffic.€Harris€testified€that€he€sawÏMcCommon€brake€and€serve€into€the€median€in€an€attempt€to€avoid€striking€plaintiff.€ÏPlaintiff€suffered€substantial€physical€injury€as€a€result€of€the€incident.€ÌÌà àFollowing€a€bench€trial,€the€judge€held€that€the€plaintiff's€own€negligence€inÏrunning€into€oncoming€traffic€was€the€proximate€cause€of€her€own€injuries€and€thatÏplaintiff€was€more€than€50%€responsible€for€her€own€injuries.€Accordingly,€judgmentÏwas€entered€in€favor€of€defendant.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€has€raised€two€issues€on€appeal,€which€are:€€(1)€whether€the€trial€courtÏerred€in€admitting€the€deposition€testimony€of€Elton€Harris;€and€(2)€whether€the€trialÏcourt€erred€in€finding€that€Plaintiff€proximately€caused€her€own€injuries€and€was€moreÏthan€50%€responsible€for€her€own€injuries.ÌÌà àThe€plaintiff's€first€contention€is€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€admitting€theÏdeposition€testimony€of€Elton€Harris€into€evidence.€Plaintiff€argues€that€the€depositionÏshould€not€€have€been€admitted€because€defendant€failed€to€issue€a€subpoena€forÏHarris.€€ÌÌà àPrior€to€trial,€defendant€filed€an€affidavit€with€the€trial€court€stating€that€HarrisÍresided€in€Mississippi€and€that€defendant€would€be€unable€to€procure€Harris'€presenceÏby€subpoena€because€there€was€no€known€Tennessee€address€to€which€defendantÏcould€issue€a€subpoena.€The€trial€court€agreed€to€admit€the€deposition€on€the€conditionÏthat€the€parties€attempt€to€locate€the€witness€and€report€the€results€of€such€attempt€toÏthe€court.€€The€parties€confirmed€to€the€court€that€Harris€still€resided€out€of€state.€€ÏPlaintiff€argues€that€defendant's€failure€to€subpoena€Harris€was€error€for€two€reasons.€ÏFirst,€plaintiff€asserts€that€Harris€did€not€reside€at€a€distance€greater€than€100€milesÏfrom€the€place€of€trial,€and€thus,€defendant€failed€to€comply€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.Ï32.01(3).€€Next,€plaintiff€argues€that€defendant€should€have€complied€with€theÏsubpoena€requirement€because€Harris€stated€in€his€deposition€that€he€was€willing€toÏcome€to€trial€to€testify.ÌÌ€à àTenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€32.01(3)€€provides€in€part:ÌÓÓà àà8 àà àò òRule€32.01.€€Use€of€Depositions.€„ó ó€At€the€trial€orÏupon€the€hearing€of€a€motion€or€an€interlocutoryÏproceeding,€any€part€or€all€of€a€deposition,€so€far€asÏadmissible€under€the€Rules€of€Evidence€applied€as€thoughÏthe€witness€were€then€present€and€testifying,€may€be€usedÏagainst€any€party€who€is€present€or€represented€at€theÏtaking€of€the€deposition€or€who€had€reasonable€noticeÏthereof,€in€accordance€with€any€of€the€following€provisions:Ìà@ à.€.€.ÌÌà àà8 àà à(3)€€The€deposition€of€a€witness,€whether€or€not€aÏparty,€may€be€used€by€any€party€for€any€purpose€if€the€courtÏfinds:€€(A)€That€the€witness€is€dead;€or€(B)€that€the€witness€is€Ïat€a€greater€distance€than€one€hundred€miles€from€the€placeÏof€trial€or€hearing€or€is€out€of€the€state,€unless€it€appears€thatÏthe€absence€of€the€witness€was€procured€by€the€partyÏoffering€the€deposition;€or€(C)€that€the€witness€is€unable€toÏattend€or€testify€because€of€age,€illness,€infirmity€orÏimprisonment;€or€(D)€that€the€party€offering€the€depositionÍhas€been€unable€to€procure€the€attendance€of€the€witnessÏby€subpoena€or€the€witness€is€exempt€from€subpoena€toÏtrial€under€T.C.A.€ðð€24„9„101;€or€(E)€upon€application€andÏnotice,€that€such€exceptional€circumstances€exist€as€toÏmake€it€desirable,€in€the€interest€of€justice€and€with€dueÏregard€to€the€importance€of€presenting€the€testimony€ofÏwitnesses€orally€in€open€court,€to€allow€the€deposition€to€beÏused.€€Notwithstanding€the€foregoing€provisions,Ïdepositions€of€experts€taken€pursuant€to€the€provision€ofÏRule€26.02(4)€may€not€be€used€at€trial€except€to€impeach€inÏaccordance€with€the€provisions€of€Rule€32.01(1).ÌÌÌà àÌÓÓà àThe€admissibility€of€evidence€lies€within€the€sound€discretion€of€the€trial€courtÏand€its€decision€will€not€be€reversed€on€appeal€unless€there€has€been€a€demonstrationÏof€a€manifest€abuse€of€discretion.€€òòInman€v.€Aluminum€Co.€of€Americaóó,€697€S.W.€2d€350Ï(Tenn.€App.€1985);€òòOtis€v.€Cambridge€Mutual€Fire€Ins.€Co.óó,€850€S.W.€2d€439€(Tenn.Ï1992).€ÌÌà àIn€the€present€case,€Harris'€deposition€was€admitted€into€evidence€in€fullÏcompliance€with€Tenn.€R.€Civ.€P.€34.02€because€Harris€resided€out€of€state.€€ÏAdditionally,€we€find€the€fact€that€Harris€agreed€to€testify€at€trial€to€be€withoutÏsignificance.€€Accordingly,€we€hold€that€the€trial€court€did€not€abuse€its€discretion€inÏadmitting€Harris'€deposition€testimony€and€that€such€testimony€was€properly€admitted.ÌÌà àPlaintiff€next€alleges€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€its€finding€that€plaintiffÏproximately€caused€her€own€injuries,€and€that€plaintiff€was€more€than€50%€negligent.ÌÌà àOur€standard€of€review€on€this€issue€is€òòde€novoóó€upon€the€record,€accompaniedÍby€a€presumption€of€correctness€of€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).€€ThisÏCourt€must€affirm€the€trial€court's€findings€of€fact,€unless€the€evidence€preponderatesÏotherwise.€€T.R.A.P.€13(d).Ìà àÌà àProximate€cause€is€that€which€is€the€procuring,€efficient,€and€predominateÏcause.€€òòNash€v.€Loveóó,€440€S.W.€2d€593€(Tenn.€App.€1968).€€An€actor's€conduct€will€beÏconsidered€the€proximate€or€legal€cause€of€injury€if€three€requisites€are€met.€€First,€theÏactor's€conduct€must€be€a€substantial€factor€in€bringing€about€the€harm.€€Next,€thereÏmust€be€no€legal€rule€that€would€operate€to€relieve€the€actor€from€liability.€€Finally,€theÏharm€that€occurred€must€have€been€reasonably€foreseeable.€€òòMcClenahan€v.€Cooleyóó,Ï806€S.W.€2d€767,€775€(Tenn.€1991).€€ÌÌà àIn€light€of€the€above€factors,€we€agree€with€the€trial€court€that€plaintiff's€act€ofÏemerging€from€her€vehicle€and€stepping€into€oncoming€traffic€was€the€proximate€causeÏof€her€own€injuries.€€Similarly,€we€do€not€find€that€the€evidence€preponderates€againstÏthe€trial€court's€determination€that€plaintiff€was€more€that€50%€responsible€for€her€ownÏinjuries.€€In€fact,€we€find€very€little€evidence€from€the€record€that€would€support€theÏconclusion€that€defendant€was€negligent€in€any€respect.ÌÌà àThe€judgment€of€the€trial€court€is€affirmed.€€Costs€are€taxed€to€plaintiff.ÌÌÓÓÌà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€Ïóóà àà àà àà àà àà àà àà àHIGHERS,€J.ÌÌÌÌCONCUR:ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,W.S.ÌÌÌÌòò€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€€óóÌLILLARD,€J.Ì