ÿWPC0  …# VUNa %¯ 0(µw@Ý4 1 0l@ 0D¬ 0Jð 0T: 0^Ž 0hì 0rT 0|Æ 0†B 0È 1uX 0dÍ U>1B)oDC˜ AMÛU*(íRÑ?)E9,~v~ªvÓ( D3û B. 0@K AO‹ÆÚ 0D  D/ä B ˜HP LaserJet 4Si/4SiMX PS 600dpiPSCRIPTÀÌÀääÀÀÌ0 (ÖÃ9 Z ‹6Times New Roman RegularX($¡¡ >U? @ A B C£DEFÓ€Rs|˜!X lT ô3|xR((3üÝ$¤¤Ý ƒ!ÝÝ  Ýà  àòòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó(#Ã$òòÚ  Ú0Ú  Úóó2 ÿÿ0Indent1Ô2ÔÔ3  Ô2" ÿÿ0Indent2à0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2, ÿÿ0Indent3à0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô26 ÿÿ0Indent4à0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2@ ÿÿ0Indent5à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2J ÿÿ0Indent6à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2T ÿÿ0Indent7à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô2^ ÿÿ0Indent8à0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àà0 àÔ2ÔÔ3  Ô  ÿÿ?AGMSYaioIndent0I.A.1.a.(1)(a)i)a)P ÿÿ8Mac DefaultMac DefaultÓ ` °šXÓ< Œ 9p`(&Times New Roman% Line 7 d7Border 1dd€-Cþÿ << Gÿÿ< Œ 9p`(Arial ãÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÔ€!ÔÔ€!ÔÓ  ÓÔ YYY ÔFILEDÔ€!XÔÌÌò òDecember€31,€1996ÌÌCecil€Crowson,€Jr.ÌÔ€!ôÔAppellate€Court€Clerkó ó ÇÝ ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  Ýò ò36„4„101.€Grounds€for€divorce€from€bonds€of€matrimonyó ó.€.€.€.€Ìà8 àà à(12)€For€a€continuous€period€of€two€(2)€or€more€years€which€commencedÏprior€to€or€after€April€18,€1985,€both€parties€have€lived€in€separate€residences,€haveÏnot€cohabitated€as€man€and€wife€during€such€period,€and€there€are€no€minorÏchildren€of€the€parties.Ì Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝSubsection€12€was€added€to€36„4„101€by€Public€Acts€1985,€ch.€178,€ðð€1.€€It€was€amendedÏby€Public€Acts€1989,€ch.€393,€ðð€1€which€changed€the€three€year€period€to€two€years.Ì ;Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝLa.R.S.€9:301€provided:€ÌÌà8 àWhen€the€spouses€have€been€living€separate€and€apart€continuously€for€a€period€ofÏone€year€or€more,€either€spouse€may€sue€for€and€obtain€a€judgment€of€absoluteÏdivorce.Ì "Ý ƒ!ÝÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÝ ƒ$Ýà àòòÚ  ÚÚ  ÚóóÝ  ÝÓ` Ü` ˜XÓN.J.S.A.€2a:34„2(d)€provides:ÌÌà8 àà àSeparation,€provided€that€the€husband€and€wife€have€livedÏseparate€and€apart€in€different€habitations€for€a€period€of€at€least€18Ïor€more€consecutive€months€and€there€is€no€reasonable€prospect€ofÏreconciliation;€provided,€further€that€after€the€18„month€period€thereÏshall€be€a€presumption€that€there€is€no€reasonable€prospect€of€aÏreconciliation;€.€.€.€.ÌPtPtHHÚ(ÿáÿâùFG(üHHÚ(d'hStyl{WP}01•ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃà Ãà Ãà Ãà Ãà ÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÃÐ ÐÐHHÐÐ  ÐÐ2ÐÐÿÿ¸æ$ÿÐÐHHÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ  ÐÐ ÐÐ ÐÑÑÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÑ € ÑÑ<Px–ÈÑÒÒÒ443!#4ÒÒ$ *$ÒÒ$*$ÒÒ ÿKK ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÒ  Geneva ÒÓ.,ÓÓÓÓ6ÓÓ ÓßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßÑGenevaÑÑ ÑÒ  h HD: Geneva ÒÒ  h HD: Geneva Ò++++'ÿÿdxd d("ÿÿ$££Ò  ÒÒ  Ò€-‚ƒCþÿ<< CÿÿƒLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5($$””ò òÚ  Ú1Ú  Úó ó„„'÷ÿ dxdüÿP PdÝ ƒ!ÝÔ . ÔÔ€ÔÝ  ÝÑ\R AØ'\ÑÓ` Ü` p”XÓÑ\R AØ'\ÑÞ ÞÌà@ àò òIN€THE€COURT€OF€APPEALS€OF€TENNESSEE,€WESTERN€SECTIONÌà@ àAT€JACKSONÌà@ à_______________________________________________________ÌÌó óà à)ò òÌBOBBY€G.€JOYCE,ó óà à)à àGibson€County€Chancery€CourtÌà à)à àNo.€11667Ì€€€€€Plaintiff/Appellant.à à)Ìà à)ÌVS.à à)à àC.€A.€NO.€02A01„9602„CH„00034Ìà à)Ìò òALICE€IRENE€JOYCE,ó óà à)Ìà à)Ì€€€€€Defendant/Appellee.à à)Ìà à)Ì______________________________________________________________________________ÌÙ€€ÙßR€ "A1-j|ž¹` Å `€€@ÿRßÌFrom€the€Chancery€Court€of€Gibson€County€at€Trenton.Ìò òHonorable€George€R.€Ellis,€Chancellor€ó óÌÌÌÌò òCharles€Samuel€Kelly,€Jr.ó ó,ÌKELLY,€MILLAR,€STRAWN€&€KELLY,€Dyersburg,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Plaintiff/Appellant.ÌÌÌÌò òL.€L.€Harrell,€Jr.€ó ó,ÌHARRELL€&€HARRELL,€Trenton,€TennesseeÌAttorney€for€Defendant/Appellee.ÌÌÌÌOPINION€FILED:ÌÌò òREMANDEDà àÌÌÌà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.€ó ó:€(Concurs)Ìò òHIGHERS,€J.€ó ó:€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÌÓÓÓ  ÓÓ` Ü` ˜XÓà àBobby€G.€Joyce€(Husband)€sought€a€divorce€from€Alice€Irene€Joyce€(Wife)Ïpursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€36„4„101(12).× ƒ# ××  ×€€The€parties€were€married€September€2,€1967.€€TheÏcomplaint€alleges€that€they€separated€on€October€2,€1992.€€Wife€answered€that€it€was€on€this€dateÏthat€she€was€committed€to€Western€State€Hospital€where€she€remained€for€several€weeks.ÌÌà àWifeððs€attorney€was€subsequently€appointed€her€guardian€ad€litem.€€Wife€furtherÏmoved€that€the€complaint€be€dismissed€on€the€basis€that€she€is€mentally€incompetent.€€The€trialÏcourt€dismissed€the€complaint€on€the€basis€of€Wifeððs€mental€incompetence,€and€Husband€appeals.€ÌÌà àThis€appeal€appears€to€present€a€matter€of€first€impression€in€this€jurisdiction,€theÏissue€being€whether€insanity€is€a€defense€to€a€divorce€sought€on€the€basis€of€the€two€yearÏseparation€set€forth€in€ðð€36„4„101(12).× ƒ$ ××  ×ÌÌà àIt€is€Husbandððs€contention€that€the€trial€court€erred€in€dismissing€his€complaintÏbecause€the€separation€ground€is€a€no„fault€ground,€that€Wifeððs€incapacity€presents€no€prejudice€toÏher€because€of€the€appointment€of€the€guardian€ad€litem€and€that€Wifeððs€condition€is€not€a€statutoryÏdefense€to€divorce.ÌÌà àCourts€from€other€jurisdictions€have€addressed€this€issue€with€varying€results.€€ForÏexample,€in€òòò òAdams€v.€Adamsóóó ó,€408€So.2d€1322€(La.€1982),€wife€sought€a€divorce€based€uponÏher€having€lived€separate€and€apart€from€her€husband€continuously€for€more€than€one€year.× ƒ% ××  ×€€SheÏcontended€that€under€the€statute€she€was€entitled€to€a€divorce€notwithstanding€that€her€husband€wasÏcommitted€to€a€mental€institution€on€the€first€day€of€the€separation€and€had€remained€there€everÏsince.€€She€argued€that€the€statute€does€not€require€that€the€separation€be€voluntary€or€that€bothÏparties€be€sane€at€the€outset€of€the€separation€or€thereafter.€€Husband€argued€that€the€separationÏcontemplated€by€the€statute€is€voluntary€and€cannot€be€voluntary€when€it€commences€because€of€theÏinsanity€and/or€institutional€commitment€of€one€of€the€spouses.€€The€Supreme€Court€of€LouisianaÏdetermined€that€neither€partyððs€position€was€fully€correct€but€that€the€ð ðliving€separate€and€apartððÏcontemplated€by€the€statute€must€be€voluntary€on€the€part€of€at€least€one€of€the€parties,€even€thoughÏthe€statute€does€not€specifically€so€provide,€and€continues€for€a€period€of€one€year.€€TheÏcommencement€of€that€year€only€begins€when€a€spouse€evidences€an€intent€to€end€the€maritalÏassociation.€€The€insanity€of€the€other€spouse,€coincident€with€or€subsequent€to€the€outset€of€theÏcoupleððs€physically€living€separate€and€apart,€is€not€necessarily€determinative.€€The€court€statedÏthat,€under€husbandððs€interpretation€of€the€statute,€and€further€noting€no€statutory€provisionÏpermitting€a€divorce€on€the€grounds€of€insanity,€it€would€be€impossible€to€obtain€a€divorce€once€theÏother€spouse€exhibited€behavior€which€might€be€considered€insane€by€the€trial€judge.€€In€contrast,Ïwhere€both€spouses€are€sane,€either€may€choose€against€the€will€of€the€other€to€live€separate€andÏapart€continuously€for€one€year€and€thereby€establish€the€right€to€a€divorce.€€In€the€case€where€oneÏspouse€is€afflicted€with€mental€illness,€the€healthy€spouse€is€denied€the€right€to€secure€a€divorce,Ïwhich€right€that€spouse€would€otherwise€have€but€for€the€mental€condition.€€The€Supreme€Court€ofÏLouisiana€reversed€the€trial€court€and€awarded€wife€a€divorce.€€òòò òSee€also€Loudenback€v.ÍLoudenbackó óóó,€407€So.2d€73€(La.€Ct.€App.€1981).ÌÌÓ&` Ü` ‚XV•X&Óà àIn€òòò òAltbrandt€v.€Altbrandtóóó ó,€322€A.2d€839€(N.J.€Super.€Ct.€Ch.€Div.€1974),Ïhusband€sought€a€divorce€based€upon€New€Jerseyððs€eighteen€month€separation€statute.× ƒ& ××  ×€€WifeÏcontended€that€the€separation€must€be€voluntary,€which€it€could€not€be€due€to€her€mentalÏincompetence.€€The€court€held€that€the€statute€does€not€require€a€voluntary€act.€€Incompetence,€ifÏnot€treated€by€institutionalization,€is€no€defense€to€a€cause€of€action€for€divorce.€€The€court€notedÏthat€it€was€the€legislative€intent€to€establish€a€no„fault€ground€for€divorce€in€accordance€with€theÏpublic€policy€of€the€state€that€dead€marriages€should€be€legally€terminated.€€If€the€maritalÏrelationship€has€deteriorated€to€the€point€that€one€party€seeks€a€divorce,€the€court€noted€there€is€noÏsocial€good€to€be€achieved€by€denying€it.€€Reconciliation€cannot€be€achieved€unilaterally.€€TheÏopinion€further€noted€that€under€another€section€of€the€divorce€statute,€N.J.S.A.€2a:34„2(g),Ïseparation€as€a€result€of€institutionalization€for€mental€illness€must€be€for€twenty„four€months.€€ÌÌà àIllustrative€of€the€contrary€position€is€òòò òDorsey€v.€Dorseyóóó ó,€195€F.2d€567€(D.C.ÏCir.€1952),€wherein€the€parties€voluntarily€separated€(the€applicable€statute€provided€a€divorce€mayÏbe€granted€for€voluntary€separation€for€five€consecutive€years€without€cohabitation).€€ShortlyÏthereafter,€Wife€was€adjudicated€insane€and€institutionalized€where€she€remained.€€Occasionally€sheÏwas€allowed€to€visit€the€home,€but€never€indicated€a€desire€to€resume€family€or€marital€relations.€€InÏfact,€she€always€expressed€a€desire€to€return€to€the€hospital.€€The€trial€courtððs€holding€that€theÏWifeððs€insanity,€occurring€within€the€five€year€period,€terminated€the€voluntary€nature€of€theÏseparation€was€affirmed.€€Relying€upon€previous€decisions€that€a€period€of€insanity€must€beÍexcluded€in€computing€the€statutory€period€of€desertion,€and€reasoning€that€the€continued€desertionÏmust€depend€upon€the€continued€intention€and,€but€for€the€insanity€of€the€wife€she€may€haveÏrepented€and€returned€to€her€husband€before€the€expiration€of€the€statutory€period,€the€courtÏreasoned€that€this€rule€should€apply€with€equal€force€to€voluntary€separation.€€ÌÌà àIn€òòò òMiller€v.€Milleróóó ó,€487€S.W.2d€382€(Tex.€Civ.€App.€1972),€husband€sought€aÏdivorce€on€the€grounds€of€living€apart€without€cohabitation€for€as€long€as€three€years.€€The€courtÏheld€that€there€would€be€a€meritorious€defense€if€any€portion€of€the€three€year€period€of€separationÏset€forth€in€the€statute€fell€within€the€period€in€which€the€defendant€was€mentally€incompetent.€€TheÏwife€was€so€declared€and€indefinitely€committed€to€a€state€hospital€where€she€remained.€€The€courtÏstated€that€no€act€committed€by€an€insane€person€while€insane€may€be€a€ground€for€divorce.ÌÌà àThe€husband€sought€a€divorce€under€Virginiaððs€two€year€separation€statute€inÏòòò òCrittenden€v.€Crittendenóóó ó,€168€S.E.2d€115€(Va.€1969).€€Wife€asserted€her€mentalÏincompetence€and€commitment€as€a€defense.€€The€trial€court€granted€husband€a€divorce€and€theÏappellate€court€reversed.€€Husband€contended€that€the€code€section€was€without€qualification€andÏnot€dependant€upon€fault€or€provocation€and,€therefore,€he€was€entitled€to€a€divorce€on€the€groundÏof€separation€for€two€years€notwithstanding€the€wifeððs€incompetence.€€The€court€acknowledged€itsÏprior€determination€that€this€code€section€was€enacted€to€permit€the€granting€of€divorce€to€eitherÏspouse€regardless€of€fault€when€the€parties€have€lived€separate€and€apart€for€the€required€period€andÏfurther€acknowledged€that€the€statute€does€not€qualify€the€separation€by€use€of€the€wordsÏð ðvoluntaryðð€or€ð ðmutualðð€and€further€does€not€contain€an€exception€applying€to€a€situation€where€theÏseparation€results€from€commitment€for€mental€incompetence.€€However,€the€court€reasoned€asÏfollows:€€ÌÌÓÓà8 àà àð ðIt€is€likewise€true,€as€the€complainant€argues,€that€the€statuteÏin€question€does€not€qualify€the€separation€there€contemplated€by€useÏof€the€words€ððvoluntaryðð€or€ððmutualðð.€€And€the€statute€does€notÏcontain€any€exception€applying€to€a€situation€where€separationÍresults€from€the€commitment€of€one€of€the€parties€for€mentalÏincompetence.ÌÌà8 àà àBut€that€does€not€mean€that€it€was€the€intention€of€theÏlegislature€in€enacting€the€statute€indirectly€to€make€mentalÏincompetence€a€ground€for€divorce.€€And€yet,€to€hold€that€theÏcomplainant€is€entitled€to€a€divorce€in€this€case€would€surely€giveÏeffect€to€such€a€veiled€intention.ÌÌà8 àà àTo€the€contrary,€we€are€of€opinion€that€the€legislatureÏintended€that€the€separation€contemplated€by€Code,€ðð€20„91(9)€mustÏbe€of€parties€who€are€sufficiently€competent€to€be€conscious€of€theÏfact€that€the€act€of€separation€has€occurred.€€Were€that€not€so,€itÏwould€be€tantamount€to€saying€that€one€may€separate€from€oneððsÏself,€thus€ignoring€the€logical€meaning€of€the€word€ððseparationðð€asÏrequiring€the€existence€of€two€entities.€€While€a€separation€in€divorceÏlaw€often€occurs€as€the€result€of€the€unilateral€act€of€one€party,€theÏconsciousness€of€the€other€party€that€such€separation€has€occurred€isÏessential€under€the€statute€here€involved.ÌÌà8 àà àThe€conclusion€is€inescapable€that€one€who€is€separated€fromÏhis€spouse€as€the€result€of€his€commitment€for€mental€incompetenceÏis€not,€as€a€matter€of€law,€capable€of€being€conscious€of€the€fact€thatÏa€separation€has€occurred.€€It€follows€that€a€separation€so€occurringÏis€not€sufficient€to€support€a€ground€for€divorce€under€Code,€ðð€20„91(9).ðð€ÌÌÌÌÓÓòòò òCrittendenóóó ó,€168€S.E.2d€at€116,€117.ÌÌ€à àThe€trial€court€in€òòò òShaw€v.€Shawóóó ó,€182€S.E.2d€865€(S.C.€1971),€granted€husbandÏa€divorce€pursuant€to€an€amendment€to€the€South€Carolina€constitution€which€inserted€an€additionalÏground€for€divorce€for€continuous€separation€for€at€least€three€years.€€The€separation€commencedÏwhen€Wife€was€confined€to€a€mental€hospital.€€The€lower€court€reasoned€that€there€was€noÏintention€to€except€a€separation€caused€by€mental€incompetence€since€it€was€not€so€stated€in€theÏamendment.€€The€appellate€court€stated€the€converse€of€this€proposition€to€be€that€the€failure€toÏrecognize€a€distinction€is€tantamount€to€reading€into€the€constitutional€provision€an€intent€to€makeÏmental€incompetency€or€insanity€a€ground€for€divorce.€€The€court€noted€that€when€considering€theÏpublic€policy€of€South€Carolina€with€regard€to€marriage€and€divorce,€it€is€deemed€inconceivableÏthat€there€was€any€intent€by€the€amendment€to€allow€divorce€where€the€continuous€separation€of€theÏparties€was€occasioned€by€the€mental€incompetence€of€one€of€them€or,€in€effect,€to€allow€divorceÍon€the€ground€of€insanity.€€The€court€relied€upon€the€rationale€of€òòò òCrittenden€v.€Crittendenóóó ó.ÌÌà àWe€find€the€reasoning€as€set€forth€in€òòò òCrittenden€v.€Crittendenóóó ó€to€be€moreÏpersuasive.€€Our€statute,€like€the€one€before€that€court,€does€not€qualify€the€separation€thereÏcontemplated€by€the€use€of€the€words€voluntary€or€mutual.€€Our€statute€likewise€creates€noÏexception€where€the€separation€results€from€one€of€the€partiesðð€mental€illness.€€However,€toÏinterpret€the€statute€as€appellant€contends€would€be€to€create€a€ground€for€divorce€based€uponÏinsanity.€€We€are€not€unmindful€that€the€lack€of€such€a€ground€can€create€hardships€on€manyÏspouses.€€However,€this€is€a€matter€more€properly€addressed€by€the€legislature.€€Our€determinationÏof€this€issue,€however,€is€not€dispositive€of€the€case€at€bar.€€The€order€entered€by€the€trial€courtÏstates€that€the€court€found€that€the€parties€have€been€separated€for€a€period€of€greater€than€two€yearsÏprior€to€the€filing€of€this€action,€and€that€the€defendant€is€mentally€incompetent€and€has€been€soÏsince€prior€to€the€partiesðð€separation€and€that€the€parties€have€no€minor€children.€€The€order€furtherÏstates€that€the€matter€came€on€to€be€heard€on€October€9,€1995€upon€the€pleadings€and€the€oralÏtestimony€of€witnesses€examined€in€open€court€and€the€entire€record€of€the€cause.€€However,€theÏtranscript€of€the€October€9,€1995€proceedings€consists€solely€of€statements€and€argument€ofÏcounsel€and€reveals€that€no€evidence€was€presented€to€the€trial€court.€€Where€the€trial€court€hearsÏevidence€not€preserved€by€a€certified€transcript€or€statement€of€the€evidence,€it€is€presumed€thatÏthere€was€evidence€to€support€the€ruling€of€the€trial€court.€€òòò òScarbrough€v.€Scarbroughóóó ó,€752ÏS.W.2d€94€(Tenn.€App.€1988).€€However,€statements€of€counsel€do€not€provide€a€factual€basis€forÏjudicial€action€unless€they€embody€a€clearly€binding,€prejudicial€concession€or€a€joint€stipulation€ofÏthe€parties.ÌÌà àIt€is€undisputed€that€no€children€were€born€to€this€marriage.€€Wifeððs€answer€deniesÏthe€two€year€separation,€but€her€attorney€and€guardian€ad€litem€admitted€at€the€hearing€that€theÏparties€had€been€separated€more€than€two€years.€€It€was€further€stipulated€that€Wife€is€ð ðmentallyÏincompetent.ðð€€ÌÌà àChapter€127,€Public€Acts€of€1957,€amended€the€statute€to€the€effect€that€the€termÏð ðmentally€ill,ðð€was€substituted€for€the€term€ð ðinsaneðð€and€ð ðmental€illnessðð€for€the€term€ð ðinsanity.ðð€ÏThe€present€statute€provides€that€ð ð[m]entally€ill€individualðð€means€an€individual€who€suffers€from€aÏpsychiatric€disorder,€alcoholism,€or€drug€dependence,€but€excluding€an€individual€whose€onlyÏmental€disability€is€mental€retardation.€€T.C.A.€33„1„101(14).€€òòò òMerriam„Websterððs€MedicalÏDesk€Dictionaryóóó ó€423€(1993)€defines€ð ðmental€incompetenceðð€as€ð ðmental€incapacity.ðð€€ð ðMentalÏIncapacityðð€is€defined€as€ð ð1:€an€absence€of€mental€capacity€€2:€€an€inability€through€mental€illness€orÏmental€deficiency€of€any€sort€to€carry€on€the€everyday€affairs€of€life€or€to€care€for€oneððs€person€orÏproperty€with€reasonable€discretion.ððÌÌà àWife€moved€the€trial€court€for€an€evaluation€to€determine€the€nature€and€extent€ofÏher€mental€condition.€€The€order€granting€the€motion€ordered€that€she€be€examined€and€evaluatedÏby€Dr.€Bernard€Hudson€of€the€Carey€Counseling€Center,€Trenton,€Tennessee.€€The€record€doesÏnot€disclose€whether€that€evaluation€was€made€or,€if€so,€the€results.€€Reference€is€also€made€in€theÏtranscript€to€medical€records€from€Western€State,€but€these€are€likewise€not€to€be€found€in€theÏrecord€before€us.€€It€is€common€knowledge€that€there€are€varying€degrees€of€mental€illness€andÏmental€incompetence.€ÌÌà àOur€supreme€court€has€addressed€the€defense€of€insanity€in€a€fault„based€divorce.€ÏIn€òòò òSimpson€v.€Simpsonóóó ó,€716€S.W.2d€27€(Tenn.€1986),€wife€was€awarded€a€divorce€on€theÏgrounds€of€cruel€and€inhuman€treatment.€€In€reversing€the€decision€of€the€trial€court,€which€hadÏdismissed€the€petition€based€upon€husbandððs€defense€of€insanity,€the€court€said€ð ð[w]e€think€the€ruleÏshould€be€that€a€defendant€in€a€divorce€action€asserting€insanity€as€a€defense€to€the€commission€ofÏacts€of€cruelty€must€prove€that€at€the€time€of€such€conduct,€as€a€result€of€mental€disease€or€defect,Ïhe€or€she€lacked€sufficient€capacity€either€to€appreciate€the€wrongfulness€of€his€or€her€conduct€orÏthe€volition€to€control€his€or€her€acts.ðð€€òòò òSimpsonóóó ó,€716€S.W.2d€at€33.€€The€court€noted€that€this€isÍthe€civil€equivalent€of€the€insanity€rule€applicable€to€criminal€cases€adopted€in€òòò òGraham€v.€Stateóóó ó,Ï547€S.W.2d€531€(Tenn.€1977).€€The€question€which€must€be€answered€in€this€case€is€whether€orÏnot€Wifeððs€condition,€stipulated€in€this€record€as€ð ðmentally€incompetentðð€meets€the€test€set€forth€inÏòòò òSimpson€v.€Simpson,€supraóóó ó,€to€wit,€whether€as€a€result€of€her€mental€disease€or€defect,€sheÏlacked€sufficient€capacity€either€to€understand€the€nature€of€her€actions€or€the€volition€to€control€herÏacts.€€The€record€does€not€disclose€whether€she€was€institutionalized€for€the€full€two€year€period€ofÏseparation.€€If€it€is€determined€that€€her€condition€meets€the€òòò òSimpsonóóó ó€test,€the€period€of€separationÏwould€be€tolled€as€long€as€that€condition€exists.€€ÌÌà àTherefore,€pursuant€to€T.C.A.€ðð€27„3„128,€this€cause€is€remanded€to€the€trial€courtÏfor€further€proceedings€consistent€with€this€opinion.€€The€costs€of€this€appeal€are€taxed€to€theÏappellant,€for€which€execution€may€issue€if€necessary.ÌÌÓÓÓ` Ü` È“XÓà à__________________________________Ìà àFARMER,€J.ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌCRAWFORD,€P.J.,€W.S.€(Concurs)ÌÌÌÌ______________________________ÌHIGHERS,€J.€(Concurs)